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V.L. Kennedy C.S.B.

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THEOLOGIA NATURALIS.

PROŒMIUM.

1. Definitio.—Ea pars Philosophiæ, quæ de Deo tractat, **Theologia naturalis** seu **Theodicæa**[1] dicitur, et definitur : *scientia de Deo nativis mentis humanæ viribus comparata.*

Dicitur 1° *scientia de Deo*, quia Theodicæa *a*) *objective* est systema veritatum circa Deum, quæ ex principiis evidentibus logice derivantur ;[2] *b*) *subjective* est systema cognitionum ope demonstrationis acquisitarum, seu, certa cognitio per causam. Quamvis enim Deus non habet causam *essendi* (materialem vel formalem) nec *fiendi* (efficientem vel finalem), habet causam *cognoscendi* seu *logicam*, ex qua certa in nobis de eo gignitur cognitio. Nomine " Deus " omnes intelligunt ens

[1] " Theodicæa, si vim nominis spectas, est *justificatio Dei*. Nomen inventum est a Leibnitzio, qui (1710) scripsit : Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu etc. Theodicææ munus apud Leibnitzium est explicare, quomodo, etiam admissis placitis Optimismi, mala, quæ in creaturis inveniuntur, non pugnent cum conceptu Dei. Deinde Theodicææ etiam appellati sunt libri, qui, quin ad Optimismum aberrarent, ostendere conabantur, quomodo origo malorum apte cum Dei absoluta bonitate componatur. Tandem hoc nomen translatum est, ut significet partem Philosophiæ, quæ de Deo agit "—(**Hontheim**, *Theodicæa*, p. 1).

[2] By *Natural* Theology is meant that kind of reasoning about God, which starts from principles, the truth of which can be known to us by the light of our *natural* reason left to itself, that is, to its innate capacity of perceiving and judging the facts as well of common as of scientific experience, and of drawing conclusions from these facts according to principles that either are self-evident or have previously been proved. If this reasoning is carried on systematically, it results, as we shall discover, in *a system of truths about God, the First Cause of all things*, and may therefore be rightly called *the Science of Natural Theology*—(**Boedder**, *Nat. Theology*, p. 1).

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supremum mente et voluntate præditum, a quo omnia, quæ sunt, procedunt et dependent.

Dicitur 2° *nativis viribus comparata*, quia Deum non spectat, prout sciri potest lumine Fidei,—sub quo respectu de Deo disserit Theologia revelata—sed prout nobis innotescit lumine naturali rationis. " Universa fere (inquit **Suarez**), quæ de Deo, ut *unus est*, attribuuntur, duplici Theologia cognosci possunt, naturali et infusa seu supernaturali. Naturali quidem, quatenus 'cœli enarrant gloriam Dei,' quod de elementis, animalibus, et præsertim de ipsius hominis natura dici potuisset. Divina autem et altiori Theologia hæc de Deo cognoscuntur, quando ex divina revelatione et per illam percipiuntur. Nec vero duplex hic modus cognoscendi Deum supervacaneus est aut otiosus; nam prior ad perfectionem naturæ consentaneam pertinet, et superiori Theologiæ inservire potest " (*De Deo*, Procem.).

2. Consectarium.—Ex eo quod Theodicæa Deum investigat lumine rationis sibi relictæ, et Theologia idem præstat mediante ratione lumine Fidei illustrata et confortata, tria inter has scientias emergunt discrimina.—Primum discrimen consistit in *objecti amplitudine;* Theologia enim ad plura se extendit, quæ sunt Theodicææ prorsus impervia.[1] Alterum discrimen situm est in *earum perfectione;* Theodicæa enim, quum ex principiis naturalibus procedat, debet *in certitudine* suarum conclusionum cedere Theologiæ, quæ, utpote in principiis revelatis fundata, participat Fidei supernaturalis absolutam certitudinem. Atvero *in evidentia* Theodicæa præ-

[1] Natural Theology inquires into the existence, the attributes, and work of the one infinite God, without being able to treat of the inscrutable mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and of the Word Incarnate; whereas Supernatural Theology, although it does not pretend to make these mysteries comprehensible to reason, yet, guided by Divine revelation, which has established their reality, a alyses their meaning, shows their consequences, illustrates their harmony with known truths, and thus throws light upon the Divine beauty of Christian Revelation—(**Boedder**, *ib.*).

stat Theologiam, quum huic non competat evidentia *consequentis* seu *conclusionis*, sed consequentiæ dumtaxat ; nam eo, quod ejus principia, utpote revelata, carent evidentia, necesse est, ut pariter ejus conclusiones sint inevidentes. Adest autem evidentia *consequentiæ*, quia conclusiones ex principiis logice promanant. Hanc duplicem evidentiam sibi vindicat Theodicæa. Tertium denique discrimen invenitur in *earum utilitate*, quæ, quod attinet ad Theologiam, est supernaturalis, quum scopus Theologiæ sit hominem ordinare ad Deum ut finem supernaturalem ; Theodicæa tamen, licet finis ejus non sit supernaturalis, maximam habet utilitatem, et quidem :

" 1°. In ordine scientiarum philosophico, quia quum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, finalis, et exemplaris rerum omnium, scientia de Deo reapse continet, absolute loquendo, ultimam rationem reliquarum omnium scientiarum. . . . Unde, scientia illius, qui naturales omnes disciplinas calleret, ignoraret autem Deum, manca foret, quia nesciret causam primam, et proinde ultimam atque altissimam scientiarum omnium rationem.

" 2°. Deinde in ordine ad scientiam morum est peculiari modo utilissima notio Dei, immo necessaria, quia extra Deum nullus est finis ultimus homine dignus, nec ulla moralitas, nec lex naturalis, nec verum fundamentum jurium et officiorum, nec ullum proinde vinculum humanam tenens societatem. . . .

" 3°. Denique cognitio et contemplatio Dei honestissimam suavissimamque affert delectationem, spem felicioris alterius vitæ inflammat, animum in mediis ærumnis erigit, in certaminibus confortat, atque a fluxa hujus mundi vanitate revocatum Conditori et ultimo suo fini firmius conjungit " (**Urráburu,** *Theol. Nat.*, v. 1, p. 7).

3. Totus hic tractatus in duas *partes* dividitur, quarum prima tractat de divina existentia et essentia, altera autem de divinis attributis. Quod attinet ad

methodum, sequenda est methodus analytico-synthetica (*Log.*, n. 124) ; ex effectibus enim ad eorum supremæ causæ existentiam procedimus ; deinde ex conceptu talis causæ ejusdem naturam atque attributa derivamus.

THEOLOGIÆ NATURALIS PARS PRIMA.

De Dei Existentia et Essentia.

4. Priusquam gradum facimus ad Dei existentiam demonstrandam, oportet triplicem quæstionem solvere, nimirum, utrum Dei existentia demonstratione *indigeat*, utrum demonstrari *possit*, et his affirmative solutis, *quomodo* sit demonstranda. De his agitur in primo capite, in altero afferuntur argumenta, quibus Dei existentia probatur, additur tertium de Dei essentia.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De naturali divinæ existentiæ cognoscibilitate.

ART. I.

DEI EXISTENTIA DEMONSTRATIONE INDIGET.

5. THESIS I.—Dei existentia non est veritas per se nota quoad nos seu immediate evidens; proinde demonstrari indiget.

Stat. Quæst.—Veritas per se nota duplici modo sumitur : per se nota *quoad se*, per se nota *quoad nos*. Veritas est per se nota *quoad se*, si est per se cognoscibilis, quia, nimirum, cognito complete subjecto propositionis, qua exprimitur, hoc ipso cognoscitur prædicatum. Tales sunt omnes propositiones, quarum prædi-

catum est de essentia subjecti. Hoc sensu igitur existentia Dei est veritas per se nota. Veritas est per se nota *quoad nos*, si talis est, ut nos illam immediate cognoscamus ; quod sane contingit, quando, intellectis terminis, quibus exprimitur, nexus utriusque statim apparet absque ope termini tertii. Talia sunt principia prima.[1]

In Psychologia ostensum fuit nos non habere immediatam Dei intuitionem, hic ostendimus judicium " Deus est," licet sit immediate verum, non esse nobis in hac vita immediate evidens.[2]

6. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Illa propositio est per se nota quoad nos, cujus terminorum identitas vel diversitas objectiva nobis patescit ex inspectione intrinsecæ rationis subjecti ; *atqui*, teste conscientia, non ita Deum apprehendimus, ut illico et ex hac ipsa apprehensione

[1] A proposition which is *known of itself* is one which is knowable without the intervention of demonstration. This it can be in two ways, either because by aid of experience, or because by aid of analysis, the predicate is seen in the subject. The predicate may be seen in the subject either as regards itself only, or as regards us. As regards itself, a proposition is *known of itself* when that which is enunciated in it, has in itself the reason why it is *immediately* knowable. Of this kind are all propositions the predicate of which is of the *essence* of the subject. When the subject is completely known, the predicate can be thereby known. It would therefore be better said that the proposition is *knowable* of itself. . . .

A proposition is *known of itself*, on the other hand, *as regards us*, when it is such that we also can *immediately* know it. This is the case when the terms, that is, the subject and the predicate being understood, the bond between the two is at once apparent to us ; or, when the truth of the proposition is made manifest to us solely through analysis of its terms without the aid of any other means. These are called *immediately evident* propositions, such as first principles—(**Humphrey**, S.J., *His Divine Majesty*, p. 8).

[2] " Adverte æquivocationem esse posse, quando propositio dicitur *immediata*. Potest enim intelligi vel de propositione, *immediate vera*, vel de propositione *immediate evidente*. Primo modo si accipiatur, unum idemque est cum propositione per se nota. Sin altero, non omnis propositio immediate evidens est per se nota. Nam propositio per se nota dicitur cum prædicatum est de ratione subjecti. Atqui propositiones immediate evidentes multæ existunt, quarum prædicatum non est de ratione subjecti, ut quæ ad ordinem empiricum spectant, qualis est hæc, *Ego cogito*, vel *Mundus existit* "—(**Schiffini**, *Theol. Nat.*, p. 59).

sola ejus existentiam affirmemus. Immo inveniuntur, qui, licet Dei distinctam notionem habeant, in dubio vel magna mentis confusione versentur circa ejus existentiam ; quod de veritate per se nota quoad nos (*i.e.*, immediate evidente) fieri non posse perspicuum est (cf. *Liberatore*, Instit. Phil., v. 2, p. 445).

II.—Prædicatum propositionis, " Deus existit " exprimit existentiam *realem*, ideoque realem existentiam subjecti propositionis ; *atqui* realis existentia subjecti immediate cognosci et affirmari nequit nisi per intuitionem subjecti ipsius, quia, dum de eo ideam dumtaxat habemus, restat quærendum, an huic ideæ respondeat *reale* objectum necne ; id quod (quum memorata intuitio excludatur) per solam demonstrationem cognosci potest. Veritas autem, quæ cognoscitur per demonstrationem, non est per se nota quoad nos. *Ergo* existentia Dei non est per se nota quoad nos, " sed indiget demonstrari per ea quæ sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota quoad naturam, *scil.*, per effectus " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 2, a. 2).

ART. II.

DEI EXISTENTIA DEMONSTRARI POTEST.

7. Dei existentiam ratione demonstrari posse negarunt imprimis Lutherus, Calvinus, Jansenius, qui auxilium gratiæ interioris absolute necessarium esse dixerunt ad veram de Deo notitiam comparandam. Theologi protestantes, vel quia hos magistros sequuntur, vel quia suam faciunt doctrinam Kantianam de impossibilitate divinam existentiam demonstrandi intellectu theoretico, confugiunt ad cæcum instinctum intellectus, vel ad cæcum instinctum voluntatis, vel ad quandam internam experientiam divinæ existentiæ ; at

sic primarium suæ theologiæ objectum omni scientifica certitudine privant, fidemque prorsus cæcam et irrationabilem reddunt.[1] Accedunt *a*) Traditionalistæ, qui *certam* Dei notitiam oriri autumant per revelationem ope traditionis nobis transmissam (*Psych.*, n. 295), et *b*) Modernistæ (*v.g.*, Murri, Tyrrell, Blondel), juxta quos ratio humana "ad Deum se erigere non potis est, nec illius existentiam, per ea quæ videntur, agnoscere. Hinc infertur Deum scientiæ objectum directe nullatenus esse posse; . . . *atheam* debere esse scientiam itemque historiam, in quarum finibus nonnisi *phænomenis* possit esse locus, exturbato penitus Deo et quidquid divinum est" (**Pius X.,** Encyclica, *Pascendi*, 1907).[2]

8. Quare, maxime interest Theologiæ et fidei, ut Dei existentia ratione demonstretur, immo "dubitari nequit, quin et expediat et oporteat hac demonstratione uti. Nam Scriptura ipsa summam ejus proponit et ad hanc expendendam vehementer hortatur. SS. Patres non pauci late eam et diligenter explicant, neque ulla demonstratio ab ecclesiasticis scriptoribus quovis tempore majori cura exculta est. Licet enim ad fidem divinam suscipiendam sufficere possit obvia

[1] Ulrici well says that "Kant's theory that the existence of God is incapable of proof has become widely spread, both among believers and unbelievers. Even theologians (Protestant) concur in this view, and imagine that by doing so they serve the faith which they profess to teach. Modern theology, in so readily abandoning the proofs of God's existence, not only renounces its claim to be considered a science, but uproots the very foundations of the faith, and of the religion to which it belongs. Such writers do not reflect . . . that faith without solid foundation becomes a mere arbitrary subjective assent"—(**Hettinger**, *Nat. Religion*, p. 77).

[2] Human reason (*juxta Modernistas*) is limited strictly to phenomena, to things that appear, and the aspects under which they appear. Scientific knowledge or proof of what lies beyond the phenomenal is impossible. Hence God is, for science, unknown and unknowable, and natural theology, which professes to prove His existence and know some of His attributes, is a huge intellectual deception. It may give us *ideas* about God, but can never tell us anything about the divine *reality*—(**Toner,** *Irish Theol. Review*, v. 3, p. 10).

illa, quæ sponte nascitur, Dei cognitio ; ad hanc tamen non modo perficiendam sed firmandam quoque utilis ac sæpe necessaria est legitima demonstratio. Quæ etiamsi non esset hujusmodi, ut rudioribus quoque ingeniis possit accommodari ; his tamen prodest plurimum scire, a viris doctis eam contra incredulos invicte defendi. Neque ullus error nostra ætate perniciosior exstitit illo, quem ab impiis invectum fideles multi incaute susceperunt : *Deum pietatis quodam sensu apprehendi, sed ratione non demonstrari*" (**Kleutgen,** *De Ipso Deo*, p. 98).

9. Juxta Ontologistas Dei existentia per creaturarum contemplationem illustrari et clarior fieri potest, nequit vero mens ad eam attingere procedendo a cognitis ad incognitum, quum Deus, inquiunt, sit primum cognitum et medium reliquarum cognitionum. Falsa esse principia, quibus innititur tota hæc theoria, patet ex dictis in *Psych.* (n. 299), et magis patebit ex mox dicendis in capite secundo. Sufficiat hic indicare generales rationes, cur ad indolem cognitionis intellectualis pertineat possibilitas Dei existentiam naturaliter demonstrandi.

a) Intellectus, secus ac sensus, non ad certum genus rerum coarctatur, sed ad omnia tum materialia tum spiritualia se extendit (*Psych.*, n. 275) ; *ergo* aliquo saltem modo cognoscere potest Deum, qui omne ens eminenter continet et est ipsum *esse*. *b*) Intellectus natus est penetrare ad rerum causas et principia, nec in causis et principiis minus remotis quiescere potest ; *ergo* ejus naturæ plane convenit, ut cognitione attingat ad primam rerum causam atque universale principium. *c*) Intellectus percipit rerum relationes et mutuum ordinem, ac sedulo quærit finem, in quem res ratione harum relationum ordinentur ; *ergo* maxime ei convenit percipere ultimum finem, in quem res tendunt. *d*) Demum, quum natura non deficiat in necessariis,

oportet, ut intellectus cognoscat Deum ut principium et finem ordinis moralis ; ordo enim moralis est necessarius homini ut est homo. Probatum igitur manet menti humanæ inesse vim, qua ad certam evidentemque divinæ existentiæ cognitionem pervenire possit.

10. Notandum est Dei existentiam demonstrari posse non esse veritatem ordinis naturalis dumtaxat, sed etiam supernaturalis. Id constat *a*) ex S. Scriptura, quæ aperte docet rationem humanam ex operibus Dei ad ejus existentiam assurgere posse. " Vani sunt omnes, in quibus non subest scientia Dei ; et ex his, quæ videntur bona, non potuerunt intelligere eum, qui est, neque operibus attendentes cognoverunt quis esset artifex. . . . A magnitudine enim speciei et creaturæ cognoscibiliter poterit creator horum videri " (*Sap.*, c. xiii., v. 1-5). Jamvero, hæc verba indicant eum sua naturali facultate abuti seu natura sua vanum esse, qui Dei existentiam ignoret ; *atqui* quod homo sine abusu suæ naturæ ignorare non potest, id procul dubio usu rationis sciri potest. Iisdem verbis indicatur modus cognitionis, scilicet, *concludendo* Deum ex creaturis sicut causam ex effectu. Et sic ubique in sacris litteris " nullo in loco ubi de cognitione existentiæ Dei ex creaturis sermo est, ulla est mentio necessariæ revelationis sive traditionis ; sed semper ut elementa necessaria et sufficientia ad eam cognitionem comparandam ponuntur hinc natura rationalis, inde universum ut medium, per quod Deus se manifestet, et ex quo cognoscatur " (**Franzelin,** *De Deo uno*, p. 80).[1]

[1] The Bible expressly declares that the heathen, who know nothing of Revelation, can with certainty discern from nature itself the existence of God. . . . A passage wherein the natural demonstration of God's existence is declared by the Scriptures to be conclusive, occurs in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans : " For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and divinity, so that they (the heathen) are inexcusable. Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God " (Rom. i. 20, 21). Here is a plain declara-

b) Idipsum traditio Ecclesiæ apertissime testatur. Consentiunt enim Patres et Doctores hominem ex consideratione creaturarum posse ope solius rationis pervenire ad notitiam, non modo primitivam, sed etiam expolitiorem, Dei existentiæ (cf. *Franzelin*, loc.cit. p. 94). Quam universalem doctrinam *Conc. Vat.* solemni definitione confirmavit.[1]

tion of the sufficiency of one demonstration—the cosmological, to wit,—of God's existence; for were it not sound the heathen would certainly have an excuse: they would have a right to claim that it was impossible for them to conclude with certainty the existence of a creator from that of created things. In face of this text it is to me incomprehensible how Protestants can so universally deny the soundness of the demonstration of God's existence—(**Hammerstein**, S.J., *Foundations of Faith*, Part I., p. 3).

[1] The Agnostic denial of the ability of human reason to know God is directly opposed to Catholic faith. The Council of the Vatican solemnly declares that "God, the beginning and end of all, can, by the natural light of human reason, be known with certainty from the works of creation." The intention of the Council was to reassert the historic claim of Christianity to be reasonable, and to condemn traditionalism together with all views which denied to reason the power to know God with certainty. Religion would be deprived of all foundation in reason, the motives of credibility would be worthless, conduct would be severed from creed, and faith be blind, if the power of knowing God with rational certainty were called in question. The declaration of the Council was based primarily on Scripture, not on any of the historic systems of philosophy. The Council simply defined the possibility of man's knowing God with certainty by reason apart from revelation. This possibility of knowing God was not affirmed of any historical individual in particular; the statement was limited to the power of human reason, not extended to the exercise of that power in any given instance of time or person. The definition thus took on the feature of the objective statement: man can certainly know God by the "physical" power of reason when the latter is rightly developed, even though revelation be "morally" necessary for mankind in the bulk, when the difficulties of reaching a prompt, certain, and correct knowledge of God are taken into account. What conditions were necessary for this right development of reason, how much positive education was required to equip the mind for this task of knowing God and some of His attributes with certainty, the Council did not profess to determine. Neither did it undertake to decide whether the function of reason in this case is to derive the idea of God wholly from reflection on the data furnished by sense, or merely to bring out into explicit form, by means of such data, an idea already instinctive and innate. The former view, that of Aristotle, had the preference; but the latter, that of Plato, was not condemned. God's indirect manifestations of Himself in the mirror of nature, in the created world of things

ART. III.

DE MODO, QUO DEI EXISTENTIA DEMONSTRANDA SIT.

11. THESIS II.—Dei existentia demonstrari nequit a priori, nec a simultaneo, sed tantum a posteriori.

Stat. Quæst.—Demonstrabilitate divinæ existentiæ jam stabilita, restat inquirendum, quomodo debeat mens procedere in illa demonstranda, *scil.*, an *a priori*, an *a simultaneo*, an *a posteriori*. Ad quam triplicem quæstionem præsens thesis respondet, primam et alteram partem negando, tertiam vero affirmando.

Constat duplex esse genus demonstrationis, alterum *a priori*, alterum *a posteriori* (*Log.*, n. 118); quibus nonulli in re præsenti addunt tertium, quod vocant *a simultaneo*, quia procedit a principio, quod nec prius nec posterius est re demonstranda, sed simul cum illa, nimirum, procedit ex conceptu divinæ essentiæ, ex quo conceptu realem ejusdem essentiæ existentiam colligere conatur. Vocatur etiam *ontologicum*, tum quia Ontologistis magnopere placet, tum quia nexum ontologicum stabilire conatur inter Dei definitionem ejusque existentiam, quo fiat, ut qui prius hanc existentiam non admittebat, eam admittere cogatur.

12. *S. Anselmus* primus hoc argumentum diserte proposuit, et hoc fere modo: Habemus ideam Dei tamquam entis perfectissimi, quod cogitari potest; atqui talis idea importat existentiam hujus entis, quum ex-

and persons, were simply declared to be the true sources of knowledge distinct from revelation—(**Shanahan**, *Catholic Encyclopædia* v. 1, p. 219).

"Si quis concedens, quod Vaticanum definivit Deum per creata *certo cognosci*, negaverit vero *stricte* (*i.e.*, usque ad evidentiam) *demonstrari*, assertio ejus, etsi non hæretica, parum nihilominus tuta in fide est, quam alii temerariam, alii etiam hæresi proximam esse censent"—(**Kleutgen**, *op. et loc. cit.*).

istentia sit perfectio ; ergo ex idea Dei, quam habent omnes, licet inferre Dei existentiam.

Idem argumentum aliquatenus mutatum propugnarunt Cartesius aliique (cf. *Driscoll*, God, p. 64).

13. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*non a priori*). **Arg.**— Demonstratio a priori habetur, quando res per causam vel per aliquam rationem ipsa objective priorem probatur ; *atqui* divina existentia, utpote improducta, non habet causam. Nec habet rationem ipsa priorem ; hæc enim ratio non esset nisi essentia divina, ex qua divina existentia deflueret ; *atqui* in Deo ne virtualiter quidem distinguitur essentia ab existentia, quum hæc de notione illius sit ; et proinde altera minime est altera prior aut posterior ; *ergo*.

14. PARS 2ª (*non a simultaneo*). **Arg.**—Conceptus entis perfectissimi, quod cogitari potest, includit quidem notam existentiæ, at, hic conceptus quum non sit intuitivus, non attingit objectum suum ut ens reale sed solum ut ens ideale. Jamvero, quum ens reale non contineatur in ente ideali, nequaquam prædicatum reale (sed solum ideale) exinde vi analysis colligi potest, seu, ex conceptu entis perfectissimi, quod cogitari potest, erui nequit ejusdem actualis existentia.

Iterum : In omni propositione prædicatum tribuitur subjecto secundum ordinem, in quo ipsum subjectum ponitur ; prædicatum enim exprimit notam subjecti. *Atqui* in demonstratione *a simultaneo* subjectum est solummodo in ordine ideali (secus enim haberetur manifesta petitio principii) ; *ergo* ope demonstrationis *a simultaneo* concludere possumus *ideam* existentiæ, minime vero *realitatem* existentiæ, convenire ideæ entis perfectissimi seu infiniti. *Vel etiam :* Ex eo quod Deus *intelligitur* ut ens perfectissimum, legitime infertur ipsum *concipiendum esse* ut actu existens, illegitime autem infertur ipsum *revera existere*.

Demum : In *conceptu* entis perfectissimi includitur

existentia eo modo, quo includi potest, *i.e.*, idealiter ; illegitimo autem transitu ab ordine ideali ad ordinem realem infertur illud ens a parte rei existere.[1]

15. *Dices* 1°. Nemo potest ens infinite perfectum concipere, quin illud ut actu existens concipiat ; *atqui* id quod nemo concipere potest, quin illud ut actu existens concipiat, manifesto existit ; *ergo*.

Resp. Nemo potest tale ens concipere, quin *actu simplicis apprehensionis* illud *concipiat* ut existens, *conc.* ; . . . quin *judicet* illud actu existere, *neg.* In conceptu entis perfectissimi includitur quidem nota existentiæ, sed aliud est *apprehendere* existentiam talis entis, aliud *judicare* tale ens a parte rei existere.[2] Athei habent conceptum entis infinite perfecti, quum de eo loquantur, tamen non admittunt actualitatem talis entis, sed illud esse ens rationis asseverant. Nihil igitur contra eos valet argumentum *a simultaneo* (cf. *S. Th.* 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2).

Dices 2°. Ens maximum, quod cogitari potest, non esset maximum cogitabile, nisi realiter existeret ; *ergo* ex eo, quod est maximum cogitabile, sequitur illud existere.

Resp. Non esset maximum, quod cogitari posset, nisi *cogitaretur ut* realiter existens, *conc.* ; nisi reipsa existit, *neg.*

Inst. Atqui id, quod non solum cogitatur ut existens, sed realiter existit, majus est quam id, quod simpliciter

[1] The idea of necessary being involves existence, but not real existence, only logical and conceptual ; since after we have the idea of the necessary being, it still remains to be proved that there is an object which corresponds to this idea ; the predicate belongs to the subject according to the manner in which the subject is taken, and as this is only in the purely ideal order, the predicate is also purely ideal—(**Balmes**, *Fundamental Phil.*, v. 2, p. 440).

[2] To conceive a being which is the greatest possible and which must therefore be conceived as existing is not at all the same as to affirm or prove that such a being exists really and objectively—(**De Wulf-Coffey**, *Hist. of Medieval Phil.*, p. 164).

cogitatur ut existens ; *ergo* maximum cogitabile est maximum reale seu existens.

Resp. Id, quod cogitatur ut existens, et realiter existit, majus *reale* est, quam id, quod simpliciter cogitatur ut existens, *conc.* ; majus *intelligibile* est, *neg.* Demonstratio *a simultaneo* in eo errare videtur, quod supponit ens maximum cogitabile *conceptum ut existens* non exhibere cogitanti easdem notas ac ens maximum cogitabile et realiter existens ; id quod procul dubio falsum est. Re quidem vera, maximum, quod cogitari potest, conceptum ut existens, notas prorsus easdem menti exhibet, sive realiter existat sive non. Unde, conceptus entis maximi, quod cogitari potest, abstrahit a realitate existentiæ, et proinde talis conceptus nullam præ se fert rationem, cur concludere oporteat ens maximum cogitabile esse ens realiter existens.

16. Pars 3ª (*a posteriori*). Hæc pars nulla indiget probatione speciali ; ejus enim veritas sequitur ex thesi de divinæ existentiæ demonstrabilitate et ex prioribus hujus thesis partibus. Si enim Dei existentia demonstrari potest, sed non potest a *priori* nec *a simultaneo*, restat, ut demonstrabilis sit *a posteriori*. Hoc modo demonstrari posse sic ostendit **S. Thomas** : " Naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit. Unde, tantum se nostra cognitio naturalis extendere potest, in quantum manuduci potest per sensibilia, . . . et quia creaturæ sensibiles sunt effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo *an est*" (1, q. 12, a. 12).

CAPUT SECUNDUM.

Demonstratio a posteriori divinæ existentiæ.

17. Scholastici triplici ratione solent demonstrare *a posteriori* Dei existentiam. 1°. argumentis metaphysicis, quæ nimirum desumuntur ex universalibus rerum creatarum proprietatibus (v.g., *ex contingentia*) ; 2°. argumentis physicis, quæ hauriuntur ex phænomenis mundi corporei propriis ; 3°. argumentis moralibus, quæ innituntur factis moralibus seu illis, quae ab homine, quatenus intellectu et voluntate ornatur, originem ducunt.

ART. I.

ARGUMENTA METAPHYSICA.

18. Quinque distinguuntur argumenta metaphysica : *a*) Argumentum *ex motu* seu *cinesiologicum* (κίνησις, motus), quod ostendit motum omnem, cujuscumque naturæ sit, tandem ad primum motorem reduci posse. *b*) Argumentum *ex efficientia* seu *cosmologicum*, quod ostendit omnia, quæ sunt, non posse esse ab alio, et proinde debere existere ens a se, a quo reliqua ultimatim dependent. *c*) Argumentum *ex contingentia* seu *alloiologicum* (ἀλλοῖος, *diversus*), quod ostendit admitti debere extra omnes res mutabiles et temporaneas ens immutabile et æternum. *d*) Argumentum *ex gradibus perfectionis* seu *henologicum* (ἕν, *unum*), quod ostendit diversos gradus perfectionum, qui rebus creatis insunt derivari ab ente *uno* summeque perfecto. *e*) Argumentum *ex æternitate possibilium* seu *ideologicum*, quod

ostendit fundamentum veritatum, prout hæ in ordine *ideali* nobis apparent, esse ens *reale* et *intellectuale*.

19. Hæc argumenta omnia in idem fere incidunt, quum iisdem principiis, *scil.*, causalitatis et rationis sufficientis, innitantur ;[1] nihilominus ea distincte exponere juvat, tum quia diversa argumenta diversas Dei perfectiones illustrant, tum quia diversæ mentes diversis argumentis facilius convincuntur. Neve miretur junior lector quod in his et aliis argumentis evolvendis multum immoremur, sed potius doleat quod tanta sit nostri temporis nequitia, ut hanc divinæ existentiæ veritatem bonis hominibus jucundissimam, contra errores Scepticorum ubique nunc grassantes, ad instar castrorum, ex omni parte munire necesse sit.[2]

[1] The cosmological argument is indeed so comprehensive in its data and bearing that all theistic arguments may be regarded as contained in it—(**Hall**, *The Being of God*, p. 153).

[2] Though the existence of God is a truth knowable, and easily knowable, by the light of reason, there are many that call that truth in question. Professed Agnostics are perhaps more numerous now than they have ever been before. How to account for this increase in Agnosticism, who can tell ? The advances made in physical science can give no clue to it. We have the witness to this of Prof. Huxley, who writes: "There is a great deal of talk, and not a little lamentation, about the so-called religious difficulty which physical science has created. In theological science, as a matter of fact, it has created none. Not a solitary problem presents itself to the philosophical Theist at the present day which has not existed from the time that philosophers began to think out the logical grounds and the logical consequences of Theism." But whatever the reason may be, Agnosticism is apparently on the increase. It is difficult to avoid contact with Agnostics. They are to be met with in every rank of life. Some of them are aggressive and wish to meet us in discussion. Others profess a wish to believe, and invite us to remove their difficulties. If we ought to be prepared to justify the faith that is in us, much more ought we be prepared to justify that conviction of God's existence, which is presupposed by all our faith. We ought to be able to defend this conviction against any that might choose to assail it ; and still more ought we to be able to extend a helping hand to such as might come to us in the spirit of honest inquiry. We say in a spirit of honest inquiry, for granted and even strenuously asserted that doubt as to God's existence argues some serious fault past or present in all who possess this doubt, nevertheless, it may very well be that one who has through fault of his, lost belief in God, is now honestly endeavouring to find his way back to the truth—(**Gildea**, *Intro. ad Hammerstein, op. cit.*, p. ix).

§ 1. Argumentum ex Motu.

20. THESIS III.—Existentia Dei ut primi motoris probatur ex motu rerum mundanarum.

Stat. Quæst.—"Motus" hic sumitur in sensu lato pro mutatione entium contingentium sive materialium sive spiritualium, qua ex mera potentia ad actum alicujus perfectionis vel ex una perfectione ad aliam transeunt (cf. *Cosm.*, n. 88).[1]

21. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Omnes hujus mundi substantiæ sive materiales sive spirituales moventur; nihil enim revera est sensibus magis obvium, nihil in scientia physica est magis certum ac fundamentale quam motus localis, nihil conscientiæ magis patescit quam nisus animæ ad ulteriorem perfectionem. *Atqui* omne, quod movetur, ab alio movetur; *ergo* existit motor primus et proinde ens a se, quod est Deus. Ex motu igitur rerum mundanarum probatur existentia Dei.

Prob. min. 1°. *Ex conceptu mutationis.* Res, dum transit de potentia ad actum, novam acquirit perfectionem; actus enim perinde est ac perfectio, potentia ac imperfectio. *Atqui* causa sufficiens hujus novæ

[1] There are various kinds of movements. These must be distinguished one from the other, not only for the sake of clearness, but especially because they give rise to separate lines of reasoning. Thus there is *local* movement, *i.e.*, movement from place to place, *e.g.*, I walk across the room. . . . Again, an object may change in *quantity*, *i.e.*, may become greater or smaller in size, *e.g.*, the phenomena of growth in living things, of increase and decrease in inanimate objects through the force of attraction or of friction. Hence we have quantitative changes or quantitative movements. Finally, an object may change in *quality*, *i.e.*, remaining unchanged in size or weight, it may acquire or lose other attributes, *e.g.*, the change from heat to cold, from bitter to sweet, from black to white, from a pleasant to a nauseous odour, etc. This is called qualitative change. Local motion is movement in the strict sense of the word. Quantitative and qualitative motion, however, are more properly designated by the common term mutation. Thus we have two lines of reasoning leading the mind to admit the existence of God. The former is based on local motion and is confined to the field of physical science. The latter rests upon the notion of mutation, and is more metaphysical—(**Driscoll**, *God*, p. 133, ed 2ª).

perfectionis nequit esse ipsa res, quæ perficitur, quum ipsa non impertiat sed acquirat perfectionem ; nec potest perfectio illa oriri absque causa, ut patet ; restat igitur ut res ad illam moveatur ab alia re, et proinde quidquid movetur ab alio movetur.

2°. *Ex conceptu potentiæ et actus.* Res, quatenus movet vel perficit, est in actu seu possidet perfectionem ; quatenus movetur vel perficitur, est in potentia seu caret perfectione. *Atqui* sicut manifesta contradictio est unum idemque simul habere aliquam perfectionem eaque carere, manifesta contradictio est rem esse sui motus causam adæquatam ; *ergo* quidquid movetur, ab alio moveatur necesse est.[1]

Prob. consequentia. Ex principio exposito in minore sequitur omnia, quæ ad aliquam perfectionem moventur, postulare motorem, qui istam perfectionem aut formaliter aut eminenter continet ; *atqui* iste motor perfectionem, quam communicat, aut immobiliter possidet, ita scilicet ut eam ab alio non accipiat, et habemus motorem primum ; aut sic eam possidet, ut ad ipsam moveatur ab alio, de quo alio redibit eadem quæstio. Quare, tandem sistendum est in motore primo, a quo omnia in illa linea perfectionis ultimo moventur. Quodsi perfectio communicata sit ipsum esse, primus motor debet esse ens a se existens seu ipse Deus. *Ergo.*

22. *Dices :* In supposito infinitæ seriei moventium simul et motorum non daretur primus motor.

[1] A thing is in motion in order to obtain some perfection it does not at present possess. For we must bear in mind that motion here is taken in the sense of action or operation. If it already possessed the perfection, it would not move to obtain it. Hence the acquisition of the perfection is the explanation of the movement. To say, therefore, that a being moves itself, is to assert that at the same time it has and has not the perfection. It has not, inasmuch as it moves to acquire the quality; it already possesses the perfection, inasmuch as it contains in itself the sufficient cause of the movement. But this must be rejected as absurd—(**Driscoll,** *ib.*, p. 141).

Resp. In infinita serie entium, quæ movent simul et moventur, quodlibet movetur, nec movet nisi postquam moveatur. Unde, extra illam seriem debet esse aliquod ens, a quo tota series moveatur ; secus enim falso supponitur omnia in illa serie moveri. Nec valet recursum habere ad motum mutuum seu circularem, ita scilicet ut A moveat B, et B moveat C, et C moveat A. Hoc enim modo unum ens (*v.g.*, A) relate ad aliud (C) esset simul prius et posterius: *prius*, quia illud movet ; *posterius*, quia ab illo movetur. Præterea, A esset in hac hypothesi causa remota sui motus, quum moveat C, et tamen ut moveatur, præsupponat impulsum a C præstitum.

§ 2. Argumentum ex Efficientia.

23. THESIS IV.—Existentia Dei ut primæ causæ ex eo probatur quod non omnia entia possunt esse ab alio.

Stat. Quæst.—Hoc argumentum innititur principio causalitatis, et differt a præcedente ut species a genere. Principium causalitatis est : *quidquid incipit existere* (vel *contigens est*) *efficientem sui causam habet* (*Ont.*, n. 427). Vi hujus principii probabimus existentiam entis, quod non habet causam, sed est causa efficiens reliquorum omnium.[1]

[1] Every being must have a reason of existence, otherwise it would simply not exist. This reason must reside either in the being itself or outside of it. If it is external, *i.e.*, if the being in question has been called into existence by some other, its reason of existence I designate a "cause." If follows that while every being has a reason of existence, a cause of existence is possessed only by those beings which have been created. . . . The principle of causality inevitably leads us, by way of cosmological proof, to the existence of God. All that is has a reason for being. That which now is, but at one time was not (that which has become), has its reason of being *external to itself ;* hence has what we name a cause. I call this final truth the principle of causation or causality, and it is as unassailable as the Pythagorean axiom in mathematics—(**Hammerstein,** *op. cit.*, p. 15).

24. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Certum est plura existere. Jamvero, aut omnia, quæ existunt, sunt facta, aut existit aliquod ens infectum ; *atqui* omnia, quæ existunt, esse facta repugnat ; *ergo* existit ens infectum seu a se existens, quod est Deus.

Prob. min. 1°. Res facta non habet in se rationem sufficientem suæ existentiæ, et proinde si omnia, quæ existunt, facta dicuntur, omnia carent ratione sufficiente, cur in ordine rerum existant ; hanc enim rationem non habent in se, quum facta supponantur ; non habent in alio, si præter facta nihil admittatur. *Atqui* repugnat, ut quidquam existat, quod neque in se neque in alio rationem suæ existentiæ habeat. *Ergo* extra omnia entia facta admittendum est aliquod ens non factum, quod est ceterorum causa efficiens.[1] 2°. Si omnia, quæ existunt, sunt facta, aut dicendum est aliquod ens seipsum produxisse, aut diversa se invicem produxisse, aut processum infinitum productionum dari. *Non primum*, quia sic ens ageret antequam esset, seu, simul esset (ut ageret) et non esset. *Non alterum*, quia sic unum ens existentiam tribueret alteri, a quo nondum existente ipsum existentiam accepit. *Non tertium*, quia hic processus non vitat necessitatem admittendi aliquod ens improductum ; eo enim quod singulæ partes

[1] A being that has been produced has not in itself a sufficient reason for its existence ; it is a contingent being ; it might have been non-existent. If there are only beings that have been produced, all, from the first to the last, might have not existed. Why do they exist ? What is the sufficient reason or cause of their existence ? Do not say : Each individual finds its sufficient reason in the preceding cause. This would be ridiculous ; for this preceding cause does not possess in itself its sufficient and last reason. However far, however high the series may ascend, when can we stop at a being of which we can say : Here is the sufficient reason of the series ? Never ! The atheist in doing away with the first cause is thus compelled to maintain that there never was a sufficient reason for the existence of the series. But this is absurdity itself ; it is the denial of the first principles of reason. Therefore there does exist a first cause : there exists a being that finds in itself a sufficient reason for its existence, a being which has not been produced, a necessary being—(**Devivier-Sasia,** *Christian Apologetics*, v. 1, p. 54).

seriei sunt essentialiter ab alio, tota seriei collectio essentialiter sit ab alio necesse est.[1]

Prob. cons. scilicet, *existit ens infectum seu Deus.* Inter entia producta reperiuntur entia spiritualia puris perfectionibus intellectus, voluntatis, personalitatis prædita. Jamvero, quum effectus nullam habere possit perfectionem, quæ ejus causæ adæquatæ non competat, dicendum est causam adæquatam rerum productarum esse ens intelligens, volens, personale ; *atqui* ens infectum intellectu, voluntate, personalitate, præditum, quod est causa prima et adæquata rerum productarum omnes vocant Deum ; *ergo.*[2]

[1] In the universe we observe that certain things are effects, *i.e.*, they depend for their existence on other things, and these again on others ; but, however far back we may extend this series of effects and dependent causes, we must, if human reason is to be satisfied, come ultimately to a cause which is not itself an effect, in other words, to an uncaused cause or self-existent being, which is the ground and cause of all being. And this conclusion, as thus stated, is virtually admitted by Agnostics and Pantheists, all of whom are obliged to speak of an eternal something underlying the phenomenal universe, whether this something be the "Unknown," or the "Absolute," or the "Unconscious," or "Matter" itself, or the "Ego," or the "Idea" of being, or the "Will" ; these are so many substitutes for the uncaused cause or self-existing being of Theism—(**Toner**, *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 6, p. 610).

[2] The very conception of an efficient cause involves the consequence that it must contain within itself, either actively or potentially, all the effects of which it is the cause ; otherwise such portions of the effects which are not inherent in the cause must be self-produced, which is a self-contradiction, or be produced by the energy of an independent Creator, a conclusion which the theist will readily accept. This being so, all the effects, or in other words, the phenomena, which exist in the universe, must exist either actively or potentially in the first cause, *i.e.*, in God. Now, one of the phenomena of the universe is intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, must exist in God. Another of its phenomena is the moral nature of man, and the principles of morality founded on the moral law. God, therefore, must be a moral Being. Another of its phenomena is free agency as it exists in man. The first cause of man (*i.e.*, God) must, therefore, be a free agent. Another of its phenomena is will, for it exists in man. Volition, therefore, must exist in God. Another of its phenomena is personality, for it exists in man. Personality, therefore, must exist in God. Another of its phenomena is that its forces act in accordance with invariable laws, from which action the order of the universe springs. Invariable law, therefore, must be an expression of the divine will, and the love of order must exist in God—(**Row**, *The Existence of God*, p. 16).

II.—Manifestum est indefinite multa, quæ non existunt nec existent, æque intrinsece esse possibilia ac ea, quæ nunc existunt vel posthac existent. Quæstio igitur occurrit, cur ex omnibus possibilibus quædam consequantur existentiam, quædam autem non. In promptu est responsum : quædam, secus ac alia, existentiam consequuntur, quia ad illorum existentiam adsunt requisita proxima et remota. His præmissis, sic *argumentamur :*

Indefinite multa, quae nec existunt nec existent, æque internam possibilitatem habent ac ea, quæ actu existunt vel existent ; ac proinde interna possibilitas non est ratio sufficiens eorum existentiæ. *Atqui* res per essentiam suam habent internam possibilitatem ; *ergo* ea, quæ actu existunt, habent per suam essentiam, ut *possint* existere ; at ut *actu* existant, requirunt causam eis existentiam donantem. Jamvero, quum non omnia possint esse entia ab alio, admittendum est ens, quod per essentiam habet non solum possibilitatem existendi, sed etiam existentiam actualem ; existit igitur ens æternum, quod quædam entia præ aliis e statu possibilitatis libere eduxit et in esse conservat. *Atqui* tale ens consensu omnium est Deus ; *ergo.*

25. III.—Apud Physicos hujus ætatis viget principium *entropiæ*, secundum quod omnes energiæ non thermicæ sensim convertuntur in calorem, calor autem vi radiationis per universum dissipatur et ad æquilibrium progreditur. Jamvero, hæc conversio (et consequens dissipatio) ab æterno non fiebat ; si enim " hic processus ab æterno curreret, æterno incremento calor mundi infinitus evasisset, quod est contra experientiam et sanam rationem. Item energia non thermica vel olim fuisset infinita, quod est absurdum, vel jam dudum tota in calorem mutata esset, quod est contra experientiam. Denique mundus vel olim a statu æquilibrii et energiæ dispersæ infinite afuisset, quod

est impossibile, vel jam nunc ad hunc statum dispersionis et mortis pervenisset, quod est contra experientiam" (*Hontheim*, p. 193), vel mundus postquam ad statum æquilibrii et mortis pervenisset ad statum motus et vitæ se denuo excitasset, quod intrinsece repugnat. Restat igitur, ut hæc conversio initium habuerit. Jamvero, aut conversio et materia mundi simul initium habuerunt, aut conversio incipiebat in materia jam existente. Si primum membrum sit verum, vi principii causalitatis admittenda est causa prima materiæ et energiarum mundi. Si alterum, aut admittenda est materia improducta, cui causa externa indidit energias, aut materia prius producta, postea energiis dotata; *atqui* materia improducta nequit energias suas ab extra accipere; nam, si in suo esse, ita et in suo agere debet ab omni externo influxu esse immunis. Si vero materia sit producta, iterum prima causa mundi admittitur; quæ causa dicitur Deus; *ergo*.[1]

[1] Modern science has rendered one eminent service to theism, in showing that the present universe has not existed from all eternity, and though the time be indefinitely remote, that it will come to an end. The nebular theory, which has found acceptance with many eminent men of science, teaches us that the present universe, at the earliest period to which science has been able to prosecute its researches, was once a fiery vapour cloud, which under the influence of inherent forces, had, in the course of ages, gradually condensed into suns and planets, one of which—our earth—has become a fit habitation for living beings. . . . A time once was, however remote, when living beings existed not. With equal certainty it follows that the universe in its present form is gradually wearing out. Suns, as sources of heat and motion, are parting with their energies. The time will therefore arrive when the earth will become too cold to be a fit habitation for animal life. It will then become a desolation like the moon. . . . The sun, too, will in the lapse of ages, get cooler and cooler, gradually losing its energies, and so likewise the whole existing universe, until all its energies being equalized, it becomes one vast homogeneous mass, alike destitute of life and motion, destined to be the region of eternal silence and desolation, unless some power external to it exists which is capable of starting it on a fresh series of developments, by again imparting to it motion and life. Such is the teaching of science as to the origin and the ultimate destiny of the present universe of being.

The earliest state of things therefore to which any scientific

§ 3. Argumentum ex Contingentia.

26. THESIS V.—Existentia Dei ut entis absolute necessarii probatur ex contingentia rerum.

Stat. Quæst.—Ens contingens intelligitur illud, quod ex essentia sua est indifferens ad existendum, seu, ens, quod ita existit, ut possit non existere. Ens absolute necessarium est illud, quod vi suæ essentiæ existit; unde intrinsece repugnat, ut non existat (cf. *Ont.*, n. 404).

Quum vero entia mundana manifesto sint contingentia (res enim incipiunt et desinunt existere, et proinde ex natura sua indifferentes sunt ad existendum), eorum existentia præsupponit ens absolute necessarium.[1]

27. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Res mundanæ sunt contingentes; *atqui* res contingentes existere nequeunt,

theory professes to have penetrated is this fiery vapour cloud. . . . If this fiery mist had existed from eternity, it would have long since, in the depths of eternal ages, completed all its possible stages of development, and have passed into that state of homogeneity, silence, and desolation to which our present universe is doomed, and from which, having no power of its own to rescue it, it must continue throughout the eternity to come, unless there be some power external to it to intervene. As, therefore, it is inconceivable that this fiery mist could have been self-originated, or could have existed from eternity, it must have originated in some previous unknown condition of things; and that in another, until at length we arrive at a cause, itself uncaused, adequate to its production, *i.e.*, a power independent of it, and distinct from it, who imparted to it existence, and breathed into its eternal silences motion, energy, and life. . . . It follows, therefore, that the universe has sprung from a cause, itself uncaused, adequate to its production. This cause is God—(**Row**, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

[1] The argument of contingency arises from a consideration of the beings which make up the world. By observation and experiment we investigate their nature and constitution. The one dominant factor, which prevails throughout, is dependence. No existing thing is isolated; a constant action and interaction takes place. As a result particular beings undergo various modifications. These changes clearly show that the beings themselves are dependant. And as such they are not sufficient for themselves but need support one from another. The character of dependence is, therefore, marked indelibly upon the visible universe. It is the finger of God. The knowledge of this fact constrains the mind to admit the existence of a being distinct from the world, yet over all, who alone can give a sufficient reason for its dependence—(**Driscoll**, *op. cit.*, p. 96).

nisi existit ens necessarium, a quo in existendo dependeant ; *ergo* existit ens necessarium, id est, Deus.

Prob. maj. Res mundanæ natura sua *a*) sunt *mutabiles* quoad substantiam, quantitatem, qualitatem, operationes, etc., ut observatio vulgaris et scientifica testatur ; *b*) sunt *compositæ* ex partibus essentialibus, quum mutationes substantiales subire possint ; ex partibus integralibus, quum extensæ et divisibiles sint ; ex substantia et accidentibus, quum sæpe mutentur in accidentibus, quin mutentur in sua substantia ; ex facultatibus et operationibus, quum non semper agant ; *c*) sunt *finitæ*, tum quia compositæ sunt, tum quia diversis diversæ insunt perfectiones, et concipi possunt perfectiones altiores illis, quæ rebus mundanis competunt. *Atqui* mutabilitas, compositio, finitudo sunt characteres contingentiæ ; *ergo* res mundanæ contingentes sunt.

Prob. min. Omne ens contingens, eo quod est contingens, seu indifferens tum ad existendum tum ad non existendum, non habet in se nisi possibilitatem existendi, et proinde sibi ipsi actualitatem existentiæ tribuere nequit, sed necessario supponit aliud ens, cujus influxu existentiam accipiat. *Atqui* illud aliud ens aut vi suæ naturæ existit, aut ab alio existentiam accipit. Si prius, thesis manet probata ; si posterius, recurrit tota quæstio, et sic deinceps, usque dum devenitur ad ens, quod nullo modo dependet ab alio sed necessitate absoluta existit.[1]

[1] Multiply the contingent as much as you like, it will never lose its nature. What can not be as well as be, needs a cause to determine its existence, since nothing can give existence to itself, and undetermined being, as the contingent by nature is, must have a determining cause. Fancy the perishable in a series of changes through life and death, reaching back eternally, if that were possible, and even then it would require a living cause to make it pass from the non-existent to the existent,—a Being who would determine the indeterminate, would limit the indefinite, and would cause by an act of His will the possible to pass into the actual. In another form the same argument may be proposed. In the physical world,

Aliis verbis: Quum ens contingens indifferens sit quoad existentiam, si omnia, quæ existunt, contingentia sunt, inest omnibus, sive singillatim sive collective sumptis, plenissima indifferentia ad existendum; *atqui* indifferentia ad existendum non est existentiæ ratio sufficiens, immo est rationis sufficientis ipsa carentia; *ergo* existentia entium contingentium exigit, ut eorum rationem sufficientem, existentiam entis nullo modo contingentis sed prorsus necessarii.

28. Obj. 1. Ex entibus contingentibus minime potest demonstrari existentia entis necessarii. In tantum enim hoc m do demonstraretur, in quantum entia contingentia requirerent ut causam ens necessarium; *atqui* ens contingens incipere potest, quin ab ente necessario producatur; *ergo.*

Resp. *Neg. assertum. Dist. maj.* ad illud probandum allatam. In tantum hoc modo existentia entis necessarii demonstraretur, in quantum entia contingentia requirerent ut causam *ultimam* ens necessarium, *conc.*; in quantum causa *proxima* deberet esse ens necessarium, *subdist.* Si agitur de productione entis ex nihilo, *conc.*; secus, *trans. Contradist. min.* Ens contingens incipere potest, quin ultima ejus causa sit ens necessarium, *neg.*; quin proxima ejus causa sit ens necessarium, *subdist.* Ens contingens, quod generari nequit (*v.g.*, spiritus, materia primitiva), *neg.*; ens contingens, quod generari potest, *trans.*

Obj. 2. Per ea, quæ non sunt necessaria, nequit absque vitio syllogistico demonstrari existentia entis necessarii; *ergo* ex rebus contingentibus non potest Dei existentia demonstrari.

all observation shows that things may be or not be; contingency is of their nature. Let us suppose, then, that nothing but the contingent existed in time or eternity; and according to that hypothesis, what was possible not to be, since it could not be its own cause, was not at one time. Taking into account, then, the universality of contingent beings, we can logically say, since it is possible for them not to be, that there was an instant when they were not, and all was emptiness through the immeasurable void, since nothing was. But if nothing was in the abyss of the past, then, I say, nothing should be in the present. The non-existent or the possible cannot become the actual, but through the activity of a living agent. If, then, all existence were eternally a blank, a blank it should always remain. Now, however, since things innumerable do exist, they proclaim, that before the existence of all perishable things, there was always a Being not liable to decay or death, who, having in Himself the principle of His own existence, is a self-existent necessary Being, from whom are all existences—who is God—(**Ronayne**, *God Knowable and Known*, p. 19).

Resp. *Dist. antec.* Ex *præmissis*, quæ non sunt necessariæ, sequi nequit *conclusio* necessaria, *conc.*; ex *natura* entis contingentis deduci nequit *existentia* entis necessarii, *neg.*; ens namque contingens, ut ex thesi patet, necessariam habet connexionem cum ente necessario. Unde, dum affirmatur existentia entis contingentis implicite et virtualiter affirmatur existentia entis necessarii.[1] Conclusio igitur nihil affirmat, nisi quod præhabebatur in præmissis.

Inst. Si ens contingens habet necessariam connexionem cum ente necessario, ipsum ens contingens necessario existit; *ergo.*

Resp. *Dist. antec.* Si illa connexio se habet ex parte entis necessarii, ita ut existentia entis contingentis sit sequela existentiæ entis necessarii, *conc.*; si connexio se habet ex parte entis contingentis, ita ut hoc *in fieri* et *esse* ab ente necessario dependeat, *neg.*

Obj. 3. Probatur quidem admittendum esse ens absolute necessarium, a quo contingentes in fieri et esse dependent, non autem probatur hoc ens esse unum numero; *atqui* nisi probatur existentia entis necessarii unius numero non probatur existentia Dei veri; *ergo* argumentum allatum nihil valet.

Resp. . . . non probatur *immediate* hoc ens esse unum numero, *conc.*; ex probato non sequitur logice hoc ens necessarium esse unum numero, *neg. Contradist. min.* et *neg. concl.* Si ad probandam Dei existentiam necesse esset ejus unitatem ostendere, pari ratione necesse esset omnia ejus attributa explicite demonstrare, priusquam ejus existentia admitteretur, id quod satis absurdum esset. Revera autem sufficit ad ejus existentiam demonstrandam, ut probetur existentia alicujus attributi, quod divinitati exclusive pertinet; sic enim virtualiter manifestatur tota Dei essentia, quum omnia ejus attributa mutuo se includant.

§ 4. Argumentum ex Gradibus Perfectionum Rerum Mundanarum.

29. THESIS VI.—Existentia Dei ut entis infinite perfecti probatur ex gradibus perfectionum entium mundanorum.

Stat. Quæst.—Diversæ perfectiones, quæ rebus in-

[1] Let us imagine a universal and absolute nothingness; I then ask: Is it possible that anything should come from nothing? evidently not; therefore on the supposition of universal nothingness reality is absurd. Therefore something has always existed, without a cause, without a condition on which it depends; therefore there is a necessary being. Its existence is supposed always, without relation to any hypothesis; therefore its *not-being* is always excluded under all conditions; therefore there exists an absolutely necessary *being*, a being whose *not-being* implies a contradiction—(**Balmes,** *Fund. Phil.*, v. 2, p. 441).

sunt, duplicis sunt generis. Aliæ enim in indivisibili consistunt, et, ad instar numerorum, nec magis nec minus suscipiunt. Hujusmodi sunt illæ, quæ naturas specificas constituunt. Sic, unus homo non est magis homo quam alius. Aliæ vero sunt perfectiones *scil.*, individuæ, quæ diversos gradus admittunt, ut sapientia, bonitas, etc. Ex his gradibus, qui secundum magis et minus inveniuntur in rebus mundanis, licet concludere ad existentiam entis summe perfecti, ex quo derivantur limitati gradus perfectionis, qui ceteris rebus competunt.

" Hæc est quarta via demonstrandi existentiam divinam a S. Thoma adhibita, quam quidem antea Patres usurpaverant, ac nominatim S. Aug. non uno in loco et S. Anselmus. Eadem usus est Rich. a S. Victore, et ante ceteros omnes Plato. . . . Scholastici vero posteriores non videntur demonstrationem hanc æquo in pretio habuisse, ac priores hactenus tractatas ; quare, plures eam non meminerunt, nec qui meminerunt, omnes satis apte declararunt " (**Urráburu,** *Theol. Nat.*, v. 1, p. 102). Optimis tamen modernis (v.g., *Hontheim, Schiffini, Urráburu, Boedder, Kleutgen*) maxime probatur, ac, secus atque alii, illud habent " non ut simplicem quamdam suasionem aut probabilem persuasionem, sed ut veri nominis demonstrationem " (**Schiffini,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 24).

30. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Constat existere in rebus mundanis diversos gradus diversarum perfectionum ; *atqui* perfectio, quæ pluribus competit in diversis gradibus, eis non competit per essentiam, seu, non constituit eorum essentiam ; id enim quod essentiam alicujus rei constituit, in ea non invenitur in gradu minore, sed plene et perfecte. Sic, spectata essentia, Petrus non est magis homo quam Paulus ; et proinde si sapientia, *v.g.*, vi naturæ et non per participationem hominibus conveniret, non magis sapiens esset unus quam

alius, nec in eis ullus defectus sapientiæ inveniri posset, sicut nec in sapientia inveniri potest insipientia. *Ergo* veritas, bonitas, entitas, intellectio, sapientia, etc., in omnibus illis entibus, in quibus gradu limitato inveniuntur, participatæ sunt, et proinde tandem aliquando rationem sufficientem suæ limitationis non habent nisi in ente, quod est ipsa veritas, ipsa bonitas, ipsa entitas, etc. Jamvero, quum hæ perfectiones, utpote puræ (*Ont.*, n. 394), omnem limitationem, omnem imperfectionem excludant, dicendum est existere ens in omni genere perfectionum simplicium infinitum, quodque est fons omnium perfectionum, quæ in aliis rebus gradu limitato inveniuntur ; *atqui* tale ens, consensu omnium est Deus optimus maximus ; *ergo*.[1]

31. *Dices:* Si ex diversis gradibus perfectionis qui in rebus existunt, licet concludere ad existentiam entis perfectissimi, a quo proveniunt hi diversi gradus, eodem jure liceret concludere ad existentiam cujusdam

[1] " If anything at all exists, an infinite Being must exist ; for if only finite beings existed, it would always be possible to conceive a more perfect being than they, or a less perfect one. For above and below every finite degree of perfection, there are innumerable other degrees, and at each such degree there are again numberless possible individuals. Now there is no reason why only a few degrees of perfection should be actualized; on the contrary, all conceivable degrees should be actualized with the same reason as those presupposed. Now, either this is the case, and then there exists also the highest degree, the infinitely perfect Being ; or merely a few finite beings exist, and, if this be the case, some free being must have chosen them in preference to all others. This brings us once again, however, to a creative intellect, which can reside in the infinite alone " (Gutberlet, *Apologetik*, p. 124). Thus we must acknowledge not merely *some sort* of prime Being in explanation of the existence of the universe, but in this prime Being we must recognize God, who, with infinite wisdom, created the universe, and with infinite love embraces us, His creatures.

The fine remarks of Gutberlet demonstrate incidentally that there cannot be several gods ; as, were that the case, none would be infinitely perfect. His argument also excludes the theory which considers God as, in some sort, the soul of the universe, having for His body the totality of the material world ; for according to this theory, God would lack that infinite perfection which is demanded by the essence of a necessary being, since He would become dependent on the material world, as our soul is, in a measure, dependent on our body—(**Hammerstein**, *op. cit.*, p. 41).

hominis perfectissimi, qui esset causa ceterorum ; *atqui* hoc esset restaurare commentum Platonis ponentis formas perfectissimas subsistentes, quarum participatione res individuales existunt.

Resp. Humanitas non magis participatur ab uno individuo quam ab alio, sed æque prorsus ab omnibus, quibus inest, quia nimirum individua ista talia sunt per essentiam suam, quæ magis et minus a se excludit. E converso autem, quotiescumque perfectio aliqua participata secundum diversos gradus occurrit, illam non per essentiam suam existere sic varie participatam concludimus, quum nullam in se habeat rationem, cur uno gradu potius quam alio gaudeat ; et proinde necesse est, ut limitatio perfectionis ab alio proveniat et tandem ab ente infinito.

32. Schol.—Thesim probavimus ex gradibus perfectionis accidentalibus, qui in rebus creatis manifestantur ; " si vero naturas specificas non in suo restricto et particulari genere perfectionis, secundum quod æque in omnibus reperiuntur, consideres, sed generalius, prout sunt modi quidam *essendi*, vel *bonitatis*, vel *perfectionis* (aut *vitæ*, si sermo sit de viventibus) argumentatio nostra in illis totam vim suam retinet. Certum est homines et cetera genera et species rerum diversum gradum entitatis, bonitatis, perfectionis, vitæ præ se ferre : unde, quia *esse* vel entitas, bonitas, perfectio, vita diversimode ac limitate participatur in singulis eorum, in nullo eorum existit *esse*, nec bonitas, nec perfectio, nec vita per suam essentiam et imparticipata, sed ab alia causa producta. Et sic ab omnibus istis diversissimis rivulis ac participationibus *esse*, bonitatis, etc., concluditur existentia entis, in quo imparticipate et a se ac nobilissimo modo reperitur *esse*, bonitas, etc., quæ ad reliqua derivari queat " (**Urráburu,** *loc. cit.*, p. 106).

§ 5. Argumentum ex Æternitate Possibilium.

33. THESIS VII.—Existentia Dei ut primi intelligentis probatur ex necessitate fundamenti actualis et æterni, in quo possibilia seu vera idealia innitantur.

Stat. Quæst.—Possibilia, licet actu non existant, non sunt purum nihilum seu nihilum essentiæ (*Ont.*, n. 268), sed gaudent aliqua realitate, qua a nihilo differunt, quum *a*) secus ac nihilum, existere possint, *b*) invicem differant (*v.g.*, aliud est possibilis lapis, aliud vero possibilis planta), nihilum autem a nihilo differre non posse evidens est.[1] Ex realitate possibilium adstrui potest validum argumentum pro Dei existentia.

34. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Possibilia, licet non existant, tamen realitatis, quam habent, aliquod fundamentum sufficiens habere debent ; *atqui* hoc fundamentum non habent in seipsis, neque in intellectu nostro, neque in ceteris rebus contingentibus ; restat igitur, ut eorum fundamentum sit aliquod ens necessario existens et primum intelligens, quod est Deus ; *ergo*.

Prob. min. a) *Possibilia non habent sufficiens sui fundamentum in seipsis ;* tum quia, quum non existant, necessario sunt finita quoad perfectionem, ens autem finitum non in seipso sed in alio rationem suæ limitationis habet (n. 30) ; tum quia in tantum a nihilo differunt, in quantum habent aliquam realitatem ; quæ quidem realitas non est aliud quam terminus imitabili-

[1] Let us examine the possible essences. What is their nature ? They are not absolutely nothing. They stand midway between a contradiction and an actual fact. The mind can have no positive conception of a contradiction. It does not actually exist, nor can it ever exist. It has no reality of existence nor of essence. It is an absolute nothing. An actual fact has a reality both of essence and of existence. Now a possible thing does not actually exist, but it can exist. It is not some thing absurd or contradictory. We cannot say that it has a reality of existence, because as yet it does not actually exist ; but we can say that it has a reality of essence, inasmuch as the mind conceives it as a thing which may exist in the concrete—(**Driscoll**, *op. cit.*, p. 72).

tatis et cognitionis alicujus entis existentis ; tum denique quia, quum a seipsis ad existentiam pervenire non possint, præsupponunt ens actuale, in cujus potentia eorum existentia fundatur.

b) Possibilia non habent suum fundamentum in intellectu nostro. 1°. Quia tantum abest, ut possibilia ab intellectu fiant, ut ab eo supponantur ; unde, unum idemque " possibile " a pluribus cognoscitur et tamen *unum* permanet. 2°. Quia ab omni intellectu finito sunt prorsus independentia ; clare enim perspicimus " posse existere " corporis vel spiritus verum fuisse antequam ab intellectu humano cogitaretur, immo clare perspicimus " posse existere " rerum esse normam, quæ in intellectum nostrum influxum exercet, illumque sibi prorsus subjicit.[1] 3°. Quia intellectus finitus est contingens, temporaneus, mutabilis ; e contra, possibilia sunt *a*) necessaria et immutabilia, quum prædicata, quæ constituunt cujusque rei essentiam, nequeunt non esse de intelligibilitate subjecti, quod talem essentiam habet ; *β*) æterna, non solum *negative*, quatenus a tempore abstrahunt et indifferentiam habent ad existendum quovis tempore, sed etiam *positive et idealiter*, quatenus ab æterno intelligibilitatem habent, et proinde ab æterno ordinem dicunt ad intellectum necessario et ab æterno existentem.[2]

[1] The fact that a thing is possible does not depend on the mind. The distinction of the possible and the impossible stands out clearly in our mental life. The mind cannot make or change the one or the other. A round square, or, two plus two equals five, can never be other than impossible. The intellect discovers the truth, and in its presence stands in silent and helpless acquiescence. . . . Therefore a possible thing which is the object of the mind is of its own intrinsic nature independent of the mind—(*Idem. ib.*).

[2] Where is truth ? Where its dwelling-place, its seat, its living essence ? Is it a pure abstraction of our mind ? Is it nothing but the universe magnified by a dream ? If it were so our intelligence itself would be but a dream ; truth, which appears to us as the principle of all things, would be only the exaggeration, and as it were the extravagance of sensible reality. Shall we say that truth has its seat in our own mind ? But our mind is limited, truth has no limits ; our mind had a beginning, truth is eternal ;

c) *Possibilia non habent suum fundamentum in rebus contingentibus.* 1°. Quia præter omnes res contingentes actu existentes, aliæ perfectiores sine fine sunt possibiles; res autem perfectior in imperfectiori fundari nequit. 2°. Quia possibilia dominantur omnibus contingentibus; repugnat enim ut quidquam sit vel fiat nisi secundum normas, quæ ex essentia possibilium fluunt. Sic, repugnat ut existeret triangulus, qui non servaret omnia theoremata, quæ ab æterno inclusa sunt in conceptu trianguli possibilis. 3°. Quia res contingentes sunt essentialiter mutabiles, et ex toto desinere possunt; possibilia, e contra, omnem mutationem, omnem inceptionem ac desitionem penitus respuunt.

Ergo supra omnes res contingentes sive materiales sive spirituales admittendum est ens quoddam æternum et necessarium, quod est fons omnium possibilium et veritatum, *scil.*, Deus; *ergo.*

35. II.—Idem probatur *ex harmonia, quam inter se habent possibilia.* Inter possibilia enim admirabilis existit harmonia, quæ elucet in ordinatis specierum seriebus mineralium et viventium; in unitate et pulchritudine totius universi ex plurimis et diversis confluentis; in ordine in veritatibus mathematicis, logicis, metaphysicis, quæ ubique sine contradictione cohærent et tam intimas relationes servant, ut mens ab

our mind is susceptible of more or less, truth is absolute. . . . Besides the contradiction existing between the nature of our mind and the nature of truth, do we not see the minds that form mankind engaged in a perpetual war of affirmations and negations? Truth would then be battling with itself. It would affirm and deny at the same time, although remaining absolute. This is the very height of folly!

If truth be not a vain name, it is in the universe only in the state of expression, and in our mind only in the state of apparition; it is in the universe as the artist is in his work, it is in our mind as the sun is in our eyes. But beyond the universe and our mind, it subsists of itself, it is a real, an infinite, an eternal, an absolute essence, existing of itself, possessing consciousness and intelligence of itself. . . . Now, so to speak of truth is to define God; God is the proper name for truth, as truth is the abstract name of God. There is then a God, if truth exists—(**Lacordaire**, *God*, p. 21.)

una veritate in alias discurrat, et a summis ad imas, ab imis ad summas has relationes sectando tute pertingat. Jamvero, hæc universalis harmonia, quæ procul dubio prius fuit possibilis quam actualis, postulat aliquam rationem, qua explicari possit ; *atqui* hæc ratio non invenitur in singulis possibilibus seorsum sumptis, quum singula sua sola entitate nequeant esse ratio, cur cum aliis a se distinctis conveniant. Restat igitur, ut hæc harmonia possibilium rationem habeat in aliquo ente actuali, ex quo, tamquam variæ ejus imitationes, possibilia esse suum participant. Quod ens debet esse *a*) *intellectivum*, secus enim ratio harmoniæ inter plura non haberetur ; *b*) *infinite perfectum*, quia multitudo possibilium, quorum perfectiones eminenter continere debet, fine prorsus caret ; *c*) *causa efficiens* et *exemplaris* omnium, quæ sunt vel esse possunt, quia, quum harmonia indicata sit rebus interna et essentialis, nihil potest esse hujus harmoniæ ratio, quin sit ipsarum rerum causa prima efficiens et exemplaris. *Atqui* ens intellectivum, infinite perfectum, causa efficiens et exemplaris omnium rerum est Deus ; *ergo*.

ART. II.

ARGUMENTA PHYSICA.

36. Ex diversis argumentis physicis, quæ afferri possunt ad Dei existentiam evincendam duo seligimus, *scil.*, argumentum *ex ordine*, qui in mundo conspicitur, et argumentum *ex finalitate* rerum mundanarum seu ex mutua relatione inter causam efficientem et finalem, quodque ideo vocatur argumentum *teleologicum*. Argumenta physica valde celebrata sunt apud omnes, qui de Dei existentia agunt, et ad fines practicos hisce temporibus utilissima, quando natura physica adeo studiose investigatur.

§ 1. Argumentum ex Ordine Mundi Visibilis.

37. THESIS VIII.—Admirabilis ordo, qui in mundo corporeo relucet, auctorem sibi postulat sapientissimum, quem Deum nominamus.

Stat. Quæst.—In mundo corporeo effulget ordo complicatissimus, sublimissimus, constantissimus, utilissimus, ut jam in Cosm. (n. 22) ostendimus et omnes concedunt.[1] Testes sint Mineralogia, Botanica, Zoologia, Chimia, Physica, Astronomia, Physiologia, Anatomia, etc., quæ leges et ordinem rerum naturalium exponunt atque extollunt. Hic ordo juxta Materialistas provenit ex mero casu vel ex cæca necessitate et evolutione rerum absque ulla supramundana causa (*Cosm.*, n. 17); juxta sanam vero rationem et fidem catholicam ex providentia entis supremi.

38. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Ordo, quem in mundo existere omnes admittunt, postulat ordinatorem summe intelligentem; *atqui* ordinator summe intelligens non est nisi Deus; *ergo*.

Prob. maj. 1°. *Ex sensu communi hominum.* Omnes homines insuperabili naturæ impulsu feruntur ad agnoscendum in rebus ordinatis opus intelligentiæ, nec est qui opus affabre elaboratum (*v.g.*, domum, horologium, poema) ad casum vel cæcam evolutionem partium referret. Immo ex eo solo, quod opera ordinate

[1] There is no dispute between theists and their opponents as to whether orderly arrangements really exist in the universe, and these of a very complicated nature. On the matter of fact they are agreed. So complete was the perception of this truth, even in those early stages of civilization, when the Greek language acquired its settled meaning, that the Greek designation for the universe is κοσμος, *i.e.*, order. Since that period, this conviction has been greatly deepened, for the progress of scientific investigation has increased our knowledge of the universe to an extent which has utterly transcended even the dreams of these early thinkers, and everywhere it proclaims the presence of orderly arrangements of the greatest complexity. In the boundless depths of the universe to which it has succeeded in penetrating, everywhere order reigns —(**Row**, *op. cit.*, p. 19).

et juxta normas rationis efficiuntur, ad opificis intelligentiam concludimus, et quo perfectior ordo in opere manifestatur, eo majorem intelligentiam in opifice inesse intelligimus.

Jamvero, pro ordine in mundo manifestato, eo major requiritur in ordinatore intelligentia, quo plures sunt res ordinandæ ; quo difficilius ordinantur ; quo diutius et constantius ordo perdurat. *Atqui*, ut cuique patet, res ordinandæ, ut mundus exurgeret, quasi infinitæ sunt; quasi infinitæ etiam sunt combinationes, quæ fieri possent inter has res, quæ tamen combinationes non ordinem sed maximam inducerent confusionem ; unde, ut omnia in " numero, pondere ac mensura " disponerentur ac juxta normam primitivæ dispositurae immutata per tot sæcula permanerent inter omnes revolutiones, corruptiones et generationes singularum rerum, opus erat causa intelligentissima ac potentissima.[1]

[1] Atheism contends that this order and conformity to design, manifested throughout nature, is but the result of chance. What, then, is chance ? A word, and nothing more—the x of our sums, a conventional sign, employed to signify an unknown quantity. To make, then, chance a cause, to the exclusion of the true Cause is to set up an empty negation as the cause of existence and order, and to affirm a fact without a cause. " If the fortuitous concurrence of atoms," says Cicero, " could create the universe, why has it never produced a temple, a portico, a city, or a house, the construction of which objects would be far more simple ? " (*De nat. Deorum*, lib. 2, c. 37). " The perfect harmony which we find in all parts of the universe," says Mädler, " proves the existence of a volition, intelligent, self-conscious, and free in its action ; *e.g.*, the comets are irrefragable signs that an All-wise, Almighty Being governs the universe." Agassiz tells us that " the world is the manifestation of an Intelligence as mighty as it is productive ; of a Goodness as infinite as it is wise ; furnishing thereby the clear evidence of the existence of a personal God, Creator of all things, Ruler of the universe, Dispenser of all good."

The assertion of some atheists, that the forces and laws of nature are *necessarily* in action, is simply another subterfuge. Strauss argues, " We have no right to conclude that because man cannot produce a work requiring the adaptation of means to an end without consciously aiming at the end, therefore such works in nature must be similarly produced ; that is, by an intelligent Creator. For nature herself proves that her adapted work does not imply conscious intelligence in the worker." But, on the contrary, this necessarily fixed action of the forces of nature, and conformity to

2°. *Ex unitate mundani ordinis.* Res mundanæ non sunt prorsus sejunctæ et mutuo independentes, sed talis est earum connexio, ut omnes, quotquot sunt, ad unum totum constituendum harmonice conspirent, licet sæpissime vires habeant mutuo oppositas. Sic, *v.g.*, vires mechanicæ, physicæ, chimicæ, physiologicæ, psychologicæ tantam proportionem inter se habent, tantumque ordinem servant, ut vires superiores subsidium inferiorum requirant easque in finem suum dirigant, inferiores ad superiorum indigentiam examussim respondeant et propter influxum earum ulteriorem perfectionem accipiant. Minima autem virium deviatio, suspensio, vel etiam læsio unius legis sufficere posset, ut universus mundus ad chaos reduceretur. Perpende quam cito summa rerum mundanarum pernicies accideret, si vis attractionis augeretur vel relaxaretur.[1]

their purpose, are an additional argument for the existence of a cause which has determined this fixedness and conformity. Nor can the result be ascribed, as others say, to different products, resulting from differentiated motive forces; for who or what differentitated these forces, so as to produce these different effects, each of which expresses a different idea? Who so ordered this marvellous variety, that the most perfect harmony arises therefrom?—(**Hettinger**, *Nat. Religion*, p. 86).

[1] The supreme universal law that determines and regulates the dynamics of all beings, and reaches from the most active and effective to the most weak, is that as often as any agent intervenes in a system, order, or series of inferior forces, these forces are modified in their effects by the intervention of the agent. Thus we see that forces purely mechanical, being compounded with one another, vary their direction and intensity; thus we see, in chemistry, that the same elements, though in identical proportions, give rise to bodies chemically different, according as they are submitted to different conditions; thus, in the living being, the vital principle modifies the law of mechanics and of the chemical affinities to which material elements are subject: thus, in fine, the mind and the will dominate over the requirements of the body, and human liberty triumphs over the obstacles that brute force puts in its way. This law of reciprocal subordination of forces is so entwined with the very essence of things that without it all order, all progress, and even organic life itself, would be impossible. It is of the essence of force, says M. Güthlin (*Les doctrines positivistes en France*), that its habitual effects may be ruled, and even, if necessary, replaced, by the effect of a superior force. This negative or passive character of a force is as essential as its active or positive character. The one cannot exist or be understood without the other. If any force,

3°. *Ex universitate ordinis.* Nemo enim non videt quanta perfectio, harmonia, sapientia appareat in siderum collocatione et cursu, in maris et terræ proportione, in virium physicarum et chimicarum dispositione, in organismorum constitutione, in sensuum et instinctuum animalium adaptatione. Quocumque vis oculos convertere, sive ad maxima et remotissima corpora, quæ solo telescopio attinguntur, sive ad minima animalcula et primigenas viventium cellulas, quæ solo microscopio deteguntur, sive ad objecta, quæ nudis sensibus aspiciuntur, mirabilem ordinem vigere discernis.[1]

in any hypothesis, and notwithstanding any superior law or energy, had to attain its proper and special effect, the mutual action of forces would become impossible, the harmony of beings would be destroyed in its basis, the idea of order would disappear, and from an everlasting conflict of all the elements of the world would spring a something monstrous and irreconcilable, which the mind cannot conceive, and for which there is no name in any language, since even *chaos* cannot correspond to a contradiction. Such, concludes this learned writer, is the dynamic law of beings; and the great drama of nature or of history is nothing but a repetition of this law—(**Mir,** *Harmonía entre la Ciencia y la Fe,* ch. 13).

[1] No feature of nature has impressed men more than the reign of law and order, apparent everywhere; and on this account they called the world *Cosmos,* instead of *Chaos.* . . . It is not merely in the larger and more obvious operation of Nature that we can trace this marvellous ubiquity of law, but in her most hidden processes and inmost constitution. At every point we are forced to ask why things should be as they actually are, and how they came to be subject to conditions which they cannot be supposed to have created for themselves. Why, for example, should the ultimate elements of matter,—be they atoms, or electrons, or whatever else,—always and everywhere observe the same rules of the great game in which they serve as counters? Why, to take a concrete instance, should atoms of hydrogen in Sirius, or in a star of the Milky Way, obey just the same laws as do those with which we make coal-gas or spirit of salt? These various atoms, as Lord Grimthorpe reminds us, have never been within billions of miles of one another. What is the mysterious influence which links them together across the depths of space? . . . How comes it, again, that the seventy different kinds of atoms (to speak in round numbers) are distributed—according to Mendeléeff's periodic law—among some seven groups or families, the members of each group resembling one another in various particulars, wherein they differ from the rest? Or, to pass from atoms to molecules, . . . how is it that molecules of the same kind are always constructed upon exactly the same model, resembling one another far more closely than sovereigns struck from the same die, or different copies

Jamvero, ens, quod totum mundum et singulas ejus partes adeo mirifice ordinavit, maxima præditum debet esse sapientia. Enimvero, si " ad pontem omnino longum construendum tanta arithmeticæ, geometriæ, mechanicæ cognitio in architecto humano requiritur, qui tamen longe facilius fabricatur, quam cellula minima, quantæ scientiæ mathematicæ erat universi mundi ordinem per tot sæcula imperturbate duraturum disponere ? Quis non mirabitur summum illum mathematicum, *perfectissimam illam scientiam*? Præterea, architectus mundi peritissimus erat in chimia, physica, biologia, omnibus scientiis. Architectus mundi omnes atomos omnesque earum per omnia sæcula situs et motus simul mente comprehendere debuit, quia ad ordinem stabiliendum omnia omnibus comparanda et commensuranda erant. Quis non miretur *tantam mentis capacitatem* ? Hæc omnia architectus scivit sine experientia, sine longo consilio, sine diuturna alicujus magistri informatione. Quis non venerabitur hanc *eximiam sagacitatem* ?" (**Hontheim,** *op. cit.*, p. 177).[1]

of this morning's *Times ?* It was in this uniformity of type, character and behaviour, repeated always and everywhere, in instances multiplied " beyond the power of imagination to conceive," that Sir John Herschel saw a feature stamping atoms and molecules as " manufactured articles, and subordinate agents," which, no less than a line of spinning-jennies, or a regiment of soldiers clad in the same uniform, and going through the same evolutions, imply a controlling force directing things according to a definite system. . . . And if in the inorganic world we find food for such considerations, with immensely greater instance are they forced upon us by a study of the organic. Here we enter a new realm of mystery, for the laws we encounter, actively energizing at every point, are altogether different from those with which hitherto we have had to deal. The matter which enters into the constitution of living things—animals and plants—is precisely the same as that of which the inorganic world is constituted. No single atom or molecule is found in the one which has not been drawn from the other. . . . Nevertheless they fall at once under the spell of a force which introduces into their operations an order altogether new, for it somehow strikes across all the laws of dead matter, setting up a new code of its own which endures just so long as life lasts—(**Gerard,** *The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer*, ch. xi., p. 87).

[1] Faraday says : " When I contemplate the innumerable united forces working in nature ; when I reflect how quietly and silently they

Prob. min. (*scil., ordinator mundi est Deus*). Imprimis, *minor* sequitur ut corollarium ex *majoris* demonstratione; "quis enim hæsitabit dicere intellectum, qui sine ulla difficultate tam multa capit et tam subtilia scrutatur, eadem facilitate mundum potuisse construere majorem, complicatiorem, perfectius ordinatum? Quin justa est præsumptio intellectum hunc esse omniscium. Nulla enim ratio affertur, cur ulla ab eo, qui tam multa novit, scientia excludatur.—Intellectus autem omniscius, quum sit infinitus, non potest esse nisi in ente, quod est infinitum et a se." Deinde, intelligentia mundi ordinatrix debet esse et ipsius creatrix. Intelligentia enim "non cernitur tantum in accidentibus rerum, velut in motus existentia, celeritate, directione et in

maintain their mutual equilibrium so that the most antagonistic elements, in themselves strong enough to destroy completely the whole economy of nature, subsist peaceably side by side, and are made subservient to the needs of the animate creation; when I consider all this, I am more than ever convinced of the Almighty Ruler's wisdom, goodness, and greatness, which our language is powerless to express."

Inspired by the same views, Herschel says: "The aim of physical geography is to exhibit the compiled and accumulated mass of details as forming one harmonious whole united by mutual relations and influences, and subject to one great plan." Now, where there is plan, there must be some one to have conceived it—(**Hammerstein,** *op. cit.*, p. 117).

The order so manifest in the world of plants appeals to an intelligent cause for its explanation, and the more human intelligence sees that order, the more it exacts the intervention of a Primary cause as the only rational solution. It was thus the illustrious Swedish botanist, Linnæus, wrote after his labours and discoveries: "The eternal God, immense, all-wise, and omnipotent, has left His seal on the creation of His hands. My soul has seen the reflection of the Almighty in His creatures, and I have been plunged in a stupor of admiration. I have followed here and there His traces in the things of nature, and seen His work even in the most diminutive and imperceptible of beings; what power, what wisdom, what ineffable perfection! I have seen how the world of animated beings is linked to the vegetable kingdom, and how this again is connected with the mineral kingdom. The sun and the whole sidereal system, immense, incalculable, appear to me suspended by the hand of that Prime Motor, the Cause of causes, the guide and preserver of the universe. All created things bear testimony to that unfathomable wisdom and power divine; their beauty, their harmony and their just proportions, proclaim the omnipotence of that great God" —(**Slevin,** *Order in the Physical World*, p. 39).

corporum situ et aliis hujusmodi, verum etiam in ipsis elementorum essentiis. Mundi enim perfectio maxime ab eo pendet, ut tot sint elementa, ut hanc habeant naturam, ut hæc sit eorum quantitas. Quid enim mundus esset sine oxygenio et sine certis illis oxygenii proprietatibus et sine tanta oxygenii copia ? A sapientia igitur mundi gubernatrice oxygenium et reliqua elementa et existentiam et copiam habent ; hæc autem accipere non poterant nisi creatione " (*Idem, ib.*). *Atqui* mundi creator dicitur Deus ; *ergo*.[1]

§ 2. Argumentum ex mundi Finalitate.

39. THESIS IX.—Existentia Dei ut entis omnia mundana in finem dirigentis probatur ex finalitate, quæ in mundo manifestatur.

Stat. Quæst.—Hoc argumentum plures non distinguunt a præcedente, et certum est unum ab altero vix separari posse in argumento conficiendo ; ratione tamen satis ab invicem distinguuntur, ut separatim proponantur, quum in priori ordo consideretur quodammodo *materialiter* seu in se et relate ad causam efficientem, in posteriori vero *formaliter* et relate ad finem, quem in operando causa efficiens præstituit consequendum ; finalitas enim est forma et quasi anima diversas partes mundi apte inter se uniens, ut collineant ad communem totius perfectionem.

40. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Singula entia hujus mundi agunt propter finem. " Videmus enim quod aliqua,

[1] It is argued, " that the order which reigns in the world proves at most the existence of an architect, who fashions all with materials ready prepared to his hand, not that of a creator, to whose idea all is subject, or who is the absolute Master of all that exists " (Kant). But this *intentional* form of things in nature is not accidental or external ; it is their interior, essential, and substantial form ; *i.e.*, their very idea, nature, and essence ; and is, consequently, absolutely inalienable from the things themselves. It does not merely belong to them : it is within them ; one with them ; and is inalienably identified with the idea we form of them—(**Hettinger,** *op. cit.*, p. 89).

quæ cognitione carent, *scil.*, corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem ; quod apparet ex hoc quod semper, aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id, quod est optimum. Unde patet, quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem, quæ non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. *Ergo* est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem ; et hoc dicimus Deum " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 2, a. 3).

Aliis verbis: Eædem causæ naturales constanter operantur id, quod naturæ cujusque et ultimatim ordini totius universi maxime congruit ;[1] *atqui* hujus rei ratio non invenitur in externis causarum adjunctis, sed in inclinatione ipsis causarum naturis indita ab aliqua intelligentia eas ad determinatum modum agendi dirigente, quæ intelligentia est ipse Deus ; *ergo.*

Prob. min. p. 1ª. **Hujus rei ratio . . . invenitur in inclinatione . . .** 1°. Diversa mundi corporei agentia

[1] All nature tends naturally to its end. There is a reason for everything : an answer, whether we know it or not, to every Why ? To make this quite clear, we must draw a broad distinction between the methods or ways in which different classes of beings tend towards their respective ends. Man, for example, acts in a very different manner from the falling stone or the time-recording clock or the instinct-led animal. Intelligent beings determine what effects they desire to produce, and act so as to produce them. Natural and artificial agents produce their effects blindly and regularly in virtue of their nature, if they are not interfered with by other agents. They receive their impulse towards their respective ends from the same source as that to which their nature is due. And the impulse is steady and constant. It is ruled as much by finality as the actions of intelligent man, who tends towards the acquisition or production of a contemplated effect, swayed in his selection of ways and means by the very uncertainty of the means at his disposal. Whether we consider the universe as a whole, or whether we consider only some particular part of it, we are struck by the harmony and balance manifested in it. The course of the planets and the laws of motion to which they are subject, the revolution upon its axis of this world of ours, the succession of the seasons, each has its purpose and reason for being as it is. Any natural law, as that of gravity, for example, gives a flat contradiction to those who would attempt to deny the purposive finality of nature—(**Aveling**, *The God of Philosophy*, p. 91).

in eisdem adjunctis externis et sub eisdem influxibus modo diversissimo operantur, et agentia ejusdem specei in diversis adjunctis modo essentialiter eodem. Cogita plantarum auctionem, crystallorum formationem, etc., quæ opera sæpissime non perficiuntur nisi resistendo influxibus externis eosque superando. Unde satis evidens est rationem, cur entia naturalia eodem modo constanter operantur, esse naturalem inclinationem, quæ in eorum actionem magis influit, quam omnes causæ externæ. *Ergo* non ab externis adjunctis sed ab inclinatione eis impressa ad certos effectus producendos seu fines attingendos operantur.[1]

[1] Every species follows its own law of development. The organization of every creature struggles on bravely and persistently till it has climbed to the summit of the species. This persistent struggle reveals a plan stretching far and wide beyond the present actual limits of nature. On every step of the journey, from germ to blossom and fruit, new possibilities arise, which are none the less wonderful because we know the intermediate stages. For the species and manner of the growth, and the certain law that governs it, cannot be explained by the slow process of development. No chemical or physical force can give the organism an opposite tendency. All changes affect the parts, not the form of the whole, which endures after the life of the individual. The germ forces the elements taken from its surroundings to enter into certain combinations with one another so as to produce a structure similar to itself. No reason whatever can be given why living matter should assume different elementary forms: why it should shape itself at one time into leaves and twigs, blossoms, fruit and thorns, and at another into muscle, nerve and bone, hair and nail. Nor do we know why these should blend with other groups of cells into a harmonious unit. . . . The biogenetical law, so much insisted upon in the doctrine of descent, merely shows that one and the same plan underlies the evolution of species and individuals. In this very fact, so thoroughly in keeping with the general character of the Cosmos, we admire the Creator's wisdom in forming individuals and species according to the same idea, and in combining unity and variety for the same end. . . .

Many a caterpillar crawls from the tree to the ground or to a wall to end there its chrysalis life. Then it passes a brief but happy existence as a butterfly, and lays its eggs on a leaf. We do not ask whence the living creature derived the power to do these things. But we are bound to ask how comes it that the creature invariably takes the right turn on an unknown road. How comes it that it always attains its end so surely, except some external obstacle besets its path? Are not necessity and purpose here joined in the closest bonds of wedlock? Does not this conformity to purpose, under the pressure of necessity, far surpass the greatest efforts of human genius? —(**Schanz,** *A Christian Apology*, v. 1, p. 251-3).

2°. Consimilis est processus artis et naturæ in suis operibus producendis ; ars enim naturam imitatur ; [1] *atqui* quæ arte producuntur, propter finem fiunt ; *ergo* etiam opera naturæ.[2] Ad rem **S. Thomas** : " Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in natura ; unde, si artificialia, ut domus, fierent a natura, hoc ordine fierent, quo nunc fiunt per artem ; *scil.*, prius institueretur fundamentum, et postea erigerentur parietes, et ultimo supponeretur tectum. Hoc modo procedit natura in iis, quæ sunt terræ affixa, *scil.*, plantis, quarum radices, quasi fundamentum, terræ infiguntur, stipes vero ad modum parietis elevatur in altum, frondes autem supereminent ad modum tecti. Et similiter si ea, quæ fiunt a natura, fierent ab arte, hoc modo fierent, sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura, ut patet in sanitate, quam contingit fieri et ab arte et a natura ; sicut enim natura sanat calefaciendo et infrigidando, ita et ars. Unde manifestum est, quod in natura est alterum propter alterum, *scil.*, priora propter posteriora, sicut et in arte " (*Phys., lib.* 2, *lect.*, 13).

—*Minoris* p. 2ª. **Ordinatio in finem fit a causa intelligente.** Quum singula agentia hujus mundi agant propter aliquem finem, per finem ad agendum moven-

[1] " Art," says Buffon, " finds its models in the works of nature : all man's inventions are only rude imitations of what nature has created in perfection "—(**Hettinger,** *op. cit.*, p. 90).

[2] Those who deny a divine design in the universe do not venture to deny the designs of men in human history, human science, human invention, and in the intellectual world of human creation. . . . I know *a priori* my own designs, and though I cannot know *a priori* the designs of the Creator, I can say, as my designs are to me, so I believe all that I see is to Him. . . . To act and live by design is the law of man's highest perfection : to act without design is to degrade his rational nature : to act with perverse design is to destroy himself. But if the whole history of human action is the history of design accomplished or frustrated by man, with what semblance of reason can any disputant say that by man alone the power and works of design are revealed, but that in the whole universe no proof of design can be discovered ? I fully accept Lord Bacon's declaration : " I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind "—(**Manning,** *Religio Viatoris*, p. 22).

tur ; finis enim tribuit causæ efficienti motivum, secundum quod agat. *Atqui* finis, quatenus movet causam efficientem, nondum existit *physice*, quum enim sit bonum attingendum per operationem, est ultimus in executione. Restat igitur (quum nihil possit nihil), ut existat *idealiter, i.e.*, ut existat in intentione alicujus causæ intelligentis. *Ergo* entia mundana tendunt in finem, quatenus ab aliqua intelligentia finem cognoscente illuc diriguntur.[1]

—*Minoris* p. 3ª. **Intelligentia omnia entia mundana in finem dirigens est Deus.** Entia mundana dirigun-

[1] Whence comes the adaptation of inanimate nature to the support of life ? The natural tendency of brute matter cannot explain it. The relation of brute matter to life is accidental to its nature. Whence then did the relation originate ? No satisfactory answer to this question can be given except this : that an Intelligent Ruler of this world arranged the material elements of which the universe is built up in such a way that they gradually become adapted to the service of living beings whose existence He intended and foresaw. This answer must be insisted upon all the more from the fact that man, the most noble being on earth, finds it rich with an innumerable multitude of things accommodated to his bodily and mental wants. As we have proved before, the soul of man is not the outgrowth of matter, but the work of an intelligent Creator only. No evolution of matter, of plants, and of animals, could culminate in the existence of man, composed of a human soul and a human body ; and yet matter and life inferior to man, conspire to furnish him what he needs for the maintenance of his body, and to help him in the cultivation of his intellect. Certainly no reasonable explanation of this great fact can be given but by recurring to an intelligent mind, superior to man and the irrational world, which arranged the latter ere man was created, with a view to prepare him a fit dwelling-place. " A successively increasing purpose," says Mivart, " runs through the irrational creation up to man. All the lower creatures have ministered to him, and have, as a fact, prepared the way for his existence. Therefore, whatever ends they also serve, they exist especially for him "—(**Boedder,** *Nat. Theol.*, p. 57).

Looking at the order and the aim of the universe, there is nothing but a dilemma : either admit that the forces of nature are intelligent, or admit that they are produced and governed by a Supreme Intelligence. " Although I declare myself an evolutionist and a follower of modern naturalism," wrote Prof. Tommasi, of Naples, " I confess that when I begin to consider the special connections of organisms, and contemplate their inner and wonderful structure, and seek a teleological reason for their respective functions, I am petrified, I waver in my convictions. And not once, but a hundred times, have I been obliged to exclaim : How is it possible that they could have been formed by the law of a mere mechanical evolution ?"—(**Ballerini-M'Loughlin,** *A Short Defence of Religion*, p. 13, ed. 2ª).

tur in finem non motu extrinseco sed mediante inclinatione ex eorum essentia promanante, et proinde entia mundana in sua ipsorum essentia a causa ordinatrice dependent ; *atqui* hanc dependentiam habere nequeunt, nisi quatenus hæc causa eis ipsum *esse* largita est, seu, quatenus est horum entium causa creatrix ; causam autem creatricem mundi dicimus Deum ; *ergo*.[1]

ART. III.

ARGUMENTA MORALIA.

41. Tria distinguuntur argumenta moralia pro Dei existentia, quæ sunt : *a*) argumentum desumptum ex naturali beatitudinis desiderio, quod omnes experiuntur (arg. eudæmonologicum, *εὐδαίμων* = *beatus*) ; *b*) argumentum fundatum in agnitione obligationis moralis (arg. deontologicum, *δέον* = *debitum*) ; *c*) argumentum fundatum in universali populorum persuasione de supremi numinis existentia (arg. ethnologicum, *ἔθνος* = *gens*).

[1] The tendency to order is intrinsic in the natural elements ; it is not a geometrical arrangement ; it is something essential, *e.g.*, take away chemical affinity and the element is destroyed. " Plant the shipbuilder's skill within the timber itself," writes Aristotle," and you have the mode in which nature produces." Thus the mind that imposed upon natural things an intrinsic tendency to order, must have made the essences of things as they are ; in other words, must have created them. . . . The wonderful harmony of creation, the marvellous unity of action among elements so different in kind, the combination of diverse tendencies to a common result, all show with unmistakable emphasis that a divine mind guides the universe and gave to all its elements their course and being—(**Driscoll,** *op. cit.*, p. 177).

The results of modern investigation establish the contention that matter bears the marks of manufacture quite as unmistakably in its elementary and primitive forms as in its combinations. All available evidence supports the conclusion that the Designer of the laws of matter is the cause of matter itself—(**Hall,** *op. cit.*, p. 160).

§ 1. Argumentum ex Desiderio Beatitudinis.

42. THESIS X.—Existentia Dei ut summi boni probatur ex desiderio beatitudinis animæ humanæ innato.

Stat. Quæst.—Beatitudo definitur : "*Bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum;*" (**S. Th.,** 1, 2, q. 2, a. 8), vel : "*Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus*" (*Boetius*). Distinctione facta inter beatitudinem *objectivam* (cui proprie convenit definitio S. Thomæ) et beatitudinem *subjectivam* (cui convenit definitio Boetii), prior est bonum perfectum vel aggregatio omnium bonorum, cujus adeptione plene satiatur appetitus rationalis ; altera autem est ipsa boni perfecti, seu aggregationis omnium bonorum, possessio plene quietans appetitum rationalem.

43. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Quum desiderium naturale, quo homo fertur in beatitudinem, nequeat esse illusorium, debet existere objectum, quo hoc desiderium expleri possit ; *atqui* numquam expleri potest nisi bono infinito ; *ergo* bonum infinitum, *i.e.*, Deus, existit.

Expl. maj., nempe, Desiderium beatitudinis nequit esse illusorium. 1°. Constat experientia vulgari et scientifica ea omnia existere objecta, in quæ entia inferiora appetitu naturali feruntur ; nisi igitur existit objectum aptum ad explendam insuperabilem tendentiam, quam homo experitur, in beatitudinem, dicendum est inter omnia entia mundana solum nobilissimum (*scil.*, hominem) in meram chimæram vi suæ naturæ ferri, et in eo pulcherrimum ordinem teleologicum totius mundi visibilis plane corruere ; quod affirmare perabsurdum est et errorem Pessimismi necessario inducit.[1]

[1] Let us suppose it to be impossible for man ever to attain to happiness. What would thence follow ? His natural powers would be unable to discharge their chief function, though fully adapted to it ; his innate tendencies, however strong, would be without a real object ; his longing, though ruled by reason, would always be ultimately directed to an unattainable end. Do we notice anything of that kind

2°. Desiderium beatitudinis, utpote ex natura humana emergens, et in bonum *totius* hominis, non tantum alicujus partis vel facultatis, se extendens, est radix psychologica omnium desideriorum particularium, quæ voluntas habere potest. Sic, *v.g.*, si quæritur, cur homo amet aut desideret scientiam, sanitatem, divitias, ludum, etc., cur fugiat morbos, ignominiam, annihilationem, etc., semper responderi potest, id ea ex causa esse, quia appetit beatitudinem, ad quam adipiscendam quasdam res conferre, quasdam obstare videt. Quare, voluntas in omni actu objectum beatitudinis interpretative appetere dicitur. Jamvero, voluntas non potest tendere in aliquod objectum nisi intellectus (formaliter vel saltem virtualiter) judicet tale objectum esse adeptu possibile. Unde, si non existit objectum aptum ad explendam totam appetitus rationalis capacitatem, error invincibilis est fundamentum omnis appetitus entium rationalium, et natura rationalis per se et essentialiter fallax est, atque, quod consequens est, omnia, quæ insunt Scepticismo universali, absurda amplecti debemus.[1]

in irrational nature ? Are there in plants or animals organs without corresponding functions, natural tendencies which must always fail, necessary desires which cannot be satisfied, and so are a source of continual torment, activities naturally directed to objects which do not and cannot exist ? No, nature does nothing in vain, nor is there anything useless in it. This saying of Aristotle is amply verified by modern science and daily illustrated by experience. Shall not the same axiom hold true with regard to man, the crown of creation ? Shall nature which everywhere else is order, regularity, and beauty, in him be disorder and confusion ? Shall it, when it has become rational and has attained to its highest perfection, be a labyrinth of incongruities ? Shall reason itself turn out an absurdity and monstrous self-contradiction ? . . .

The happiness, then, of which we are capable, owing to our intrinsic constitution ; the happiness which we desire not only in our childhood or in an inferior state of civilization, but most strongly when our mental life is fully developed ; the happiness, the longing for which is the most powerful spring of action and incitement to progress, bears within itself evidence both of its attainableness and of the reality of its object—(**Ming**, S.J., *Data of Modern Ethics Examined*, p. 96).

[1] Everybody's experience tells him that the great master-trait of man's nature is its inborn desire for happiness, or its longing to possess an object that by its qualities will completely content the

Prob. min. 1°. *Experientia.* Quo plura bona finita assequuntur homines, eo plura et majora appetunt, quod sane signum infallibile est appetitum humanum bonis finitis beari non posse, siquidem pro eorum accessione non minuitur sed augetur appetitus; aliter vero res esset, si bona finita essent media ad desiderium beatitudinis quietandum proportionata.

2°. *Ratione.* Objectum proprium appetitus rationalis est bonum ut sic; *atqui* nullum bonum finitum nec omnia simul sunt bonum ut sic, quum ex intrinseca natura sua defectibilia et limitata sint; *ergo* in illis non potest voluntas plene quiescere, sed necessario tendit ad bonum omnem defectum et limitem excludens, *scil.*, ad bonum infinitum. Unde *S. Thomas:* "Impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum. . . . Objectum autem voluntatis, quæ est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum, sicut objectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis nisi

human heart. This desire is rooted in man's rational nature; directly it emanates from the will, but its basis is laid in the operations of the intellect. Of this the special object is truth, and since the true differs from the good only in relation, the universally true will also be equivalently the universally good. What the intellect apprehends as true, is the measure of what the will embraces as good.

Being engrafted on man's rational nature, the desire for happiness is manifested by him in various ways. Whether he plays, or reads, or walks, whether he tries to escape disease, or ignominy, or confinement, it is happiness that he seeks for. To this he naturally strives to make all things contribute; and though the desire of it, sometimes satiated by indulgence, may cause him in particular instances disgust, it will not, for all that, be thoroughly satiated. Now a desire so radically interwoven with man's nature, and so supreme and unconquerable in its tendency, must necessarily have an object to satisfy it. Claim that its end is void, that it is a feint set within man for his deception, and forthwith you open the way for universal scepticism. If the will has no real object for the full contentment of its desires, why should the intellect have one for the real ground of its thoughts? And if it has not, then the true no more exists objectively than does the good; so that here in life we are only striving to catch after shadows, and are living in a sort of dream-land—(**Ronayne**, *op. cit.*, p. 279).

bonum universale ; quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed in solo Deo " (1, 2, q. 2, a. 8).[1]

44. Obj. 1. Desiderium beatitudinis, Deo non existente, non esset frustra ; inservire enim posset ut incitamentum, quo homines ad agendum moverentur, atque ita scientia ac cultura semper ad majorem perfectionem adducerentur ; *ergo*.

Resp. *Dist. antec.* Desiderium beatitudinis, Deo non existente, non esset frustra, si aliud daretur objectum hujus desiderii satiativum, *conc. ;* secus, *neg. Dist. prob. additam.* Inservire posset ut incitamentum, si homo ut medium subordinaretur scientiæ et culturæ progressui, *conc. ;* vice versa, si scientia et cultura hominis perfectioni subordinari debent, *neg.* Si finis desiderii beatitudinis, quod experimur, esset nos ad agendum impellere, natura nobis indidisset amorem laboris potiusquam amorem fructus laboris et bonitatis infinitæ.

Obj. 2. Appetitus rationalis plene satiari potest in amore infinitæ bonitatis idealis; *ergo* desiderium beatitudinis non probat existentiam entis infinitæ bonitatis.

[1] Huc pertinent hæc verba, quæ a *cl. Cronin* excerpimus et nostra facimus : " The reader should compare and contrast the argument here given and the modernist view of the proof for God's existence, which latter view we condemn as, not only untrue, but as contradictory and absurd. The modernist view is that the existence of God is not provable intellectually, that yet we know Him to exist because of a feeling of need for God—a feeling by means of which we are brought into direct communication with Him and perceive Him in some way, or feel Him, as truly, though perhaps not so clearly, as we feel many individual objects of the sensuous world. But being perceived by feeling only, we can only apprehend God as phenomenon.—His noumenal or real existence, it is said, is hidden from us.

" Now this modernist theory is opposed in every way to the line of argument followed in the text. For (1) the argument given in the text is merely used in confirmation of the other intellectual arguments . . . such as the argument for the necessity of a first cause, arguments which, we maintain, establish God's existence beyond all possibility of doubt. (2) The argument in the text is itself an intellectual argument and proof of God's real noumenal existence. We know that the natural end of a natural appetite must be real. And hence we argue that, since God is the end of the natural appetite of the will, He must be real. (3) Our argument does not presuppose that our intellect apprehends God immediately. . . . Our argument, following Aquinas, is that the immediate and formal object of intellect is being-in-general, and that of the will is good-in-general, but since God is the only thing that can fully exhaust the capacity of these objects and of the faculties that concern them, He is our ultimate end, and real "—(*The Science of Ethics*, v. 1, p. 72).

Resp. *Neg. supposita*, scil., 1um, quod dari potest bonitas idealis absque infinita bonitate reali; ordo enim idealis fundatur in ordine reali; nec potest bonitas idealis, utpote existentia carens, dici infinita. 2um, quod appetitus amore prosequitur idealia seu mere possibilia, qua talia; non enim res ideales sed existentes appetimus; si quando autem idealia amare videmur, ratio est, quia ea ut realitates fingimus. Deinde, satis absurdum est hominem et reliqua viventia ad ens ideale ut ad ultimum finem ordinari.

Obj. 3. Plures carent desiderio boni infiniti; contenti enim essent, si divites, honorati, amati, inter cives semper vivere possent.

Resp. Nec umquam assequuntur illam beatitudinem terrenam, quam desiderant. Admittere igitur debent vitam alteram, in qua felicitas hic frustra quæsita est adeptu possibilis. "Deinde falluntur illi homines. Si omnia illa bona eis obvenirent, tunc tandem intelligerent, quam longe distarent a plena quiete et perfecta beatitudine; intelligerent ultra illa bona voluntatem nostram naturali impetu ferri, quia secundum rei veritatem plena voluntatis quies, quam omnes quærunt, non habetur nisi in bono infinito. Habent igitur etiam hi homines (interpretative) desiderium boni infiniti, quia quærunt plenam voluntatis quietem, quæ de facto nulla est, nisi in bono infinito. Denique hic non quæritur, qua re quidam ex vitio proprio contenti sunt, sed ad quid naturæ humanæ congenita excellentia nobilia pectora et sana corda pellat"—(**Hontheim**, p. 218).

§ 2. Argumentum ex Existentia Obligationis Moralis.

45. THESIS XI.—Existentia Dei ut legislatoris supremæ et absolutæ auctoritatis probatur ex lege morali, quæ voce conscientiæ nobis innotescit.[1]

Stat. Quæst.—Legis est obligare. Obligatio autem est necessitas moralis a voluntate superioris imposita aliquid faciendi vel omittendi.

[1] To Newman and others the argument from conscience, or the sense of moral responsibility, has seemed the most intimately persuasive of all the arguments for God's existence, while to it alone Kant allowed an absolute value. But this is not an independent argument, although, properly understood, it serves to emphasize a point in the general *a posteriori* proof which is calculated to appeal with particular force to many minds. It is not that conscience, as such, contains a direct revelation or intuition of God as the author of the moral law, but that taking man's sense of moral responsibility as a phenomenon to be explained, no ultimate explanation can be given except by supposing the existence of a Superior and Lawgiver whom man is bound to obey. And just as the argument

Dicitur 1°.) *necessitas*, quia adstringit voluntatem ad unum modum agendi.

Dicitur 2°.) *moralis*, quia non est vis physica, quæ adimit libertatem, sed ea, quæ, mediante cognitione, movet voluntatem ad actum ponendum vel omittendum, salva libertate psychologica (*Psych.*, n. 326).

Dicitur 3°.) *a voluntate superioris imposita*, quia obligatio non oritur a voluntate, inclinatione, passione vel habitibus subjecti, sed imponitur a persona realiter a subjecto obligato distincta et respectu ejusdem aliqua auctoritate prædita.[1]

Jamvero, obligatio moralis, quam homines sentiunt, adeo absoluta eis apparet, ut nullum bonum finitum sit ratio sufficiens, cur ab ea eximantur. Hæc persuasio in mente humana existens inde solum explicari potest, quod voluntas agendo contra obligationem moralem spernit bonum infinitum.[2]

Obs. Non eo tendit hoc argumentum, ut in mente gignat primam Dei cognitionem, quum conceptus moralis obligationis absolutæ aliquo modo (*scil.*, implicite et confuse) involvat conceptum Dei ut legislatoris ; sed ejus scopus est, ut hic Dei conceptus implicite contentus in sensu obligationis moralis, quem omnes experiuntur, explicitus fiat. " Clara cognitio obligationis moralis non supponit

from design brings out prominently the attribute of intelligence, so the argument from conscience brings out the attribute of holiness in the First Cause and self-existent Personal Being with whom we must ultimately identify the Designer and the Lawgiver—(**Toner**, *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 6, p. 611).

[1] We are compelled to describe the relation of conscience to human conduct in terms of authority. But authority over our conduct has no meaning except as possessed by a person other than ourselves—(**Hall**, *op. cit.*, p. 180).

[2] The connection between the moral order and our last end is absolutely necessary. It is based on the nature of things. For while wickedness is of itself opposed to our ultimate end, virtuous actions are the only way leading to its attainment. . . . Hence the absolutely unchangeable alternative results for us, either to forfeit our end and final happiness, or to act morally, either to renounce our supreme good, or to conform our conduct to right reason. No other obligation is so stringent, so absolute, so evidently divine. Its every element is of absolute necessity : the end and the connection of the means with it, the nature of things, the will of the Deity, the dictate of reason, and the innate longing of the will for felicity—(**Ming**, *op, cit.*, p. 178).

necessario claram et distinctam cognitionem existentiæ Dei, licet sine cognitione ejus aliqua saltem confusa consistere non potest" (**Franzelin**, *De Deo uno*, p. 57).

46. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Obligatio moralis nobis manifestat ens, quod sit bonum infinitum, quodque absoluta auctoritate potiatur ; *atqui* tale ens consensu omnium est Deus ; *ergo*.

Prob. majoris p. 1ª. . . . **ens, quod sit bonum infinitum** ; simul namque ac cognoscimus aliquam actionem esse nobis præceptam vel vetitam lege morali, respectu talis actionis experimur in nobis obligationem plane absolutam, quæ omnem exceptionem excludit. Nimirum, intime sentimus nullum bonum finitum cum transgressione legis moralis fortasse conjunctum, nullum malum, quod vitari posset legem violando, tanti esse, ut actionem reddant licitam vel excusabilem. Jamvero, voluntati, utpote essentialiter ordinatæ in bonum idque solum, non potest imponi necessitas moralis nisi a bono, et proinde obligatio absoluta, quæ præferenda est omnibus quibuscumque bonis finitis, nonnisi a bono infinito imponi potest ; irrationabiliter enim voluntas, quippe quæ appetit omne bonum, a bono finito ligaretur. *Ergo* obligatio moralis manifestat ens, quod sit bonum infinitum.

Hoc confirmatur ex eo, quod bonum universi requirit, ut omnes res, quæque pro sua natura, adigantur ad suum ordinem actionibus proportionatis complendum ; secus enim essentialiter manca esset natura. Patet autem res naturales physica necessitate adigi ad suum finem ; similiter igitur requiritur, ut entia rationalia, in quæ necessitas physica cadere non potest, in suis operationibus ligentur necessitate orta ex cognito nexu operationis cum bono infinito seu fine ultimo.[1]

[1] Rationally we infer from the adaptation of parts to parts and to the whole in the material world the existence of its intelligent author, but in the moral world it is not mere brute matter that is co-ordinated in its relations, but the free, intelligent actions of rational beings. They freely think, and will, and desire, and resolve, and yet on the

—*Majoris* p. 2ª. . . . **ens, quod absoluta auctoritate potiatur.**—Cum sensu obligationis inseparabiliter conjungitur sensus dependentiæ et subjectionis. Dictamen enim conscientiæ de obligatione se nobis tanta auctoritate et imperio manifestat, ut absolutam obedientiam, posthabitis quibuscumque in contrarium allicientibus vel urgentibus, ei deberi intime sentiamus.[1] Unde, qui huic dictamini obtemperare renuunt, angores et timores animæ experiuntur, et non raro sensu criminis admissi vehementer cruciantur.

Jamvero, hic sensus dependentiæ et subjectionis *a*) non habet sui causam in ulla lege humana ; sæpe enim sentitur, quando nulla lex humana urget, immo clare cognoscimus ideo leges humanas justas esse et obligationem nobis imponere, quia eas in aliquo universaliori et magis fundamentali principio obligationis inniti, ac exinde vim suam haurire conspicimus ; [2] *b*) non procedit

whole they feel that they are under the constraining power of a law that is around them and in them. No man can escape that law ;— universal in its scope, it bears on all men at all times. . . . Now the order which thus rests on a universal law must have for its author an intelligent, ethical Being of universal sovereignty. It is an order, too, which, as it is based on the essential distinction between moral actions and the fundamental relations of men to their destiny, must be grounded on law eternal and unconditioned. Consequently this law of right and wrong, of truth and justice, must always remain unchanged, thereby proclaiming, since it is necessary and determinate, its author to be a necessary and deterimnate Being— (**Ronayne**, *op. cit.*, p. 284).

[1] The moral law, as revealed to the human race in the form of conscience, is a fact of the very highest importance. It is no mere notion, but a command, a positive law, to which man, free agent as he is, feels compelled to submit. It stands out as the most unassailable certainty of our personal consciousness. The voice of conscience is the expression of a Higher Will, claiming from us unhesitating and unvarying obedience. No power in this world, no effort, not even the strength of habit itself, can silence conscience. It is enthroned at the centre of man's being, and He who made man has given him the light of conscience by which to direct his way— (**Tilm. Pesch**, *The Christian Philosophy of Life*, p. 36).

[2] Before the existence of civil society, before constitutions were framed and human laws were enacted, there must have been some rules of conduct, already possessing a binding force. . . . If so there must have been a standard of right based on nature itself, and anterior to all human legislation. Again, when legislators devise a system of rules to prevent the clashing of rights and the conflict of

ex nostra natura rationali, tum quia nemo est sibi ipsi superior, nec proinde potest quis sibi ligamen morale imponere, tum quia offensa contra naturam rationalem potest quidem tristitiam causare, minime autem valet ad excitandum timorem et persuasionem pœnæ inferendæ a legislatore invisibili, mali vindice; tum denique et e contra, quia qui, spretis difficultatibus, quæ forte obstant, internæ voci conscientiæ obsecundat, pace et lætitia animæ fruitur atque expectatione præmii a remuneratore superno confortatur.[1]

Præterea, si homines sibi vere falseve persuadent se

interests, they must have before their minds an ideal of justice anterior to human rules and binding on the human will: this ideal cannot be derived from the laws which they are just then engaged in framing, for the effect cannot exist before the cause, and *an imitation presupposes a model*. Lastly, when unjust or pernicious laws have been enacted, and the people wish them to be repealed and replaced by just and beneficial laws, whence do the citizens derive their ideal of what a law ought to be? Certainly not from the existing legislation, since the modification or reversal of this legislation is demanded; then the people must appeal to a higher standard, which existed before the passing of the obnoxious laws, and which has remained unchanged despite the sins of legislators—(**Holaind,** S.J., *Natural Law and Legal Practice,* p. 37).

[1] If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, *this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible,* before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father, *we certainly have within us the image of some person,* to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings in us are such as *require for their exciting cause an intelligent being:* we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction in breaking mere human laws: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and, on the other had, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. "The wicked flees, when no one pursueth"; then why does he flee? Whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, *the Object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine;* and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of *a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive*—(**Newman,** *Grammar of Assent,* c. 5, § 1).

transgressionem contra legem expiasse, timere desinunt, licet offensa contra naturam rationalem maneat, et sæpissime etiam tristitia animæ de hac offensa. Tandem, ut alias rationes omittamus, hac ex causa scelesti quandoque ad Atheismum vel Agnosticismum confugiunt, ut per dubium circa existentiam supremi legislatoris et judicis aliquantulum mitigent remorsum conscientiæ et formidinem luendi pœnas suorum scelerum.

Jamvero, quum præter legislatorem humanum et naturam rationalem non detur ens finitum, quod ullo modo potest voluntati humanæ ligamen morale imponere, restat, ut obligatio absoluta moralis repetatur ab ente infinito, quod suprema auctoritate homines adigit ad legis moralis observantiam.

47. II.—Quum falsitas sit malum hominis, qua talis, et veritas ejus bonum proprium, plane absurdum est, *a*) ut error sit fundamentum omnis virtutis et rectitudinis moralis ; et, e contra, *b*) ut veritas sit fons omnium vitiorum, quibus genus humanum coinquinari possit ; *atqui* ita res se habet, si Deus non existit ; *ergo*.

Prob. min. *a*) Experientia constat persuasionem de Dei existentia tamquam summi boni voluntatis, tamquam supremi legislatoris omne malum prohibentis et punientis, esse solum medium efficaciter a vitiis deterrens et ad virtutem perducens ; *atqui* hæc persuasio, Deo non existente, est erronea, et proinde error est principium omnis virtutis et rectitudinis moralis.

b) Fons omnium vitiorum est solutio voluntatis a vinculo morali ; negata enim Dei existentia, aufertur conceptus legis et legislatoris, præmii et pœnæ, verbo, omne motivum, quo homo ad vitia proclivis impellatur ad agendum moraliter seu accommodate ad suam naturam rationalem. *Atqui* in hypothesi facta solutio voluntatis ab omni vinculo morali innititur in veritate ; *ergo* in tali hypothesi veritas est fons omnium vitiorum.[1]

[1] No error can be held to be a necessary element in the conservation of the race, but the conviction that God truly exists is indis-

Unde intelligitur, cur Rousseau, Voltaire aliique Athei fateantur ab Atheismo nullam virtutem, sed e contra omnem improbitatem sponte et per se manare.[1]

48. *Dices :* Maxima flagitia nonnumquam committunt homines, qui Deum esse agnoscunt ; falso igitur Athei speciali ratione nota nequitiæ inuruntur.

Resp. Magnum existit discrimen inter Atheos et Theistas male viventes ; hi enim quasi per accidens pec-

pensable, whether for the conservation of the race at large, or of human society, hence this conviction is not error, but truth. . . .

To deny the existence of God is to affirm man's independence ; here is the source of every form of evil. Apart from the knowledge of God, society would be no more than a mere collection of arrogant fools and lovers of sensual delights, whom nothing—not even the dread of the knout—could restrain from mutual destruction.

Many centuries ago we find Plato asserting that " the very foundations of human society are undermined by him who seeks to oust religion," whilst Plutarch avers that " it is easier to build a city in the air than to impart stability to a society which disclaims belief in the supernatural." Frederick II. of Prussia used to say that the great mass of the people was *canaille* with which he would be sorry to have to do if God were left out of count, and his words apply, not merely to the masses, but with still greater force to the " upper classes," and to humanity as a whole. When some world-renowned savant is found to assert, " There is no God," the words reach the ears of him who rules, and he forthwith adds, " Then justice is nothing but a shadow." The trader hears, and says, " There is no longer any need to be an honest man." The thief and the assassin whisper to themselves, " Away with remorse ! none but a fool would cherish it." The young man who is being hurried away along by the tide of passion says boldly, " There is no such thing as virtue after all." The downtrodden toiler hears, and asks himself, " What is the good of work or patience ? " The people hear, and obedience to authority seems henceforth the merest folly.—(**T. Pesch**, *The Christian Philosophy of Life*, p. 36).

[1] Shun, shun those who, under the pretence of explaining nature, sow in the hearts of men the most dispiriting doctrines, whose scepticism is far more affirmative and dogmatical than the decided tone of their adversaries. Under pretence of being themselves the only people enlightened, they imperiously subject us to their magisterial decisions, and would fain palm upon us, for the true causes of things, the unintelligible systems they have erected in their own heads ; whilst they overturn, destroy, and trample under foot all that mankind reveres, snatch from the afflicted the only comfort left them in their misery, from the rich and great the only curb that can restrain their passions, tear from the heart all remorse of vice, all hopes of virtue ; they still boast themselves benefactors of mankind, " Truth," they say, " is never hurtful to man,"—I believe that as well as they, *and the same, in my opinion, is proof that what they teach is not the truth*—(**Rousseau** apud *Lambert, Answers to Atheists*, p. 109).

cant, nimirum dum bene cognitas habent veritates de Dei existentia, de ejus contra peccatum præceptis et minis, etc., Athei autem vi sui principii ad peccandum rapiuntur, sublato omni motivo, quo efficaciter refrenentur.[1]

§ 3. Argumentum ex Consensu Generis Humani.

49. THESIS XII.—Existentia Dei ut supremi numinis colendi probatur ex universali generis humani consensu in aliqua divinitate agnoscenda.

Stat. Quæst.—Thesis est de consensu moraliter universali. Unde, nihil detrahitur veritati thesis, si alicubi existit gens omni notione divinitatis destituta. Quid enim ponderis tribui potest uni alterive genti in comparatione ad totum reliquum genus humanum ? Porro, gentes, quæ hujus ignorantiæ insimulantur, plane barbaræ sunt et vitam more pecorum degunt ; in quibus igitur non quærendum est quid ratio humana naturaliter dictet ; sed potius in hac sicut in ceteris rebus ut monstra naturæ rationalis habendæ sunt.[2] Nec facile

[1] The intellect perverted in any way distorts principles, judgments, and laws. And twenty errors in practice are as nothing compared with one error in principle. Twenty errors in practice may be corrected and the twenty-first may never be committed ; but one erroneous principle is like a damaged wheel in a machine. It can never work correctly afterwards. One speculative error will produce an infinite series of practical errors. . . . There has sprung up . . . a school of men who tell us that the Absolute is unknowable, and that we can know nothing about God. They say that they do not deny the existence of God, because they know nothing about Him. But if we know nothing about God, we can know nothing about His law. If we reject the Lawgiver, at the same time we reject the law. And if we know nothing about the law of God, what can we know about right and wrong ? what can we know about morality. And, therefore, if we know nothing of God, we know nothing of morality. God and the moral law come and go together—(**Manning,** *Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost,* p. 323).

[2] In seeking for peoples that know no God, who live without faith or worship, where do our philosophers go ? Do they select for their inquiries peoples that have stood on the highest pinnacle of civilization. . . . No, not they. But they go to some cannibal South Sea island, scarce touched by the foot or known to the science of the white man, or to some degraded and wretched African tribe, and then, with these specimens, dug from the very heart of the most

credendum est testimonio illorum, qui affirmant tales existere gentes ; hi enim testes, ut plurimum, vel carent *scientia*, quippe qui cursim et velut a longe perscrutati sunt harum gentium opiniones et sensus circa divinitatem ; vel carent *veracitate*, eo quod studentes partibus impiorum, qui omni religioni bellum ingerunt, proni sunt referre, non quod verum est, sed quod suo fini irreligioso favere reputant.

Deinde, non quæritur consensus in cognitione clara nullique errori admixta, sed in cognitione qualitercumque rudimentaria, qua nimirum divinitas sub aliqua nota sibi propria (*v.g.*, entis supramundani, timendi, placandi, colendi) ut existens apprehenditur.

50. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Inter omnes homines existit ineradicabilis persuasio de alicujus numinis supremi existentia ; *atqui* hæc persuasio non potest prodire nisi a natura rationali, et proinde infallibiliter vera est ; *ergo*.

Maj. constat 1°. *ex testibus*. Viatores, historici, philosophi, pœtæ omnium generis humani ætatum testantur omnes gentes aliquam religionem professas esse et aliquod ens supremum reverendum ac colendum admisisse. Ita docent inter paganos Plato, Aristoteles, Seneca, Homerus, Plutarchus, etc. ; et inter christianos SS. Aug., Justin, et reliqui patres, ut videri potest apud *Franzelin* (*op. cit.*, p. 95).

Viri edocti, qui mores hodiernorum populorum accurate explorarunt, eos circa entis supremi existentiam consentientes invenerunt.[1] Quæ autem a quibusdam

dismal barbarism, they come forward and cry : " Behold, peoples who acknowledge no God ! " Well, then, let us accept the specimen, and only answer, " Compare that atheistic race of yours with our theistic races, and let the distance between cannibalism and Christian culture measure the space that divides peoples who believe in no God and peoples who believe in Him, and have laboured to follow His Spirit and fulfil His ends—(**Fairbairn,** *City of God*, p. 87).

[1] Some sort of belief in the Divine has prevailed, so far as our sure knowledge extends, in every age, in every race, and in every clime. The evidence of this fact consists mainly in the universal pre-

in contrarium afferuntur, nullius sunt valoris ; debentur enim observationi male institutæ, præjudiciis aliisve causis non scientificis.[1]

—2°. *ex monumentis.* Apud omnes gentes inveniuntur monumenta ad cultum divinitatis ordinata, ut templa, aræ, necnon sacrificia, legesque formam cultus præscribentes ; quæ omni procul dubio proclamant universalem persuasionem de existentia alicujus entis supremi. Accedit, quod in omnibus linguis abundant vocabula, quibus numen supremum, modo ut pater, modo ut judex, modo ut dominus omnium visibilium designatur ; linguæ autem, ut notum est, exprimunt intimam animæ persuasionem.[2]

valence of religion. It is now acknowledged by the foremost specialists in this subject that no race, however debased, can be found in which religion is wholly wanting—(**Hall,** *The Being of God,* p. 109).

[1] Taylor tells us that, " judging from the mass of evidence before us we are forced to admit that the belief in spiritual things is universal among the lower types of humanity ; whilst the contrary assertion is based on modern sources more or less untrustworthy. For the statement that there are races without religion rests on testimony often misapplied, and never conclusive." . . . So also Max Müller : " The real point to settle before we adopt one or other view (the religion or irreligion of savages) is what kind of authority can be deduced from those whose opinions we quote ; did they really know the language, and did they know it, not only sufficiently well to converse on ordinary subjects, but to enter into a friendly and unreserved conversation on topics on which even highly educated people are apt to misunderstand each other. . . . Savages are shy and silent in the presence of white men, and they have a superstitious reluctance against mentioning even the names of their gods. Not many years ago it was supposed, on good authority, that the Zulus had no religious ideas at all : at present our very Bishops (Protestant) have been silenced by their theological inquiries." We are justified, then, in saying that as yet we have no reliable evidence of any single nation utterly devoid of religious sentiment. And, further, that in those isolated groups which are wholly irreligious their reasoning faculty is absolutely undeveloped, and their condition simply amounts to brutish—(**Hettinger,** *op. cit.,* p 74).

[2] Theism is latent in the inferior religions, whether we regard them as seeds of future growth or as the result of a falling away from higher and purer forms. And this is borne out by the fact that the study of the languages employed by savages, and the knowledge gained by those who observe their practices and conversation at closer range show the existence of a latent consciousness of a Supreme Being, which superstition is not able wholly to eradicate. To realize the nature and significance of this consensus, however, we should notice that it becomes more determined and unqualified

Prob. min. **Hæc persuasio prodit ex natura rationali.** Etenim, quum sit factum constans et universale, explicari nequit nisi recurrendo ad causam pariter constantem et universalem. Quam causam nisi cognitam comprehensamque animis haberent homines, "non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum sæculis ætatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. Etenim videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse. . . . *Opinionum enim commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat*" (**Cicero,** *De nat. Deor., lib.* 2, c. 2).[1] *Atqui* præter naturam rationalem non datur alia causa ad hanc universalem et apud omnes fixam ac firmatam persuasionem gignendam proportionata. Quodsi hac in re hujusmodi causæ existunt, prout Athei affirmant, revocari debent "ad ignorantiam vel præjudicia mentis vel sensuum deceptionem, ad vanam spem vel inanem timorem appetitus, ad pravam denique educationem, vel ad hominum (*v.c.*, sacerdotum) fraudem et conspirationem. *Atqui* hæ causæ vel nullæ sunt, vel plane impares huic effectui producendo. Etenim persuasio hæc excedit captum sensuum, atque firmior et luculentior evadit, quo magis, vera scientia succrescente, ad trutinam revocatur. *Ergo* repeti nequit vel ex sensuum illusione, vel ex ignara aut præjudicata mente. Deinde, ad spem vel ad timorem quod attinet, persuasionem subaudiunt, non primo progignunt; nec insuper effectum adeo uniformem et constantem haberent,

with the advance of knowledge and thought. The higher races possess the most definite theistic convictions—(**Hall,** *op. cit.*, p. 112; *cf. Driscoll*, p. 42).

[1] That that "wherein all by nature agree must be true," is a conclusion rightly drawn by Cicero. Or could a man in his senses venture to tax the whole of mankind with an error in their consciousness? No lie can last for ever; only truth is eternal. If the consciousness of God were an error, it would, like any other error, have long ago vanished, But instead of this, we see it propagating itself with growing power through all the ages—(**Christlieb,** *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 142).

nisi ex ipsa natura profluerent, quæ profecto per se non tendit ad errorem. Educatio denique, hominum fraus et conspiratio, res est nimis varia, quæ proinde in hoc uno constans et uniformis esse non potuit : ea etiam persuasionem Divinitatis subaudit, atque adeo huic opinioni originem dare non potuit. Atque illud etiam præteriri non debet, quod si quæ sunt causæ erroris, eæ potius ad Atheismum inclinant. Deum quippe nec sensus percipiunt, nec phantasia imaginatur, nec libido exoptat. Atqui nemo est qui ignoret errores fere omnes, qui humanum genus deturpant, ex hoc triplici fonte promanare. Si igitur, quamvis hæc omnia obsisterent, immota in humano genere mansit persuasio Divinitatis, necesse est ut causam habeat plane ineluctabilem. Atqui hæc alia esse non potest nisi ipsa natura rationalis, non accidentaria quæpiam deceptionis causa" (**Schiffini,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 38).

Prob. cons. **Hæc persuasio est infallibiliter vera.**— Persuasio enim, quæ in ipsa natura rationali innititur atque ex ea constanter et universaliter enascitur, est necessario vera ; quodsi res aliter esset, ratio humana natura sua nos in errorem duceret, nec esset effugium contra Scepticismum universalem.[1]

51. *Dices :* Multi eruditissimi præsertim inter naturalium scientiarum cultores Atheismum profitentur.

[1] This universal consent of nations can only have its origin in an evidence of the existence of a deity to be worshipped. Else it must be admitted that human reason has a natural bias towards falsehood. If, in practically every case, reason has reached the conclusion that issues in this common accord of peoples without sufficient evidence, then undoubtedly reason is on the whole untrustworthy and insecure. . . . And therefore, to save ourselves from the stultifying thought that reason may be essentially unreasonable and the human intellect a guide to error instead of to truth, we must admit that a deity does indeed exist, and that the evidence of the existence of God is the only cause to which can be assigned the common consent of mankind regarding it. Nor is such a conclusion in any way strained or unnatural. The demonstrative arguments already presented to the reader are in no sense new or wonderful. . . . And they are so exceedingly natural and rational that, even if not consciously elaborated, they are capable of producing and rationally accounting for this common conclusion of the human race— (**Aveling,** *op. cit.*, p. 151)."

Resp. Exinde minime debilitatur vis argumenti ex consensu generis humani desumpti, qui non ut metaphysice, sed tantum ut moraliter universalis supponitur; nam qui Atheismum vel Agnosticismum profitentur paucissimi sunt, si cum toto genere humano comparentur. Quod vero attinet ad quosdam eorum, qui edocti reputantur, dicendum est horum auctoritatem prorsus eliminari auctoritate aliorum qui perennem influxum in progressum scientiarum exercuerunt, v.g., Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Kepler, Newton, Laplace, Herschel, Cuvier, Secchi, Pasteur, Volta, Ampére, Kelvin, Preston, Röntgen, Marconi, Curie, etc., qui omnes ex studio scientiarum naturalium magis magisque fuerunt adducti ad agnoscendum mundi Creatorem ejusque sapientiam ac providentiam laudandam.[1] Nec

[1] Hac in re *cf. American Ecclesiastical Review*, Nov. '03, art. *The attitude of modern scientists towards religion*, **Schwickerath**, S.J. . . . "Having finished this brief survey of the scientists of the nineteenth century we may now ask: Is it true that the large majority of the great scientists are opposed to Christianity? We must deny this most emphatically. We have met with the names of the greatest scientists of the century, and have found that they believe in the existence of God and the spirituality and immortality of the soul. And these are practically the only questions which come into consideration in strictly scientific investigation. . . . Besides those who admit the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, we have met with a considerable number of first-class scientists who profess themselves sincere Christians, and not a few of them are devout Catholics. Fr. Kneller has made the following apt observation: Suppose an infidel scientist, in his hatred of Christianity, would proudly refuse to accept any discovery made by a Christian scientist—the poor man would be in a sorry plight. Is he a chemist? he has to do without Berzelius, Dumas, Liebig, Deville, Chevreul, that is, about the whole of modern chemistry would have to be discovered by him. Is he a physicist? he has to prescind in electricity from the discoveries of Galvani, Volta, Ampére, Faraday, that is, from nearly everything that is known in this field. In optics, he would have to go back to the times before Fresnel, Fraunhofer, Fizeau, and would have to take up the antiquated theories of emissions; in calorics, little would be left without Mayer and Joule. In astronomy, he has to renounce everything that has been discovered by Fraunhofer's telescopes. So much about the theoretical part. But what would our proud infidel do in active life, in industry and commerce? The unfortunate man has to sit in the dark, unless he is willing to take the old tallow candle, for stearine he owes to the Catholic Chevreul; he has to put out his electric lamps, for the electric current cannot be used without the measurements of the pious Catholics Ampére and Volta, nor can

mirum hoc est, quia nullum existit in natura phænomenon, nullum in scientiis problema, quod, si paulo attentius et intimius perscrutetur, non necessario proclamet existentiam causæ primæ omnes res mundanas creantis ac continuo gubernantis. Unde, qui scientiis naturalibus addicti Dei existentiam non agnoscunt, id non faciunt quasi coacti evidentia scientifica, sed aut quia, nolentes Deum existere, ex scientiis aliquas apparentes rationes excudere conantur, quibus veluti aliquo fundamento innixi jus adipiscantur ejus existentiam negandi vel saltem de ea dubitandi ; aut quia haud profunde sapiunt in scientiis, quas ut Dei existentiam excludentes effutiunt.[1]

52. Scholion Generale.—Hic per modum coronidis juvabit colligere malas sequelas, quas in omnem ordinem rerum Atheismus introducit. Eas nervose sic enumerat **Tongiorgi** (*Theol. Nat.*, p. 357).

53. Atheismus "**I. Sapientiam prorsus enecat, scien-**

he use the electric cars. Aluminium he cannot use, as it was discovered by the Catholic Deville ; in photography he is forbidden the collodium of Schönbein ; in medicine he has to do without Pelletier's quinine ; the whole doctrine of microbes has to be dispensed with, as it is chiefly due to the Catholic Pasteur. And in numberless other cases he would be thrown back into a condition which we would call intolerable, if he disdained to use what he ultimately owes to the genius of scientists who were sincere Christians "—(*ib.*, p. 495).

[1] Three causes for the existence of atheism may be mentioned. The first is moral and spiritual blindness, due either to excessive absorption in scientific and non-spiritual interests, or to lack of submission to the conditions and laws of spiritual knowledge. The natural sciences are concerned exclusively with the conjunction and sequence of phenomena, and the habits of scientific specialists sometimes bring about an atrophy of the higher faculties. Darwin lamented that his absorption in physical investigations had destroyed his capacity to enjoy poetry and beauty. Again, a false and sceptical conception of the nature of belief and knowledge—one which is based exclusively upon abstract speculation, and fails to accord with normal experience—will shut out from consideration the manifold self-revelation of God. Finally, personal circumstances, such as exceptional early education, unfortunate experiences with professing believers, and an exclusive consideration of perverted religious systems, will often create violent prejudice and blinding hate of truth. The late Robert Ingersoll's position was the result of reaction from the most narrow type of Calvinism which he never ceased to treat as the real Christianity of history—(**Hall,** p. 113).

tiisque tenebras teterrimas offundit.—Sublata enim causa absolute ultima, rationum ultimarum cognitio evadit impossibilis ; fundamentalia insuper problemata, quæ resolvere scientia debet in omni ordine, sive physico, sive logico, sive ethico, sive historico, fiunt penitus insolubilia. Nam

a) *In ordine physico* explicari nequit rerum origo, quia tollitur prima causa efficiens ; legum quoque physicarum harmonia et constantia, quia tollitur prima causa exemplaris, et ultima finalis, rerumque provisor et gubernator.

b) *In ordine logico* inexplicabile est possibilitatis fundamentum ontologicum, æternitas ac necessitas essentiarum, immutabilitas veritatis.

c) *In ordine ethico* intelligi prorsus nequit, quid sit lex illa honestatis, cujus imperium ineluctabilemque auctoritatem omnes experimur ; nulla enim lex sine legislatore. Hinc officia ac jura sine fundamento sunt ; virtus sine præmio manet, vitium sine pœna ; immo ipsum honestarum et inhonestarum actionum discrimen fit incertum.

d) *In ordine historico* facta multa inexplicabilia fiunt, sublato provisore supremo ; et factorum sive concursus sive successio, quæ ab hominis arbitrio sæpe non dependent, cæco solum casu explicari possunt. Tamen ex hoc ordine et ex hac successione emergit mundus moralis, qui, non minus quam physicus, mirabilis est, nec fortasse minus illustria intelligentiæ disponentis vestigia continet.

54. II. Atheismus humanæ naturæ osor et inimicus est.—Intimis enim naturæ propensionibus contradicit, easque in ludibrium ipsius ac tormentum vertit. Deo enim sublato, nullus est amplius remunerator virtutis, nullus scelerum vindex, nullus perturbati ordinis reparator, nullum in adversis solamen, nullum amplius objectum, cujus assecutione felices nos esse possimus.

Sine Deo animæ immortalitas chimæra est, desiderium beatitatis ludibrium, virtutis amor calamitas, ac propensionibus inter se pugnantibus homo misere discerpatur necesse est. Si Deum mihi tollis, quid superest? Brevis hæc incertaque vita, quam calamitates et ærumnæ potius, quam anni diesque metiuntur, in quam homo conjectus sine adjutore, sine provisore, sine remedio, sine spe, conditionem obtinet brutorum conditione multo deteriorem.

55. III. Humanam denique societatem Atheismus impossibilem facit.—Quæ enim humani convictus fundamenta, nisi mutua fides, legum reverentia, in principe amor justitiæ, in subditis obsequium erga auctoritatem, in omnibus patriæ amor ac civium charitas? Hæc autem omnia in athea hominum multitudine frustra requires. Invisibilis enim atque omnia videntis potestatis timore sublato, omnique futurorum bonorum adempta spe, una superest agendi regula, utilitas; unicus finis, voluptas; unicum efferentibus se cupiditatibus frænum, timor. In imperantibus timor populi, in populo timor imperantis, hoc totum societatis fundamentum erit; ac propterea jus unicum, fortioris voluntas; unica debilioribus relicta defensio, simulatio, fraus, proditio. Nonne præstat in silvis atque inter feras degere, quam in hujusmodi societate versari?

Ex his omnibus concludemus, merito Atheos et vocari insipientes, et populorum odia semper et legum severitatem subiisse; qui et sapientiæ contemptores, et hominum inimici, et societatis eversores esse probantur."

Quare, si malum æstimari debet pro majore vel minore bono, cui opponitur, pro exitialibus effectibus, qui sunt ejus sequelæ, profecto nihil Atheismo pejus cogitari potest.

APPENDIX.

Quid De Atheis Sentiendum Sit.

56. Probata Dei existentia, merito quæritur, quid sentiendum sit de Atheis, *i.e.*, de hominibus, qui Dei existentiam non agnoscant. Quæstio non est de iis, qui Athei *practici* vocantur ; qui nimirum " confitentur se nosse Deum, factis autem negant " (S. Paulus, ad Titum, c. 1, v. 16), sed de Atheis *theoreticis*, qui Dei existentiam non agnoscunt, aut quia in omnimoda de Deo ignorantia versantur (Athei *negativi*), aut quia notionem Dei revera consecuti (unde *positivi* dicuntur) eum non existere erronee affirmant (Athei *dogmatici*), vel quæstionem de ejus existentia ut insolubilem existimant (Athei *agnostici*).[1]

57. Jamvero 1°. certum est dari non posse homines, qui pleno usu rationis prædíti carent omni notione etiam implicita de Dei existentia ; quia in homine, qui ad perfectum rationis usum pervenit, deesse nequit cognitio discriminis inter bonum morale et malum ; talis autem cognitio aliquam Dei cognitionem sub conceptu entis supremi imperantis et prohibentis necessario includit. Præterea, ut constat ex argumentis pro Dei existentia allatis, intellectus humanus facili discursu transit a contemplatione rerum mundanarum ad aliquam earum causæ cognitionem ; et voluntas bona particularia appetendo naturali impetu fertur in bonum

[1] The term " Agnosticism " is of very recent origin. Mr. Huxley is very ingenious in telling how it was coined. When a young man, he became a member of the Metaphysical Society of London, he found himself out of place in the company of men, each of whom had a reputation as the parent of an *ism* of some kind. He felt constrained to be like his associates, and broached the doctrine of Agnosticism. In a spirit of humility he openly confessed he was an Agnostic because he did not know nor could he ever hope to know a solution for the fundamental truths of religion. The doctrine, however, signified by the term agnosticism is not new. It is of the same nature as that proposed by the Sceptics in the time of Socrates—(**Driscoll,** *op. cit.*, p. 7).

universale. Unde, vix fieri potest, ut homo exerceat suas facultates, quin in confusam notionem primæ causæ et summi boni perveniat. Dari possunt et revera dantur, qui destituuntur *clara notione unius Dei* ut totius mundi auctoris et domini (Polytheistæ).

58. 2°. Certum est dari non posse Atheos, qui sine ulla formidine errandi judicant Deum non existere. " Fieri plane non potest, ut quis, quando hujus mundi fabricam contemplatur et præsertim organismorum mirabilem structuram, supremo quodam intellectu hæc omnia disposita esse sine mentis hæsitatione diffiteatur. Fieri non potest, ut quis boni et mali discrimen deprehendens legislatorem supremum existere sine scrupulo infitietur. Fieri non potest, ut quis, quando justitiam videt oppressam et iniquitatem superbe in terris regnantem, retributionem justam esse futuram cum firma certitudine neget. Fieri non potest, ut homo desiderio beatitudinis flagrans, quando de morte cogitat, ad spem vitæ futuræ a Deo sibi paratæ non solicitetur.—Deinde generatim falsum judicium numquam in mente est sine quadam errandi formidine " (**Hontheim,** *op. cit.*, p. 382).[1] " Nec vero iis, qui forte contrarium de se testantur, fides ulla adhibenda est. ' Mentiuntur,' sic scite

[1] The Holy Spirit tells us that the " fool said in his heart there is no God." Observe the clause—" in his heart "—not in his mind, not in his reason. No, it is a rooted unwillingness to obey and love God that causes men to try and persuade themselves that no such Divine Person exists, and in this effort they too often succeed. " The wish is father to the thought," as the poet says. It is their hearts, their desires, that speak, not their reason. In the inner depths of their own consciences they know that God does and must exist, and that the universe would remain for ever a wholly and absolutely inexplicable riddle unless we accept the doctrine of an intelligent Creator—a doctrine of reason and common sense. Man cannot disguise from himself the fact—if he reflects at all—that every object around and about him proclaims the presence of God far more certainly than the human footprint on the sand proclaims the presence of man. For the traces of God's creative power are on every leaf and on every blade of grass. We cannot deny Him without dethroning reason, stultifying ourselves and committing an act of intellectual suicide—from which may God in His mercy preserve us—(**Vaughan,** *Earth to Heaven*, p. 13).

Seneca, ' qui dicunt se non sentire esse Deum ; nam etsi tibi affirment interdiu, noctu tamen et soli dubitant.' Atque hoc ex factis persuaderi potest ; siquidem plerumque contingit, ut Atheismus a suis sectatoribus, ad meliorem frugem redactis, saltem sub vitæ finem ejuretur. . . . Idem confirmavit Santhibal, famosus Atheus sæculi XVII., qui, ut Baylius refert, acriter querebatur neminem in sua secta dono perseverantiæ gaudere, sed omnes tandem aliquando prope mortem resipiscere. Quod sane ostendit eos homines non plena animi persuasione delirium illud profiteri, sed simulate et fallaciter. Qua de re audiatur ipse Baylius, quæstionem sic definiens : ' Probabile admodum est eos, qui in cœtibus hominum communiores religionis veritates impugnare affectant, plus dicere, quam revera sentiunt. Vanitas magis, quam conscientia, in eorum disputationibus locum habet. Hi nimirum opinantur novitatem audaciamque sententiarum, quas tuentur, existimationem fortis animi sibi esse allaturas. Hinc pertentant, ut contra propriam animi persuasionem difficultates ostentent, quæ fieri solent contra Providentiam et Evangelium. Sic igitur sensim consuetudinem quamdam contrahunt loquendi impie ; ac si voluptuosa vita vanitati eorum adjungitur, celerius etiam in hoc itinere progrediuntur. Hæc prava animi consuetudo, auspiciis partim superbiæ partim sensualitatis contracta, acumen obtundit impressionum educationis ; nimirum sensum sopit veritatum, quas de Divinitate, pœnis æternis, felicitate, didicerunt. Sed hæc in illis non extincta fides est, sed ignis cineri suppositus ; cujus vim sentient, cum se ipsi consulent et potissimum cum aliquod discrimen ingruet. Tunc trepidiores videntur, quam ceteri homines ' " (**Liberatore,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 465).

59. 3°. Certum est dari posse homines, qui per longum tempus in dubio versentur circa Dei existentiam. Nam veritas divinæ existentiæ, licet facillime cognosci

queat ab homine usum rationis habente, tamen non paucis apparentibus difficultatibus obscurari potest. Jamvero, voluntas potest intellectum avertere a rationibus hanc veritatem demonstrantibus eumque figere in consideratione apparentium difficultatum, qua consideratione veritas divinæ existentiæ dubia redditur præsertim ei, cujus voluntas, aut superbia aut timore judiciorum imbuta, desiderat Deum non esse.[1] " Hinc, dubitatio primum ingeneratur in animo ; qua deinceps, ob contractam consuetudinem ex repetitis actibus, sic mens paulatim perverti poterit, ut in falsitate illa conquiescere videatur. Nihilominus effici nequit, ut hujusmodi homines sic ab aliquo veritatis radio non tangantur vel inviti, ut Dei existentiam repentino quodam animi motu in quibusdam saltem casibus suspicentur. Natura enim nullo conatu penitus obliterari potest ; vi autem naturæ, in cognitionem existentiæ divinæ mens prorumpit. Quare, Atheorum opinio numquam dubii limites sic excedit, ut in firmam animi sententiam commutetur " (*Idem, ib.*).

CAPUT TERTIUM.

De Divina essentia.

60. *Deum esse* jam manifestum fit ex dictis in capite præcedente ; nunc vero *quid Deus sit*, quantum a nobis fieri potest, declarandum est.

Quominus autem assequamur quid proprie sit Deus, obest non solum infinitas divinæ essentiæ sed etiam naturalis nostra cognitio, quæ nec immediata est nec a priori, sed " a sensu principium sumit ; unde, tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, in quan-

[1] " Nemo Deum negat nisi cui expedit Deum non esse "—(**S. Aug.**).
" Tenez votre âme en état de désirer toujours qu'il y ait un Dieu, et vous n'en douterez jamais "—(**Rousseau**).

tum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam *videat*, quia creaturæ sensibiles sunt effectus Dei, virtutem causæ non adæquantes. Unde, ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec ejus essentia *videri*. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cognitionem, ut cognoscat de Deo, quia est et alia hujusmodi, quæ oportet attribui primo principio" (**S. Th.**, I, q. 12, a. 12).[1]

Quare imprimis oportet quærere, num et quomodo divinam essentiam in hac vita cognoscamus ; deinde in quo formaliter consistat ratio divinæ essentiæ constitutiva, demum quanta sit perfectio divinæ essentiæ.

ART. I.

DE NATURALI NOSTRA DIVINÆ ESSENTIÆ COGNITIONE.

61. THESIS XIII.—Licet Deum non comprehendamus, nec eum, prout in se est, attingamus ; tamen quid Deus sit, vere cognoscimus, quamvis imperfecte.

Stat. Quæst.—Triplex datur divinæ essentiæ cognitio, nimirum, *a*) *comprehensiva*, quæ totam divinæ essentiæ

[1] As our natural knowledge of God is mediate and indirect, our knowledge of the Divine Essence cannot be intuitive—that is, resulting from direct intuition ; nor can it be even equivalent to intuitive cognition—that is, reflecting the Divine Essence as It is in Itself purely and simply. The latter could be the case only if creatures were perfect images of the Creator, and also if, in addition, we had a perfect knowledge of their essences. . . . Nevertheless, our idea of God is not simply negative and relative, showing merely what He is not and in what relations He stands to other beings. It is true, indeed, that the first element of our notion of Him is that He has none of the imperfections of finite things, and that He possesses the power to produce the perfections of creatures ; yet, as these perfections are a reflection of His perfections, we are enabled to gather from them notions or conceptions of God, imperfect and indirect indeed, but still, at the same time, positive and truly representing the perfections belonging to the Divine Essence—(**Wilhelm** *and* **Scannell**, *Manual of Cath. Theology*, v. I, p. 164).

cognoscibilitatem exhaurit. Deus solus hoc modo suam essentiam cognoscit. *b*) Cognitio *propria* et *intuitiva*, quæ scilicet directe et immediate repræsentat Deum, prout est in se, et non tantum per externas ejus adumbrationes. Hæc cognitio, quæ *facialis* dici solet, solis beatis competit. *c*) Cognitio *analoga*, quæ Deum per ordinem ad effectus, qui ejus perfectiones deficienter imitantur, manifestat. Quæ cognitio, quatenus exhibet notas, quæ Deo soli vere conveniunt, est quodammodo *propria* et *quidditativa*, seu, quid Deus sit vere repræsentat.[1]

62. Tripilici autem via mens humana hanc analogam Dei cognitionem perficit :

1°. *Via causalitatis* seu *affirmationis*, qua quidquid perfectionis in creaturis respicimus, totum de Deo affirmamus ; Deus enim carere nequit perfectionibus, quas creaturis communicat. Qua via eum ut verum, bonum, pulchrum, intelligentem, volentem, potentem, etc., cognoscimus.

2°. *Via negationis* seu *remotionis*, qua a Deo omnem imperfectionem ac limitem cujusvis creaturæ proprium removemus. Quo pacto Deum concipimus ut *immensum* per negationem perfectionis mixtæ, ut *infinitum* per negationem cujuscumque limitis, et sic de ceteris.

3°. *Via eminentiæ* seu *excessus*, qua removentes a Deo quidquid sapit imperfectionem et limitem, illi tribuimus modo nobilissimo omnes, quas in creaturis cognoscere possumus, perfectiones. Qua ratione Deus dicitur esse *supersubstantialis*, *supersapiens*, etc. " Quia in Deo (inquit **S. Thomas**) non est sapientia, qualem nos intelligimus et nominamus, potest vere negari, ut

[1] " Cognito Dei *quidditativa*, ut loquuntur Scholastici, dupliciter potest intelligi : 1°. cognitio propria essentiæ Dei ut in se est, ubi *proprium* opponitur analogico ; 2°. cognitio propria quid Deus sit, ut *proprium* opponitur communi, dum perfectiones aliquas intelligimus, quæ vere sunt Dei unius propriæ, atque ita ideam Dei informamus, qua eum a ceteris omnibus, quæ sunt vel esse et concipi possunt, plane distinguimus. Hoc altero sensu quidditativa cognitione Deum a nobis concipi quis dubitet ? "—(**Franzelin,** *op. cit.*, p. 155).

dicatur, Deus non est sapiens. Rursum, quia sapientia non negatur de Deo, quia ipse deficiat a sapientia, sed quia supereminentior est in ipso quam dicatur aut intelligatur, ideo oportet dicere, quod Deus sit supersapiens" (*Q. Disp.*, 1, q. 7, a. 5, ad 2).[1]

Hæ tres distinctæ rationes cognoscendi Deum sunt intime conjunctæ et quasi mutuo completivæ. Via enim affirmationis perfectio Deo *directe* tribuitur, sed *indirecte* imperfectio, quæ est in nostro modo concipiendi, excluditur, simulque supereminentia divinæ perfectionis implicite declaratur. Via negationis removetur quælibet deficientia a plenitudine absolutæ perfectionis ; indicatur igitur possessio perfectionis et quidem modo eminentiori. Via excessus affirmatur perfectio, sed modus, quo nos eam concipimus, negatur.

63. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*Deum non comprehendimus*). **Arg.**—*a*) Cognitio comprehensiva est ea, quæ

[1] Theologians distinguish three ways of arriving at correct notions of God by means of the analogical conceptions gathered from natural perfections. The first is the Positive method or the method of Causality, by which we consider the created perfection as an image and likeness of the corresponding Divine perfection. The second is the method of Negation, or removal, whereby we deny that certain perfections exist in God in the same manner as in creatures, viz., mixed with imperfection. The third is the method of Eminence, which is a combination of the two preceding methods, and consists in conceiving the Divine perfections of the most exalted character, and as having in themselves in a supreme degree whatever is perfect in creatures without any admixture of imperfection. Hence there are three ways of predicating of God the perfections found in creatures. We can say : God is a spirit, God lives, God is rational, meaning that these perfections really exist in God. We can also say : God is not a spirit, is not living, is not rational, meaning that these perfections do not exist in God as they exist in creatures. To reconcile this seeming contradiction, the perfections should be predicated of God in the eminent sense : God is superspiritual, superrational. This doctrine is often expressed by the Fathers by saying that God is at the same time πανώνυμος, ἀνώνυμος, ὑπερώνυμος (all-names, nameless, above all names).

These three methods may be aptly compared with the methods of the three principal fine arts. The painter produces by transferring colours to the canvas ; the sculptor executes a statue by chipping away portions of a block of marble ; while the poet strives to realize his ideal by the aid of metaphor and hyperbole—(**Wilhelm,** *op. cit.*, p. 166).

adæquat internam objecti cognoscibilitatem ; *atqui* interna Dei cognoscibilitas est infinita ; rei enim cognoscibilitas commensuratur cum ejus entitate ; actus igitur cognitionis finitus adæquare non potest objectum in cognoscibilitate infinitum. *b*) Cognitio est quædam intentionalis repræsentatio objecti cogniti, et proinde cognitio Dei comprehensiva esset adæquata expressio infinitæ perfectionis ; *atqui* quum modus repræsentandi sequatur modum essendi, nullius creaturæ cognitio, utpote in ratione entis finita et accidens, potest ens infinitum et absolute subsistens adæquate repræsentare. *Ergo.*

Quare, ipsis beatis impossibilis est comprehensiva Dei cognitio. " In tantum enim intellectus creatus divinam essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, in quantum majore vel minore lumine gloriæ perfunditur. Quum igitur lumen gloriæ creatum in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 12, a. 7).

64. PARS 2ª (*Deum conceptu proprio non cognoscimus*). **Arg.**—Nullum objectum conceptu proprio cognoscitur nisi immediate et in se intelligitur, aut in alio prius cognito perfecte manifestatur. *Atqui a*) Deum in hac vita non esse objectum immediatæ cognitionis constat ex falsitate Ontologismi ; *b*) Deum per creaturas, ex quibus prius cognitis mediate cognoscitur, non esse perfecte manifestatum, constat ex eo, quod Deus non est respectu creaturarum causa univoca, et creaturæ a divina perfectione infinite distant. " Longe etenim dispar est ratio effectuum respectu causarum propriarum ejusdem speciei et perfectionum creatarum, quantumvis nobilium, respectu divinæ naturæ. Nam illi, quia conveniunt univoce cum suis causis, possunt adæquate manifestare illarum essentiam, tamquam perfectæ similitudines ejusdem ; atvero, quævis perfectiones in

creaturis existentes sunt effectus infinite distantes ab illa immetata virtute, unde fluxerunt velut umbratiles similitudines lucidissimi exemplaris, deficientissimaque vestigia inexhaustæ magnificentiæ. Atque hæc est causa, cur Patres multi scripserint de Deo omnes perfectiones, quas nimirum ex rebus sensibilibus cognoscimus, affirmari posse, et omnes pariter negari : *possunt omnes affirmari*, quia nihil perfectionis deesse potest Deo ; *possunt omnes negari*, quia nullæ in eo sunt modo illo, quo a nobis cognoscuntur in hac vita, sed longe nobiliori et ineffabili" (**Urráburu,** *Theod.*, v. 1, p. 204).

65. Pars 3ª (*quid Deus sit, vere, quamvis imperfecte, cognoscimus*). **Arg. I.**—De nulla re possumus cognoscere *an sit*, quin eo ipso quodammodo cognoscamus quid sit. Et revera, per rationes pro Dei existentia adductas scimus eum esse causam primam, ens necessarium, intellectivum, etc. ; *atqui* hoc est aliquo modo cognoscere quid Deus sit ; *ergo*.

II.—Quum veritas logica consistat in conformitate intellectus cum objecto, illæ cognitiones veræ habendæ sunt, quibus objectum vere, licet imperfecte, repræsentatur ; *atqui* in actu, quo divinam essentiam concipimus, intellectus noster primo et directe quidem fit conformis rebus creatis, sed quia res creatæ sunt imitationes seu similitudines divinæ essentiæ, intellectus noster, eo ipso quod his similitudinibus informatur, ipsi divinæ essentiæ assimilatur ; *ergo* cognitio, quam de divina essentia per conceptus analogos obtinemus, quamvis valde imperfecta est (quum perfectiones creatæ valde deficienter divinas perfectiones repræsentent), rationem veræ cognitionis essentialiter præ se fert, *i.e.*, vere, quamvis imperfecte, quid Deus sit cognoscimus.[1]

[1] We arrive at our understanding of that which God is, through our previous knowledge of the perfections which we perceive in creatures. These perfections are manifold, and every one of them shadows forth under some one aspect the perfection of its exemplary

66. Cor.—Ergo ea de Deo cognitio, quam per fidem supernaturalem possidemus, non est *propria* sed tantum *analoga ;* nam, quum gratia naturam non tollat sed perficiat, ejus subsidio divinæ perfectiones nobis cognoscendæ exhibentur non prouti sunt in se, sed prouti notionibus ex rebus finitis haustis cognosci possunt. " Divinæ revelationis radius ad nos pervenit secundum modum nostrum. . . . Quamvis enim per revelationem elevemur ad aliquid cognoscendum, quod alias esset nobis ignotum, non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi per sensibilia : unde Dionysius dicit, . . . quod impossibile est nobis aliter superlucere divinum radium, nisi circumvelatum varietate sacrorum velaminum " (**S. Th.,** *De Trin.*, q. 6, a. 3).

ART. II.

DE PERFECTIONE DIVINÆ ESSENTIÆ CONSTITUTIVA.

67. Essentia alicujus rei physice et metaphysice spectari potest. " Physice spectatur, quoties rei constitutiva exhibentur secundum statum, quem habent, sublata præcisione mentis. Hoc modo, si de rebus subsistentibus agatur, essentia est ipsamet earumdem *substantia ;* ac propterea si composita est, ut principia physice rem constituentia jure assignantur materia et forma. Dicuntur autem *proprietates* essentiæ sic spec-

and efficient cause, that is to say, the perfection of Him who made it, and after the pattern of Whom it was made. Not any one of these perfections is, nor all of them together, an adequate expression or representation of the Divine perfection. . . . As the Divine essence is the pattern of all the perfections which can be, or can be conceived to be in creatures, so does the essence correspond to all the ideas of perfections which our minds can possibly conceive. As, therefore, created perfections are an imperfect objective imitation and shadowing forth of the Divine perfection under various aspects, so also every one of our ideas is an inadequate and therefore an imperfect exhibition, under one or other aspect, of the simple and infinite perfection of God—(**Humphrey**, S.J., *His Divine Majesty*, p.45).

tatæ, quæ reipsa ab ea distinguuntur, et naturali dimanatione procedunt, ut sunt facultates omnes naturales. In metaphysica vero consideratione, tamquam prædicata rei essentialia, ea dumtaxat spectantur, quibus primo res intelligitur constitui in suo esse, quæ ratio sint ceterorum, tametsi inter se reipsa non distinguantur. Ita, *ex. gr.*, immortalitas consideratur non ut essentiale constitutivum, sed quasi proprietas consequens essentiam animæ rationalis, quamquam nulla fingi debeat distinctio realis inter utramque " (**Schiffini,** *op. cit.*, p. 126).

68. Jamvero, quod ad Deum attinet, *physica* ejus essentia, omnibus consentientibus, est complexus omnium perfectionum divinarum inter se et cum divina substantia realiter identicarum. Atvero, non parum difficilis est quæstio de *metaphysica* Dei essentia. Nam quum Deus ad nullum genus speciemve pertineat, nulla proprie dicta definitio per genus et differentiam de eo dari potest, sed solummodo cum aliqua proportione et analogia ad creaturas de eo loqui possumus. Quare, sicut in creaturis invenitur aliqua perfectio vel perfectionum complexus (v.g., *animalitas-rationalitas* in homine), quæ rem in certo ordine constituit atque ab omnibus aliis rebus distinguit, necnon radix est proprietatum, quæ huic rei conveniunt ; ita inter perfectiones quas in Deo ratione distinguimus, investigare possumus *a*) quanam illarum, secundum nostrum imperfectum concipiendi modum, Deus constituatur, *b*) ab aliis rebus distinguatur, *c*) et ex qua, quasi ex radice, ceteræ Dei perfectiones consequi intelligantur.[1]

[1] We conceive the essence and nature of God—which is itself absolutely simple—under a number of inadequate notions of manifold perfections. We derive our ideas of perfection from creatures ; and in creatures perfections are distinct, one from the other. In creatures perfections depend one on another, and flow forth one from another, up to the *metaphysical essence* which is the principle of all of them. . . .

Although in God it is one most simple Being who is a spirit, who is wise, and who wills, yet we, in aiming at distinctness of conception, cannot conceive a *will* either in itself, or in its functions,

Utilitas hujus quæstionis in eo est, quod "determinatio quid in Deo instar *essentiæ* concipi debeat, conciliabit unitatem multiplicitati rationum, sub quibus Dei perfectiones cogitamus, cognitionemque nostram reddet profundiorem ac simplicitati sui objecti magis accommodatam" (**Franzelin,** p. 258). Quibus præmissis, statuamus thesim sequentem.

69. THESIS XIV.—Metaphysica Dei essentia in eo consistit, quod Deus sit ens a se.

Stat. Quæst.—Præter sententiam in thesi enuntiatam variæ aliæ a Scholasticis magni nominis propugnatæ sunt. Nam, 1°. *a*) Alii metaphysicam Dei essentiam reponunt in infinitate *extensiva*, seu, in cumulo omnium perfectionum. Deus, inquiunt, non per ullam perfectionem seorsum consideratam, sed per omnes simul sumptas, ens summum constituitur. Ita Nominales. *b*) Alii eam consistere autumant in infinitate *intensiva*, seu, in summo gradu, qui cogitari potest, singularum perfectionum. Deus, inquiunt, non eo præcise quod omnes perfectiones possideat, ab omnibus aliis distingu-

without in our conception presupposing an *intellect*—and we cannot conceive an intellect, without in our conception presupposing a *spiritual substance*—and a spiritual substance again we cannot conceive, without in our conception presupposing the *being* of that spiritual substance. Although, therefore, on account of the infinite simplicity of God, it is impossible for us to distinguish in God a metaphysical essence, in the way in which we distinguish a metaphysical essence in creatures, this does not, however, hinder us, in our imperfect mode of understanding, from conceiving, among the manifold ideas under which we come to know to some extent that which God is, one idea which has some similarity to *essence*. The conception of an *essence* ought to give the notes which distinguish the thing, whose essence it is, from all other things of a different order. These notes are also understood as constituting the thing. From them, therefore, as first in order, other things which are in them may be deduced, while they themselves do not follow from any other previous things. The *essence* of a thing, therefore, is always a perfection which is *supreme*—in the sense of there being no perfection which is previous to it—among all the perfections which constitute a thing in a certain order of beings, and which distinguish the thing from all other things—(**Humphrey,** *op. cit.*, p. 59).

itur (quum variæ perfectiones tum Deo tum creaturis tribuantur), sed eo, quod hæ omnes Deo insunt gradu infinito. Quæ sententia est multorum Scotistarum. *c*) Alii Scotistæ, quibus assentitur *Palmieri*, eam reponunt in infinitate *radicali*, seu, in exigentia omnium perfectionum in summo gradu possibili ; sic enim in radice continentur omnes divinæ perfectiones, et exinde a priori colligi possunt.

2°. Alii censent metaphysicam Dei essentiam consistere in *intellectione actuali*, seu, in divina substantia quatenus est intellectio subsistens. Ita *Gonet*, *Billuart*, et nuper *Mancini*. Divina essentia, inquiunt, in supremo gradu perfectionis constitui debet ; inter omnes autem gradus perfectionis supremus est intellectio. Deinde, Deus, quatenus est *intellectivus*, a rebus corporeis distinguitur ; quatenus est intellectio *subsistens*, distinguitur ab intelligentiis creatis. Demum, intellectio subsistens necessario continet rationem vitæ, *esse*, etc. (cf. *Sansev.*, Theol. Nat., p. 83).

3°. Præ his diversis sententiis semper communior fuit ea, juxta quam metaphysica Dei essentia consistit in *aseitate*, seu, ut alii volunt, in *ipso esse subsistente*. Qui duplex modus loquendi in idem incidit ; uterque enim dicit ens per se et essentialiter existens. Id tamen prior modus loquendi exprimit excludendo *causam* essendi ; alter vero excludendo *potentialitatem* essendi ; quod sane alii innuunt, quando essentiam Dei reponunt in *actu purissimo essendi*.

Probe autem intelligendum est quid præ se ferat "*a se*" in hoc contextu. Sensus enim non est Deum esse a se *efficienter*,[1] quasi per actionem suam esse proprium produxisset—quod nimirum est plane impossibile,

[1] Hoc tamen docuit *Schell*, contra quem optime arguit *Janssens* (*De Deo uno*, p. 229) : "Dum Philosophi ac Theologi passim propriissimam Dei notam dicunt *ens a se* sive *aseitatem*, Schell eam reponit in *ente per se*, ita ut ultima Dei definitio sit : *ens causa sui*."

We may not speak of God as self-caused, for His being is not a product of His will, but a fact of His essence—(**Hall**, p. 252).

quum actio præsupponat esse—sed sensus est Deum esse a se *formaliter, i.e.*, existit per esse nec ab alio nec ab ipso productum, nec in potentia receptum, sed cum ipsius essentia absolute identificatum.

70. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Metaphysica Dei essentia reponenda est in illa divina perfectione, *a*) quæ Deum primo constituit in suo proprio ordine entis ; *b*) quæ Deum a rebus creatis fundamentaliter distinguit ; *c*) quæ denique est ultima ratio reliquarum Dei perfectionum, ita ut hæ ab illa possint a priori deduci. *Atqui* hæc tria perfectissime præstat *aseitas* seu *ipsum esse subsistens ; ergo.*

Maj. enumerat triplex quasi munus essentiæ metaphysicæ.

Minor. prob. a) *Aseitas primo Deum constituit.* Illud est primum alicujus rei constitutivum, quod quum concipitur, res ipsa concipitur, quod, quum negatur, res ipsa excluditur ; *atqui*, aseitate concepta, concipitur ens, quod in se et ratione sui habet principium formale *esse* suiipsius, quodque absoluta independentia et absoluta necessitate existendi gaudet ; negata vero vel prætermissa aseitate, conceptus Dei plane desinit. Præterea, aseitas absque contradictione concipi nequit ut in alia perfectione fundata, et exinde sui rationem derivans.

b) *Aseitas Deum a rebus creatis fundamentaliter distinguit.* Ratio entis est fundamentum omnium rerum actualium et possibilium ; *atqui* Deus, utpote ens a se, non in aliqua superaddita perfectione, sed in ipsa ratione entis ab omnibus reliquis distinguitur ; nec aliter ab eis distingui potest, quum ceteræ ejus perfectiones aut eum non secernant ab omnibus aliis rebus, sed a quibusdam dumtaxat (ut intelligentia a non intelligentibus), aut non sunt fundamentales, sed potius ut modi et affectiones divinæ essentiæ concipiuntur (*v.g.*, infinitas, immutabilitas).[1]

[1] All created things are in some way compounded of that which is common to many, and of that which is proper to themselves.

c) *Aseitas est ultima ratio reliquarum Dei perfectionum.* Id quod determinat rei existentiam, determinat quoque modum existentiæ illi rei proprium et necessarium ; modus enim existendi necessario sequitur ipsam existentiam, quum rei existentia sine proprio modo existendi nec esse nec concipi possit. *Atqui* per aseitatem solam et independenter ab omnibus aliis Deus ad existendum determinatur ; *ergo* per aseitatem determinatur ad modum existendi sibi proprium, *i.e.*, ex aseitate tamquam a radice seu ultima ratione reliquæ Dei perfectiones derivari intelliguntur. Has enim perfectiones ut Dei modos vel determinationes mens finita concipere cogitur ; aseitatem autem ut ipsam Dei actualitatem in seipsa et non in alio priori sui rationem habentem mens clare conspicit.[1] Ad rem **S. Thomas** : " Quum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem *essendi* " (1, q. 4, a. 2). Et **S. Bernardus** : " Si bonum, si magnum, si beatum, si sapientem, vel quidquid tale de Deo dixeris, in hoc verbo instauratur, quod est *Est* " (*De Consider.*, lib. 5, c. 6). Quo etiam pertinet nomen Dei proprium

In God—not only as God is in Himself, but as God is conceived by us mortal men—there is not anything which is common to beings that are not God, and which is, through addition of a perfection, determined to an idea which is *proper* to God. On the contrary, the *Being* of God, and our idea of that *being*, is in itself absolutely proper to God, and differs utterly from every other idea of *being* which can possibly be conceived. God's *Being* is itself all perfection.

Nevertheless, since the word *being* is an *analogous* term, and, while principally applied to God, may also signify *being* which belongs to others that are not God, it is possible for us to determine the word *being* to signify *the Divine Being alone*, by the addition to it of the words *from itself* or "self-existent." This addition we may regard as an ultimate differentia, in the language of logic; as giving expression to the essential difference between *Divine Being* and *participated being*—(**Humphrey,** *op. cit.*, p. 63).

[1] Aseity can be considered as the source of the other perfections of God ; because it is by being an unproduced and altogether independent Being, subsisting by Himself, that He possesses all other perfections, every other perfection being considered as *a special mode of being*—(**Sala,** *Teodicea*, p. 404).

a Deo ipso Moysi revelatum, *scil.*, "*Jahveh*" seu "qui est," (ὁ ὤν) ; quod nomen idem prorsus sonat ac ipsum esse subsistens seu ens per essentiam existens.[1]

71. II.—Thesis iterum probatur ceteras sententias excludendo. 1°. *Metaphysica Dei essentia non consistit in infinitate.* *a*) Non in infinitate *extensiva*, seu, in cumulo omnium perfectionum, *quia* quæritur illa perfectio primaria, ex qua ceteræ perfectiones secundum nostrum modum concipiendi consequuntur ; hæc autem opinio omnes perfectiones æque primarias facit. Quare, essentiam metaphysicam cum physica confundit. *b*) Non in infinitate *intensiva*, *quia* hæc infinitas non est ratio ultima perfectionum, sed potius ad eas accessit tamquam modus et complementum. *c*) Non in infinitate *radicali* (*i.e.*, in exigentia omnium perfectionum), *quia* hac exigentia admissa, adhuc restat explicandum, cur divina natura exigat omnes perfectiones.

2°. *Metaphysica Dei essentia non consistit in intellectione*, *a*) quia intellectio concipitur non ut naturæ constitutiva, sed ut affectio naturam constitutam subsequens ; *b*) quia intellectio divina suum objectum proprium (*scil.*, divinam essentiam) præsupponit, nedum constituit ; *c*) quia plures Dei perfectiones (*v.g.*, immensitas, æternitas), nequeunt *a priori* inferri ab intellectione ;[2] *d*) quia

[1] Je commence à comprendre maintenant la vérité rigoureuse et la beauté de cette définition de la divinité donnée par nos Saints Libres, ou plutôt par Dieu lui-même, répondant à Moïse qui lui demandait son nom pour l'apprendre aux enfants d'Israel : *Je suis celui qui suis. Ego sum qui sum* (Exod., c. 3, v. 14). Si Dieu est par lui-même, *a se*, tandis que les créatures ne sont rien que par Lui, la raison en est que Dieu est l'être même ; l'existence lui est absolument essentielle : ce qui n'a jamais lieu pour les créatures. Lorsqu'on demande leur nom, on répond : elle est minéral, plante, animal, ou homme, parce que ces natures constituent leur essence : mais l'être, l'existence, ne leur est jamais essentiel ; en Dieu seul l'essence et l'être se confondent ; son essence est d'être. Seul il est l'être vrai, l'être franc, l'être de source, *esse verum*, *esse sincerum*, *esse germanum*, comme le disait S. Augustin, ou plutôt il est l'être sans épithète, *esse simpliciter*, comme le répète S. Thomas, car "qui *est* comme Dieu ?" "*quis ut Deus*" ?—(**Farges,** *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 293).

[2] Nec valet dicere non ex intellectione qua tali, sed qua subsistens est, ceteras Dei perfectiones *a priori* deduci posse. Tunc

non cohæret cum doctrina **S. Thomæ**, qui docet intellectionem divinam esse a divina essentia distinctam eamque consequentem. "Essentia divina est principium *actuum* divinorum, licet essentia sub ratione essentiæ non dicat principium actus, qui est operatio, sed qui est esse. Sed quum in essentia sit considerare diversa attributa, quæ sunt realiter una in ipsa, ratione tamen distincta ; actus refertur ad essentiam secundum hoc attributum vel secundum illud, quod exigit conditio actus ; sicut *intelligere est ab essentia divina*, in quantum ipsa est intellectus" (1. dist. 6, q. 1, a. 1).

ART. III.

DE INFINITA DIVINÆ NATURÆ PERFECTIONE.

72. THESIS XV.—Deus, quia est ens a se, est ens infinite perfectum.

Stat. Quæst.—"Infinite perfectum est ens, quod non, ut ita dicam, intra certos essendi fines coarctatum est, sed omnem essendi plenitudinem continet. Distinctius definitur ens infinite perfectum, cum dicitur esse ens, in quo sint omnes perfectiones cogitabiles *qua veræ* perfectiones (*scil.*, sine modo existendi perfectionem quodammodo coarctante). Quæ definitio brevissime exprimitur, quum dicitur ens infinite perfectum esse id, quo majus, *i.e.*, melius seu perfectione qualibet perfectius, cogitari nequeat. Quoniam omnis perfectio est *actus* seu id, quo esse actuale aliquo modo completur, Deus ratione perfectionis suæ infinitæ etiam vocatur *ens actu infinitum*, *i.e.*, ens, quod secundum actum

enim non apparet, cur "intellectio" ut nota essentiæ constitutiva proferatur, quum intellectio ut subsistens sit ipsum *esse a se subsistens*.

Intellectuality, which is self-existent, is itself already comprehended in self-existent life ; and both intellectuality and self-existent life are comprehended ultimately in *self-existent being*—(**Humphrey**, p. 62).

essendi sibi naturaliter proprium omni esse intelligibili plenum sit ita, ut in nulla re ab ipso diversa possit aliquod esse inveniri, quod in ipso non sit incomparabiliter melius. Aptissime igitur Deum cum S. Thoma dicimus *'ipsum esse per se subsistens'* (1, q. 4, a. 2). Est enim *'ipsum esse'* quia nulla est perfectio seu nullum *esse*, quod ipse non eminenter contineat; modus autem, quo ipsum esse Deo convenit, signate exhibetur, cum additur *'per se subsistens,'* i.e., *vi solius essentiæ suæ* existens" (**Boedder,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 121).[1]

73. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Perfectio alicujus entis limites habet aut ex ipsa formali ratione talis perfectionis, aut ex limitata capacitate subjecti illam perfectionem recipientis (ut sapientia *humana*), aut ex sua causa efficiente. *Atqui* perfectio divina *a*) non habet limites ex sua formali ratione; perfectio enim formaliter

[1] The Infinite—that is, the endless or limitless—may be conceived under three different aspects, which are thus expressed in the language of the Schoolmen: (1) that than which nothing greater can be conceived (*quo nihil majus cogitari potest*); (2) that which contains all conceivable greatness or magnitude (*quod continet omnem magnitudinem, quæ cogitari potest*); (3) that which is incomparably and immeasurably greater than anything conceivable (*quod est incomparabiliter vel incommensurabiliter majus omnibus aliis, quæ cogitari possunt*).

God was defined by the Vatican Council to be "Infinite in understanding and will and all perfection" (sess. iii., c. 1). That is to say, (1) God cannot be thought of as greater, better, or more perfect than He is, nor can any other being be conceived greater, better, or more perfect than God; (2) there is no limit to the Divine perfection, because God contains all conceivable perfections, and the fulness of His Being attains the utmost limits of possible being both intensively and extensively, that is, God has every conceivable perfection and every conceivable form and degree of each perfection; (3) and the plenitude of the Divine Being is such that no sum of finite perfections, however great, can either equal or measure it—on the contrary, finite being and its indefinite increase and multiplication are possible only on account of God's inexhaustible plenitude of Being. The absolute substantial infinity of God evidently implies that He is infinite (1) not only as compared with a certain kind of created beings, but as indefinitely transcending all conceivable degrees and kinds of perfection; (2) not only in some one attribute, but in all; (3) not only as to the magnitude or multitude of His activity, but also as to the perfection of His Essence and activity, Intellect and Will in themselves—(**Wilhelm,** *op. cit.*, p. 185).

considerata a limitibus præscindit, seu, eos neque postulat neque excludit. *b*) Non habet limites a subjecto illam recipiente, quia perfectio entis a se non recipitur in subjecto, non est actus potentiæ sive subjectivæ sive objectivæ, quum sit ipsum esse divinum irreceptum. *c*) Non habet limites a causa efficiente, quia non habet causam, sed est ratio sui. *Ergo* perfectio divina nulla ex parte habet limites, et proinde (quum inter finitum et infinitum non detur medium) absolute infinita dicenda est.

Idem paulo aliter. Limitatio, si adesset, in perfectione divina aut ipsi divinæ essentiæ deberetur aut causæ extrinsecæ ; *atqui a*) non debetur divinæ essentiæ, quia essentia divina, quippe quæ est ipsum esse subsistens, ad nullum gradum perfectionis potest supponi coarctata, quin *esse* in suo conceptu formali importet defectum *esse* seu perfectionis, id quod non minus absurdum est quam dicere sapientiam formaliter importare non-sapientiam seu insipientiam. Deinde, Deus non est causa suiipsius, ita ut sibi majorem vel minorem perfectionem tribuat, sed quidquid est et habet, est et habet, quia est ens. *b*) Non debetur causæ extrinsecæ, quia neque in essendo neque in modo essendi dependet Deus ab alio. *Ergo.*[1]

[1] If God's perfections were finite or limited, He would have received such limitation either *intrinsically* from Himself, or *extrinsically*, viz., from a cause or being distinct from Himself. But neither supposition can be admitted. First, He cannot have received any limit to His perfections *intrinsically*, namely, from Himself, that is, by reason of His essence. For the essence of God, viz., of the Being that is self-existent—*ens a se*—is actually to be. . . . Moreover, as God is not the cause of His own existence neither can He be the cause of His own limitation ; for limitation would affect His essence ; but His essence is eternal, and consequently eternally identified with His existence. What He is now He has been from all eternity. In the second place, He cannot have received any limits to His perfections *extrinsically*, viz., from a being or cause distinct from Himself, for this would imply a dependence on that being, while He is independent of all beings, as He is the first cause of all existing contingent beings. Again, the cause of such limitation should have been eternal, like God's existence. But God alone exists from eternity—(**Sasia**, *op. cit.*, p. 84).

74. II.—Deus est *a*) ens a se, *b*) causa efficiens omnium contingentium, *c*) fons omnium possibilium ; *atqui* ex hac triplici ratione ostendi potest Deum esse infinite perfectum ; *ergo*.

Prob. min. *a*) Limitatio entis non provenit ex ejus existentia, quum existentia in suo conceptu nullam limitationem involvat, nullam perfectionem excludat ; sed ex entis essentia, qua nimirum ens in sua specie constituitur ; *atqui* existentia est ipsa essentia entis a se.[1]

b) Prima causa entium contingentium fruitur virtute creativa, quæ sane se porrigit ad omne creabile ; nam quum terminus formalis actionis creativæ sit ens ut tale, virtus, quæ entia actualia creavit, pariter quodlibet creabile creare potest. *Atqui* talis virtus est simpliciter infinita, et proinde infinita est natura divina quacum identificatur ista virtus. Nam, prætermissa quæstione an virtus creativa sit ex sua natura necessario infinita (*Cosm.*, n. 31), pro certo infinita dicenda est " virtus creandi, quæ ex se complectitur, ut objectum adæquatum, omne creabile, quia hoc objectum in infinitum extenditur, et quamcumque perfectionem finitam determinate signabilem superat ; requirit ergo in causa habente talem virtutem, infinitam vim et perfectionem " (**Suarez,** *Meta.*, *Disp.* 30, s. 2, n. 15).

c) Possibilia fundari nequeunt nisi in actuali ; *atqui* possibilia characteres infinitatis præ se ferunt ; *ergo* ens actuale, in quo fundantur, simpliciter infinitum debet esse. Et revera, debet esse infinitum quoad *durationem*, quum tempus possibile initio et fine careat ; quoad *præsentiam*, quum spatium possibile nullo fine

[1] Whatever perfection is compatible with its essence is actually realized in a self-existing being; but as there is no conceivable perfection as such, *i.e.*, no expression of positive being as such, that is not compatible with the essence of the self-existent, it follows that the self-existent must be infinite in all perfection. For self-existence itself is absolute positive being, and positive being cannot contradict, and cannot therefore limit, positive being—(**Toner,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 6, p. 613).

includatur ; brevi, quoad *perfectionem*, quum nulla concipi possit creatura adeo perfecta, ut perfectior non sit possibilis ; immo, quo perfectior est aliqua creatura, eo major est ejus capacitas acquirendi ulteriores gradus perfectionis, ita ut creatura absolute perfectissima intrinsece repugnet. Quare, ens actuale (*scil.* Deus), quod est fundamentum possibilium, infinite perfectum debet esse. *Ergo.*

Thesis confirmatur ex natura intellectus et voluntatis, quæ, ut passim vidimus (cf. *Th.* x.), ordinantur ad infinitam veritatem et bonitatem ; frustra autem esset hæc ordinatio, nisi existeret ens infinita veritate et bonitate præditum, *i.e.*, simpliciter infinitum in perfectione.

75. Cor. 1.—Ergo errant, qui (ut *Locke*) Deum eatenus esse infinitum affirmant, quatenus ejus potentia nullis limitibus circumscribitur, negant vero ipsius divinæ essentiæ infinitatem. Potentia enim in perfectione essentiæ fundatur et proinde eam superare nequit. Insuper, Deus, si in aliqua perfectione infinitus est, absolute infinitus est, quum ejus perfectiones et essentia sint prorsus identicæ.

Cor. 2.—Ergo errant, qui Deum eatenus esse infinitum affirmant, quatenus " nescimus, an et ubi terminetur " (*Hobbes*). " Quod profecto idem est ac in Deo et divinis perfectionibus non absolutam sed relativam infinitatem agnoscere, sive Deum infinitum denegare. Quamvis enim alicujus rei fines mentis nostræ aciem fugiant, id tamen non impedit, quominus res ista fines habeat, atque terminata sit "—(**Sanseverino,** *Elem. Phil.*, Theol., p. 66).

76. Cor. 3.—Ergo errant " Transcendentales Germaniæ (quibus adstipulati sunt plures in Gallia, ut Vacherot, Renan, Cousin), qui Dei infinitatem explicant per hoc, quod Deus non sit *esse* aliquod reale seu *personale*. Ita enim argumentantur : Infinitum est omnis determinationis et limitationis expers, et quum

omnia complectatur in se, a nulla re, quæ extra ipsum est, distingui potest. Jamvero, personale et reale est a ceteris distinctum. Ergo infinitum est impersonale. Ab hac doctrina non procul abest sententia Rosminii asserentis *esse* omnium rerum finitarum et creatarum identificari cum ipso *esse* Verbi divini, sublata subsistentia. Hi omnes errores perperam admodum confundunt infinitum et indeterminatum *privative* acceptum cum infinito et indeterminato *negative* sumpto : ' Infinitum primo modo, ait Aquinas, Deo convenire non potest . . . quia omnis privatio imperfectionem designat, quæ longe a Deo est.' Verum, ut idem Aquinas loquitur, ' Deus dicitur infinitus *negative*, quia ejus essentia per aliquid non limitatur ' ; et alibi : ' aliquid dicitur determinatum dupliciter, primo modo ratione limitationis, alio modo ratione distinctionis. Essentia autem divina non est determinata primo modo, sed secundo modo ' " (**De Maria,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 65).

Aliis verbis : *Infinitum* sumitur *privative* et *negative*. *Privative* sumptum dicit aliquid omni actu, quo finiatur, privatum, talis est, *v.g.*, materia prima, quantitas sine qualitatibus considerata. Unde, essentialiter imperfectum est et indeterminatum. *Negative* autem acceptum dicit ens finem in perfectione prorsus excludens. Similiter *determinatio* significare potest, *a*) vel *carentiam* ulterioris perfectionis, *b*) vel *distinctionem*, quatenus realitas unius non est realitas alterius. In hoc altero sensu, secus ac in priori, determinatio non importat limitationem.

77. Cor. 4.—Ergo rerum omnium perfectiones in Deo continentur, sed modo diverso pro diversitate perfectionum. Quare, *a*) perfectiones *puræ* seu *simplices* (*v.g.*, bonitas, sapientia, vita), quum *in se consideratæ* nullam imperfectionem adjunctam habeant, *formaliter* (*i.e.*, secundum propriam suam naturam et rationem) Deo insunt. *b*) Perfectiones *mixtæ* seu *secundum quid*

(*v.g.*, extensio, motus, ratiocinatio), quum imperfectionem admixtam habeant, in Deo continentur *eminenter* et *virtualiter* :—*eminenter*, *i.e.*, secundum id solum, quod dicit perfectionem, exclusa omni imperfectione ; *virtualiter*, quia Deus, utpote prima causa rerum omnium, rerum omnium perfectiones in se præhabere debet. *c*) Perfectiones puræ, *si spectantur ut sunt in rebus creatis*, Deo insunt *eminenter-formaliter*, quia in creaturis inveniuntur limitatæ et ut accidentia subjecto superaddita. Unde, si perfectiones puræ non essent in Deo formaliter, Deus non esset absolute et infinite perfectus ; si perfectiones mixtæ ei inessent formaliter, absurditas sequeretur Pantheismi.[1]

78. Schol.—Quidam affirmant rationem divinæ infinitatis in eo esse, quod inter divinam essentiam et existentiam non esse realem distinctionem, et omnem essentiam creatam infinitam fore, si cum sua existentia esset identica, ideoque realem distinctionem inter creatam essentiam et existentiam admittendam esse, nisi velimus creaturas cum Deo confundere. At res ita se non habet ; etenim essentia creata, etsi non realiter alia a sua existentia, sed realiter cum ea identificata ponatur, nullatenus infinita evadit ; necessario enim manet

[1] *Simple* perfections we ascribe to God *formally*, that is to say, according to their proper signification. Thus we ascribe to God life and wisdom in the proper and strict significance of the terms, life and wisdom. We do not, however, ascribe even these perfections to God as they are found in creatures, or as we conceive them. Wisdom, as we conceive it, is a quality informing a subject, and distinct from the subject it informs. In God, by reason of His infinite simplicity, there can be no *information*, no composition. The creature *has* wisdom. But God *is* wisdom. He identifies His wisdom and His other attributes with Himself. . . . *Mixed* perfections we ascribe to God, not formally but *eminently*. We cannot ascribe them formally to God, because in their proper signification they involve imperfection. But we do ascribe them *eminently* to God, inasmuch as, instead of any given mixed perfection, we attribute to God some higher perfection which contains all the perfection of mixed perfection, without the imperfection which the latter involves. Then we do not ascribe the power of reasoning to God formally, but we do ascribe it to God *eminently*, inasmuch as we attribute to Him intelligence, or immediate intuition of truth—(**Hammerstein,** *op. cit.*, Intro., p. vii).

ens productum, contingens, et ad aliquod genus et speciem rerum restrictum. Ergo tale ens non est ipsum esse subsistens, sed habet aliquod esse, seu, ejus esse restrictum est per essentiam cum qua identificatur, sicut intellectualitas in homine limitata est per rationalitatem cum ipsa realiter identicam. Unde, carentia realis distinctionis inter divinam essentiam et existentiam non suppeditat sufficiens fundamentum infinitatis divinæ, sed requiritur carentia omnis distinctionis in re fundatæ seu formalis identitas, quæ quum haberi nequeat nisi in ente a se existente, solum enti a se existenti competere potest infinitas (cf. *Ont*, n. 332).

THEOLOGIÆ NATURALIS PARS SECUNDA.

De Attributis Divinis.

79. Attributum divinum, sensu latiori acceptum, est perfectio, quæ juxta nostrum concipiendi modum Dei essentiam constituit, vel ab ea dimanat. Hic autem sensu magis proprio sumitur ad significandum *quodlibet prædicatum Dei proprium, quod a nobis concipitur per modum proprietatis et affectionis divinæ essentiæ.* Attributa divina diversimode dividuntur. Nimirum :—

1°. In *positiva* et *negativa*. Positiva sunt ea, quæ ex sua formali ratione Deo perfectionem adscribunt ; tales sunt sapientia, bonitas, potentia ; negativa vero ex sua formali ratione a Deo imperfectionem removent ; ut sunt simplicitas (*removens compositionem*), æternitas (*removens successionem*), immutabilitas, immensitas. Ut exempla monstrant, hæc divisio non repetitur ex grammatica forma nominum, sed ex nostra Deum cognoscendi ratione (n. 62).

2°. In *absoluta* et *relativa*. Absoluta exprimunt perfectionem divinam sine connotatione termini extrinseci ; huc pertinent veritas, immutabilitas, intelligentia,

amor. Relativa connotant terminum a Deo distinctum. Hujusmodi sunt creator, gubernator, omnipotens, misericors.[1] Ex his *a*) alia sunt necessaria, ideoque Deo ab æterno conveniunt, ut omnipotentia, scientia possibilium ; *b*) alia contingentia sunt, ac terminum in tempore incipientem connotant, ea tamen ratione, ut denominatio perfectionis non in tempore, sed ab æterno Deo conveniat, *v.g.*, scientia futurorum ; *c*) alia denique sunt contingentia, ac terminum ea ratione connotant, ut denominatio perfectionis cum ipsa actuali rei existentia incipiat, ut providentia, dominium. Ne vero falso intelligantur attributa sub *b*) et *c*) memorata, " duo spectari debent : unum est *perfectio* in Deo, quæ est sane necessaria et æterna ; alterum est *terminus externus* non necessarius et temporaneus, ex quo sumitur denominatio, sed qui non est perfectio in Deo. Dum ergo Deus dicitur creator, dominus, provisor, sanctificator, fundamentum harum denominationum consideratum in Deo est perfectio necessaria et æterna intellectus, voluntatis, potentiæ ; quod autem extra Deum est creatum, subditum, directum, sanctificatum, non addit Deo perfectionem, licet ex eo desumantur illæ denominationes " (**Franzelin,** p. 266).

3°. In *physica* et *moralia*, prout exprimunt perfectiones physicas (ut potentiam), vel morales, ut justitiam, sanctitatem.

4°. In *communicabilia*, quæ modo imperfecto a creaturis participari possunt, ut bonitas ; et *incommunicabilia*, quæ minime participari possunt, ut immensitas.

5°. Denique, in *quiescentia* et *operativa*, quorum priora divinum esse, altera divinam operationem respiciunt. Attributa quiescentia sunt duplicis generis ; alia enim aliquo modo omnibus rebus conveniunt (unitas, veritas, bonitas), et vocantur *transcendentalia ;* alia

[1] Aliam habent significationem attributa *relativa* in Theologia sacra, quando agitur de SS. Trinitate.

designant perfectiones speciales et dicuntur *prædicamentalia*.

Hanc ultimam divisionem attributorum seligimus sequendam in hac parte, quam placet in duas dispescere sectiones, quarum altera erit de attributis quiescentibus, altera de attributis operativis.

SECTIO PRIMA.

De attributis quiescentibus.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

DE ATTRIBUTIS TRANSCENDENTALIBUS.

ART. I.

DE DEI UNITATE.

80. THESIS XVI.—Deus est essentialiter unus unitate tum simplicitatis tum singularitatis.

Stat. Quæst.—*Unum* dicitur, quod est *indivisum in se*. Ens indivisum in se est perfecte unum, si caret partibus seu *simplex* est. Unum, quod non habet simile in natura seu cujus natura non multiplicatur, dicitur *unicum* seu *singulare* (cf. *Ont.*, n. 281 sqq.). Thesis igitur se resolvit in duas partes, quarum prima affirmat Deum esse absolute simplicem, *i.e.*, ab eo omnem divisibilitatem et proinde omnem compositionem tum physicam tum metaphysicam penitus excludi. Altera pars affirmat Deum ita esse unum, ut repugnet plures esse Deos. Huic parti adversantur *Polytheistæ*, qui deorum pluralitatem admiserunt ; *Tritheistæ*, qui mysterium Trinitatis perperam intelligentes docuerunt tres esse deos ; *Dualistæ*, juxta quos duo

existunt entia necessaria et æterna, unum essentialiter et summe bonum, alterum essentialiter et summe malum.[1]

81. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*Deus est absolute unus, i.e., simplex*). **Arg. I.**—*Generatim.* Deus est ens primum, independens, et a se ; *atqui* tale ens non potest non esse absolute simplex ; omne enim compositum est suis componentibus (saltem natura) posterius, ab eis in suo esse dependet, ac causam exigit, quæ componentia in unum conjungat. "Quum compositio (inquit **S. Thomas**) non sit nisi ex diversis, ipsa diversa indigent aliquo agente ad hoc, quod uniantur. Non enim diversa, in quantum hujusmodi, unita sunt. Omne autem compositum habet esse secundum quod ea, ex quibus componitur, uniuntur. Oportet ergo, quod omne compositum dependeat ab aliquo priore agente. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, a quo sunt omnia, non potest esse compositum" (*Qu. Disp.*, I. q. 7, a. 1).

82. II.—*Speciatim.* Deus omnem compositionem tum physicam tum metaphysicam excludit ; *ergo* est absolute simplex.

Prob. antec. p. 1ª. **Excludit compositionem physicam.** —Compositio physica resultat aut ex partibus constitutivis (*materia et forma*), aut ex partibus quantitativis (*v.g., organis*), aut ex subjecto et accidentibus. *Atqui* Deus 1°. non constat partibus *constitutivis ;* "quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et bonum per suam formam ; unde oportet quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod materia

[1] Dualism is a halting place on the road between polytheism and monotheism. The cause of this halt is partly an exaggerated estimate of the amount and power of evil in the world, and partly belief in the eternity of matter. Thus it is pessimistic and materialistic in its philosophy, sharing in the difficulties of both of these positions. Its characteristic doctrines are two : (*a*) that two rival Gods or ultimate principles, one good and the other evil, are contending for the mastery in the universe ; (*b*) that matter is intrinsically evil. It troubled the ancient Church in the form of Gnosticism and Manichæism, and the Manichæan disparagement of matter makes itself felt in every age—(**Hall,** p. 218).

participat formam. Primum autem, quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per participationem, quia bonum per essentiam prius est bono per participationem. Unde, impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma" (S. Th., 1, q. 3, a. 2).

2°. Non constat partibus *quantitativis*. Etenim *a*) aut omnes hæ partes sunt entia necessaria, *b*) aut omnes partes sunt entia contingentia, *c*) aut aliæ partes sunt entia necessaria, aliæ vero contingentia. Jamvero, in primo casu habentur plura necessaria et proinde immutabilia, quæ ad unum conflandum se mutuo perficiunt; est enim partium se mutuo perficere; *atqui* quod perficitur, id mutari necesse est. In altero casu Deus ponitur contingens et ab alio. In tertio casu habentur plura necessaria, quæ se mutuo perficiunt, et a contingentibus perficiuntur; *ergo*.

3°. Non constat *subjecto et accidentibus*. Imprimis enim hæc compositio assimilari debet compositioni ex partibus quantitativis, quam compositionem Deo repugnare ex dato argumento manifestum est. Deinde, subjectum accidentia recipiens se habet tamquam potentia ad actum; *atqui* Deus nullatenus est in potentia, quum sit ens necessarium; *ergo*.

Prob. antec. p. 2ª. **Excludit compositionem metaphysicam.** Etenim—1°. compositio metaphysica, ut ex sua ipsius notione apparet, unice habetur ratione contingentiæ et perfectibilitatis formalitatum objectivarum, quibus constat res composita; quæ sane formalitates, licet in composito non sint res distinctæ, eo tamen modo se habent ad invicem, ut existentia unius existentiam alius non inferat, sed una ab alia determinetur seu perficiatur. *Atqui* Deus, utpote ens a se et necessarium, notionem contingentiæ et perfectibilitatis prorsus excludit; *ergo*.[1]

[1] Concepts which in their application to objective reality are absolutely inseparable, so that none of them can have a real foundation different from the real foundation of the rest, cannot be meta-

2°. Quadruplex distinguitur compositio metaphysica, *scil.*, *a*) ex essentia et existentia, *b*) ex genere et differentia, *c*) ex natura et individualitate, *d*) ex natura et personalitate.

Jamvero, *a*) *compositio ex essentia et existentia Deo repugnat*, quia ens primum, quum vi suæ essentiæ existat, in suo conceptu formali existentiam contineat necesse est. Nimirum, essentia, quæ non est formaliter identica cum existentia, ad existentiam se habet ut potentia ad actum ; *atqui* divina essentia nec potentia est nec ut potentia concipi potest, quin simul concipiatur ut contingens et ab alio in esse dependens :—*ut contingens*, quia essentia, quæ concipi potest ut potentia, non repugnat non esse ; *ab alio in esse dependens*, quia essentia concepta ut potentia non potest esse omnium prima ; actus enim prior est potentia (cf. *Ont.*, n. 307, 5°). *Ergo* inter Dei essentiam et existentiam nulla (ne virtualis quidem) existit distinctio, et proinde nulla compositio ; compositio enim est unio distinctorum.

b) *Compositio ex genere et differentia Deo repugnat.* Nam genus est quid determinabile, potentiale, universale ; Deus autem est maxime determinatus, actualis, singularis ; in Deo igitur nullum est genus, ac proinde ex genere et differentia non componitur. Præterea,

physically compounded. For though none of them *expresses* what is *expressed* by the others, yet each of them *implies* all the rest. But the concepts we form of the Divine attributes are in their application to objective reality absolutely inseparable. Each of the Divine attributes in its objective reality coincides with the one self-existing Divine substance, which we have proved to be a simple unchangeable essence. Consequently none of the Divine attributes has any objective foundation except in so far as it is one with the rest; which is evidently the same as to say that the Divine attributes are absolutely inseparable in their application to objective reality. Divine justice, for instance, without Divine mercy is impossible; and so Divine power without Divine wisdom. Therefore those attributes are not metaphysically *compounded*, although they must be said to be metaphysically or virtually *distinct;* the concept of justice does not *express* what is expressed by the concept of mercy, although it *implies* the same—(**Boedder,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 97).

quidquid ex genere et differentia constituitur, in genere cum aliis rebus univoce convenit ; *atqui* nulla ratio objectiva, ne ratio entis quidem, cum Deo aliisque rebus univoce convenit (*Ont.*, n. 273) ; *ergo*.

c) *Compositio ex natura et individualitate Deo repugnat* ; si enim ultima determinatio individuans non esset de ipsa essentia entis necessario existentis, tale ens non esset absolute necessarium sed hypothetice tantum ; *scil.*, existeret in hypothesi quod individualitas adderetur. Porro, in iis, quæ natura et individualitate sunt composita, natura ab individualitate præscindit et ad diversas individualitates indifferenter se habet, ut patet si natura humana cum individualitate Petri, Pauli, etc., comparatur ; *atqui* natura divina, utpote necessario existens, necessario excludit indifferentiam ad hanc vel illam individualitatem ; *ergo*.

d) *Compositio ex natura et personalitate Deo repugnat*. Enimvero, ens necessarium vi suæ essentiæ habet determinatum modum essendi ; τό indeterminatum enim non potest existere. *Atqui* personalitas est modus essendi Deo competens ; *ergo*. Deinde natura, quæ distinguitur (virtualiter vel realiter nihil interest) a personalitate et cum ea compositum constituit, ad propriam personalitatem vel ad alienam indifferenter se habet ; natura autem necessario subsistens nequaquam indifferens est ad subsistentiam seu personalitatem, et proinde cum ea nullo modo compositum constituere potest.

Apposite **Suarez** : " In substantiis creatis cognoscitur natura facere compositionem cum personalitate creata, et a propria personalitate distingui, quia natura creata ex vi suæ essentiæ est aliquo modo indifferens, ut sit per se, vel aliquo modo in alio, *i.e.*, ut sit in proprio vel alieno supposito. Dico autem esse aliquo modo indifferentem, quia licet natura sua postulet proprium suppositum, tamen salva tota essentia naturæ potest illo carere, et esse in alieno, quod est manifes-

tum signum distinctionis et compositionis ; sed hæc indifferentia est potentialitas quædam, et magna imperfectio ; unde locum non habet in divina natura, quæ propterea omnino determinata est, ut per se sit in proprio supposito, nec possit ulla ratione esse in alieno " (*Meta., Disp.* 30, s. 4, n. 5).

83. *Dices :* Deo inesse videtur compositio physica, quum tres sint divinæ personæ, quæ unam rem summe perfectam constituunt.

Resp. Tres personæ divinæ, quatenus realiter ab invicem distinguuntur, non coeunt in unum compositum ; quatenus in natura conveniunt, non sunt distinctæ, sed simplicissimum unum.

Dices 2°. Deo inesse videtur compositio metaphysica ; unaquæque enim relatio interna (paternitatis, etc.) simul cum divina natura ratione distincta aliam personam constituit.

Resp. Inter divinam naturam et divinas relationes non existit distinctio rationis *perfecte* fundata—quæ sane requiritur ad compositionem metaphysicam—sed imperfecte dumtaxat (cf. *Ont.*, n. 288).[1] Præterea, relationes divinæ eatenus solum dicunt perfectionem, quatenus cum natura divina identificantur ; quatenus autem a natura distinguuntur, non dicunt perfectionem sed

[1] *Real distinction* does not necessarily mean *real composition*, nor does *virtual distinction* necessarily mean *virtual composition*. For things to be compounded they must first be distinct ; but, given the existence of distinct things, it is not necessary that they should be compounded together into a unity. Catholic Theology recognizes a real distinction between the three Divine Persons, because They are, as " substantial " relations within the one Godhead, opposed to one another ; but it is not constrained in consequence to admit that the Godhead is really compounded of Them, because it teaches that each Person is not really distinct from, but really identical with, the Essence of the Divinity. Again Catholic Theology recognizes a virtual distinction between the Divine Essence and each Divine Person, but it does not teach us that the Divine Essence is virtually compounded of the three Persons, because the concept of each Person does not prescind from, but involves the concept of, the Essence. These observations show us that the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is opposed neither to the physical nor to the metaphysical simplicity of God—(**Boedder**, *op. cit.*, p. 98).

simpliciter *ad aliquid ; atqui* ubi perfectio perfectioni non additur, non habetur ulla compositio ; *ergo.*[1] Recole tamen Trinitatem in unitate esse mysterium.

84. Cor. I.—Ergo quum in Deo nullæ existant partes physicæ sive constitutivæ sive quantitativæ, nec corpus est nec corpus habet, nec in essendo a corpore dependet, atque ideo est spiritus purus. Quum porro in eo nullæ sint partes metaphysicæ, nulla potentialitas, nulla perfectibilitas, recte dicitur *actus* vel *spiritus purissimus.* Quare, "sicut repugnat Deum esse compositum ex partibus ita etiam repugnat, ut Deus tamquam pars veniat in compositionem alterius. . . . Composita quidem dici potest et a PP. dicitur hypostasis Christi (*i.e.*, hypostasis Christus), non quod hypostasis Verbi per se sit composita vel *tamquam pars* veniat in compositionem cum natura humana, neque enim a natura humana perfectionem aliquam accipit ; sed dicitur Christus hypostasis composita, quatenus una hypostasis ut suam habet naturam duplicem divinam et humanam, quæ posterior in Christo est per modum partis et *quasi pars*" (**Franzelin,** p. 305).

Cor. 2.—Ergo ratione divinæ simplicitatis divinæ perfectiones ab invicem et a divina essentia distinguuntur non *realiter* sed *virtualiter* (*Ont.*, n. 289). Distinctio virtualis seu rationis ratiocinatæ habetur, quando una eademque res pluribus conceptibus formaliter diversis exhibetur ; *atqui* conceptus, quibus singula attributa divina necnon divinam essentiam nobis exhibemus, sunt formaliter diversi ; aliam namque rationem objectivam cogitamus, dum Dei justitiam, aliam vero, dum ejus misericordiam, aliam denique, dum ejus essentiam nominamus.[2] Quum vero Dei essentia

[1] "Relatio est quidem aliquid secundum esse suum, quod habet in subjecto ; sed secundum rationem suam non habet quod sit aliquid, *sed solum quod ad aliud referatur ;* unde, secundum rationem suam non ponit aliquid in subjecto"—(**S. Th.**, 1° *dist.* 20, q. 1, a. 1).

[2] In the Deity, goodness, beauty, truth, wisdom, etc., do not exist as distinct attributes ; they are so many different names for

seu aseitas sit de ratione uniuscujusque attributi, essentia considerari nequit cum perfecta præcisione ab attributis, nec attributa cum perfecta præcisione ab essentia. Qua de causa prædicta distinctio non fit cum perfecto fundamento in re.

Scotistæ docent attributa divina ab essentia et inter se distingui *formaliter ex natura rei* (cf. *Ont.*, n. 290).

Ex dictis intelligitur, quo sensu dici queat : Deus est charitas, vita, etc. ; vel, Dei charitas est Dei sapientia. Nimirum istæ propositiones veræ sunt *objective*, quum quodvis attributum sit ipsa Deitas ; falsæ autem sunt *formaliter*, quum Dei essentia et attributa, prout a nobis concipiuntur, non sint idem. Unde, numquam licet, saltem absque explicatione, divina attributa sibiipsis substituere. Quis ferret dicentem : Dei misericordia punit ?

Cor. 3.—Ergo ens absolute unum in se seu simplicissimum est necessario unicum, quum in tali ente compositio ex natura communi et individualitate repugnet.

Quamvis autem Dei unicitas sequitur ex ejus simplicitate, oportet, ob summam rei gravitatem, eam argumentis distinctis demonstrare. Sit igitur hujus thesis pars altera.

85. PARS 2ª (*Deus est unicus*). **Arg. I.**—Non est verus Deus, cui quidquam perfectionis deest ; *atqui* " si essent plures Dii, oporteret eos differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Si autem hoc esset, perfectio alteri eorum deesset ; et sic ille, in quo

this very essence, according to the different manner in which that essence is conceived and regarded by creatures. These, and the innumerable other terms which we employ, indicate, not an innumerable number of perfections, but an innumerable number of different aspects of the one infinite and indivisible perfection. The distinction we make between one perfection and another, is not a real intrinsic distinction, but an ideal one. . . . We employ different words, not to indicate any objective change on the part of God, but simply to indicate the self-same indivisible and changeless essence of God, as it presents itself, now in one way, now in another, to our limited understanding—(**Vaughan,** *Thoughts for all Times*, p. 48.)

esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus. Impossibile est ergo esse plures Deos " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 11, a. 3).

II.—Si plures essent Dii, natura divina, non secus ac natura creata, esset universalis. Nam ex una parte naturam uniuscujusque a natura reliquorum aliquo modo differre oporteret, alioquin non essent *plures ;* ex altera vero parte unicuique inesse debet divina natura, secus non essent *Dii.* Jamvero, hæc divinitatis universalitas multiplicem habet repugnantiam. Sic enim divinitas *a*) non esset ens necessarium ; natura enim universalis ab existentia præscindit, et proinde contingens est ; *b*) non esset actus purus omnem potentialitatem et indifferentiam excludens, sed necessario esset in potentia, ut in hoc vel illo subjecto subsistat, et indifferenter se haberet ad hanc vel illam individualitatem accipiendam ; *c*) non esset absolute perfecta, quia in unoquoque Deo careret illa pura perfectione, quæ individualitatem reliquorum constitueret ; *d*) non esset in determinato numero Deorum multiplicata, sed in numero simpliciter infinito, quia si multiplicatio non sit repugnans divinitati, numerus Deorum non erit determinatus vi ipsius naturæ divinæ, sicut numerus individuorum in specie creata non est determinatus ab ipsa natura ; nec erit numerus Deorum determinatus a rationibus extrinsecis, quum divina natura sit a rationibus extrinsecis absolute independens. *Ergo* in hypothesi multiplicationis divinæ naturæ dicendum esset Deos infinite multos existere.

86. Hæc argumenta *a priori* placet confirmare argumento *a posteriori :*—

III.—Quum Dei existentiam nonnisi a rebus creatis naturaliter cognoscere valeamus, eatenus plures Deos admittere debemus, quatenus ad existentiam plurium agnoscendam res creatæ nos adducunt ; *atqui* tantum abest, ut ad agnoscendam plurium existentiam nos adducant res creatæ, ut de sufficientia unius cum ex-

clusione plurium mentem omnino convincant. *a*) *De sufficientia unius.* Etenim ad omnes res mundanas producendas ac conservandas, ad eas in fines proximos et finem ultimum dirigendas, necnon ad omnium rerum possibilitatem fundandam, sufficit unus Deus in potentia et sapientia infinitus. *b*) *Cum exclusione plurium.* Si enim " plures essent mundi creatores et rectores, nullus eorum haberet perfectum dominium nec liberam potentiam agendi, quod vellet. Nam si unus nollet creare aliquid, et vellet alter, non posset primus votum suum implere, quia sufficeret alterius voluntas ad rem creandam ; itemque si unus vellet destruere vel annihilare aliquam rem, posset id impedire alter, qui ejusdem profecto foret virtutis, et sufficeret ad rem conservandam. . . . *An contendas eos pactam* iniisse, ut idem semper vellent et agerent ? Verum quæso abs te, quonam modo pactum hujusmodi inierint, utrum ex naturæ necessitate, an libere ? Si ex naturæ necessitate, jam non sunt liberi in agendo ad extra, quod sane magnam importat imperfectionem. Si libere, quis cui consentiet ? nam non est major ratio, ut hic in alterius eat sententiam, quam vicissim. Præterea hoc ipsum jam dicit mutuam dependentiam et discordiarum vel certe displicentiæ possibilitatem, et proinde multiplicem imperfectionem natura divina indignissimam " (**Urráburu,** *vol. cit.*, p. 356).[1]

[1] De même que les saints Pères, pour prouver l'existence de Dieu, se servent principalement de la preuve appellée téléologique, de même ils établissent généralement l'unité de Dieu par l'ordre admirable et le gouvernement de l'universe. Au fond, ces deux arguments ne diffèrent guère l'un de l'autre. En effet, l'ordre dont on conclut l'existence d'un auteur souverainement sage du monde consiste précisement en ce que toutes choses sont reliées entre elles, de manière à former un tout bien ordonné. Si donc on peut conclure de cet ordre que la cause du monde ne peut être qu'un Être doué d'une haute sagesse, on peut également conclure de l'unité de la fin en vertu de la quelle cet ordre existe que cette cause doit être unique. . . .

On pourrait cependant objecter, et l'on a objecté réellement que, en dehors de l'auteur unique de ce monde, il pourrait y avoir plusieurs autres êtres, indépendants de lui, qui n'exerceraient aucune

87. Schol. 1.—Dei unitati haud adversatur doctrina catholica de Trinitate personarum ; hæc enim non asserit triplicem esse divinam naturam seu tres esse Deos, sed unicam naturam in tribus personis, quæ, licet inter se realiter distinguantur, sunt tamen una eademque res per se necessaria et infinite perfecta, *scil.*, Deus. Quemadmodum, *v.g.*, si daretur reale spatium infinitum, repugnaret utique existentia alterius spatii infiniti, haud vero repugnaret idem spatium esse infinitum secundum tres suas dimensiones. Trinitas igitur personarum in divina natura non est trinitas Deorum.[1]

88. Schol. 2.—Omnino rejicienda est doctrina Dualismi, qui statuit duo esse rerum prima principia, alterum

influence sur notre monde et dont chacun peut-être serait la cause d'un autre monde. Dans cette hypothèse, il serait toujours vrai que tous les êtres dont nous connaissons l'existence ont un auteur et maître commun. On pourrait se contenter de cela, en tant que cette preuve morale suffit à nous convaincre que nous devons reconnaître et adorer un Être souverainement sage et puissant comme seul Créateur et gouverneur de ce monde qui nous est connu. Toutefois alors nous n'aurions pas la certitude, fondée sur une démonstration rigoureuse, que notre créateur et maître est l'Être absolument suprême et que tout ce qui possède un être distinct de son être dépend de lui—(**Kleutgen**, *La Phil. scol.*, v. 4, n. 963, p. 397).

[1] I stretch forth my hand ;—Where is it ? In space ! What is space ? Philosophers have disputed about its nature. . . . Whatever it may be, whether substance or not, space is manifestly a capacity constituted by three dimensions of relation, length, breadth, and height ; three terms perfectly distinct, equal, inseparable save by an abstraction of the mind ; and yet in their evident distinction forming together but one single and indivisible extent, which is space. I say that length, breadth, and height are terms of relation, that is to say, terms which relate to each other, since the sense of length is determined by the sense of breadth, and so on. I say that these terms of relation are distinct from each other ; for it is manifest that length is not breadth, and that breadth is not height. I say, in fine, that these three terms, notwithstanding their real distinction, form but one single and indivisible extent. This, moreover, is perfectly clear to the senses and to the mind. There is then neither obscurity nor contradiction in this proposition : God is unique substance, containing in His indivisible essence terms of relation really distinct in themselves. . . . Imagine space become a spiritual substance. Length, breadth, and height would possess consciousness and knowledge of their relative individuality, consciousness and knowledge of their absolute unity in space ; they would be one by substance, many by distinction raised to the state of personality—(**Lacordaire**, *God*, pp. 44-7).

summe bonum, quod est primum principium omnium bonorum, alterum summe malum, quod est primum principium omnium mundi malorum. Imprimis enim, præterquam quod malum non habet causam per se, sed tantum per accidens, et ens summe malum est summe non-ens, hæc doctrina plura involvit absurda. Nam si hæc principia æquali potentia gaudent, necesse est,quum sint inter se essentialiter opposita, ut eorum vires collidant atque in operando se mutuo efficaciter impediant ; quo in casu nec bonum nec malum fieri posset. Si supponuntur inæqualia in potentia, ens fortius prævalere debet, et solum bonum, vel solum malum, in mundo haberetur, quod est manifeste falsum. Nec licet cum *Bayle* supponere inter hæc duo entia pactum quoddam, quo nimirum mutuo cedunt potestatem aliquam, ut propterea enascantur bonum et malum. Etenim pactum istud, si bonum, non potest acceptari a principio malo, quum hoc natura sua in malum determinetur, nec, si malum, potest a principio bono acceptari. Deinde, si principio bono non repugnat, ut fiant mala, frustra inducitur principium malum, ut existentiæ malorum ratio reddatur, quum hæc optime explicari possit ex permissione principii boni, et ex activitate rerum finitarum, quæ in agendo deficere possunt.

Radicem hujus erroris sic ostendit **S. Thomas** : "Qui posuerunt duo prima principia, unum bonum et alterum malum, . . . non consideraverunt causam universalem totius entis, sed particulares tantum causas particularium effectuum. . . . Similiter etiam qui invenerunt duorum particularium effectuum contrariorum duas causas particulares contrarias, nesciverunt reducere causas particulares contrarias in causam universalem communem ; et ideo usque ad prima principia contrarietatem in causis esse judicaverunt. Sed cum omnia contraria conveniant in uno communi, necesse est in eis supra causas contrarias proprias inveniri unam causam communem. Et

supra omnia, quæ quocumque modo sunt, invenitur unum primum principium essendi " (1, q. 49, a. 3).

ART. II.

DE DEI VERITATE.

89. Veritas est perfectio *rerum, intellectus, morum* (*Log.*, n. 141), ideoque Deo, cui convenit omnis perfectio pura, hæc triplex veritas (*ontologica, logica* seu *formalis, moralis*) inesse debet. Quæritur igitur quomodo Deo quæque conveniat.

90. Ontologica Dei veritas.—Deus est *summa* veritas ontologica. Veritas enim ontologica est ipsa entitas rei ut intelligibilis ; *atqui* essentia divina est summe intelligibilis (quum intelligibilitas tam late pateat quam entitas), atque actu summe intelligitur seu secundum totam ejus intelligibilitatem actu comprehenditur a divino intellectu cum divina essentia a parte rei identico. Unde, summa existit conformitas divinæ essentiæ cum divino intellectu ; et proinde Deus est *summa* veritas ontologica.

Deus est *prima* veritas ontologica, quia omnia tum existentia tum possibilia suam intelligibilitatem a Deo nanciscuntur ; res enim creatæ et creabiles sunt primario veræ per ordinem ad ideas exemplares, quas Deus efformat essentiam suam intuendo, et secundum quas res individuæ propriam perfectionem sortiuntur.[1] Præterea,

[1] God is the First Truth. No truth is before Him or above Him. As First Cause He is the foundation of the objective truth of all things existing, and also of the possibility of all things possible. He is the prototype, the ideal, of all things, and consequently the measure of the truth they contain. He is, as it were, the mirror or the objective light, in which all things can be known better than in themselves, although not necessarily by us. Hence it follows (1) that we can know nothing as true except by some influence of the First Truth on our mind ; (2) that the affirmation of any truth implies the affirmation of the First and Fundamental Truth ; and (3) that the negation of God implies the negation of all objective truth, thus not only making all knowledge uncertain, but changing it into falsehood and deception—(**Wilhelm,** *op. cit.*, p. 204).

Deus est *primarium* objectum sui intellectus, cetera autem entia solum secundarium.

" Deus est *purissima* veritas, cui nulla falsitas admisceri potest ; veritas enim falsitatem non compatitur, sicut nec albedo nigredinem. Deus autem non solum est verus, sed est ipsa veritas. Ergo in eo falsitas esse non potest " (**S. Th.,** *C. Gent., lib.* I, c. 61).

91. Formalis Dei veritas.—Deus est *summa* veritas *formalis :—summa,* quia Dei intellectus perfectissime conformis est omni enti, *scil.,* divinæ essentiæ, rebus creatis et possibilibus ; secus enim Deus non esset omniscius ; *formalis,* quia conformitas divini intellectus cum objecto non est aliquid divinæ essentiæ superadditum, sed est cum ipsa prorsus identica.

Deus est *prima* veritas formalis ; veritas enim formalis in intellectibus creatis est quædam participatio divinæ veritatis, quum principium cognoscens et veritas rei cognitæ ex ipsa divina veritate deriventur. Lumen namque intellectuale in creaturis est veluti radius luminis increati eas in divina imagine constituentis ; veritas autem rei cognitæ aut est divina veritas aut est a divina veritate derivata. *Atqui* veritas formalis in intellectibus creatis oritur ex unione veritatis, quæ est in rebus, cum lumine intellectuali ; *ergo* omnis veritas formalis pendet a Deo, qui proinde est *prima* veritas formalis.[1]

[1] Formal truth is, in created intellects, a participation of Divine truth. This it is either through an immediate intellectual conjunction with the Divine essence and substantial truth—as in the case of the beatific vision in the light of glory ; or through a supernatural light of another order, derived from the primal truth—a light which there is in all supernatural knowledge in different modes and degrees ; or through communication of a habit of knowledge, and of ideas—as in the case of the natural knowledge possessed by the angels, and as was the case in the natural knowledge possessed by the first man ; or finally, through that which is the lowest of all communications of light, the intellectual light within us. From the conjunction of this light with the objective truth which is in existing things, there springs *formal* truth ; that is to say, the adequate correspondence of our intellect with the reality of those things. There is a concurrence or confluence of the objective, and the subjective. The one is the counterpart of the other. The two meet and are wedded, and the offspring is *formal* truth—(**Humphrey,** *op. cit.,* p. 93).

92. Moralis Dei veritas.—Deus est *summa* veritas moralis, seu, nullo modo potest mentiri ; mendacium enim est difformitas signi externi a conceptu interno ; *atqui* difformitas seu inordinatio, utpote imperfectio, in Deo inesse nequit. Deinde, ad summam Dei perfectionem pertinet, ut creaturæ summa fide verbis ejus inhærere possint ; id quod sane requirit summam in Deo veritatem moralem.

Deus est *prima* veritas moralis. In ordine morali duo considerari debent : *objectum* circa quod actio moralis versatur, et *norma*, secundum quam actio moralis temperatur ; *atqui* objectum aut est Deus ipse aut a Deo habet esse ; norma vero actionis directiva consistit in principiis practicis, quæ constituunt legem naturalem, quæ et ipsa est participatio legis æternæ omnes creaturarum actiones in finem dirigentis ; *ergo*.

ART. III.

DE DEI BONITATE.

93. THESIS XVII.—Deus est ipsa bonitas.

Stat. Quæst.—Bonitas definitur : *entitas rei ut conveniens*. Res autem considerari potest ut *sibi* conveniens propter intrinsecam suam perfectionem ; et ut *alteri* conveniens propter perfectionem, delectationem vel utilitatem, quam alteri affert. Jam, in hoc duplici sensu Deus non solum est bonus, sed summe bonus, et proinde est ipsa bonitas.

94. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*summe bonus sibi*). **Arg.** —Divina bonitas considerari potest secundum ordinem realem, moralem, finalem ; *atqui* in hoc triplici ordine Deus est summe bonus ; *ergo*.

Prob. min. 1°. Deus est summe bonus in ordine *reali*, quia est ens summum ; tantum enim aliquid habet de bonitate, quantum habet de ente, quum hæc sint convertibilia.

2°. Deus est summe bonus in ordine *morali*, *a*) quia est essentialiter lex æterna omnem deordinationem a seipso excludens atque in suis creaturis absolute prohibens ; *b*) quia est norma omnis rectitudinis et honestatis creatæ ; *c*) quia denique rectitudinem increatam et creatam amore infinito prosequitur.

3°. Deus est summe bonus in ordine *finali*, quia, utpote infinite perfectus, sibiipsi est sufficientissimus, et in plenitudine suæ bonitatis veluti in fine adepto felicissime quiescit, nec in alia re extra seipsum potest beatitudinem quærere.

95. Pars 2ª (*summe bonus aliis*). **Arg.**—A Deo derivatur omnis creaturarum bonitas sive physica sive finalis sive moralis :

1°. *Physica*, quia ipse est omnium rerum causa eas creans, conservans, gubernans, in operando adjuvans.

2°. *Finalis*, quia " suprema eminentia divinæ essentiæ rerumque intestina natura exigit, ut quidquid a Deo est ut primo principio, ad Deum sit ut ad ultimum finem. Deus secundum normam necessariam omnis rectitudinis, quæ ejus est essentia, non ageret, atque adeo sanctus esse desineret, si bonum aliquod conderet participatum, quod ad ipsum tamquam ad ultimum finem directum non esset. Ipsum quod dicitur bonum participatum, si ad hunc finem non esset, contradictionem involveret ; est enim ipsi naturæ et essentiæ boni participati intestina ordinatio ad bonum absolutum ut ultimum suum finem, non minus quam essentialis est ei omnimoda dependentia in toto suo *esse* ab illo absoluto bono ut a suo principio " (**Franzelin,** p. 335).

3°. *Moralis*, quia tota perfectio moralis seu sanctitas creaturæ rationalis sita est in conformitate actuum et habituum ad normam moralem, quæ in divina essentia continetur, atque in cognitione et amore præstantissimæ Dei bonitatis.

96. Cor.—Ergo omnia sunt bona bonitate divina, non

quidem *formaliter* in sensu Pantheistarum, sed quatenus Dei bonitati tamquam exemplari et causæ extrinsecæ respondet omnis perfectio creaturarum. Specialissime vero in ordine supernaturali divina bonitas est sui diffusiva. In hoc enim ordine " specialem quamdam infinitatis rationem præ se fert : *a*) quia nos liberat a peccati malitia infinita ; *b*) quia pro redemptione a peccato pretium solvit infinitum ; *c*) quia seipsum, qui est bonum infinitum, dat *α*) per Incarnationem, *β*) per Eucharistiam, *γ*) per inhabitationem Spiritus Sancti in anima justi, *δ*) per visionem beatificam in cœlis " (**Hontheim,** *Theod.*, p. 525).

97. Schol. De Dei Pulchritudine.—Cum Dei veritate et bonitate cohæret ejus pulchritudo, de qua igitur pauca. In Deo insunt summa cum perfectione tria elementa pulchritudinis, scil., *integritas*, *debita proportio* seu *consonantia*, *claritas*.

1°. Deo competit *summa integritas*, quum nihil de plenitudine entis et perfectionis ei desit.

2°. Deo competit *summa consonantia*, quia in eo habetur *a*) *summa unitas* propter summam ejus simplicitatem et summam concordiam inter attributa, quæ sibi invicem opposita apparent, *v.g.*, inter misericordiam et justitiam, libertatem et immutabilitatem ; et *b*) *summa varietas* propter maximam virtualem multitudinem et varietatem attributorum. Jamvero, consonantia seu proportio dicit *unitatem in aliqua varietate*.

3°. Deo competit *summa claritas*, tum quia in seipso suam infinitam perfectionem et cetera omnia claritate infinita cognoscit, tum quia quemlibet intellectum, cui concedit ipsum intueri, lux divinæ veritatis summe clarificat.[1]

[1] Obscurity and darkness are in themselves ugly, and destroy the beauty of objects ; because, where they exist, neither order, variety, union, nor proportion can be discernible. St. Denis makes the following observation on this subject : " God, as the sovereign beauty, is author of the order and union which constitute created beauty ; it

4°. Deus est fons omnis pulchritudinis finitæ. Etenim pulchritudo *physica* est proprius Dei effectus ; pulchritudo *moralis* pendet a Deo ut norma rectitudinis ; pulchritudo *artificialis* a creatura rationali efficitur ad imitationem pulchritudinis physicæ.

5°. In omni ordine rerum Deus suam pulchritudinem manifestat : *a*) in *ordine ideali* ; veritates enim abstractas valde pulchras esse et contemplanti delectabiles constat; *b*) in *rebus inorganicis* præsertim in crystallis aliisque lapidibus pretiosis, maxime autem in luce, quæ non solum ipsa est pulchra, et aliis corporibus splendorem et gratiam tribuit, sed divinæ pulchritudinis est symbolum ; *c*) in *rebus organicis*, ut in varietate, formis, coloribus plantarum et animalium ; *d*) in rebus *spiritualibus*, in animabus hominum et in angelis, quorum pulchritudo pulchritudinem totius universi, etiamsi in unam formam colligatur, incomparabiliter superat. Quare, Deus utpote in se possidens totam rationem pulchritudinis, et rebus creatis totam earum pulchritudinem communicans, jure merito pulchritudo *summa*, pulchritudo *prima*, prædicatur.

is by an infused communication of Himself that He bestows beauty on all things, as a ray of light embellishes more or less the different objects on which it is reflected, according to their capability of receiving its impressions." Now, the beauty which the light of God communicates to different objects proceeds from the proportion, the brilliancy, and the degree of grace He bestows on them. . . . All these qualities are found united in the uncreated beauty of the Almighty, in a manner infinitely more perfect than we can conceive. We recognize in Him not only union, but likewise unity of essence, in a distinction of Persons, with an infinite lustre and brilliancy, joined to the incomprehensible proportion His actions and perfections have to each other. And what surpasses all this, the wonderful assemblage of these infinite perfections is included in a single, simple, and pure act, which is God Himself—(**St. Francis de Sales,** *Love of God*, c. 1).

CAPUT SECUNDUM.

De attributis Dei prædicamentalibus.

ART. I.

DE DEI IMMUTABILITATE.

98. THESIS XVIII.—Deus est physice et moraliter absolute immutabilis.

Stat. Quæst.—Mutatur, quod non manet semper idem ; non autem manet semper idem, quod sive ab extrinseco sive ab intrinseco ita afficitur vel affici potest, ut modo hac ratione, modo illa a priori diversa, se habeat. Itaque immutabilitas definitur : *proprietas, vi cujus res non potest aliter se habere.*

Mutatio, ut in *Ont.* (n. 408) notavimus, est *interna* vel *externa*, prout aliqua res incipit se aliter habere *intrinsecus* quam prius, vel res novam denominationem accipit ob realem mutationem in alia re, cui habet relationem ; quo pacto dicitur mutari homo, qui prius incognitus nunc fit cognitus. Hæc mutatio, quum rem, de qua prædicatur, vere immutatam relinquat, Deo tribui potest et reapse ei tribuitur, quoties creaturæ in ordine ad eum mutantur, ut quum dicimus Deum incipere amare hominem pœnitentem.[1]

Mutatio interna est duplex : *physica* et *moralis*. Prior obtinet, quando qualiscumque physica realitas a subjecto acquiritur aut amittitur ; altera vero habetur,

[1] On pourrait parler des changements dans les relations extérieures d'un être qui ne changerait pas lui-même. Ainsi une montagne immobile est tantôt à droit, tantôt à gauche, de l'observateur qui en fait le tour en divers sens. Mais ce n'est là qu'un changement *apparent*, que l'on peut sans inconvenient attribuer à Dieu, relativement aux créatures, puisque tous les changements réels qu'il suppose n'affectent que les créatures, sans modifier l'être divin—(**Farges,** *op. cit.*, p. 325).

quando voluntas suum statum mutat circa aliquod objectum, nimirum, per accessum vel recessum consilii, ut quum ex non volente fit volens et vicissim. Quare, absoluta Dei immutabilitas dicit ab eo excludi omnem variationem et diversitatem status, tum quatenus nulla physica realitas ad eum accedere vel ab eo recedere potest, tum quatenus voluntas ejus tantæ est constantiæ, ut numquam aliquid velle incipiat, quod antea non voluit, numquam aliquid velle desinat, quod antea voluit. Immutabilitas moralis præsupponit immutabilitatem intellectus, qua Deus nihil de novo scire incipit, nihil umquam scire desinit.

99. Immutabilitas physica et moralis sunt intime conjunctæ, ita tamen differunt, ut mutatio moralis, non *immediate* sed *mediate* tantum, importet mutationem physicam. Etenim quum Deus unico actu voluntatis, absque ulla sui mutatione ferri possit in diversa objecta, ideo, etiamsi suum propositum circa hoc vel illud objectum mutaret, nulla propterea in eo sequeretur mutatio *physica*. Sed quia talis mutatio innuit voluntatem finitam et proinde physice mutabilem, moralis mutabilitas mediate infert mutabilitatem physicam (cf. *Suarez*, Meta., Disp. 30, s. 9, n. 58).

100. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*physice immutabilis*). **Arg. I.**—*a*) Deus, utpote ens a se et necessarium, est actus purus omnem potentialitatem excludens (n. 84) ; *atqui* quidquid quocumque modo est physice mutabile, includit potentiam ad alium modum se habendi. *b*) Deus est absolute infinitus in perfectione ; *atqui* quidquid quocumque modo est physice mutabilis, necessario capax est augmenti vel decrementi in perfectione, et proinde mutationis. *c*) Deus est absolute simplex, ideoque habet, quidquid habere potest, et est, quidquid habet ; *atqui* ens, quod habet, quidquid habere potest, nihil potest acquirere ; ens, quod est, quidquid habet, nihil amittere potest, nisi ex toto desinat esse. *Ergo.*

II.—Quævis rei mutatio aut in melius fit, aut in pejus, aut in æquale ; atqui Deus non potest *in melius* mutari, secus enim non fuisset infinite perfectus ante mutationem ; neque *in pejus*, sic enim desineret esse infinite perfectus ; neque *in æquale*, quia infinite perfecto non potest dari æquale, ut constat ex dictis de Dei unicitate (n. 85). *Ergo* Deus in sua entitate physica est absolute immutabilis.

101. Pars 2ª (*moraliter immutabilis*). **Arg. I.**—Si Deus est moraliter mutabilis, seu, si fieri potest, ut nova formet decreta, vel a decretis formatis recedat, ratio est *a*) aut quia, ob aliquam mutationem physicam, aliquid incipit esse ei bonum, quod prius non erat bonum ; *b*) aut quia nova motiva volendi cognoscit ; *c*) aut quia, immutata manente cognitione, vult, quod antea non voluit, vel non vult, quod antea voluit. Jamvero, *prima* ratio physica Dei immutabilitate excluditur ; *altera* infinita Dei scientia ; *tertia* infinita divinæ voluntatis perfectione, quæ prorsus respuit omnem inconstantiam et levitatem, quarum quippe imputatio maxime dedecet etiam homines ; jure enim merito ut levis et inconstans is reprehenditur, qui suum propositum sine ratione relinquit.[1]

II.—Aut Deus ab æterno præscivit se suum consilium mutaturum esse, aut non præscivit ; si prius dicitur, irrationabilis modus agendi Deo sapientissimo adscribitur, quum non sit sapientis id mente decernere, quod se mutaturum esse præscit ; si posterius asseritur, negatur infinita divinæ scientiæ perfectio. Præterea, aut ab æterno aut in tempore Deus suam voluntatem mutat:—*non in tempore*, quia tunc ab æterno esset in Deo sus-

[1] A decree cannot be repealed without a motive, nor *wisely* repealed without a *reasonable* motive. But for God there can be no reasonable motive to recall what He has once decreed. A reasonable revocation of a decree is always based upon a better knowledge or a fuller consideration of the matter and circumstances. Neither the one nor the other is conceivable in God, whose essence is identical with infinitely perfect intuition of all truth—(**Boedder,** *op. cit.*, p. 297).

pensio volitionis, quæ sane est imperfectio, quum nonnisi ex defectu cognitionis provenire posset ; *non ab æterno*, quia impossibile est, ut in eodem indivisibili *nunc* æternitatis contraria decreta formentur, v.g., *volo creare, nolo creare. Ergo.*

111.—Quidquid in Deo est, est realiter identificatum cum ejus esse, et proinde omnes actus ejus sunt ipse Deus ; *ergo* eadem immutabilitate, qua Deus in suo esse gaudet, in actibus suæ voluntatis afficitur.

102. Schol.—Quando Deus omnino immutabilis dicitur, non est concipiendus veluti iners, sed ut *actus purissimus* " omnibus mobilibus mobilior " (*Sap.*, c. 7, v. 24), verbo, *ipsa activitas.* " Non itaque in ejus vacatione (inquit **S. Aug.**) cogitetur ignavia, desidia, inertia, sicut nec in ejus opere labor, conatus, industria. Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere." *De civ. Dei.*, lib. 12, c. 17).[1]

103. Obj. 1. Prius Deus non fuit creator, postea autem fuit creator ; *atqui* ens, quod aliter se habet prius et postea, est mutabile ; *ergo.*

Resp. *Dist. maj.* . . . per mutationem et denominationem extrinsecam, *conc.* ; per internam sui mutationem, qua ex creatore in potentia factus est creator in actu, *neg. Contradist. min.* et *neg. concl.*

[1] Notre Dieu est un Dieu vivant, mais il ne vit pas à la manière humaine, et pour le comprendre il faut éloigner de notre esprit toute image anthropomorphique. L'*immutabilité*, que nous attribuons à la vie divine, n'a rien de commun avec l' *immobilité* ; aussi avons-nous déjà signalé comme inexacte l'expression de *Moteur immobile*, attribuée à Aristote, alors qu'il a dit au contraire *Moteur immuable* : ce qui est bien différent. Bien loin d'être le repos et l'inaction, l'*Acte pur* est l'activité même, portée à sa souveraine intensité. Il meut et il se meut lui-même, mais sans être mis en acte par personne, et sans passer comme les créatures de repos à l'action, de la puissance à l'acte, car il est l'acte même, acte éternel et incessant, qui ne peut être suspendu, ni changé ; qui exclut toutes les hésitations, les variations, les caprices, les efforts successifs, les recommencements perpétuels, et jusqu' à la division en une multitude d'actes partiels, si nécessaire à notre faiblesse. En ce sens, c'est le mouvement même de Dieu qui est immuable, puisqu'il n'apporte au sein de Dieu ni diminution, ni progrès, ni trouble, ni vicissitude. Il est le déploiement constant d'une force infinie dans une paix et une béatitude parfaite—(**Farges**, *op. cit.*, p. 327).

Deus creando non acquisivit novam perfectionem, sed per decretum *principiative æternum, terminative temporale*, creaturis impertivit existentiam ; hæ igitur in ordine ad Deum realem relationem dependentiæ acceperunt, et sic etiam Deus secundum humanum concipiendi et loquendi modum mutatus exhibetur mutatione externa, et ad suos effectus relatione logica refertur.

Obj. 2. In Incarnatione Deus homo factus est, et proinde mutatus est ; *ergo*.

Resp. *Dist. antec.* Deus homo factus mutatus est extrinsece per mutationem humanitatis assumptæ, ad quam novam relationem logicam acquisivit, *conc.* ; per internam sui mutationem, *neg.* In unione hypostatica vera mutatio et perfectio ad sacram humanitatem, quæ assumpta fuit ad subsistendum in persona Verbi, accessit ; deitas vero exinde nihil novi acquisivit nec acquirere potuit, quippe quæ jam in se omnem humanitatis perfectionem eminenter continebat.

Obs. 3. S. Scriptura docet Deum pœnituisse quod fecerit hominem, etc., quæ quidem involvunt mutationem intrinsecam.

Resp. 1°. Scriptura sæpissime docet Deum esse immutabilem (*v.g.*, " *Ego dominus et non mutor*," Mal. c. 3 ; " *apud quem* (*Patrem*) *non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio*," S. Jac. c. 1) ; *ergo*.

Resp. 2°. Scriptura se ad hominum captum et morem loquendi accommodans hæc docet, *conc.* ; docet Deum vere pœnituisse, etc., *neg.* Hæ locutiones scripturisticæ adhibentur ad significandum Deum, homines aquis diluvii obruendo, ita se gessisse ac si dolore affectus pristinam revocasset voluntatem.

104. Obj. 4. Dei libertati convenit, ut ipse potuerit eligere oppositum ejus, quod revera elegit, quin ideo imperfecte ageret ; *ergo* etiam nunc eligens oppositum ejus, quod ab æterno elegit, non ageret imperfecte.

Resp. *Conc. antec.* ; *neg. cons.* ; enimvero qui nunc vult, quod prius noluit, non tantum suo proposito in aliquod objectum fertur, sed simul prius propositum retractat ; id quod certo aliquam intellectus vel voluntatis imperfectionem indicat (n. 101). Libero arbitrio igitur, quatenus est perfectio, non convenit, ut proposita suscepta mutare possit, sed ut hoc vel illud oppositum eligere potuerit ; et proinde ab ente infinite perfecto omnis mutatio in consiliis est prorsus aliena.

Obj. 5. Si voluntas Dei est immutabilis, frustra ad eum preces fundimus.

Resp. Deus preces nostras exaudiendo non mutat suum con-

silium, sed ab æterno prævidens preces nostras, ab æterno decrevit nos exaudire. Ad rem **S. Thomas** : " Oportet homines agere aliqua, non ut per suos actus divinam dispositionem immutent, sed ut per actus suos impleant quosdam effectus secundum ordinem a Deo dispositum. . . . Non enim propter hoc oramus, ut divinam dispositionem immutemus, sed ut id impetremus, quod Deus disposuit per orationes esse implendum ; ut, scil., homines, postulando mereantur accipere, quod eis Deus omnipotens ante sæcula disposuit donare,' ut *Gregorius* dicit " (2, 2, q. 83, a. 2).[1]

ART. II.

DE DEI ÆTERNITATE.

105. THESIS XIX.—Deus est absolute æternus.

Stat. Quæst.—Æternitatis definitionem a Boethio datam expositam habes in *Ont.* (n. 409). Brevius definiri potest : *Duratio entis existentis essentialiter sine initio, fine, successione.* Dicitur *entis existentis*, quia possibilia sunt æterna quidem, at eorum æternitas non est aliud

[1] Jesus Christ said : " All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive " (Matth. xxi. 22). On these words, an argument might be formed thus : The conditions laid down by Jesus Christ that God may grant His graces to man are two : *prayer* and *faith*. But these two acts depend altogether on human liberty, which is subject to a thousand changes, and may end in ways unforeseen by him who prays. Therefore, as God grants the graces asked, He must change in His will, adapting Himself to that issue at which human liberty arrives in prayer.

We answer : However these things eventuate, whether man prays or not, whether he prays with or without the due dispositions, at every turn in the series the hypothesis will have a certain development. In other words, to borrow the language of grammar, since we are dealing with an hypothetical proposition, when the *protasis* is in human liberty and changeable things, the *apodosis* is in the hands of God. But granting the protasis, the apodosis follows. Now, God from eternity knew all things actual, possible, and conditional, and conformably to His prescience also from eternity, He arranged, so to say, His decrees according to the development that things were to have. Therefore God in hearing or not hearing the prayers of men, does not at all change His will, but, by the act that manifests His operation in time, He performs that which He had eternally decreed—(**Sala,** *Teodicea*, p. 36).

quam æterna Dei cognitio.[1] Duratio est permanentia rei in esse. Variæ sunt durationes pro varietate rerum.

Prima et imperfectissima est duratio *motus*, cujus partes sibi continuo succedunt, ita ut nunquam divisibilis pars, sed semper solum aliquod indivisibile punctum, præsens sit. Quæ duratio *tempus* dicitur.

Altera est duratio *substantiarum corporalium*, quæ per aliquod tempus permanent, tamen quum sint motui subjecta, in aliquo sui jugiter mutantur. Quæ ideo *in tempore esse* vel *temporales* dicuntur.

Tertia est duratio *substantiarum spiritualium*, quæ sunt naturaliter incorruptibiles et proinde substantialiter immutabiles, tamen non sunt absolute immutabiles, quum diversa accidentia in ipsis succedant. Harum duratio *ævum* vocatur.

Quarta est duratio *entis a se existentis*, cujus solius duratio est absoluta perfectio, quum omnem mutationem omnemque potentialitatem excludat.[2] Quæ duratio est æterna et *æternitas* veri nominis vocatur.

106. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Deus est absolute æternus, si ejus existentia necessario excludit initium, finem, et successionem ; *atqui* ita res se habet ; res enim, quæ necessitate suæ naturæ seu a se existit, non potest non existere, et proinde absurde conciperetur ut incipiens vel desinens existere. Res absolute simplex et absolute immutabilis nullam potentialitatem ad alium statum, nullam prioritatem et posterioritatem in duratione compatitur ; *atqui* Deus est ens necessitate suæ naturæ existens, absoluta simplicitate et immutabilitate in suo esse fruens, et proinde ejus duratio absolute æterna est.

II.—Quidquid nullam in suo conceptu imperfectionem

[1] " Vera et necessaria sunt æterna, quia sunt in intellectu æterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus ; unde non sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit æternum "—(**S. Th.**, 1, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3).

[2] The eternity of God does not mean that He existed alone through *ages prior* to creation. It means that His life and being transcend temporal measures—(**Hall**, p. 142).

involvit, Deo tribuendum est ; *atqui* duratio necessario carens initio, fine, et successione (*i.e.*, æternitas absoluta), nullam procul dubio involvit imperfectionem, immo maximam rei perfectionem indicat ; *ergo.*

107. Cor. 1.—Ergo æternitas divina *secundum se considerata*, quum reapse sit incommutabilis Dei essentia, excludit omnem distinctionem præteriti, præsentis, et futuri ; ideoque in ea non habetur nisi immutabile *nunc ;* quemadmodum veritas mathematica semper eadem manet sine ulla sui vicissitudine.[1] Unde Christus dixit : " antequam Abraham fieret, ego *sum.*" Attamen Dei æternitas *relative considerata* admittit præteritum et futurum ; unde recte dicimus : Deus crea*vit* mundum, Deus judica*bit* mundum. Immo secundum diversa tempora, diversa et opposita de Deo prædicantur, *v.g.*, in principio Deus creavit mundum, nunc vero eum non creat. Ratio est, quia talia prædicata, utpote relativa, mutantur, termino relationis mutato, subjecto immutato manente. Nullam igitur mutationem vel successionem Deo tribuunt, sed solum creaturis.[2]

[1] Soit un axiome mathématique ou un théorème géometrique : *le tout est plus grand que la partie ; les trois angles d'un triangle valent deux droits.* Nous n'avons aucune peine à concevoir que ces vérités ne peuvent pas ne pas être, ni cesser d'être un seul instant et qu'elles sont eternelles. Or nous concevons, en même temps, et aussi clairement, que ces vérités existent *tout* entières à la fois, sans qu'il soit possible de supposer en elles aucune succession d'avant et d'après, aucune différence entre le passé et le futur, ni l'ombre d'aucune vicissitude. Elles ne deviennent pas peu à peu ; impossible de dire qu'elles *ont été* ou qu'elles *seront ;* mais elles *sont* pleinement, en dehors et au-dessus du temps quoique presentes à tous les temps, dans l'immuable éternité—(**Farges**, *op. cit.*, p. 335).

[2] There can be no adequate illustration of what transcends imagination ; but the figure of the circle is helpful in comparing time and eternity. . . . The centre, being a point, has no measure, and yet is abreast of every part of the circumference, however vast that may be. It symbolizes eternity. The radii occupy various positions, and are drawn in different directions. But while these divergences produce different points of contact with the circumference, their points of contact at the centre coincide under all circumstances. They symbolize the relations between the temporal and the eternal. Like the radii these relations are diverse and changeable, but the region of change lies in the temporal alone. When, therefore, we describe the relations of the eternal mind and will of God to the

108. Cor. 2.—Ergo res creatæ coexistunt *toti* æternitati, sed non *totaliter* seu *ab æterno*. Id est, quando existunt, præsentes sunt æternitati et quidem toti, quum æternitas partibus careat ; at non ideo dici possunt ab æterno coexistere Dei æternitati secundum physicam realitatem, quam in tempore habent—id quod quidam falso opinati sunt. De quibus cf. *Franzelin*, op. cit., p. 352 ; *Chr. Pesch*, De Deo uno, n. 170 : *Urráburu*, Theod., v. 2, p. 316-46.

Cor. 3.—Ergo inepte quidam (ut Clarkius) asserunt Dei æternitatem esse tempus initium et finem excludens. Quia enim perfectissimam æternitatis durationem non possunt concipere nisi mediante duratione temporanea, illam sicut hanc alteram successioni esse subjectam autumant. Atvero, in æternitate percipienda id ipsum intellectui accidit, quod interdum accidit visui, qui ratione medii (*v.g.*, fenestræ currus moventis) suo objecto tribuit motum, qui ei minime inest. Sic etiam Dei æternitas semper stans, sed per medium temporis concepta, nobis successiva apparet.

Cor. 4.—Ergo " sicut Deus per essentiæ suæ infinitatem est fundamentum omnis creaturæ possibilis, et per immensitatem omnis loci et extensionis possibilis, ita per æternitatem omnis temporis et durationis successive possibilis. . . . Ulterius, sicut infinitudo essentiæ non potest concipi a nobis, nisi in ordine ad species rerum possibilium, nec immensitas nisi respectu spatii imaginarii possibilis, ita nec æternitas, nisi comparatione temporis imaginarii infiniti " (**Lessius,** *De perf. div., lib.* 4, c. 3, n. 15, 16).

temporal effects of His operations in terms of temporal change and sequence, we are describing truly, if we remember that we are not describing the eternal centre itself, which is immutable—(**Hall,** p. 255).

ART. III.

DE DEI IMMENSITATE.

109. THESIS. XX.—Deus est immensus.

Stat. Quæst.—Sicut æternitas dicit absolutam perfectionem in ratione durationis, ita immensitas dicit absolutam perfectionem in ratione præsentiæ : et sicut æternitas quodammodo intelligitur per durationem successivam, ita immensitas per relationem ad locum et spatium. Quare, **immensitas** definiri potest : *essentialis Dei præsentialitas omnibus, quæ sunt vel esse possunt, spatiis, quin ullo spatio includatur. Præsentialitas* est proprietas, qua res aliis rebus præsens esse potest. Immensitas, ut in definitione innuitur, duo quasi elementa continet, *scil.*, præsentiam *actualem* in omni spatio reali, et præsentiam *virtualem* seu *jus præsentiæ* in omnibus spatiis possibilibus. Prior præsentia vocatur *omnipræsentia* seu *ubiquitas*, ac, secus atque immensitas (quæ attributum absolutum et æternum est, ideoque a mundo existente abstrahit et omnes mundos in infinitum possibiles respicit), attributum relativum est, atque res creatas supponit, ex quarum existentia, tamquam conditione posita, Deus denominatur omnipræsens. At immensitas non est spectanda veluti *in potentia*, ut per actualem rerum existentiam reducatur *in actum*, sed reponenda est in actuali divinæ substantiæ amplitudine, per quam Deus constituitur actu præsens omnibus rebus possibilibus, si hæ reapse existerent.

Triplici modo Deus ubique præsens esse dicitur, scil., *per essentiam, per scientiam, per potentiam.* Deus ubique est *per essentiam*, quia tota ejus substantia est in omnibus rebus et locis ; *per scientiam*, quia " omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis ejus " (*Heb.*, c. 4) ; *per potentiam*, quia omnia in esse et operari ab eo creante, conservante, et concurrente dependent.[1]

[1] " Quidam hanc triplicem omnipræsentiam non inepte colligunt ex loco S. Scripturæ (*Psalm.*, 138) : ' Si ascendero in cœlum, tu illic

Non est, cur expresse agamus de omnipræsentia ; si enim immensitatem Deo competere ostendimus, jam hoc ipso constat Deum omnibus rebus existentibus substantialiter esse præsentem.

110. Si immensitas conferatur cum creaturarum in spatio præsentia, maxima apparet inter eas diversitas. Enimvero 1°. *quod attinet ad corporum præsentiam*, hæc præsentia limitibus circumscribitur, contingit enim quatenus partes corporis cum partibus spatii commensurantur, et præsentia unius corporis præsentiam alterius non compatitur ; e contra, divina immensitas omnes limites in præsentia excludit, in singulis partibus spatii totus Deus præsens est, nec res alias sua præsentia in spatio excludit, sed omnes pervadit et compenetrat. 2°. *Quod attinet ad præsentiam spirituum creatorum*, hæc quoque est limitata, atque cum majore et minore spatio adæquari potest ; e contra, immensitas est prorsus illimitata et omnia spatia explet. Cavendum est ne immensitas concipiatur ut quædam extensio vel diffusio, instar corporis, divinæ substantiæ in locis et spatiis, sed potius concipienda est ad modum, quo veritates necessariæ ubique sunt, et quasi per prius existunt in spatio possibili quam corpora ibi locantur (cf. *Franzelin*, p.364).

111. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Deus est immensus, si in eo habetur præsentialitas illimitata, tota simul, semperque in actu ; *atqui* ita res se habet. Etenim *a*) præsentialitas est—*perfectio*, quum sensu communi omnium perfectio veri nominis sit, quod res aliis rebus præsens esse potest, et eo major perfectio, quo hæc vis præsentiæ ad plura se extendit,—et quidem *simplex*, quippe quæ

es ; si descendero in infernum, ades ' (*quia Deus ubique est per essentiam*). ' Si sumpsero pennas meas diluculo et habitavero in extremis maris, etenim illuc manus tua deducet me et tenebit me dextera tua ' (*quia Deus ubique est per potentiam*). ' Et dixi : forsitan tenebræ conculcabunt me et nox illuminatio mea in deliciis meis,—quia tenebræ non obscurabuntur a te et nox sicut dies illuminabitur ' (*quia Deus ubique est per scientiam*) "—(**Hontheim,** *op. cit.*, p. 571).

in suo conceptu nullam includit imperfectionem. Unde sequitur Dei præsentialitatem esse illimitatam ; repugnat enim quamlibet perfectionem divinam esse limitatam. Considerata creaturarum præsentia, clare apparet earum determinatam præsentiam esse perfectionem mixtam, *i.e.*, præsentiam cum carentia majoris præsentiæ. Remota autem hac limitatione, efflorescit perfectio simplex illimitata in ratione præsentiæ.

b) Hæc præsentialitas est *tota simul*, quia Deus, utpote ens simplicissimum, numquam concipi potest præsens per partes.

c) Est *semper in actu* quia in Deo, ente infinite perfecto et actu purissimo, illa vis præsentiæ, quæ nuncupatur immensitas, concipi nequit partim in actu, partim in potentia, et proinde, ut rebus et spatiis sit præsens, vel potius, ut res et spatia sint ipsi præsentia, nihil requiritur nisi horum existentia.

Deo igitur competit præsentialitas illimitata, tota simul et semper in actu, *i.e.*, immensitas.

II.—Constat substantiam spiritualem (*v.g.*, animam rationalem) esse in loco extenso. Quo igitur perfectior est substantia spiritualis, eo majori spatio tota præsens esse potest ; et proinde substantia spiritualis infinite perfecta omnibus spatiis realibus ita est præsens, ut iis nullatenus limitetur, sed virtute præsentiæ ea infinite excedat seu immensa sit. *Ergo.*

III.—Deus ubicumque per seipsum operatur vel operari potest, ibi per suam substantiam actu adsit necesse est, quum actio divina cum divina substantia realiter identificetur ; *atqui* Deus operatur in universo mundo illum conservans et cum omnibus agentibus concurrens. In tantum vero alii mundi in infinitum sunt possibiles, in quantum Deus sua actione eos potest creare et conservare. *Ergo* ubicumque res aliqua est vel esse potest, ibi Deus substantialiter adsit necesse est ; quod sane perinde est ac Deum immensum esse affirmare.

112. Obs.—Non est celandum Scotistas et quosdam alios, quos citat et sequitur *Lahousse* (Theod., n. 229), negare validum esse argumentum pro divina immensitate haustum ex universalitate divinæ operationis. Etiamsi, inquiunt, actio in distans, quæ sit formaliter transiens, aperte repugnet, non ideo tamen evidenter apparet, cur Deus, qui solo actu voluntatis effectus producit, eos non posset producere in distans. Scholasticorum pars omnino major cum *S. Thoma* docet immensitatem efficacissime probari ex divina ubique operatione. Ostendunt enim actionem in distans esse absolute impossibilem, non quia est actio hujus vel illius agentis, sed ex generali ratione agentis, quod quantavis virtute gaudeat, revera se habet quasi non existeret, nisi ibi adsit, saltem per medium, ubi effectus producitur (cf. *Urráburu*, Theod., v. 1, p. 487).

113. Cor. 1.—Ergo errant, qui (ut *Erasmus, Eugubinus*) immensitatem in hoc tantum reponunt, quod res creatæ divinæ scientiæ et potentiæ subjiciantur. Sic enim " immensitatem Dei *oratione* relinquunt, *re* autem tollunt. Quamquam enim Theologi de divina omnipræsentia disserentes, Deum in rebus omnibus per scientiam, per potentiam et per essentiam esse definiant ; tamen id, quod proprie ad immensitatem pertinet, hoc tertio continetur. Duo enim, quæ præcedunt, ex aliis Dei attributis, scientia nimirum et potestate, manant. Nisi igitur *substantialis* Dei præsentia in rebus admittatur, propter quam divina natura ita rebus omnibus insit, ut eas sine ulla admixtione pervadat, totaque in mundo et tota pariter in singulis ejus partibus reperiatur ; Dei immensitas, quidquid ad fucum faciendum dici velit, e medio revera pellitur " (**Liberatore,** *Instit. Phil.*, v. 2, p. 496).

Cor. 2.—Ergo ista ratio loquendi, qua Deus ad creaturas *accedere* et ab eis *recedere* dicitur, non est intelligenda de illa præsentia, qua ipse omnibus rebus necessario adest, sed de operatione speciali, qua incipit vel desinit creaturis adesse ; quæ tamen inceptio vel desitio non inducit intrinsecam in Deo mutationem, sed eam in creaturis supponit.

Cor. 3.—Ergo potius dicendum est mundum in Deo

contineri, quam Deum in mundo ; quia Deus immensitate sua omne spatium reale superexcedit. Ob eamdem rationem Deus recte dicitur creasse mundum intra se, *i.e.*, intra suam immensitatem. Si enim extra se mundum creasset, non potuisset eum postea pervadere absque sui mutatione. At quum mundus sit ens quoddam in seipso subsistens et a Deo prorsus distinctum, non improprie dicitur Deus extra se mundum creasse.

114. Schol.—Circa controversiam de præsentia Dei in spatio extramundano, hæc pauca sufficiant.

1°. Certum est immensitatem Dei esse fundamentum omnis extensionis possibilis et Deum immensitate sua habere perfectionem cujuscumque præsentiæ possibilis.

2°. Certum est, quum immensitas sit perfectio infinita, si aliqua spatia extramundana per novas creationes realia evaderent, Deum eo ipso his spatiis (vel potius illa Deo) fore præsentem.

3°. Certum quoque est Deum non esse in spatio extramundano, si talis modus loquendi significat realem relationem præsentiæ spatii ad Deum ; quod enim non est reale, realem relationem non potest habere. Si vero ' esse in spatio ' significat ubicationem seu præsentiam absolutam (*i.e.*, relationem excludentem), dicendum est Deum esse in spatio extramundano, quemadmodum in spatio, quod hic mundus nunc occupat, Deus inesset, si mundus in nihilum redigeretur. Quare, Deus est extra mundum eodem modo, quo erat ante creationem mundi, quando omne spatium fuit mere possibile, fundatum tamen in divina immensitate. Concludamus cum **S. Bernardo** : " Incomprehensibilis est Deus ; sed non parum apprehendisti, si hoc tibi de eo compertum est, quod *nusquam sit*, qui non clauditur loco, et *nusquam non sit*, qui non excluditur loco. Suo autem illo sublimi atque incomprehensibili modo, sicut omnia in ipso, sic ipse in omnibus est. . . . Alias vero, *ubi erat antequam mundus fieret, ibi est.* Non est quod quæras ultra ubi

erat ; præter ipsum nihil erat. Ergo *in seipso erat*" (*De Consid.*, lib. 5, c. 6).[1]

SECTIO SECUNDA.

De Attributis Operativis.

115. Ex supra demonstrata divinæ essentiæ perfectione infinita sequitur Deo convenire vitam seu activitatem immanentem. Nunc vero investigandum est, qualis

[1] There was a state of things in which God was by Himself, and nothing else but He. There was no earth, no sky, no sun, no stars, no space, no time, no beings of any kind ; no men, no Angels, no Seraphim. His throne was without ministers ; He was not waited on by any ; all was silence, all was repose, there was nothing but God ; and that state continued, not for a while only, but for a measureless duration ; it was a state which had ever been ; it was the rule of things, and creation had been an innovation upon it. . . . I say through a whole eternity God was by Himself, with no other being but Himself, not working, but at rest, not speaking, nor receiving homage from any, not glorified in creatures, but blessed in Himself and by Himself, and wanting nothing.

What an idea this gives us of the Almighty ! He is above us, we feel He is ; how little can we understand Him ! We fall in even with men upon earth, whose ways are so different from our own, that we cannot understand them ; we marvel at them, . . . we call them strange and incomprehensible ; but what are they, compared with the marvellousness of the Everlasting God ? He alone indeed is incomprehensible, who has not only lived an eternity without beginning, but who has lived through a whole eternity by Himself, and has not wearied of the solitude. Which of us, or how few of us, could live a week in comfort by ourselves ? . . . We cannot live simply in ourselves ; the mind preys upon itself, if left to itself. This is the case with us mortal men ; now raise your minds to God. Oh, the vast contrast ! He lived a whole eternity in that state, a few years of which is to us madness. He lived a whole eternity without change of any kind. Day and night, sleep and meal-time, at least are changes, unavoidable changes, in the life of the most solitary on earth ; . . . but the Eternal is the sleepless, He pauses not, He suspends not His powers, He is never tired of Himself ; He is never wearied of His own infinity. He was from eternity ever in action, though ever at rest ; ever surely in rest and peace profound and ineffable ; yet with a living, present mind, self-possessed, and all-conscious, comprehending Himself and sustaining the comprehension. He rested ever but He rested in Himself ; His own resource, His own end, His own contemplation, His own blessedness—(**Newman,** *Discourses to Mixed Congr.*, Disc. xiv.).

sit hæc divina activitas. Quum autem vita organica (vegetativa scilicet et sensitiva) a Deo sit prorsus aliena, restat, ut ejus vita sit pure intellectualis. Duplex autem est activitas intellectualis, quarum altera pertinet ad intellectum, altera ad voluntatem. Unde, de divina scientia et voluntate agitur in hac sectione.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De scientia divina.

116. Scientia, prout Deo tribuitur, non significat cognitionem per discursum acquisitam—talis namque cognitio magnam indicat cognoscentis imperfectionem —sed significat specialem intellectus perfectionem, qua res in seipsis et in suis causis summa cum claritate cognoscuntur. Quare, sicut aliæ perfectiones puræ, ita scientia de Deo sensu proprio et sine ulla metaphora prædicanda est.

ART. I.

DE NATURA, PRINCIPIO ET DIVISIONE DIVINÆ SCIENTIÆ.

§ 1. De Natura Divinæ Scientiæ.

117. Deo inesse scientiam clare constat, tum quia scientia, *i.e.*, intellectualis cognitio veritatis, est perfectio pura, quæ proinde enti infinito deesse nequit, tum quia, ut ex argumentis physicis (p. 34) probatum manet, ipse est auctor ordinis et finalitatis mundi corporei, et fons omnis veritatis, quæ intellectui creato inesse potest, tum demum quia, ut mox apparebit, Deus natura sua determinatur ad cognitionem omnis veritatis. Quæritur igitur, cujusmodi sit divina scientia.

Jamvero, scientia divina est—

a) *substantialis*, quia quum Deus sit actus purus, ejus scientia, secus ac nostra, nequit esse accidens vel qualitas, quæ abesse potest, sed est cum ipsa divina essentia a parte rei plene identica, et proinde tam substantialis est quam ipsa divina essentia.[1]

b) *immutabilis* non solum quatenus non mutatur in seipsa, sed quatenus eadem objecta semper eodem modo respicit ; " nam ex arce æternitatis omnia immutabili intuitu videt (Deus), etiam illa, quæ in se variantur, et omnia respicit pro suis temporibus, et in illo respectu semper ac perpetuo permanet " (**Suarez,** *Meta.*, Disp. 30, s. 15, n. 17).

c) *simplicissima ;* consistit enim in unico actu perfectissimo, quo Deus seipsum et in seipso cetera omnia, possibilia non minus quam actualia, comprehensive cognoscit, tum secundum intrinsecam eorum realitatem, tum secundum eorum inter se relationes. Qui actus perfectissime judicativus est, exclusa omni compositione et divisione, omni discursu ab una veritate cognita ad aliam.[2]

[1] God's knowledge not only is an act, or ever actual, but that act is itself a *substance*. An act of knowledge may be either accidental or substantial. An *accidental* act of knowledge is an act which can be either present or absent; and nevertheless the whole substance of him who knows remains in its entirety. An accidental act of knowledge is not therefore of the intrinsic idea of him who knows; and the presence of it involves some, at least metaphysical, composition. . . .

A *substantial* act of knowledge, on the other hand, is an act which is so identified with the *substance* of him who knows, that it cannot be separated from that substance. It is so much of the intrinsic idea of that substance, as to exclude even metaphysical composition. Such is God's knowledge, as that knowledge is a substantial act.

It is a necessary perfection of infinite being that it cannot be conceived as capable of perfection, through another perfection. The divine *knowledge* is essentially the divine *substance*. God's being is God's knowledge—(**Humphrey**, *op. cit.*, p. 161).

[2] The divine knowledge is infinitely perfect in its embrace of every conceivable object of thought, and it is infinitely perfect from the first, or rather from eternity. And this infinite perfection of knowledge is attained not by any succession of ideas, not by any compounding of predicates with subjects, nor again by any passage from premises to conclusions. It is attained by one all-embracing act of cognition. And this one act, what else can it be but the divine essence

d) *independens*, quia a nulla re divinæ essentiæ extranea determinatur (cf. n. 119).

e) *infinite perfecta* tum extensive tum intensive :— *extensive*, quia ad omnia extendit ; *intensive*, quia dotes, quæ ad perfectionem scientiæ intensive inspectæ pertinent sunt claritas, certitudo, veritas, infallibilitas. *Atqui* quum omnia, quæ in Deo sunt, sint essentialiter summe perfecta, necesse est hæ dotes in summo gradu perfectionis divinæ scientiæ insint. Et sane, divina scientia est imprimis " *clarissima* et *evidentissima*, nam hæc perfectio maxime pertinet ad essentiam scientiæ ; si ergo illa scientia in essentiali ratione scientiæ summe perfecta est, etiam in claritate necesse est esse perfectissimam. Unde etiam fit esse *summe certam ;* nam certitudo comitatur evidentiam cum proportionata perfectione. Nam, licet interdum certitudo sit sine evidentia (scil., *in fide*), nunquam tamen est evidentia sine certitudine ; et licet certitudo obscura excedat aliquam certitudinem evidentem, absolute tamen et ex suo genere certitudo evidens melior est ; unde, si comitetur supremam evidentiam, est etiam suprema certitudo. Rursus hinc fit illam scientiam etiam esse *summe infallibilem* et *maxime veram*, quia attingit veritatem cum perfectissimo lumine et simplicissimo intuitu, unumquodque verum intuendo prout in se est, et de unaquaque veritate judicando secundum mensuram ejus, et in hoc consistit *infallibilitas*, quæ idem fere est quod certitudo " (**Suarez,** *ib.*).

118. Ex jam dictis facile infertur 1°. *a*) nullam in divina cognitione posse inesse dubitationem vel opinationem ; hæc enim cum evidentissima et certissima

itself ? If it were really anything distinct from it, God's essence would neither be simple, nor infinite, nor immutable, nor eternal. We must, then, conclude with St. Thomas : " It must be affirmed that God's knowledge is His substance " (1, q. 14, a. 4). He, the infinite Being, is unchangeable, infinite, actual thought—(**Boedder,** *Nat. Theol.*, p. 258).

scientia plane repugnat ; *b*) nullam fidem, tum quia fides dicit assensum propter externam auctoritatem, tum quia importat cognitionem obscuram atque imperfectam ; *c*) nullum a fortiori errorem, quum Deus sit ipsa veritas (p. 104).

Infertur 2°. divinam scientiam *a*) non continere notiones universales ; hæ enim non repræsentant res in concreto, ideoque imperfectam cognitionem dicunt ; *b*) non facere mentales distinctiones, quia hic modus cognoscendi, non secus ac ratiocinium, imperfectionem sapit ; *c*) non fingere entia rationis, quia productio entis rationis importat cognitionem non-entis, non ut non-entis, sed ad instar entis. Deus tamen cognoscit distinctiones et entia rationis, quæ facit intellectus humanus ; cognoscit enim omnes cogitationes nostras. Sic, cognoscit distinctiones, quas mens nostra facit inter attributa divina, et intelligit hos nostros de Deo conceptus diversos diversis rationibus divinam essentiam exprimere.

Infertur 3°. quidquid perfectionis insit cognitioni creaturarum, Deo tribuendum esse, remota omni imperfectione, quam diversitas cognitionum vel nominum importet. Homo enim " secundum quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere *intelligentiam ; scientiam* vero, secundum quod cognoscit causas altissimas ; *consilium*, vel *prudentiam*, secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed hæc omnia Deus una et simplici cognitione cognoscit. Unde, simplex Dei cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest ; ita tamen quod ab unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam prædicationem venit, secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid perfectionis est " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 14, a. 1, ad 2).

§ 2. De Formali Principio Divinæ Scientiæ.

119. THESIS XXI.—Entia ab ipso distincta Deus cognoscit secundum propriam realitatem, quam in seipsis habent; non ista vero, sed ipsa divina essentia est principium formale Dei intellectum determinans ad cognoscendum.

Stat. Quæst.—Principium formale cognitionis est id, quod determinat facultatem ad cognoscendum. Duplex distinguitur hujusmodi principium: aliud *externum*, quod est objectum sua activitate determinans facultatem ad actum; aliud *internum*, quod est species intelligibilis, qua facultas formam objecti intra se recipiens constituitur in actu primo proximo ad actum cognitionis eliciendum.

Principium formale internum intelligi potest sensu *stricto* et sensu *lato*. Priori sensu acceptum significat speciem, quæ determinat intellectum ad actum eliciendum. Principium formale sensu lato sumptum non aliud significat quam rationem sufficientem, cur cognoscens hujus vel illius rei cognitionem habeat.

Jamvero, a Deo excludendum est omne principium externum divinæ cognitionis determinativum, et proinde entia creata et creabilia sunt termini dumtaxat et extrinsecæ conditiones respectu divinæ cognitionis, quatenus veritas eorum requiritur, ut Dei scientia ad ea terminetur. Porro, essentia divina est, secundum nostrum modum concipiendi, solum principium et quasi species intelligibilis determinans intellectum divinum ad cognoscendum. Diximus *quasi species*, quia quum Dei intellectus et essentia sint idem, divinam essentiam determinare divinum intellectum nihil aliud significat quam intellectum jam ex se esse determinatum ad omnia cognoscenda, seu, Deum sibi esse rationem sufficientissimam, cur omnia cognoscat.

120. Prob. Thesis. Pars 1ª (. . . . *cognoscit secundum propriam eorum realitatem*). **Arg.**—Si Deus entia a se

distincta non cognosceret secundum realitatem, quam in seipsis habent, *a*) scientia divina non esset *extensive* infinita, quum in tali hypothesi terminaretur ad solam essentiam divinam et ad alias res, prout in ea *eminenter* continentur ; *b*) scientia divina circa ipsam divinam essentiam non esset *intensive* infinita, quum intellectus divinus hanc non cognosceret perfecte tamquam causam et exemplar rerum omnium ; *perfecta* enim causæ et exemplaris cognitio includit cognitionem effectuum et exemplatorum tum actualium tum possibilium, et quidem prouti sunt in seipsis. *Atqui* nisi scientia divina sit extensive et intensive infinita, Deus infinite perfectus dici nequit ; *ergo*.[1]

121. Pars 2ª (*essentia divina est principium formale divinæ cognitionis*). **Arg.**—In tantum egeret Deus principio formali cognitionis a sua essentia distincto, in quantum in se non haberet totum illud, quod requiritur ad actum cognitionis perfectissimum, *i.e.*, ad actum, qui tam late patet, quam patent cognoscibilia ; *atqui* Deus, sicut est in *esse* independens ab omni ratione sibi extrinseca, ita quoque in *operari* plenissime sufficiens est per seipsum ad omnia cognoscenda, quin indigeat specie vel alia determinatione ab extra proveniente. *Aliis verbis* : Deus ratione suæ essentiæ habet in se non solum

[1] If God were to know the *being* of things, only as those things are " eminently " (as theologians say) in God, He would not be knowing created *being itself*, or *possible being itself*. He would be knowing only His own essence in which that being is mirrored. This " eminent " *being* in God is not the created or possible being itself, but is the divine essence.

If God were not perfectly to know the *being itself* of things as they are in themselves, or as they may one day be, He would not be comprehending His own essence, as it is the *cause* and *pattern* of all things. Perfect comprehension of the *cause* includes knowledge of *effects*. whether possible effects, or actually existing effects, as they are in themselves. Although, therefore, God does not know the secondary objects of His knowledge in themselves as in a cause which determinates and perfects His knowledge ; yet God does know them, not only as they are " eminently " in the divine essence, but also as they are now, or may one day be, *formally in themselves*—(**Humphrey**, *op. cit.*, p. 144).

perfectissimam vim intelligendi, sed etiam speciem intelligibilem omnium intelligibilium perfectissime repræsentativam. Perpulchre ad rem **S. Bernardus** : " Deus scientiarum dominus est, qui solus solam nesciat ignorantiam, qui totus sit lux, et tenebræ in eo non sint ullæ, totus sit oculus et minime aliquando fallitur, quia minime clauditur ; *qui extra se non quærit lumen, cui admoveatur, ut videat, ipse qui videt, ipse unde videt* " (*De consid.*, lib. 5, c. 4, n. 10).

Porro, si divina cognitio aliud præter divinam essentiam haberet principium, sequeretur *a*) divinam scientiam non esse *substantialem* sed accidentalem ; *b*) eam non esse *independentem*, quum in suo esse a rebus externis penderet ; *c*) eam non esse *determinatam*, sed indifferentem, quum secus non indigeret principio externo determinante. *Atqui* omne quod est accidentale, dependens, indifferens, a Deo Deique perfectionibus prorsus alienum est.

Denique, ideo præcise requiritur in nobis species et determinatio ab objecto proveniens, ut mens quoad plura indifferens determinetur ad hoc vel illud cognoscendum ; *atqui* scientia divina non potest esse indifferens, quum indifferentia dicat potentialitatem et mutabilitatem, quæ sane in Deo locum habere non possunt.

Ergo extra Deum non datur principium formale divinæ scientiæ, et proinde id, quod est principium formale seu ratio divinæ scientiæ est ipsa divina essentia.[1]

[1] " As God can have no potentiality for further perfection, but is pure actuality, there cannot be in Him any difference between intellect and intellectual representation. Consequently He is neither without an intelligible species, as our intellect, before it understands something actually ; nor is His intelligible species different from the substance of the divine intellect, as is the case with our intellect when it has actual understanding ; on the contrary, the intelligible species (of God) is the divine intellect itself "—(*St. Thomas*, 1, q. 14, a. 2). This comes to the same as saying that the essence of God is the intelligible species of His intellect. . . . Let us set forth the same truth in other words, so far forth as it applies to the knowledge God has of the actual world. Since all things else save God are so many

122. Cor. 1.—Ergo entia a Deo distincta non determinant sed terminant divinam scientiam : *non determinant*, quia non afficiunt divinum intellectum, ut hic transeat a cognoscendo in potentia ad cognoscendum in actu ; *terminant*, quia sunt objecta cognita ; terminus enim cognitionis est id, quod cognoscitur.

Cor. 2.—Ergo entia a Deo distincta sunt conditio, non intrinseca sed extrinseca, divinæ scientiæ : *non intrinseca*, quia nullatenus influunt in actum divinæ cognitionis physice spectatum, quum ille actus sit cum divina essentia identificatus ; *extrinseca*, quia, ut divina cognitio ad hoc vel illud objectum terminetur, necesse est, ut hoc vel illud objectum sit cognoscibile, cujus igitur cognoscibilitas (sive in statu possibilitatis sive in statu existentiæ) est conditio, non quidem actûs, sed terminationis actûs. Exinde facile colligitur divinam cognitionem nullam novam acquirere perfectionem ex eo, quod ad entia externa terminatur ; sed est unus actus infinitus, qui immutatus manens ad omnia ut possibilia necessario terminatur ; quodsi quædam ex eis existentiam accipiant, adhuc immutatus manens ad hæc quoque terminatur eaque inter suam amplitudinem complectitur ; tota enim mutatio contingit in nova hujus actus ad objecta terminatione, quæ est relatio Deo extrinseca.

123. *Dices :* Cognitio est vera cognoscentis perfectio ; *atqui* res non existentes Deus non cognoscit ut actu existentes, et proinde aliqua realis perfectio divinæ scientiæ deest, quæ, rebus existentibus, adesset ; *ergo* non sola terminatio sed ipsa scientia est mutabilis.

adumbrations of Himself, His essence bears to each and all of them the character of a pattern in which whatever perfection they have, has its archetype and its perfect representation. He needs, therefore, no other determination by which to know them adequately. . . . The divine essence exceeds indeed all creatures infinitely by its own infinite Being ; nevertheless, it expresses all and each of them distinctly, in so far as its infinite Being is identical with infinite thought, and God's creative power realizes accurately His conceptions of creatures chosen for creation—(**Boedder**, *op. cit.*, p. 261).

Resp. Cognitio *entitative* sumpta est perfectio cognoscentis, *conc.*, *terminative*, et prout est expressio vitalis objecti cogniti, *neg.* Quare, si idem actus exprimit res existentes, quando existunt, et res possibiles, quando solum existere possunt, nullam intrinsecam mutationem subit cognoscens sive ut possibiles sive ut existentes eas cognoscat. Sed unus idemque actus divinæ cognitionis, utpote infinitus et actibus numero infinitis æquivalens, repræsentare potest res ut possibiles, quando actu non existunt, et ut existentes, quando actu existunt. Non igitur in se, sed in sua terminatione, actus divinus mutatur, quando res existunt.

124. Cor. 3.—Ergo scientia divina se porrigit ad omnia mala. Deus enim cognoscendo suam essentiam, ut est rerum exemplar, cognoscit non solum omnes diversos modos, quibus exprimitur vel exprimi potest, sed etiam omnes diversos modos, quibus ab ea exprimenda res deficiunt vel deficere possunt seu malæ sunt.

Idem probatur ex eo, quod Deus perfecte cognoscit omnem realitatem. Nam " quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat omnia, quæ possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quædam bona, quibus accidere potest, ut per mala corrumpantur ; unde Deus non perfecte cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 14, a. 10). Exinde sequitur non esse in mente divina exemplar, secundum quod mala fiant (ut censuit Rosmini) nec ideam propriam secundum quam cognoscantur.[1]

[1] This " type of the impious " is another of Rosmini's strange conceits. He says : " Even the impious man finds his type in the ideal of the Divine intelligence. . . . " But the types in the Divine Ideal are identified with the Divine Essence, and are the Divine Essence Itself as imitable in this or that degree. How then could the type of the impious be in the Divine Ideal ? Every type in the Divine Ideal expresses a *bonum*, and God sees evil as a deficiency from this type. St. Thomas expressly enquires in the *Quæstiones Disputatæ* whether evil has its idea—or the exemplar, the type—in God ; and he denies it, because evil is not a participation, but a

§ 3. De Divisione Divinæ Scientiæ.

125. Scientia divina in *se spectata*, utpote actus simplicissimus et cum divina essentia identicus, divisionem non admittit ; ut vero notitiam plus minusve perfectam attingamus de illo infinito actu, quo Deus omnia simul comprehendit, opus habemus pluribus notionibus, quibus omnibus respondet idem actus, quippe qui eminenter in sua simplicitate æquivalet omnibus nostris de eo notionibus. Variæ igitur statuuntur scientiæ divinæ partitiones. Sic Dei scientia dividitur—

1°. In *necessariam* et *contingentem* seu *liberam*, prout respicit objecta, quæ non dependent vel dependent a libera Dei voluntate. Hinc, ad scientiam necessariam referuntur omnia possibilia et divina essentia ; ad scientiam liberam spectant res creatæ.

2°. In scientiam *approbationis* et *reprobationis*, prout objecta habent vel non habent adjunctam divinæ voluntatis approbationem. Scientia boni et mali moralis.

3°. In scientiam *speculativam*, quæ sistit in objecti contemplatione ; et *practicam*, quæ opera producenda dirigit. Dei scientia circa seipsum est speculativa, circa mundi creationem et gubernationem est practica.

4°. In scientiam *simplicis intelligentiæ*, scientiam *visionis*, et scientiam *mediam*.

a) Scientia simplicis intelligentiæ dicitur ea, qua Deus cognoscit res sub præcisa ratione possibilitatis, sive extra statum possibilitatis inveniantur sive non. " Objectum itaque scientiæ simplicis intelligentiæ, sunt essentiæ rerum cum suis proprietatibus ac prædicatis necessariis, et generatim propositiones simpliciter necessariæ atque æternæ veritates, et propterea solet etiam

privation of Form. Nevertheless God knows evil, in virtue of its opposite, *i.e.*, in virtue of good, of which evil is the privation. *Ex hoc ipso quod malum non habet ideam in Deo, a Deo cognoscitur per ideam boni oppositi.* Qq. Disp., Q. 3, de Ver., a. 4, ad 7—(**Liberatore**, *On Universals*, p. 266).

ad illam revocari cognitio impossibilium et chimærarum, quia oppositorum eadem est ratio vel cognitio. . . .

b) " Scientia visionis est, qua Deus cognoscit res existentes prout tales ; quo pacto intuetur non solum seipsum, sed res omnes, quæcumque in temporis differentia existent, sive quamdiu existunt in se ipsis, sive etiam quamdiu in se ipsis non existunt, atque adeo etiam præteritas ac futuras, quia divinæ intuitioni reapse nihil est præteritum aut futurum, sed omnia præsentia secundum illud tempus, in quo reali existentia potientur " (**Urráburu,** *Theod.*, v. 2, p. 43).

c) Scientia *media* est ea, qua Deus cognoscit futuribilia, seu ea, quæ futura essent, si poneretur aliqua conditio contingens, *i.e.*, contingenter nexa cum conditionato.

126. *Futuribile* seu futurum conditionate est duplex : aliud *futuribile tantum*, quod scilicet aliquando esset, si poneretur conditio, sed nunquam erit, quia numquam ponetur conditio ; aliud *futuribile et futurum*, quod aliquando esset, si esset conditio, et reapse erit, quia erit conditio. Exemplum prioris est : *Si Christus Judam respexisset, Judas pœnitentiam egisset* (aut *non egisset*) ; posterioris : *Si Christus Petrum respexisset, Petrus pœnitentiam egisset.* Utrumque futuribile est objectum scientiæ mediæ, sed præcise ut futuribile. Quare, futuribilia, quæ, ut absolute futura, pertinent ad scientiam visionis, considerata in signo priori ad positionem conditionis, et proinde ad eorum absolutam futuritionem, pertinent ad scientiam mediam. Quod sane diligenter notare oportet, quum " eo potissimum consilio inducatur scientia conditionatorum, ut explicetur, quomodo Deus, ea prælucente, certam infallibilemque providentiam et prædestinationem, et quamlibet efficacem voluntatem habere possit de nostris actibus, salva libertate voluntatis creatæ, quatenus præsciens, quid unaquæque voluntas faceret in quibuslibet circumstantiis,

constituit hominem in illis, in quibus scit hominem esse operaturum, quod Deus vult eum operari, aut vult permittere" (**Urráburu,** *ib.*, p. 349).

In definitione dicimus "conditio *contingens*"; nam si ponitur conditio *necessaria*, "scientia conditionati revocatur ad scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ; in ipsa enim comprehensione essentiæ ac naturæ ejus, quæ dicitur conditio vel causa necessario nexa cum conditionato vel effectu determinato, etiam hoc conditionatum hicve effectus comprehenditur. Sic, Deus in comprehensione suæ omnipotentiæ intelligit veritatem: si vellem mundum creare, mundus fieret." Hic vero agitur "unice de scientia existentiæ actuum liberorum creatæ voluntatis, qui forent sub conditione, quacum nexum quidem habent tamquam cum sua conditione, qua posita, forent, qua sublata, non forent, non tamen habent nexum necessarium nec ex ipsa natura conditionis infallibilem, atque adeo etiam ea conditione posita possent non esse. Unde, non modo ipsa conditio, sub qua forent, est aliquid ontologice contingens, sed contingens est etiam nexus existentiæ actuum cum conditione" (**Franzelin,** pp. 477 et 479).

127. Ratio nominum.—Scientia *simplicis intelligentiæ* ita vocatur, quia ejus objectum simpliciter consideratur in sua propria entitate, nulla ratione habita existentiæ vel non existentiæ. Scientia *visionis* ita vocatur quia, ad analogiam visionis sensitivæ, ad res existentes terminatur. Scientia *media* ita vocatur, quia quasi medium locum tenet inter scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ et visionis, de utraque quodammodo participans, ab utraque quodammodo differens. De scientia simplicis intelligentiæ *participat*, quia importat objecti possibilitatem; ab ea *differt*, quia non versatur circa objectum præcise *ut possibile*, sed *ut futurum*, si quædam conditio poneretur. De scientia visionis *participat*, quia respicit objectum *ut existens;* ab ea *differt* quia

non respicit objectum *ut absolute* existens, sed *conditionate* tantum.

128. Contra scientiam mediam a *Molina* e Soc. Jesu *expositam*,[1] invehuntur Theologi et Philosophi præcipue ex Ord. Prædicatorum, conquerentes per illam injuriam fieri *S. Thomæ*, qui divisionem in scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ et visionis habuerit adæquatam. Sed imprimis, qui ita conqueruntur, hodie adhuc dissentiunt, utrum conditionate futura referenda sint ad scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ an visionis. "In hoc divisi sunt Thomistæ," inquit *Billuart*, . . . est quæstio nominis ; sive enim dixeris esse simplicis intelligentiæ, sive visionis, perinde est, *modo non dixeris independentem a decreto Dei actuali*." (De Deo, *diss.* 6, a. 5, ad 3).[2] Deinde, nemo negat allatam S. Thomæ divisionem esse adæquatam. Angelicus enim objecta scientiæ divinæ dividit in ea, quæ numquam, et in ea, quæ aliquando existunt, et secundum hanc rationem dividit ipsam Dei scientiam per membra contradictorie opposita, inter quæ non datur medium. Quare, cognitionem futuribilium refert ad scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ, et proinde ab ejus manifesta doctrina discedunt illi auctores, qui talem cognitionem ad scientiam visionis assignant, nec minus ii, qui ad utramvis

[1] It is evident that the Jesuits Fonseca and Molina did not invent the *scientia conditionalium*, called by the latter *scientia media ;* neither did they assert it as some Thomists, *on the ground of a new departure*, have upbraided them with doing. On the contrary they expressly appealed to the Fathers, and especially to St. Augustine. Indeed the first Thomist opponents of Molina, who wished to prove the scientia conditionalium false, and to show St. Augustine a determined enemy of it, have been completely abandoned and disowned by later Thomists. . . . At all events, the Thomists find no support in the Fathers for any need of their decreta conditionata . . . so that we may speak of an invention on their side rather than on that of Molina —(**Scheeben** apud *Hontheim*, p. 646).

[2] " Deus videt omnia futura libera, sive absolute sive conditionate sumpta, scientia *visionis* "—(**Zigliara**, *Theol. Nat.*, p. 453).

" Ad scientiam *intelligentiæ* referri *debet* cognitio eorum, quæ dicuntur futura conditionata "—(**Farges**, *Theol. Nat.*, p. 369).

" Futura conditionata . . . si futuritionem numquam sunt acceptura, sunt objectum scientiæ *simplicis intelligentiæ :* si vero de facto futuritionem accipient, sunt objectum *scientiæ visionis*. Nam illa futura conditionata, si considerantur ut aliquando in posterum realiter existentia sunt objective conditionata, sed subjective (*i.e.*, ex parte Dei) absoluta "—(**Mancini**, *Elem. Phil.*, v. 2, p. 403).

illam posse referri dicunt. " Horum, inquit, quæ actu non sunt, est attendenda quædam diversitas. Quædam enim licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt, vel erunt ; et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. . . . Quædam vero sunt, quæ sunt in potentia Dei, vel creaturæ, quæ tamen *nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt ;* et respectu horum *non dicitur habere scientiam visionis,* sed *simplicis intelligentiæ* " (1, q. 14, a. 9).

129. Si vero objecta scientiæ divinæ dividuntur in possibilia, in conditionate futura, in aliquando futura, jure triplex in Deo huic triplici objecto respondens distingui potest scientia. Hanc divisionem esse legitimam facile intelligitur considerando triplex " signum rationis," quod distinguitur in scientia, quam Deus habet de rebus a se distinctis. Etenim in primo signo Deus cognoscit actus ut possibiles ; prior enim est possibilitas quam futuribilitas et actualitas. In signo secundo cognoscit quomodo creaturæ rationales, si crearentur, in talibus vel talibus adjunctis se gererent ; prius enim est existere sub conditione quam absolute. In signo tertio cognoscit actus absolute futuros.

130. Quare, divisio scientiæ divinæ in simplicem intelligentiam et visionem adæquata quidem est. Si quis autem vellet divisionem sub alio respectu instituere, mediam scientiam inter utramque et de utraque participantem adstruere potest et debet.[1] Immo, teste *S. Thoma,* inter scien-

[1] The Dominican school has defended the view that the distinction between knowledge of " vision " and of " simple intelligence " is the only one we need or ought to employ in our effort to conceive and describe Divine omniscience, even in relation to the free acts of intelligent creatures. These acts, if they ever take place, are known or foreknown by God as if they were eternally actual—and this is admitted by all ; otherwise they remain in the category of the merely possible—and this is what the Jesuit school denies, pointing for example to statements such as that of Christ regarding the people of Tyre and Sidon, who would have done penance had they received the same graces as the Jews (Matt. xi. 21). This school therefore maintains that to the actual as such and the purely possible we must add another category of objects, viz., hypothetical facts that may never become actual, but would become actual were certain conditions realized. The hypothetical character of such facts, it is rightly contended, is more than merely possible, yet less than actuality ; and since God knows such facts in their hypothetical character there is good reason for introducing a distinction to cover them—and this is the *scientia media.* And it is clear that acts that take place and as

tiam speculativam et scientiam practicam, licet hæ scientiam adæquate dividant, existit alia scientia "secundum aliquid speculativa, et secundum aliquid practica" (1, q. 14, a. 16). Jamvero, quod attinet ad res finitas, evidens est scientiam *speculativam* non differre a scientia *simplicis intelligentiæ*, nec scientiam *practicam* a scientia *visionis*. Ergo a doctrina Angelici non discedunt, qui scientiam ponunt, secundum aliquid ad scientiam simplicis intelligentiæ, secundum aliquid ad scientiam visionis pertinentem.

ART. II.

DE OBJECTO DIVINÆ SCIENTIÆ.

131. Duplex distinguitur divinæ scientiæ objectum: *primarium*, quod primo et per se a divino intellectu cognoscitur, et ratione cujus cetera cognoscuntur; *secundarium*, quod ratione primarii cognoscitur. Primarium dicitur etiam *formale*, secundarium vero *materiale*. Ex utroque oritur objectum adæquatum divinæ scientiæ, nimirum omnia, ad quæ Dei scientia se extendit, seu, omnia quocumque modo cognoscibilia.

Jam satis indicavimus (n. 121) divinam essentiam esse divinæ scientiæ objectum primarium. "Illa enim res (inquit **S. Thomas**) solum est primo et per se ab intellectu cognita, cujus specie intelligit. Operatio enim proportionatur formæ, quæ est operationis principium. Sed id, quo Deus intelligit, nihil est aliud quàm sua essentia; igitur intellectum ab ipso, primo et per se, nihil est aliud quam ipsemet" (*C. Gent.*, lib. 1, c. 48). Unde, alia, quæ Deus præter seipsum intelligit, cognoscit ratione suæ

such fall finally under the knowledge of vision may be conceived as falling first under the knowledge of simple intelligence and then under *scientia media*; the progressive formula would be: first, *it is possible* Peter would do so and so; second, Peter *would* do so and so, given certain conditions; third, Peter *will do* or *does* so and so—(**Toner**, *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 6, p. 618).

essentiæ cognitæ, et, ut diximus, constituunt secundarium divinæ scientiæ objectum. De his in hoc articulo agemus secundum triplicem Dei scientiam supra notatam.

§ 1. De Scientia Divina circa Possibilia.

132. THESIS XXII.—Deus omnium possibilium comprehensivam habet cognitionem secundum propriam uniuscujusque naturam.

Stat. Quæst.—Avicenna (sæc. xi.) et Averroes (sæc. xii.) docuerunt Deum non cognoscere possibilia singillatim et secundum propriam ipsorum entitatem, sed tantum *obscure* et secundum *esse eminentiale*, quod in divina essentia habent. Idem docuisse Aristotelem nonnulli Patres et Scholastici affirmant ; eum vero ab hoc errore fuisse immunem alii satis demonstrant (cf. *Suarez*, Meta., Disp. 30, n. 41). Thesis exprimit universalem Scholasticorum sententiam.

133. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Deus, quum sit purus actus cognoscendi, actu cognoscit quidquid quocumque modo cognoscibile est ; *atqui* possibilia sunt vere cognoscibilia, non solum in confuso et secundum esse eminentiale, quod in divina essentia habent, sed etiam secundum suas specificas et individuas naturas, necnon secundum multiplices eorum relationes. Etenim imprimis, possibilia non sunt nihil, sed secundum omnes dictos respectus rationem entis, et proinde intelligibilitatis, præ se ferunt ; deinde, plura ex ipsis a nobis distincte cognoscuntur in suis variis relationibus. *Ergo* necesse est, ut Deus, cujus cognitio adæquat entium cognoscibilitatem, omnia possibilia secundum propriam uniuscujusque entitatem distinctissime cognoscat.

II.—Res eatenus sunt possibiles, *a*) quatenus imitantur divinam essentiam, *b*) quatenus per potentiam divinam creantem vel cum creaturis cooperantem in esse

reali constitui possunt, *c*) quatenus secundum totum eorum esse in divinam bonitatem ordinari possunt. Jamvero, qui divinam essentiam, potentiam, ac bonitatem perfecte cognoscit, eo ipso omnia possibilia, quocumque modo sunt cognoscibilia, perfecte et distincte cognoscit ; *atqui a*) quum Deus essentiam suam comprehendat, eam cognoscit secundum quod est ultima et adæquata ratio exemplaris omnium possibilium, et proinde cognitio suæ essentiæ includit distinctissimam omnium possibilium cognitionem ; *b*) quum suam omnipotentiam perfecte cognoscere non possit, nisi cognoscat omnia, ad quæ omnipotentia se extendit (alioquin cæce ageret), necesse est, ut omnia possibilia (facienda et factabilia) singillatim et secundum proprium eorum esse usque ad ultimas differentias adæquate cognoscat ;[1] *c*) quum suam infinitam bonitatem plene non cognoscat, nisi eam cognoscat ut est per se solam finis omnium, quæ esse possunt, dicendum est Deum omnia, quæcumque ad bonitatem suam tamquam finem ordinabilia sunt (*i.e.*, omnia possibilia) cognoscere, et quidem

[1] God in comprehending Himself must know all the different ways in which His Being is susceptible of imperfect imitation by finite beings. Such a knowledge involves an actual comprehension of the essences of all possible creatures with all the perfections they acquire, and all the defects and privations conceivable in them. Consequently it implies a knowledge of their faculties, their possible acts, their relations to one another, and to their Creator, and all manner of combinations, states, and alterations incident to them. Briefly, God seeing Himself has an adequate knowledge of all possible creatures and of all possible events. With one act of comprehensive intelligence He so represents the whole of them that each is known to Him fully and distinctly. Consequently, whatever God now knows as actual for any given period of time, He would know it as distinctly as He knows it now, even if He had never created. The difference would be that then He would judge the same thing to be not actual which now He judges to be actual, and thus distinguishes from the indefinite multitude of purely possible things and events. Indeed that He cannot fail to make this distinction is readily understood, if we consider the dependence of all creatures and all the incidents of created existence on the decrees and power of the Creator. Whatever exists and whatever happens cannot exist or happen, unless God has decreed that it should exist or happen, or, as regards moral evil, that He would not prevent its existing or happening—(**Boedder**, *op. cit.*, p. 264).

secundum totam eorum entitatem et mutuam relationem ; secundum omne enim, quod habent et sunt, ad Deum referuntur (cf. *Hontheim*, p. 590).

134. *Dices :* Essentia divina non est species propria entium contingentium, ideoque fieri non potest, ut Deus rerum possibilium propriam et distinctam habeat cognitionem.

Resp. Per speciem alienam res non possunt cognosci, si illa species est ordinis inferioris re cognita, *conc.*, si in se eminenter continet quidquid in rebus continetur, et proinde potest accipi ut propria species uniuscujusque, *neg.* Jamvero, " quum Deus in se omnes perfectiones contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad lineas ; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos ; ut si dicerem, homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti non solum in communi, sed etiam propria cognitione ; sicut qui cognoscit hominem, cognoscit animal ; et qui cognoscit senarium, cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, quum essentia Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cujuscumque rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso omnia potest propria cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscujusque consistit secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat. Non autem Deus perfecte se ipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio. Nec etiam ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos essendi. Unde, manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 14, a. 6).

135. Cor.—Ergo amplitudo scientiæ simplicis intelligentiæ excedit omnis mentis creatæ et creabilis cap-

tum, et infinita dicenda est, quum divina essentia perfectissime cognita a divino intellectu sit infinite imitabilis. Controvertitur autem utrum hæc multitudo possibilium sit categorematice an syncategorematice (actu an potentia) infinita. " *Sed in re non videtur posse esse magna diversitas.* Nam omnes conveniunt in his : 1°. Illa, quæ videntur, non esse in certo aliquo numero finito, nec posse perveniri ad finem eorum, numerando unum post aliud. 2°. Illa omnia simul cognosci, et ita esse simul aliquo modo, *scil.*, objective (in intellectu). 3°. Totam illam collectionem non posse actu poni in re. *Quibus positis, fere de modo loquendi videtur esse controversia.* Mihi tamen placet posterior modus loquendi (*scil.*, possibilia esse potentia tantum infinita). Quia illa multitudo, quamvis simul cognita, talem habitudinem habet ad suam existentiam, ut ex intrinseca natura petat non posse exhauriri quum fit ; unde, in sua intrinseca ratione includit hanc veluti potentialitatem, ut semper scilicet aliquid illius restet efficiendum. Et in hac potentialitate consistit ratio infiniti syncategorematice ; sicut quamvis totum tempus simul cognoscatur, ipsum tamen, etiam cognitum, ens successivum est, quia talem habitudinem habet ad existentiam, ut non possit totum simul existere, sed pars post partem ; similis enim ratio est de hoc infinito in potentia ; includit enim in conceptu suo successionem quamdam in existentia seu productione " (**Suarez,** *De Incarn.*, Disp. 26, s. 4, n. 15). Qui plura desiderat, adeat *Franzelin* (De Deo, p. 412), qui priorem partem, et *Urráburu* (Cosm., p. 805), qui oppositam, defendit.

§ 2. De Scientia Divina circa Existentia.

136. THESIS XXIII.—Deus omnes actus sive necessarios sive liberos, qui in quavis temporis differentia existunt, ab æterno perfecte cognoscit.

Stat. Quæst.—Quæ in decursu temporis existentiam sortiuntur, triplicis sunt generis : alia enim sunt effectus,

qui a Deo solo procedunt ; alia sunt actus vel effectus entium necessario agentium ; alia denique sunt actus vel effectus ab entibus rationalibus libere positi.

Jamvero, quæcumque Deus ipse solus in tempore facit, hæc eum ab æterno cognita habere constat ex divinæ voluntatis immutabilitate. Quæ enim in tempore agit ab æterno efficaciter decrevit, et proinde cognoscendo decretum, effectus temporales cum tali decreto necessario conjunctos infallibiliter cognoscit. Præsens igitur thesis limitatur ad actus et effectus a creaturis positos.

137. De divina infallibili cognitione liberorum actuum creaturarum duplex occurrit difficultas. Etenim, ex una parte, si Deus hos actus ab æterno cognoscit, sequi videtur eos non posse non esse, et proinde liberos non esse ; ex altera autem parte, antequam eliciantur, neque in seipsis neque in suis causis ullam determinatam veritatem habere videntur, nec proinde ullam cognoscibilitatem, qua ab æterno divinam scientiam terminent. His difficultatibus permoti quidam, ne libertati humanæ injuriam inferrent, Deo præscientiam actuum liberorum competere negarunt, quos inter enumeratur *Cicero*.[1] Sociniani conjecturalem tantum præscientiam actuum liberorum Deo tribuunt. Alii, e contra, ne hanc præscientiam a Deo eripiant, libertatem humanam e medio tollunt. Quam erroneam sententiam professi sunt Marcion, Celsus, et postea Wicliffe, aliique. Difficultas, quam in hac quæstione experimur, eo accidit quod non possumus

[1] Cicero reduces the religious mind to this alternative : to choose the belief that man is allowed free exercise of will, or that God has not a foreknowledge of the future ; for he thinks, that both cannot be ; but, that, if one be admitted, the other must be rejected ; if we choose prescience of the future, we most give up the opinion of free will ; if we choose free will, we must disbelieve in God's foreknowledge. Therefore this great man, of these two opinions, chose to follow the belief of man's free will. He thought it necessary, in order to confirm this, to deny, that there was any foreknowledge of the future ; and thus, in order to make the minds of men free, he made them sacrilegious. *But yet, the truly religious mind chooses both, believes in and acknowledges both, confirming them by faith and piety*—(**S. Aug.**, *City of God*, B. 4, c. 9).

divinam cognitionem significare nisi per modum nostræ cognitionis, respectu cujus quædam sunt præterita, quædam futura, quædam præsentia. Quoad Deum vero nihil est præteritum, nihil futurum. Nam, " quum visio divinæ scientiæ æternitate mensuretur, quæ est tota simul et tamen totum tempus includit, nec alicui parti temporis deest, sequitur, ut quidquid in tempore geritur, non ut futurum, sed ut præsens videat " (**S. Th.**, *Q. Disp.*, XI, q. 2, a. 12).[1]

138. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*Deus actus necessarios cognoscit*). **Arg.**—Actus necessarii in suis causis ad agendum expeditis determinate continentur, atque ex eis consequuntur secundum leges physice immutabiles ; *atqui* Deus (utpote causarum illarum libero suæ voluntatis decreto creator et conservator, necnon legum physicarum, quibus in agendo reguntur, institutor) non potest non cognoscere perfecte et ab æterno omnes actus, qui sub influxu legum physicarum e talibus causis prodire possunt.

Deinde, in omnibus operationibus rerum creatarum Deus immediate concurrit, nec absque Dei concursu potest res creata quidquam agere ; *atqui* concursum collatum in tempore, Deus ab æterno cognoscit ; non

[1] The Divine Eternity, having the simplicity of the Divine Essence and being only virtually extended, coexists in its entirety with every single moment of time, just as the central point of a circle with all the points of the circumference. Hence temporal things have no successive duration in the eye of God ; that is, in comparison with the Divine Eternity, they do not come and go, and pass by or along parts of it. In God's sight they have neither past nor future, but are eternally present. Thus the points of a circumference in motion change their positions relatively to other points, but always remain at the same distance from the centre. This, however, does not involve the eternal existence of events and things. Their eternal presence in God's sight is owing not to a duration coextensive with eternity on the part of creatures, but to the fact that the Divine Eternity encompasses and embraces all created durations in the same way as the virtual extension of the Divine Substance encompasses and embraces all space. God sees and knows as actually standing before Him in His presence all things of all times, so that the Divine knowledge cannot rightly be called either memory or foreknowledge—(**Wilhelm**, *op. cit*, p. 196).

enim cæce sed scienter operatur ; *ergo* vi concursus ab æterno decreti, ab æterno cognoscit omnes actus causarum necessariarum.

Denique, Deus hos actus cognoscit dum fiunt ; *atqui* quidquid Deus in tempore cognoscit, ab æterno cognoscit, tum quia ejus intellectio est ejus substantia, tum quia secus non esset immutabilis (n. 99) ; *ergo*.

139. PARS 2ª (*Deus ab æterno actus liberos perfecte cognoscit*). **Arg.**—Deus tunc saltem actus liberos cognoscit, quando reapse eliciuntur ; secus enim secundum quid superaretur a creaturis in perfectione cognitionis ; *ergo* ab æterno eos cognoscit. Enimvero, si Deus in tempore actus liberos cognoscere inciperet, ratio esset, aut quia ad cognoscendum indiget ab eis determinari, aut quia antequam eliciantur, non habent objectivam veritatem et cognoscibilitatem ; *atqui* neutrum valet.—

Non primum, tum quia Deus est purus actus intelligendi seu ipsa intellectio subsistens, et proinde non minus ad cognoscendum quam ad essendum omnem potentialitatem excludit ; tum quia unicum medium, quo divinus intellectus determinatur ad cognoscendum, est divina essentia super omnes conditiones temporis elevata.

Non alterum, quia priusquam actus eliciantur, veræ sunt propositiones, quibus eorum existentia enuntiatur ; veritas autem propositionis præsupponit veritatem rei, de qua est. Ut ope exempli res illustretur, recole ex duabus propositionibus contradictoriis de eodem objecto, unam necessario esse veram, alteram necessario esse falsam (*v.g.*, Petrus negabit Christum—Petrus non negabit Christum). Ex his autem vera profecto est illa, quæ affirmat fore actum liberum, qui revera erit, et proinde ipse actus liber, qui tali propositione exprimitur, verus est, priusquam ponatur. Et sane, verba Christi dicentis Petro : " ter me negabis," fuerunt vera ; falsa autem fuerunt verba Petri respondentis : " non te

negabo." Unde sequitur talem actum ab æterno fuisse verum, quum propositio illum ab æterno enuntians esset vera. Jamvero, nequit enuntiari veritas, quæ ab infinito Dei intellectu non cognoscatur ; *ergo* ab æterno Deus cognoscit omnes actus liberos, qui in tempore eliciuntur.

140. *Idem paulo aliter.* Prioritas, simultaneitas, posterioritas, quas actus habet relate ad cognitionem de eo habitam, non aliud sunt quam meræ relationes. Sic, siquis heri dixisset me hodie esse scripturum, idem omnino factum nuntiaret, ac qui hodie dicit me scribere, vel cras dicet me scripsisse ; *atqui* qui hodie vel cras hoc diceret, verum procul dubio diceret ; *ergo* etiam qui heri hoc diceret. Quare, actus liberi, priusquam prodeant, et proinde ab æterno, veritatem et cognoscibilitatem habent (cf. *Schiffini*, Log., pp. 154-61 ; *Urráburu*, Theol., v. p2, p. 225-60). *Nec valet objicere :* actus liber præteritus, secus ac futurus, physicam realitatem habuit ; *enimvero*, sicut ratio formalis futuritionis consistit in relatione temporis ad nunc antecedens, ita ratio formalis præteritionis consistit in relatione temporis ad nunc subsequens. Jamvero, tales relationes temporis nec constituunt nec mutant veritatem actus, sed ista respectu talium eadem permanet ; *atqui*, consentientibus omnibus, veritas convenit actibus liberis præteritis seu amplius non existentibus ; *ergo*, et a pari, veritas convenit actibus futuris seu nondum existentibus.

Alterum argumentum pro hac parte accipi potest ex necessitate divini concursus ad omnes actus, etiam liberos, creaturarum ; Deus enim actus, ad quos ab æterno decrevit concurrere, ab æterno scire debet.

Tertium denique ex divina providentia ; si enim Deus non cognosceret ab æterno actus liberos creaturarum, in gubernatione mundi et maxime hominum, fallibilis esset, ejus consilia improvisis eventibus continuo turbarentur, interrogatus de alicujus actibus futuris, con-

jecturis respondere cogeretur. Unde cum *S. Aug.* dicendum est: "confiteri esse Deum et negare præscium futurorum apertissima insania est" (*De civit. Dei.*, lib. 5, c. 9).

141. Obj. 1. Quod Deus prævidet, necessario erit; *atqui* dantur actus liberi; *ergo* eos Deus non prævidet.

Resp. 1°. Certum est ex dictis Deum ab æterno actus liberos prævidere; certum quoque est homines esse liberi arbitrii; quare, utrumque retinendum est, etiamsi nos lateat, quomodo sibi invicem reconcilientur.

Resp. 2°. *Dist. maj.* Quod Deus prævidet, necessario erit necessitate consequente actum voluntatis creatæ, *conc.*; necessitate hunc actum antecedente, ita ut prævisio sit causa actus, *neg. Conc. min. Dist. concl.* Eos prævidet et causat, *neg.*; divina prævisio ad eos terminatur, prouti erunt in tali vel tali temporis differentia, et proinde eos ut jam a suis causis elicitos, *conc.*

Duplex in hoc contextu distinguitur necessitas: *a*) Necessitas *consequens* actum et actus præscientiam; consequenter enim ad actus positionem fieri non potest, ut agenti non inhæreat quædam forma scientiæ terminativa. Hæc necessitas, ut patet, libertatem non lædit. *b*) Necessitas *antecedens* actum et actus præscientiam; fieri enim potest, ut antecedenter ad actus positionem, agens aut intrinsece aut extrinsece determinetur ad unum. Hæc necessitas non compatitur libertatem, sed non habetur in casu nostro; prævisio enim, non secus ac visio, ex sua natura aliud non est quam intentionalis repræsentatio rei, et proinde rem cognitam præsupponit ut actualem pro aliqua differentia temporis. Quare, divina prævisio libertatem actuum non magis lædit quam visio oculorum vel recordatio mentis rebus visis vel recordatis necessitatem imponit. "Sicut tu memoria tua non cogis facta esse, quæ præterierunt, sic Deus præscientia sua non cogit facienda, quæ futura sunt" (**S. Aug.**, *De libero arb.*, lib. 3, c. 4).[1]

[1] Tourists who are walking through an Alpine valley may be seen easily by one who is at the top of a mountain bordering on it. While they are walking there, it cannot be true that they are not doing so, though it depends on their free choice to walk or not to walk. Consequently their passing by cannot be hidden from the spectator within the range of whose eyesight they are coming. And if he were able to see with his eyes future events as clearly as he sees those that happen at a short distance, he would see the excursionists coming before they were actually on the way. Yet his foresight would not be the reason of their coming; it would be nothing but an anticipated announcement of a future event. In a similar way God

Obj. 2. Proprietas rei præsupponit rei entitatem; *atqui* veritas et cognoscibilitas sunt proprietates; *ergo* actus liberi creati, utpote temporales, non habent ab æterno veritatem et cognoscibilitatem.

Resp. *Dist. maj.* Proprietas absoluta præsupponit rei entitatem, *conc.*; proprietas relativa, *neg. Contradist. min.* Veritas et cognoscibilitas sunt proprietates absolutæ, *neg.*; relativæ, *conc.* (*Ont.*, n. 280). Proprietas relativa a proprietate absoluta in hoc differt, quod potest actualem rei existentiam præcedere. Quare, actus liberi creati sunt temporales quidem, sed ab æterno habent relationem cognoscibilitatis ad intellectum divinum. Apposite **S. Thomas**: "In adæquatione intellectus et rei, non requiritur quod utrumque extremorum sit in actu. Intellectus enim noster potest etiam nunc adæquari his, quæ in futurum erunt, nunc autem non sunt; alias non esset vera hæc: Antichristus nascetur. Similiter et intellectus divinus adæquari potuit ab æterno his, quæ ab æterno non fuerunt, sed in tempore sunt facta" (*Qq. Disp.*, xi., q. 1, a. 5).

looks, as it were, from the summit of His Eternity down upon the course of future times, and sees the free actions of His rational creatures. Their future resolutions are expressed by His infinite mind exactly as they will come about; consequently not as natural consequences of habitual or actual impulses, but as self determinations, as events that will come to pass at the bidding of rational creatures, making use of that power of accepting or rejecting any particular good which He Himself will grant them. This is well expressed by St. Thomas: "God is altogether outside the order of time. He is standing, as it were, upon the high citadel of unalterable eternity. Before Him is spread out the whole course of time, which He takes in by one simple intuition. Consequently, by one act of vision, He sees everything that happens in the course of time; and each fact He sees as it is in itself, not as something that is present to His gaze in the future, and is for the present involved in the sequence of causes on which it depends; at the same time He does also see that sequence of causes. He sees every event in a manner altogether proper to an eternal being. Each fact, to whatever period of time it belongs, He sees even as the human eye sees Socrates seated. The sitting itself, not its cause, is seen by the eye. But from the fact of a man seeing Socrates seated, it must not be inferred that the sitting is an effect flowing from its cause necessarily. On the other hand, the human eye sees most truly and infallibly Socrates seated whilst he really is seated, because everything, as it is in itself, is a fixed and determined fact. Thus, then, we must admit that God knows with absolute certainty and infallibility whatever happens at any time. Nevertheless temporary events do not happen of necessity, but are the effects of causes that might have acted otherwise" *In Periherm.*, lib. 1, lect. 14—(**Boedder,** *op. cit.*, p. 275).

§ 3. De Scientia Divina circa Futuribilia.

142. Futuribilia sunt duplicis ordinis: futuribilia numquam in actu, et futuribilia aliquando in actu (n. 126). Ex dictis (n. 138-9) constat Deum hæc altera futuribilia infallibiliter et ab æterno cognoscere; exinde autem sequitur Deum infallibiliter et ab æterno cognoscere omnia futuribilia ut talia. Etenim, si verum est: Petrus in quibusdam circumstantiis peccavit; *prius ratione* verum erat: Petrus, si in illis circumstantiis constitueretur, peccaret.

Deinde, si voluntas creata supponitur constituta in adjunctis, in quibus potest determinatum actum ponere et non ponere, necesse est vi principii contradictionis, ut ex duobus enuntiatis: *actum poneret—actum non poneret*, unum sit determinate verum, alterum determinate falsum. Ergo Deus, qui omne verum cognoscit, quodnam illorum verum sit, certo cognoscit.

Insuper, summa divinæ providentiæ perfectio postulat, ut Deus pro lubitu suo, et proinde sub omnibus, quæ concipi possunt, circumstantiis, omnes creaturas etiam liberas ad fines, quos intendit, perduceret; *atqui* Deus id efficere non posset, nisi scientia actuum liberorum conditionate futurorum suis decretis æternis præluceret.

143. *Denique*, omnes homines per preces, quas ad Deum offerunt, ei competere hanc conditionatorum scientiam profitentur; orant enim, ut Deus ipsos in iis adjunctis constituat, in quibus videt eos bene operaturos esse; ut bona temporalia eis concedat, quæ saluti suæ profutura cognoscat. Quoad *factum* hujus præscientiæ divinæ conditionatorum vix amplius apud catholicos existit controversia, sed tantum quoad *modum*. Antiquitus vero plures docuerunt futura conditionata non certo sed solum conjecturaliter a Deo cognosci.[1] Hac

[1] Et hodie *Janssens* (De Deo, v. 2, p. 47) docet Deum de eis habere cognitionem tantum *moraliter* certam.

de re sic scripsit (an. 1601) *Ledesma*, nobilis Ord. Præd. theologus : . . . " Secunda sententia est omnino huic opposita, quæ quidem docet, quod in Deo *non reperitur talis scientia istorum futurorum conditionatorum*. Docet enim ista sententia, quod potest Deus per conjecturas aliquo modo cognoscere, quid causa libera faceret, si in tali occasione cum istis vel illis conditionibus constitueretur ; non tamen potest certa et infallibili scientia id cognoscere. . . . Hanc sententiam sequuntur omnes discipuli divi Thomæ, qui in hac tempestate interpretantur illum. . . . Secunda sententia est certissima taliter, ut opposita non sit mihi probabilis " (*De div. grat. auxiliis*, p. 579). Similiter loquuntur alii, ut videri potest apud *Urráburu* (Theod., v. 2, p. 352-9). " Hanc doctrinam illi Thomistæ statuerant quia ex una parte docebant Deum non posse cognoscere actus liberos creaturarum nisi in suis decretis, ex altera vero parte videbatur iis ' indecens ac superfluum,' ut ait *Gonet* (t. 1, disp. 5, a. 2), quoad omnia conditionata in indefinitum possibilia admittere in Deo decreta subjective absoluta, objective conditionata, quale esset hoc : *Decerno, ut, si Adam futurus esset in alio ordine rerum, non peccaret*, et similia sine fine. *Zumelio* ' ridiculum ' visum est ejusmodi decreta statuere (In 1, q. 14, a. 13), quamvis postea ea ipse admiserit. Ab hac doctrina priorum Thomistarum recesserunt posteriores Thomistæ omnes, ut *Gotti :* Deus certo certitudine metaphysica ex parte objecti cognoscit futura contingentia conditionata. . . . Dicit se hoc statuere contra id, quod docuerint Ledesma et alii Thomistæ, et admittit illa decreta, quæ veterioribus Thomistis ridicula et indecentia videbantur. *Billuart* cognitionem conditionatorum docet, sed, quantum ad decreta, anceps hæret (De Deo, diss. 6, a. 5, *ad fin.*). Nostris diebus Card. *Zigliara* docet : Deus videt omnia futura libera, sive absolute sive conditionate sumpta, scientia visionis, nempe in libero decreto suæ voluntatis " (**Chr. Pesch,** *De Deo Uno*, n. 207).

Hucusque de facto existentiæ hujus scientiæ in Deo. De controversia de medio divinæ scientiæ in proximo articulo agemus.

144. Nota historica. Juxta *Manriquez*, Ord. Cist. (ob. 1649), initio inter Thomistas et Molinistas solum de existentia scientiæ conditionatorum viguit controversia; deinde vero, quando Thomistæ hanc scientiam admittere incipiebant, orta est controversia de medio hujus scientiæ (*De Controversiis*, lib. 3, c. 1). Rem ita se habuisse, colligi potest ex **Suarez** (*De grat.*, Proleg. 2um, c. 1, n. 2). "Scire oportet, inquit, modernos theologos, qui necessitatem physicæ prædeterminationis introducere cœperant, absolute et sine distinctione negasse hanc scientiam conditionatam, . . . ; et Scripturas omnes ac sanctos, qui de illa loquuntur, aliter interpretari conati sunt. *Nunc* autem illos inter se divisos esse reperio." Quidquid sit de initio, controversia sub præsenti forma ortum habuit an. 1581, quando quidam theologus e Soc. Jes., Prudentius de Montemajore nomine, in publica disputatione in Univ. Salm. habita, ostendere suscepit Deo inesse infallibilem præscientiam actuum liberorum, nullo præsupposito divinæ voluntatis decreto actum liberum prædeterminante. Quæ doctrina non mediocriter displicuit Dominico Bannez, O.P., eamque primo in prædicta Universitate, deinde coram tribunali Inquisitionis Hispanicæ ut hæreticam denuntiavit. Mox vero (1588) prodiit opus a Lud. Molina conscriptum, cui titulus: *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiæ donis, etc.* Hoc opus a Bannez et suis ut Pelagianismo infectum acriter impugnabatur; a Molina vero aliisque, qui doctrinam Bannesianam de Calvinianismo arguebant, fortiter defendebatur. Controversia culmen attigit, quando Bannez librum Molinæ tamquam hæreticam doctrinam continentem ad Romam detulit. Summus Pontifex Clemens VIII., litis dirimendæ cupidus, duorum ordinum supremos rectores jussit, ut quos vellent theologos, Romam arcesserent eo fine, ut tota quæstio coram ipso disputaretur. Quare, 20 Martii an. 1602, cœptæ sunt in Palatio Vaticano, præsidente Clemente VIII., assistentibus pluribus Cardinalibus et Episcopis (quos inter fuit Petrus Lombardus, Archiepiscopus Armachanus) celebres congregationes, quæ dicuntur "De Auxiliis." Pro Ord. Præd. disputabat *Didacus Alvarez*, cui post alteram disputationem successit *Thomas de Lemos*, quo ægrotante, ad disputationem 42^am^ rediit Alvarez. Pro Soc. Jesu disputabat *Gregorius de Valentia* usque ad disputationem nonam, tunc causa valetudinis recessit, et in ejus locum successit *Petrus Arrabul* et postea *Ferdinandus Bastida*. Per quattuor fere annos acriter ex utraque parte disputatum fuit, primo sub Clemente VIII., deinde sub Paulo V., habitis omnino 85 disputationibus. Tandem Paulus V., an. 1606, suam sententiam

pronuntiavit declarando systema Prædicatorum a Calvinianismo, et Jesuitarum a Pelagianismo, esse liberum, neutram partem esse condemnandam, quum non de dogmate sed de dogmatis explicatione agatur. Quam sententiam aliter accusati, accusatores aliter, acceperunt. Postea quidam Jansenistæ pseudoconstitutionem divulgari curarunt contra doctrinam Molinæ, cui constitutioni nullam omnino fidem adhibendam esse declaravit Innocentius X., an. 1654. Historiam totius controversiæ scripserunt *Serry*, O.P. (an. 1700), et *Meyer*, S.J. (1705). Eamdem historiam breviter delineavit *Schneemann* (Controv. de div. grat., pp. 268-354).

ART. III.

DE MEDIO OBJECTIVO DIVINÆ COGNITIONIS CIRCA FUTURA LIBERA.

145. Jam supra vidimus, et apud omnes in confesso est, medium subjectivum seu formale divinæ cognitionis esse divinam essentiam (n. 119). Hic autem quæritur, utrum scientiæ divinæ competat medium objectivum et quale illud sit. Medium objectivum in genere intelligitur illud, quod ducit in alterius rei cognitionem. Relate ad Deum medium objectivum est illa ratio objectiva, quæ fundat scientiam divinam. Jamvero—

a) Certum est nullum esse medium, quo Deus seipsum cognoscit, quum ipse sit sui intellectus objectum primo et per se cognitum.

b) Certum est tale medium haberi in scientia, qua Deus cognoscit possibilia. Possibilia enim cognoscit in sua essentia ; hæc enim est eorum ultima et adæquata ratio, nec potest Deus seipsum comprehendere, quin ista cognoscat.

c) Certum est medium, in quo Deus cognoscit futura necessaria esse sua decreta circa causas necessarias ; per hæc enim decreta novit quænam causæ necessariæ extituræ sint, et quid in omnibus adjunctis facere possint.

146. Restat igitur investigandum, quomodo Deus cognoscat futura libera sive absoluta sive conditionata. Qua in re determinanda oportet, ut quæstiones secundariæ cum primaria et fundamentali non permisceantur. Præ mente igitur habendum est, cardinem totius hujus quæstionis esse, utrum Deus cum libera voluntate concurrat concursu prævio et prædeterminante an concursu simultaneo et indifferenti. Si enim *primum* verum sit, futura libera suum esse, veritatem et proinde cognoscibilitatem habent ratione decretorum prædeterminantium ;[1] sin *alterum*, sequitur futura libera esse vera et cognoscibilia propter liberam voluntatis creatæ determinationem seu propter ipsum actum secundum voluntatis. Neve dicas futura libera determinatum *esse* et cognoscibilitatem habere in ipsa voluntate in actu primo proximo ad agendum constituta. Quæ sententia nonnullis placuit, et juxta plures, aliis tamen reclamantibus, ipsi *Molinæ*. Sed eliminanda est, quia voluntas priusquam vel a Deo vel a seipsa determinatur ad unum præ alio agendum, nullum habet actum determinatum, qui cognosci possit.

§ 1. Sententia Thomistarum.

147. THESIS XXIV.—Ratio objectiva, cur actus liberi creaturarum sint divino intellectui cognoscibiles, falso reponitur a Thomistis in decretis divinis voluntatem humanam ad unum prædeterminantibus.

Stat. Quæst.—*Prædeterminatio* seu *præmotio physica* describitur : impulsus vel qualitas transiens, a Deo immissa voluntati creatæ antecedenter ad hujus actionem liberam, quam *a*) voluntas nec sibi dare, nec datam

[1] " Deus cognoscit futura absoluta contingentia et libera in suo decreto eorum futuritionem determinante, sive in essentia sua hujusmodi decreto determinata " (**Billuart,** *De Deo, Diss.* 6, a. 4, § 2).

recusare, potest, *b*) quæque intrinseco nexu ita nectitur cum actione voluntatis, ut sine ipsa repugnet actionem fieri, cum ipsa repugnet actionem non fieri.

" Hunc impulsum (inquit **Goudin**) vocant *præmotionem physicam : motionem*, quia omnes creaturæ illa ad agendum moventur ; *præviam*, quia omnes actiones naturaliter præcedit ; *physicam*, quia non consistit in illis excitationibus et persuasionibus, quibus etiam homo hominem movere potest, sed in subministratione interioris virtutis, et activa applicatione. Solet etiam vocari *prædeterminatio physica*, quod per illam virtus activa creaturæ ex indifferenti et otiosa reducatur ad actum determinatum " (*Philos.*, Pars 4ª, q. 4, a. 1).

148. Quare 1°. Prædeterminatio physica est aliquid a Deo solo procedens et in voluntate physice receptum non tamquam complementum, quo voluntas constituatur *proxime potens ad agendum*, sed ut constituatur *actu agens*. " Semper intellexerunt Thomistæ et concorditer intelligunt hanc divinam motionem esse vim quamdam activam a Deo derivatam in causas secundas non quidem ut perfectionem stabilem, sed ut *motionem transeuntem, et ultimo virtutem agendi complentem et applicantem vim activam creaturarum* " (**Mancini,** O.P., *Elem. Phil.*, v. 2, p. 424).

2°. Hæc præmotio est voluntati ita necessaria ad agendum, ut, ipsa non immissa, absolute repugnet voluntatem agere, sicut absolute repugnat creaturam existere absque divina conservatione. " Creatura sic illa (præmotione) indiget in ordine operativo, sicut indiget conservatione proprii esse a Deo in ordine entitativo " (*Idem. ib.*).

3°. Respectu hujus præmotionis voluntas humana minime se habet ut causa efficiens, sed tantum ut subjectum recipiens, quum omne voluntatis exercitium præveniat et a Deo procedat. Præmotio " *non est in potestate voluntatis, tamquam in causa efficiente, quum*

talis motio prævia sit effective a Deo solo" (**Alvarez,** *De Auxiliis*, lib. 3, disp. 18, n. 20).

4°. Vi præmotionis datæ voluntas non potest non elicere actum prædeterminatum ; præmotio enim "*ex* propria *essentia et ab intrinseco est efficax, independenter a quocumque creato consensu*" (**Gonet,** *Clypeus Thom.*, De Prædest., disp. 6, n. 67).

5°. Hæc præmotio, licet voluntatem ineluctabiliter reducat ab actu primo ad actum secundum, libertatem non lædit, sed potius eam confirmat ; Deus enim prædeterminat voluntatem non solum ad agendum, sed etiam ad libere agendum. Quare, sicut impossibile est ut voluntas prædeterminata non agat, ita pariter est impossibile, ut prædeterminata non agat libere. "Deus prædeterminando futurum, *utrumque prædeterminat*, scil., *et quod actio ponatur et quod libere ponatur :* aliis verbis, Deus non prædeterminat determinando voluntatem, sed prædeterminat liberam determinationem voluntatis, seu prædeterminat, ut voluntas se libere determinet ; et sic habetur certitudo cognitionis ex infallibilitate effectus, et actionis libertas ex efficacia divinæ voluntatis" (**Zigliara,** v. 2, 462).

6°. Denique, Deus voluntatem creatam determinat non minus ad actus malos quam ad actus bonos, et quidem etiam ad eos, a quibus malitia est absolute inseparabilis (*v.g.*, ad apostasiam, odium Dei, atheismum) ; non ideo tamen Deus, sed tantum creatura sic præmota, est auctor peccati ; tum quia divina sanctitas non compatitur peccatum, tum quia Deus prædeterminando ad physicam entitatem peccati, malitiam moralem cum actu inseparabiliter conjunctam non vult sed solum permittit. " Deus vult actum peccati et *vult efficaciter nos velle illum*, non voluntate præcepti aut consilii, sed voluntate provisoris universalis" (**Billuart,** Diss. 8, a. 5). " Licet hæc duo (actus peccati et malitia) physice separabilia non sint, tamen non propter hoc id,

quod est simpliciter a Deo, creaturis est tribuendum ; neque e converso id, quod est creaturæ defectibilis, est tribuendum Deo " (**Mancini,** p. 434).

149. Doctrina prædeterminationis admissa, commode explicatur divina præscientia actuum liberorum. Quatenus enim Deus ab æterno decrevit efficaciter prædeterminare voluntatem ad actus, quos hæc in tempore ponit, actus liberi ab æterno determinatum *esse* et cognoscibilitatem habent, et proinde a Deo cognosci possunt. Quodsi ex his actibus quidam sunt contra regulam morum, Deus illorum malitiam cognoscit in decretis suis permissivis. Quæ decreta in eo consistunt, quod Deus denegat prædeterminationem ad actum bonum. " Deus certo et infallibiliter cognoscit omnia peccata futura *in decreto, quo statuit prædeterminare voluntatem creatam ad entitatem actus peccati,* in quantum actio et ens est, et permittere malitiam moralem peccati seu peccatum ipsum ut peccatum est, *non dando auxilium efficax ad illud vitandum. . . . In decreto, quo Deus statuit non dare auxilium efficax tali tempore alicui, quo bonum operando vel abstinendo a peccato bonum rationis conservet, certo scit, quod homo ab eodem bono rationis peccando deficiet* " (**Alvarez,** *op. cit.*, Disp. 11, n. 3).

Et sic etiam explicant Thomistæ præscientiam actuum liberorum, qui sub influxu gratiæ efficacis eliciuntur ; gratia enim efficax, juxta illos, non est nisi prædeterminatio supernaturalis indeclinabiliter cum consensu voluntatis connexa.

Jamvero, non apparet, quomodo hoc systema conciliari possit cum libertate humana ; quomodo Deus possit voluntatem ad actum peccaminosum prædeterminare, quin auctor peccati evadat. Exinde sequitur eum non cognoscere actus liberos in suis decretis. Sub hac triplici ratione thesim probamus.

150. Pars 1ª (*decreta prædeterminantia libertati vo-*

luntatis adversantur). **Arg. I.**—Duplex datur libertatis species (*Psych.*, n. 329), *scil.*, contradictionis et specificationis; *atqui* ad utramque opponitur doctrina prædeterminationis; *ergo*.

Prob. min. 1°. *Opponitur libertati contradictionis* seu *exercitii*, quæ in eo est, quod agens in actu primo proximo ad agendum constitutus potest actum ponere vel non ponere; *atqui*, doctrina prædeterminationis admissa, quicumque aliquem actum ponit, ideo præcise illum ponit, quia præmovetur impulsu divino, qui " ex propria essentia et ab intrinseco est efficax indepèndenter a quocumque creato consensu " ; quicumque autem aliquem actum non ponit, ideo præcise illum non ponit, quia deest divina prædeterminatio, quæ non minus necessaria est, ut voluntas agat, quam divina conservatio, ut existere pergat. *Ergo* voluntas creata in actu primo proximo constituta non habet in sua potestate agere et non agere. Nec potest voluntas pro lubitu prædeterminationem habere vel non habere, " quum talis motio sit effective a Deo solo."

151. *Dices* 1°. " Ut præmotio sit in nostra potestate, non requiritur, ut eam advocare et quasi attrahere possimus, sed satis est, ut Deus possit eam nobis dare, immo semper eam nobis dispenset secundum conditionem nostram : Si enim *ea, quæ per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus*, a fortiori id erit in nostra potestate quod habere possumus per Deum " (**Goudin,** *loc. cit.*, a. 6, ad fin.).

Resp. Quid aliud est hoc quam dicere : id, quod non habemus nec possumus habere, est in potestate nostra ? Nec refert quod *ea per nos aliqualiter possumus, quæ per amicos possumus ;* hoc namque effatum valet, quando possumus ab amicis petere auxilium, quo indigemus, vel amici propter amicitiam, quin rogentur, sunt parati auxilium nobis præstare. *Atqui* a Deo non possumus petere hanc vel illam prædeterminationem nisi ad eam petendam prædeterminemur; nec amicus dici posset, qui nos ad malum prædeterminaret.

Inst. Est in potestate nostra habere vel non habere prædeterminationem ; possumus enim resistendo ejus receptionem impedire (cf. *Billuart*, Diss. 8, a. 4).

Resp. Quum resistere non possimus nisi ponendo actum oppositum, redit quæstio, an in potestate nostra sit prædeterminatio, qua ad hunc actum oppositionis opus est juxta hos auctores. Collatio autem unius prædeterminationis præ alia unice pendet, inquiunt, ex liberrimo et absolutissimo Dei decreto circa actum ponendum. Nec sapientius loquuntur, qui dicunt prædeterminationem esse in potestate nostra, eo quod *sinamus, ut ab illa moveamur ;* sic enim nihil conferremus, ut potius unam quam alteram reciperemus determinationem, et proinde sola ratio, cur prædeterminemur ad hunc vel illum actum, est Dei voluntas.

152. *Dices* 2°. " Voluntas non est domina *principii*, a quo descendit præmotio, nempe Dei ; est tamen plene et perfecte domina *termini* præmotionis, nempe proprii actus, etiam sub ipsa præmotione ; ideoque ipsum suspendere, revocare, etc., ad nutum potest. Neque ex hoc ullatenus derogatur efficacitati et infallibilitati Dei moventis, quia hoc ipso quod voluntas actum, quem ex præmotione inceperat, revocat, non est sine Dei præmotione " (**Goudin,** *loc. cit.*, post med.).

Resp. Ergo voluntas non est libera quoad præmotionis receptionem, quum a Deo ipso imprimatur, et quidem eo fine, ut irresistibiliter determinet voluntatem ad unum ; repugnat enim, ut, ea impressa, voluntas non eliciat actum prædeterminatum. Quo igitur fit, ut voluntas sit hujus actus domina et illum possit ad nutum revocare ? Nec ideo, addunt, ullatenus efficacitati et infallibilitati Dei derogatur, quia nimirum, ad actum revocandum alia motione a Deo impressa impellitur voluntas. Nullatenus quidem Dei efficacitati et infallibilitati derogatur in tali hypothesi, at impræsentiarum quæritur, quomodo cum tanta efficacitate cohæreat actuale dominium actuum suorum, quod voluntas sibi vindicat. Voluntas enim videtur huc illucque agitari divinis præmotionibus.

Dices 3°. " Præmotus ad amorem habet potentiam, non

quidem futuritionis, sed possibilitatis ad non amandum, quia potentia non amandi (supposita præmotione ad amandum) non exercebitur " (**Goudin,** *ib.*).

Resp. Quod non possum facere futurum, simpliciter non possum ; sicut vinctus catenis, etsi habet potentiam possibilitatis ad ambulandum, tamen (supposita catenæ ligatione) non habet potentiam ambulandi. Præmotio respectu voluntatis est instar catenæ respectu corporis.

153. *Prob. min.* 2°. *Opponitur libertati specificationis,* quæ in eo consistit, quod voluntas hunc vel illum actum pro lubitu elicere potest. Etenim ante prædeterminationis adventum, neutrum elicere potest ; post adventum prædeterminationis, ad hunc actum ponendum irresistibiliter fertur, ab illo autem ponendo insuperabiliter impeditur. Nam sicut Deus solus præmotionem ad unum voluntati imprimit, ita Deus solus illam removere potest ; interea autem voluntas inhabilis redditur ad dissentiendum et proinde ad alium actum ponendum.[1]

154. *Obj.* 1°. voluntas potest dissentire in sensu diviso, *i.e.*, voluntas " potest dissentire sub Dei motione, sed non potest actu jungere dissensum cum illa motione. . . . Solutio

[1] Liberty consists essentially in the control that the agent has over his actions, a power of acting or not acting, of doing one thing or another at his pleasure. Now, the theory of predetermination being admitted, the created faculty, before the motion, is incomplete and cannot act : after the motion, it is complete, but as it is intrinsically determined to one only individual action, it is incapable of omitting it, or of doing any other. This is why there can be, on the creature's side, neither choice nor liberty.—(**Papagni,** O.P.,* *La Mente di S. Tommaso intorno alla Mozione Divina nelle Creature,* p. 16).

* Ce religieux a professé avec éclat la théologie, pendant presque toute sa vie dans l'Italie méridionale, à Malte, à Rome, en France, à Cracovie. L'opuscule qu'il offre au public n'est donc pas l'œuvre d'un débutant plus ou moins aventureux ; c'est le fruit soigneusement mûri d'un enseignement prolongé, et comme le testament théologique d'un professeur émérite. S. Em. le cardinal Dell' Olio, archevêque de Bénévent, a pris l'initiative de cette publication, dediée par lui aux élèves de l'Athenée pontifical de S. Thomas-d'Aquin. Elle a été faite d'ailleurs avec l'agrément du cardinal-préfet de la congregation des Etudes. . . . Il comprend trois lettres: les deux premières ont pour destinataire un Père dont le nom n'est pas révélé, mais qui paraît bien être un religieux de l'ordre de S. Dominique ; la dernière est addressée à l'archevêque de Bénévent lui-même. Le R. P. Papagni rejette tout prémotion physique. déterminée ou indéterminée ; après avoir démontré la fausseté de ce système, il s'efforce d'établir qu'on l'attribue à tort au Docteur angélique—(**Sortais,** " *Etudes,*" 5 Mars, 1905).

solida, quam nemo deberet *revocare in dubium*" (*Billuart*, D. 8, a. 4, § 2).

Resp. Hæc verba aut significant facultatem liberam, sed prædeterminatione *impeditam*, quominus ponat actum dissensus, manere sub præmotione; aut significant facultatem liberam et *expeditam* manere. In primo casu assimilant libertatem agentis prædeterminati ad libertatem hominis profundo somno correpti; in altero casu contradictoria ponere videntur.[1] Sensum divisum Billuartii *cl.*

[1] This physical premotion is a precedent condition absolutely necessary for action, and infallibly determining the will to the particular act of which there is question. How then can the faculty, under the influence of such an impulse, be said to retain the power of not acting? The omission of the act involves a repugnance—how then can a man retain the power of omitting the act, when its actual omission is repugnant? Oh, yes, you say, he can *in sensu diviso*, but not in *sensu composito*; just as a man, when sitting, has the power of standing—*sensus divisus*—although he cannot, at the same time, sit and stand—*sensus compositus*. It requires a little logic to expose the fallacy, and show there is no parity between the two cases. In the divided sense of a proposition, the attribute is predicated of the subject, abstracting from form, quality, or condition of which there is question. The man who is sitting cannot stand *in sensu composito*, because the form or mode of standing is incompatible in the same subject with the form or mode of sitting. But the man who now sits, can stand *in sensu diviso*, because actual standing may become a mode of the subject if we conceive it as destitute of its present form or mode of sitting, and might have become a mode at the very instant he resolved to sit. It is evident, therefore, that the *sensus divisus* not only asserts the presence of the faculty in the free subject, but also its reducibility to act in any given direction, if we abstract from the present actual determination to the opposite. A man who has resolved to steal, *in sensu composito*, cannot omit the stealing, because *ex hypothesi*, we speak of him with that determination continuing in his mind, but *in sensu diviso* he can omit the stealing; the meaning being that, suppose that resolution non-present or not persisting in his mind, he might, and still may, determine himself to the opposite, that is, the omssion of the act of theft. Has he a similar freedom in presence of physical predetermination? Most certainly not, neither *in sensu composito*, nor *in sensu diviso*. If the premotion to the act is there, we cannot conceive him as not acting, *even in that instant in which he receives the premotion*, and which is, therefore, at least, *in ordine causalitatis*, prior to, and, in the logical sense, divided from the determination of the will itself. If, on the other hand, the premotion to act be not present, we cannot possibly conceive him as acting at all, and, what is the supreme consideration, the presence or absence of the premotion in no way depends on the agent himself; it is out of his reach, although absolutely necessary for the act; it comes unbidden, and once present, it necessarily produces its effect. I say necessarily, because it came from without; it is extrinsic to the faculty, it came without any act

Murray intelligere non potuit nisi in "sensu perabsurdo." Et *Aravius*, O.P.: "Simpliciter et *in omni sensu* determinatio necessitat voluntatem" (apud *Franzelin*, p. 436).

Obj. 2°. Prædeterminatio naturæ voluntatis accommodatur; ideoque non solum substantia actus, sed etiam modus prædeterminatur.

Resp. Actus, cujus modus prædeterminatur, non est actus liber, sed necessarius; necessitas enim est determinatio ad unum. Et sane, prædeterminatio eo, quod voluntatem creatam irresistibiliter impellit ad unum, ei infert necessitatem, quæ omnem ipsius determinationem antecedit, quæque proinde omne dominium actus et determinationis ab ea penitus aufert. Unde, si Deus voluntatem prædeterminaret ad unum, minime ejus influxus exerceretur conformiter ad naturam causæ liberæ. Nihil igitur prodest Thomistis dicere cum S. Thoma: "Deum omnia movere secundum eorum conditionem,"—quod quidem omnes admittunt,—sed oportet eos ostendere præmotionem, quæ non est in nostra potestate, quæ ordine causalitatis præcedit actum nostrum et consensum, quæque actum, ad quem datur, insuperabiliter infert, quadrare cum actu, quem ponere vel non ponere pro nostro arbitrio possumus.[1] Nec satisfit dicere adesse mysterium, nisi probetur abesse contradictionem.

of the agent, it predetermines the will to the individual act, and its effect is infallible. It is therefore a *determinatio ad unum*, it is *ineluctabilis* so far as the will is concerned, and this is the definition given of necessity.

It is no use to say God moves free causes freely, not necessarily. We, too, admit that; but we say, if He moved them as the Thomists teach, He would move them necessarily, and because He moves them freely He moves them in a very different way, as St. Thomas himself clearly teaches—(**Healy,** *I. E. Record*, July, 1883, p. 423).

[1] Let it not be objected that according to St. Thomas God gives the action and its mode; for in this system the motion willed excludes by its very nature all elective and free mode in the agent moved. The doctrine of St. Thomas is quite different; since, not admitting as necessary a special motion for each particular action, the creature is by virtue of the motion received originally in its constitution, perfect master of all the actions which are placed within the range of its choice, and hence it has complete subjective liberty. And when God wills to move it by a special motion to a particular action, He moves its operative power to select this action in preference to others, which are also fully in its power; so that the creature, while following the motion, uses its own liberty, and God by moving it uses the same liberty of the creature—(**Papagni,** *ib.*, p. 16).

155. II.—*a*) Thomistæ dicunt voluntatem prædeterminari ad se determinandum (n. 148, 5°.) ; *atqui* hoc assertum continet notas inter se pugnantes ; prædeterminatio enim ex natura sua removet a voluntate omnem indeterminationem ; nulla itaque restat indeterminatio, quam voluntas se determinando removeret. Et revera, posita prædeterminatione, manetne voluntas active indifferens ad agendum et non agendum ? *Si manet*, frustratur divina præscientia, quæ (inquiunt) a metaphysica connexione inter prædeterminationem et actum voluntatis dependet ; *si non manet*, tollitur libertas, quæ in hac indifferentia, juxta ipsos Thomistas, consistit. Ubi enim nulla est indifferentia, nulla potest esse electio, nulla actio cum *expedita* potestate non agendi.

Neve dicas : voluntas prædeterminata *agit ; nam* id faciunt facultates inferiores, num igitur se determinent ? num liberæ dici debeant ?

b) Thomistæ docent " divinam motionem *prius* recipi in causa secunda et *modificari* ab ipsa, deinde impellere ad movendum " (*Zigliara*) ; *atqui* ad hanc motionem modificandam causa secunda (voluntas) aut indiget prædeterminatione aut non ; *si prius*, habetur processus in infinitum in prædeterminationibus et modificationibus ; si *alterum*, voluntas potest actum ponere, quin prædeterminetur, et Deus non in suo decreto, sed in ipso actu voluntatis præscit modificationem a voluntate inductam.[1]

c) Thomistæ docent prædeterminationem a Deo solo effici in voluntate, ideoque quando imprimitur, actum voluntatis omitti non posse ; *atqui*, si res ita sit, adversarii prædeterminationis ad eam impugnandam a Deo irresistibiliter prædeterminantur, non minus quam fautores ad eam tuendam—quod sane est parum conveniens.

[1] Recte ut sui systematis subversivas *Bannez* has modificationes rejecit : " Divina voluntas, inquit, omnia modificat, dum causa est universalissima et efficacissima cujuslibet rei *in quantum ad fieri et quantum ad esse et quantum ad modum . . . ; ergo non est modificabilis causa inferiori concursus activus divinæ voluntatis* "—(In 1, q. 19, a. 8).

156. Pars 2ª (*admissa doctrina prædeterminationis, Deus auctor peccati evadit*). **Arg. I.**—Deus physice prædeterminando voluntatem ad actum peccaminosum expresse et formaliter intendit illum actum cum omnibus suis proprietatibus et circumstantiis ; nulla enim ex illis est ei ignota in momento, in quo voluntatem ad actum prædeterminat ; et proinde intendendo actum, intendit pariter omnes ejus proprietates et circumstantias, seu vere intendit, ut homo actum prohibitum ponat,—quod, quomodo Deus intendat, quin auctor peccati evadat, est cogitatu impossibile.

II.—Secundum Thomistas Deus est *a*) *auctor actus*, qui est peccatum, quia " vult efficaciter nos velle illum actum " (cf. n. 148, 6°.) ; *b*) est *auctor prohibitionis, qua actus* fit malus ; ideo enim actus est peccaminosus, quia a Deo est prohibitus ; *c*) est *auctor cognitionis* hunc actum ponere non licere ; nam etiam ad omnem actum cognitionis prædeterminat ; *d*) est *auctor libertatis actus*, quum juxta Thomistas, Deus prædeterminat voluntatem ad actum peccaminosum libere ponendum. Jamvero, qui est auctor actus prohibiti, necnon scientiæ et libertatis, quæ illum actum comitantur, est auctor actus peccaminosi in sua totalitate, seu, non solum physice et quoad actus substantiam, sed etiam moraliter et quoad omnes ejus proprietates et circumstantias.[1]

[1] In this theory moral responsibility is not possible, nor is the punishment inflicted on the creature just. For, the creature, being unable to posit an action without a special corresponding motion cannot perform an action that is commanded unless it has the motion; and it cannot but perform an action that is forbidden, if it has received a motion thereto, since the motion is essentially efficacious and cannot be frustrated. Wherefore, when the creature is accused, and punished for actions commanded and not executed, or for actions forbidden and yet committed, it is accused, and punished for actions which it was in the physical impossibility of doing or omitting ; and this is unjust or absurd. No human law or human tribunal would be such. Must we, therefore, have of the equity and justice of God an idea so far beneath that of human equity and justice which is nevertheless so defective ?—(**Papagni,** p. 18).

. . . Wherefore, in this theory, the bad action is one and the same with the sin, nor can it be imputed to other than God who moved

157. *Dicunt* 1°. Deus prædeterminando non evadit peccati auctorem *a*) tum quia " quum sit essentialis sanctitas, non potest velle illud quod avertit a sanctitate et opponitur ultimo fini, ut est ratio peccati " (*Mancini*); *b*) tum quia " præmotio Dei actionem moralem malam attingit quoad entitatem actionis, non vero quoad malitiam moralem, quæ ipsi conjungitur " (*Gonzalez*).

Resp. a) Non minus repugnat Dei sanctitati, ut alios prædeterminet ad actum, a quo malitia peccati deesse nequit, quam ut ipse peccet. " Causa peccati est aliquis dupliciter, uno modo, quia ipse peccat ; alio modo, *quia facit alterum peccare*, quorum neutrum Deo potest convenire " (**S. Th.**, *Q. Disp.*, II., q. 3, a. 1). Deinde, Thomistæ sic suum systema tuendo principium manifeste petunt ; omnes enim norunt Deum peccare non posse ; quo autem pacto impeccabilitas cum prædeterminatione sociari possit, plures ignorant.

b) Nihil sane lucrantur Thomistæ, quando urgent Deum non prædeterminare ad malitiam actus. Hoc enim perinde sonat ac Deum non velle malitiam ; atvero, hanc nec homo vult ; quodsi eam vellet, vellet ratione prædeterminationis a Deo suæ voluntati impressæ. " *Nullus peccans intendit a Deo averti*, sed quærit frui temporali bono, cum quo simul Deo frui non potest " (**S. Th.**, *Q. Disp.*, I., q. 5, a. 4, ad 6). Itaque, ut quis auctor sit peccati, sufficit, ut sciens et volens actum prohibitum ponat vel præscriptum omittat ; minime vero requiritur, ut malitiam actus intendat ; malitia enim actus ex ipso actu sequitur ut consequens inseparabile. Nec valet distinguere inter effectionem actus et malitiæ permissionem ; *enimvero*, producta entitate actus, nihil superest permitti, quum totum sit productum, scil., *actus liber prohibitus* (*i.e.*, peccatum). Deinde, Deus minime potest efficaciter præmovere ad actum, et permissive se habere respectu malitiæ. Etenim homo ad actum peccati (*v.g.*, contra virtutem temperantiæ) prædeterminatus non potest actum efficaciter velle propter delectationem, quam affert,

thereto ; the creature is but an irresponsible instrument. All the replies that have been made to get out of this difficulty are but words devoid of sense, or incoherencies and contradictions—(*Idem.*, p. 44).

et simul eumdem actum ex corde detestari propter turpitudinem, quam includit. Repugnat enim, ut quis hic et nunc id summopere detestetur, quo summopere delectatur. —Quare, Deus impellendo voluntatem creatam ad actum pravum, exinde efficaciter expellit actum bonum, quo deformitatem detestaretur. Unde, Deus prædeterminans non magis passive se haberet quoad malitiam, quam veneficus quoad mortem victimæ, quam venenum bibere cogit.[1]

Præterea, malitia non est nisi relatio actus ad regulam morum in discrepantia consistens ; posito igitur actu, hæc relatio deesse nequit. Quare, non alii imputanda est malitia actus quam agenti voluntatem ad actum determinanti.

158. *Dicunt* 2°. Totum hoc argumentum " non solum a nobis, sed ab iis etiam, qui concursum simultaneum defendunt, solvi debet ; absurdum est enim et sacrilegum ponere quod Deus vel præmoveat vel concurrat ad peccatum " (*Zigliara*).

Resp. Multiplex discrimen existit inter concursum simultaneum ad actum peccati et physicam prædeterminationem ad eumdem. *Imprimis* enim, Deus præbet concursum simultaneum, non ut, eo mediante, prævideat actum peccati, sed quia prævidet voluntatis determinationem præstat concursum. Juxta Thomistas Deus prædeterminat actum, ut illum videat.

Rursus, Deus simultaneum concursum dando non limitat suum influxum ad unum determinatum actum, sed illum offert ad alios etiam oppositos, quos voluntas creata, si

[1] In this theory the permissive Will of God has no meaning ; it is an empty sound. For, in the said theory, God moves in the same way to the action which He wills and to that which He only permits ; since for the one as for the other, He gives an invincible and determinate motion, it must needs be that He wills the one as the other. The permissive will of God consists essentially in letting the voluntary power act, or in not impeding it ; and hence, of its nature, it supposes that the creature by its own movement and initiative can do what is permitted. Wherefore, to move determinately and invincibly to a particular action is not the same as to permit it, nor is he who so moves simply permitting ; the essentials of the permissive will are wanting. Nor is it any use to say that God wills the one as much as the other, one, however, approvingly, the other permissively—for the two motions are perfectly identical, and consequently that which is supposed to be permissive has no reality—(**Papagni,** p. 17).

vellet, elicere posset. In systemate Thomistico Deus prædeterminationem imprimendo impellit ad actum *unum* "ante omnem voluntatis consensum." Deus præbendo concursum simultaneum supplet creaturæ id, quod ad operandum requiritur, quodque sine legum naturalium suspensione et proinde ordinis naturalis perturbatione denegare nequit, simul autem vult, ut creatura hunc concursum ad bonum finem adhibeat ; Deus autem prædeterminando faceret id, quo creatura ad agendum non indiget, et ab ea eriperet expeditam potentiam bene agendi (si agitur de peccato) nec proinde vellet, ut creatura actum moraliter bonum poneret.

Deinde, numquam licet ad actum divinitus prohibitum quemquam impellere ; plurimæ autem existunt rationes, cur quis licite possit materialiter concurrere ad peccata aliena ; et ratio generalis est, quod qui materialiter concurrit nec physice nec moraliter determinat actum peccaminosum, sed, dum illum ob rationes graves permittit, ex corde detestatur vel saltem non approbat. Prædeterminatio autem voluntatem, per se indifferentem ad bene et male operandum, e statu indifferentiæ educit et ad actum peccaminosum impellit. Quare, non apparet, quomodo Deus, physice prædeterminando ad actum peccati, non evadat auctor peccati ; quomodo autem simultaneum concursum præbeat absque peccati imputatione, vix in dubium vocari potest.

159. *Dicunt* 3°. "Deus licet sit causa actionis, attamen non est causa quod actio sit cum defectu ; sicut peritus artifex est quidem causa cur calamus pingat, non est tamen causa cur male pingat ; et anima est causa motus tibiæ curvæ, non tamen causa cur defectus claudicationis reperiatur in tali motu. Unde sicut isti defectus scriptionis et claudicationis non attribuuntur scriptori et animæ, sed calamo et tibiæ, ita nec defectus actionum tribuuntur Deo, sed creaturis, quamvis ipse moveat creaturas ad agendum. Solutio et exemplum posterius habentur in D. Thoma" (*Goudin*).

Resp. 1°. Illa mala voluntatis dispositio, quæ hic assimilatur calamo male aptato et curvitati tibiali, aut natura-

liter inest voluntati nostræ aut libere a nobis inducitur : *si naturaliter*, non possumus bene agere, sicut homo, cujus tibiæ sunt naturaliter curvæ, non potest recte ambulare ; et proinde prava actio, non minus quam prava ambulatio, ultimo in auctorem perversæ dispositionis naturaliter habitæ refunditur ; *si vero libere* inducitur dispositio, *a*) aut ex sola voluntate, nulla habita prædeterminatione, provenit, et tunc voluntas absque prædeterminatione agere potest ; *b*) aut vi prædeterminationis oritur, et tunc perversio voluntatis et consequens actio prava Deo imputandæ sunt.

Deinde, sponte oritur quæstio, unde provenerit curvitas voluntatis in protoparentibus et innumeris angelis, quæ causa fuit, cur, adveniente prædeterminatione, ' claudicaverint a semitis Dei ' ? Num ante lapsum fuit eis tibia curva, an omnino recta, quæ impulsu divino facta est curva ?

Resp. 2°. " Quid dicerent adversarii de calamo, qui non foret ex conditione sua vitiosus et ineptus ad rite recipiendam motionem etiam periti artificis, sed posset recte vel oblique dirigi pro recto vel obliquo impulsu sibi impresso ab artifice ? An etiam in hac suppositione totum vitium scriptionis refundendum esset in calamum ? Certissime non. Itemque si quis habeat tibias ita conformatas, ut flecti possint quomodolibet ; cuinam tribuenda est claudicatio, tibiæne soli, an voluntati, quæ imperat arbitrio suo motum obliquum potentiæ motivæ, quæ posset rectissimum incessum exercere, quemadmodum fit, quum pueri joco gaudent incedere claudicantes ? *Atqui hoc est præcise casus noster.* Nam potentia voluntatis nostræ *non est determinata in malum, non est capax tantummodo pravæ operationis*, sed flecti potest in bonum et in malum, quia est ex sua natura indifferens ad utrumlibet. . . . Quum ergo aliunde soli Deo libera sit prædeterminatio, vel voluntas mere passive se habeat in illa recipienda, plane fit Deum simili modo se habere in prædeterminanda voluntate, sicut artifex movens calamum capacem rectæ vel vitiosæ directionis, vel sicut homo tibiæ recte conformatæ hunc vel alium motum imprimens pro arbitrio suo. Nempe doctrina et exempla a Goudino producta nocent ipsi vehementer, nedum faveant, quum evidenter ostendant peccaminosam actionem, admissa physica

prædeterminatione, non posse refundi in solum defectum voluntatis, sed præcipue in Deum ipsum" (**Urráburu,** *Theod.*, v. 2, p. 829).

160. *Dicunt* 4°. "Quum liberum arbitrium sit versatile inter bonum et malum, *ordo providentiæ communis exigit, ut aliquando determinetur ad actionem conjunctam cum defectu*, præcipue post peccatum originale ex quo contracta est tanta pronitas in malum. Deus tamen potest corrigere hanc defectibilitatem per *specialem gratiam, quæ paucis datur*, quia privilegia non debent esse communia" (*Goudin*).

Resp. 1°. Ergo ordo providentiæ communis exigit ut creaturæ rationales prædeterminentur ad actus, a quibus malitia peccati est hic et nunc absolute inseparabilis; væ autem miseris sic prædeterminatis juxta 'exigentiam ordinis providentiæ communis!'[1]

Resp. 2°. Ergo quia homines sunt ad peccandum proni, sed tamen sibi relicti indifferentes ad bonum et malum, Deus eos ad actus peccaminosos physice impellere debet! Si Deus non potest homines constituere in peccati occasionibus, quin eos muniat gratiæ præsidio, quomodo fit, ut eos in ipsum peccati actum vi insuperabili præmoveat? "*Paucis* datur specialis gratia, qua pronitas ad peccandum corrigitur," sed quid de illis plurimis, qui miseri sibi conscii sunt eorum pronitatem hæreditariam nulla speciali gratia correctam esse? num ordo divinæ providentiæ exigit, ut ad actus peccati prædeterminentur? Num exigentia istius ordinis factum est, ut angeli et primi nostri parentes, quibus nulla infuit pronitas in malum ex peccato originali contracta, "fuerunt prædeterminati ad actionem conjunc-

[1] Immo, *Alvarez* et *Gonet* affirmant majorem mundi pulchritudinem exigere reprobationem quorumdam hominum et angelorum. "Vellet, inquiunt, Deus horum omnium salutem ut aliquod bonum, *nisi per actualem omnium salutem impediretur major pulchritudo universi* et manifestatio justitiæ divinæ in reprobris ac splendor misericordiæ in electis. . . . Objicit sibi Gonetus, si reprobationem exigat pulchritudo universi, consequens fore, ut Deus nec potuisset omnes salvare. Audi ingenuam hominis responsionem: *esse utique*, inquit, *majus bonum universi et magis elucescere divina attributa, quod non omnes salvantur, sed 'Deus non tenetur id, quod melius est, efficere et majori bono consulere,'* adeoque potuisset absolute loquendo etiam omnes salvare"—(**Franzelin,** p. 580-1).

tam cum defectu " ? Num dici potest Deum omnium salutem sincere velle, dum, juxta systema Thomistarum, quam plurimos in ipsam ruinam spiritualem efficaciter detrudere videtur ?

161. PARS 3ª. scil., *Deum non cognoscere actus liberos in suis decretis prædeterminantibus*, ex jam dictis sequitur. Falsa enim, utpote libertatis humanæ necnon divinæ sanctitatis et bonitatis eversiva, est doctrina Thomistarum de prædeterminatione physica ; *ergo* falsa pariter est horum doctrina statuens Deum actus liberos cognoscere in suis decretis prædeterminantibus.[1]

162. Cor. 1.—Ergo Deus non cognoscit futura libera in decretis prædeterminantibus *subjective absolutis, objective conditionatis, i.e.*, in decretis, quæ (juxta Thomistas) Deus reapse et absolute habet prædeterminandi voluntatem creatam ad quosdam actus, non autem ad alios, si in his vel illis adjunctis voluntas poneretur. Ideo, inquiunt, Deus in signo priori ad decretum creationis prævidit angelos et homines peccaturos esse, si crearentur, quia ipse ab æterno absolute decrevit, se

[1] . . . We must remember the following truth which no one can deny—everything in the creature, except evil and imperfection, must come from God. . . . Now, creatures receive nothing from God except in virtue of the free determination of His Will ; and this, in its turn, presupposes knowledge, since *nihil volitum quin præcognitum*, and intelligence precedes will. It seems, therefore, that it is not only an error, but an absurdity, to make God's knowledge depend on the decrees of His Will. Now it is precisely into this absurdity those fall who will have it that God knows the conditioned futures by the knowledge of vision, in His decrees absolutely existing and predetermining certain acts to be done. Must not the decrees, being acts of the will, have been preceded by the knowledge by means of which He knew He was decreeing ? Is it not totally impossible that there should be will where there is not intellect, and that the will should will what is not known ? *God therefore does not know things because He has decreed them, but contrariwise, He has decreed them because He knew them.*

I say nothing of the impossibility of reconciling *predetermination* with free-will. The former, in fact, implies a determination which precedes human liberty. Now, it is necessary that the divine determinations be followed by their effects. Consequently, the deliberation of the will is necessitated beforehand, and hence such deliberation cannot be free—(**Pecci,** *Sentenza di S. Thommaso circa l'influsso di Dio, etc. Parte II, p.* 32).

illos, si crearentur, prædeterminaturum ad actum peccati. Iisdem decretis censent Deum cognoscere quid facerent creaturæ rationales, si poneretur conditio numquam ponenda, *v.g.*, si crearetur homo, qui reapse non creabitur, vel, quid tu faceres, si hodie alibi esses.[1] Hæc decreta cum creaturæ libertate et Dei sanctitate non posse amice componi constat ex jam supra dictis in thesim probando.

163. Cor. 2.—Ergo falsa est tessera Thomistarum: "ideo Deus cognoscit futura libera tum absoluta tum conditionata, quia ipse ab æterno voluit et determinavit ea esse" (*Zigliara*). "Scientiæ enim non competit ratio causalitatis nisi adjuncta voluntate" (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1), *scil.* congruentiam eas producendi manifestando. Præterea, Patres aperte docent non ideo res esse futuras, quia Deus eas præscivit, sed e contra, ideo eas præscivisse, quia futuræ sunt (cf. *Franzelin*, p. 423-28). Quod quidem "*Franc. Romæus*, magister gen. ord. Præd., in lib. *de libert.*, candide fatetur: 'Si, inquit, ad antiquos doctores te convertas, reperies fere omnes in hanc unam convenisse sententiam, *scil.*, non ex eo, quod Deus novit aliquid futurum, idcirco futurum est; sed quia futurum est, Deus novit. Sic enim loquuntur *Hieronymus*, *Augustinus*, *Chrysostomus*, *Origines*, sic plerique orthodoxi proceres'" (**Hurter,** *Theol. Dogm.*, v. 2, p. 52).

164. Schol. Sunt qui admittant prædeterminationem ad actus bonos, eam autem respuant quoad actus malos; quæ doctrina suavis quidem est, sed sibi parum consentanea. Hi enim *a*) concedere debent Deum absque decretis prædeterminantibus actus malos præscire, et

[1] "Que serait-il arrivé si Ninive n'avait pas fait pénitence à la voix de Jonas? Que serait-il arrivé si Judas avait rencontré le regard de Jesus, etc. Dieu n'aurait qu' à consulter les décrets généraux de sa Providence créant et réglant le libre arbitre, et à voir les solutions qui y sont implicitement contenues pour chacun de ces cas"—(**Farges,** *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 370). Ecce Deus scrutans non "corda" sed decreta.

proinde eum posse absque prædeterminationibus actus bonos præscire ; *b*) concedere debent voluntatem creatam ad hos actus seipsam determinare.—Quibus concessis, totum fundamentum Thomismi labitur.

SCHOLION.

De Mente S. Thomæ circa Prædeterminationem Physicam.

165. Quando agitur de mente *S. Thomæ* circa hanc quæstionem, plura, quæ ad rem non faciunt, nonnumquam afferuntur, ut *v.g.*, quum dicitur voluntatem a Deo *moveri*, actum voluntatis ab eo *causari*, etc. Omnes enim admittunt voluntatem a Deo moveri (n. 171) ; illi autem auctores genus cum specie confundunt, qui "*movere*" et "*prædeterminare*" tamquam vocabula synonyma adhibent, et existimant alios, qui prædeterminationem rejiciunt, omnem aliam Dei motionem simul rejicere. "Movere ad agendum idem est ac præmovere" (*Goudin*). "Vocabulum novum introductum est non ad novam rem significandam, sed ad veterem significationem tuendam" (*Zigliara*).[1]

[1] 6. . . . In the doctrine of St. Thomas there are four reasons, neither more nor less, why *Deus operatur in omni operante :* 1°. because *dat formas rebus ;* 2°. because *conservat eas in esse ;* 3°. because *applicat eas ad agendum ;* and 4°. because *est finis omnium actionum.*

This being admitted, we may ask where do we find the twofold *concursus*, antecedent and simultaneous ? That God is the universal end, that He gives the operative virtue and preserves it, all are agreed. Besides these three reasons, the Angelic Doctor gives none other except "the application," which authors universally admit under the generic denomination of the "concursus," which makes them all with one accord say, that there is in us no operation, wholly or in part, how small soever it may be supposed, of which we must not say that it proceeds from God as from the first cause. Suarez goes so far as even to say that the opposite opinion is erroneous and contrary to faith. Why, then, claim the right to attribute to St. Thomas the theory of two "concursus" and to condemn those who admit only one, as unfaithful to the teaching of so great a master ?

9. I am persuaded that I can moreover prove to you this truth

Quæstio igitur investiganda non est, utrum Deus moveat voluntatem creatam, sed utrum, in sententia S. Thomæ, *Deus determinet voluntatem liberam antequam hæc seipsam determinet.*

166. Hic imprimis notatu dignum est S. Thomam, qui in adhibendis vocabulis summam semper diligentiam ostendit, ex proposito evitare, quoties loquitur de influxu Dei in actus liberos, non solum nomina *præmotionis* et *prædeterminationis*, sed etiam nomen *determinationis;* simpliciter enim dicit Deum movere voluntatem, voluntatem autem seipsam ad suos actus *determinare*. Diximus *ex proposito*, quia mirum sane est, quod in tot locis, in quibus ex professo agit de opera-

by recalling to your attention articles 3 and 4 of question 9, of the Ist IInd. . . . . .

18. For all these reasons, it seems perfectly evident to me that the introduction of the new term " premotion " is not so indifferent a matter as might, at first sight, be supposed, and that very far from being reducible to a mere question of words, this modification amounts to nothing less than to substantially changing St. Thomas's doctrine in a question of the highest importance. If I succeed in explaining myself, I hope you will pronounce sentence in my favour.

To keep to the terms used by Fr. Goudin, especially in his *probatur tandem ultimo :* on the one hand the second act precedes the operation, and on the other, it is not at the creature's free disposal ; for the creature cannot be said to dispose freely of what does not depend on its operation ; and most certainly, what precedes its operation cannot depend on it. Now, the second act necessarily implies the operation, *with an absolute necessity,—unumquodque operatur prout est in actu secundo ;*—and that act, which could not exist without the operation, would no longer be a second act. After this, where are we to find liberty in man's operations ? St. Thomas tells us that the immediate term of the divine influx being our operation, this latter can be free because the divine influx accommodates itself to the divers natures of the second causes ; and that *by the very fact* that God makes the operation to be " mine," He makes it to be free, if I am an agent endowed with liberty. Premotion, quite the contrary, for *immediate* term of the divine influx gives us a second act of quite a new invention, which is not our work at all, and which necessarily entails our operation ; and in spite of this, Goudin persists in calling our operation free. St. Thomas puts before us a mystery when he insists on our recognising the liberty of our operation under the motion of the first cause. Premotion offers us an impossibility, when it maintains that we should proclaim the liberty of our operation in spite of its necessary connection with a second act which we have not posited. Behold whither leads, if I am not mistaken, a change of term, which at first sight, appeared likely to give rise only to a mere question of words—(**Pecci,** *op. cit.*).

tionibus Dei in liberum arbitrium, ne semel quidem adhibet voces, quibus Thomistæ suum systema describunt. Et eo quod hæ voces non erant ei ignotæ, ei ignotum fuisse dicendum est systema, quod ad amussim exprimunt.[1] Deinde quum juxta S. Thomam, *necessitas sit determinatio ad unum*, non apparet, quomodo dicere posset voluntatem prædeterminatam *ad unum* esse liberam. Ipsissima verba S. Doctoris optime monstrabunt a sua mente alienissimum fuisse systema, quod nomen *prædeterminationis* sibi ascivit. Sufficiant hæc loca :—

167. Ex Comment. in Mag. Sent.—"Deus . . . in rebus naturalibus operatur sicut ministrans virtutem agendi et sicut *determinans naturam ad talem actionem ;* in libero autem arbitrio hoc modo agit, ut virtutem agendi sibi ministret, et ipso operante liberum arbitrium agat ; *sed tamen determinatio actionis et finis in potestate liberi arbitrii constituitur*" (2°. Dist., 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3). Ergo ex oppositione, quam S. Doctor statuit inter divinum influxum in causas necessarias et liberas, clare sequitur, ex ejus mente, Deum has non prædeterminare.

"Ipsa potentia voluntatis, quantum in se est, indifferens est ad plura, *sed quod determinate exeat in hunc*

[1] St. Thomas, in all his works never, even once, says expressly that God physically determines the will to particulars ; while a hundred times he expressly and formally teaches that the will *determines itself to particulars.* Yea, he teaches that it is determined by itself precisely because God does not determine it, as He determines natural things, which therefore do not determine themselves—(**Cornoldi,** S.J., *Quale sia la concordia della mozione divina colla libertà umana,* p. 25).

The necessity of a special motion for every single action, besides the first general or natural motion, in order that the creature may act, is not the doctrine of St. Thomas. Explained in that sense, the teaching of the holy doctor takes a tinge of harshness and repugnancy which is not natural to it, and which estranges not a few minds; his ideas are altered and perverted . . . (**Papagni,** p. 14).

"Quandocumque S. Doctor loquatur de motione voluntatis a Deo, numquam asserit nec suspicioni relinquit, quod Deus determinet voluntatem"—(**Satolli,** *De oper. div.,* p. 367).]

actum vel illum, non est ab alio determinante, sed ab ipsa voluntate" (2°. Dist., 39, q. 1, a. 1). Ergo determinatio actus est ab illa voluntate, et ab ipsa sola. Hic et alibi notanda est vis propositionis negativæ—'non est ab alio,'—cujus prædicatum, juxta regulas dialecticas, est prorsus universale.

" Ratio culpæ in actu deformi est ex hoc, quod procedit ab eo, qui habet dominium sui actus; *hoc autem est in homine secundum illam potentiam, quæ ad plura se habet, nec ad aliquid eorum determinatur nisi a seipsa*" (ib., a. 2). Ergo homo male operando peccat, quia, dominium sui actus habens, per voluntatem, exclusa omni alia causa determinante, se determinat ad actum malum ponendum.

168. Ex C. Gent.—" Dominium, quod habet voluntas supra suos actus . . . *excludit determinationem ad unum*, et violentiam causæ exterius agentis; non autem excludit influentiam superioris causæ, a qua est ei esse et operari" (lib. 1, c. 68, *ad fin.*). Ergo voluntatis libertas non excludit influentiam, qua voluntas existit et capax est operandi, sed excludit omnem ejus *determinationem ad unum*, sive hæc inferatur ab extra per modum violentiæ, sive per modum naturæ interius imprimatur. Quare, si " excludit determinationem ad unum," quomodo fit, ut includat " prædeterminationem ad unum "?

169. Ex Quæst. Disp. —" Voluntas dicitur habere dominium sui actus, non per exclusionem causæ primæ, sed quia *causa prima non ita agit in voluntate, ut eam de necessitate ad unum determinet, sicut determinat naturam; et ideo determinatio actus relinquitur in potestate rationis et voluntatis*" (I, q. 3, a. 7, ad 13). Ergo iterum S. Thomas affirmat naturam a Deo determinari ad agendum, determinationem liberæ voluntatis ab ipsa sola procedere, exclusa etiam causa prima.

" Voluntas, quum sit ad utrumlibet, *per aliquid deter-*

minatur ad unum, scil., per consilium rationis, nec oportet hoc esse per aliquod agens extrinsecum" (II., q. 3, ad 5). Ergo, supposita determinatione ad bonum in genere, quam suæ naturæ inditam habet voluntas a naturæ auctore, voluntas se determinat per proprium suum motorem, qui est judicium rationis.

170. Ex Summa heol.—"Deus movet voluntatem hominis, *sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum voluntatis*, quod est bonum; et sine hac universali motione homo *non potest aliquid velle;* sed homo *per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud*, quod est verum bonum, vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen *interdum specialiter* movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum; sicut in his, quos movet per gratiam" (1, 2, q. q. a. 6, ad 3). Ergo determinatur voluntas 1°. ad bonum *universale*, quatenus Deus ei confert appetitum naturalem felicitatis eam ad se necessario trahentis; quæ determinatio, a Deo ut motore universali producta, requiritur, ut voluntas velle possit, quum sine illa homo *non possit aliquid velle;* 2°. in virtute hujus attractionis vel determinationis, voluntas creata fit capax appetendi bona particularia; 3°. supposita illa invincibili determinatione ad bonum universale, sine qua nihil potest velle, homo '*per rationem suam se determinat ad volendum hoc vel illud;*' 4°. denique Deus motione speciali *interdum* movet ad determinatum bonum, quando nimirum homines incitat per suas gratias supernaturales ad determinatum opus bonum faciendum. Quæ omnia manifesto pugnant cum doctrina Thomistarum dicentium S. Thomam physicam prædeterminationem docuisse.[1]

[1] 9. . . . In the third article (1, 2, q. 9), St. Thomas teaches us clearly how the intellect reduces itself from potentia to act in relation to the knowledge of the conclusion, *et hoc modo movet seipsum;* so likewise the will, *per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea, quæ sunt ad finem.* Article 4 concludes *necesse est ponere*

171. *Dices* 1°. S. Thomas docet (*Qu. Disp.*, I, q. 3, a. 7) Deum movere res ad operandum *applicando earum virtutes ad operationem, sicut artifex applicat cultellum ad incidendum ;* atqui hæc applicatio non est aliud quam prædeterminatio divina ; ergo.

Resp. Prius breviter percurramus corpus articuli citati. " Actionis alicujus rei (inquit) alia res potest dici causa multipliciter ; 1°. *quia tribuit ei virtutem.* Et hoc modo Deus agit omnes actiones creaturarum, quia dedit virtutes per quas agere possunt. 2°. *quia est causa virtutis collatæ*, ut sic possit dici Deus causa actionis, in quantum causat, et conservat virtutem naturalem in esse. Nam etiam alio modo *conservans virtutem dicitur facere actionem*, sicut dicitur,

quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicujus exterioris moventis, and here is the reason : the will moving itself only by the intermediary of the " counsel," which already presupposes the volition of the end, a *processus ad infinitum* would become necessary unless we admit with regard to the end, a *first* movement communicated to our will *ab extrinseco.* Consequently, if we would not depart from St. Thomas, we must grant that with the exception of the first movement of the will, God affords commonly to all the others that one sole *concursus* which we defined above and regarded as necessary for all the operations of creatures.

10. It only remains for us to determine the nature of this primordial movement, which the will must necessarily receive from the first mover. Cajetan professes to see nothing else in it but the *natural and necessary* inclination towards good and happiness. This interpretation may find support in many other passages of the holy Doctor. Of these we will quote three principal ones :

1°. *Summa th.*, 1, 2, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3. St. Thomas there shows clearly that by this first movement of the will, he means the necessary inclination towards the last end in general, an inclination without which nothing can be willed in particular : *Deus movet*, etc. (ut in textu) ; that is to say that, if the will did not necessarily will the last end in general, it could not will anything in particular. Hereupon Cajetan observes that from this reply habetur quod Deus non solum potentiam voluntatis dat, sed actum volendi clausum in omni actu volendi, ipsam scilicet volitionem boni. In omni enim volitione, hæc volitio clauditur ut principium in conclusione. Et propterea in littera dicitur quod ex hac volitione *voluntas per rationem determinat se ad hoc vel illud bonum vere vel apparenter ;* et sine illa præsupposita volitione nihil omnino velle potest, sicut nec sine principiorum cognitione intellectus aliqud nosse potest. Et *hæc volitio est illa ad quam dictum est oportere voluntatem moveri ab alio, etiam quoad exercitium actus.*

2°. *Ib.* q. 82, a. 1. Here St. Thomas demonstrates that the will *ex necessitate inhæret ultimo fini*, by substantially repeating the argument,—which he had already employed in a passage quoted higher up (1, 2, q. 9, a. 4),—in order to prove that *in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicujus exterioris moventis.*

3°. 1, q. 105, a. 4. Here, too, the holy Doctor shows that by the very fact that God has bestowed the faculty of willing, He moves the will, not only objectively, but also subjectively, and He proves

quod medicinæ conservantes visum *faciunt* videre. 3°. modo dicitur una res esse causa actionis alterius, *in quantum movet eam ad agendum;* in quo non intelligitur collatio et conservatio virtutis activæ, sed *applicatio ad actionem ;* sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli ex hoc ipso, quod applicat acumen cultelli ad incidendum, movendo ipsum. Sequitur quod *Deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei, ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.* 4°. modo unum est causa actionis alterius *sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrumenti.* Et hoc modo oportet etiam dicere, quod *Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis.*"

Jamvero, quæstio est, an, apud S. Thomam, *applicatio causæ* perinde sit ac *causæ prædeterminatio.* Hoc negandum est tum ob modum loquendi hominum generatim, tum S. Doctoris speciatim. Revera apud omnes " causam applicare " non aliud significat quam causam in eo statu constituere, in quo suam virtutem operativam exercere valeat, omni impulsu seu prædeterminatione ex parte applicantis exclusa. Sic, *v.g.*, medicus medicinam *applicans*, ei non superaddit

that He has bestowed the faculty of willing, because He has given the " volition," that is, the inclination *in bonum universale.*

11. From all this, it seems to me, the following conclusions may be drawn :—

1°. The Bannesians, as you call them, are deceived when they claim for every operation of the created will this complement, this *prærequisitum* of the divine motion to make the will pass from power to act. According to St. Thomas, the will, from the moment that it possesses the first movement towards " the last end in general," is sufficiently in act without having, in order to move itself, the least need of any other element antecedent or complementary. If the addition of this element were necessary, we should evidently have to hold as defective the doctrine taught by St. Thomas in aa. 3 and 4 quoted above.

2°. You, too, consequently commit an error, when you concede so largely the necessity of this same " complement " ; still another error and worse than the first, when, supposing, as you do, that God alone reduces the created will from power to act, you claim the right to maintain that the act may or may not follow, and that sometimes even, it will not follow.

3°. There is no need at all to bring forward here the principle otherwise so certain : *Omne quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia indiget moveri ab aliquo movente.* For it is precisely in virtue of this principle that St. Thomas proves that the will itself always moves itself, except in the case of its first movement towards " good in general." But if anyone will abuse this axiom in order to conclude from it that our will, in order to pass from non-willing of a thing to the actual volition of it, must be moved by God, it will be necessary for him *negare suppositum*, and say that the will is not sufficiently in act by itself from the moment that it possesses the inclination, common to all men, towards good and happiness in general ; now it is just quite the contrary that comes out of the article of St. Thomas we have just cited—(**Pecci,** *op. cit.*).

novam motionem vel impulsum ad sanandum, sed simpliciter ibi eam collocat, ubi naturalem virtutem sanandi exserere potest. Similiter qui lumen *applicat*, ut res videatur, vel ignem, ut cibus concoquatur, minime prædeterminat lumen vel ignem ad propriam eorum operationem, sed prærequisita ad hanc operationem necessaria apponit. Quare, si in loco citato S. Thomas physicam prædeterminationem intendisset, procul dubio dixisset Deum causam applicare impellendo, determinando, etc., secus enim non satis declarasset, quod declarare voluerat. Optime vero exempla, quæ ipse ad rem illustrandam affert, suam mentem demonstrant. Dicit enim (*loc. cit.*) Deum applicare causam *sicut artifex applicat acumen cultelli ad incidendum*. Jamvero, acumen cultelli *applicatur*, quatenus homo cultellum movendo, ibi illud collocat, ubi scissio fieri debet; quo facto, cultellus aut vi sui acuminis et naturalis gravitatis rem scindit, aut ad scindendum adhuc indiget impulsu ab artifice impresso. In primo casu evidens est *applicationem* non esse *prædeterminationem*; in altero, S. Doctor prædeterminationem diminute explicasset impulsum non memorando. Alibi eamdem quæstionem tractans, sic loquitur: "Artifex *applicans* virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem dicitur esse causa illius actionis, *sicut coquus decoctionis, quæ est per ignem*. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo" (*Contr. Gent.*, lib. 3, c. 67). Sic igitur argumentari licet: Sicut est coquus ignem applicans, ita est Deus causas creatas ad suas proprias operationes applicans; atqui coquus nihil per modum impulsus efficit in igne, ut hic cibum decoquat, sed illum in eo statu constituit, in quo virtutem suam in cibum exerceat; ergo nec quidquam hujusmodi efficit Deus in voluntatem (vel in aliam causam), dum eam ad agendum applicat. Ergo dicendum est *applicationem causæ nihil aliud importare quam appositionem conditionum, quæ requiruntur, ut causa agere valeat.* Ergo *in mente S. Thomæ applicatio non idem est ac prædeterminatio.* Et quoniam applicatio non fit nisi mediante aliqua actione, et omnis actio est immediate a Deo, sensu verissimo dicitur: "*Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis*," non solum, quia rei dat et conservat virtutem activam, sed etiam quia apponit requisita ad agendum, seu, rem constituit in adjunctis ad agendum necessariis; et, quod consequens est, Deus est causa omnis actionis ut "agens principale est causa actionis instrumenti."

172. *Dices* 2°. S. Thomas semel et iterum docet Deum *prædeterminare omnes effectus; ergo.*

Resp. 1°. Sexcenties docet Deum non prædeterminare voluntatem liberam; *ergo.*

Resp. 2°. Semel et iterum docet Deum prædeterminare omnes effectus, quatenus certa providentia omnia disponit, *conc.*; quatenus

motione aliqua voluntatem liberam ad unum prædeterminat, *nego*. Rem ita esse cuique illa loca consideranti haud difficulter patebit.[1]

173. *Dices* 3°. Prædeterminationem esse "partum genuinum ingenii D. Thomæ *testatur traditio numquam interrupta inter innumerabiles scriptores Thomistas*" (*Mancini*).

Resp. Suarez citatis suæ ætatis fautoribus prædeterminationis, hæc addit: "Auctorem *antiquum*, qui hanc doctrinam sic declaratam tradiderit, *nullum reperio*. Nam licet D. Thomæ attribuatur a prædictis auctoribus, propter quosdam ejus loquendi modos, tamen inferius videbimus nihil firmum ex ejus doctrina in hujus sententiæ confirmationem afferri posse, et potius contrariæ favere, quam etiam nonnulli etiam Thomistæ docuerunt" (*De Concursu*, lib. 1, c. 5, n. 5). Audiamus igitur hac de re præstantissimos inter veteres

[1] 13. . . . Goudin (*art.* 4) has written an entire paragraph entitled: *probatur præmotio ex D. Thoma*. Now in the whole course of this argument, it does not appear that the holy Doctor has one single time used the word "premotion." Goudin himself grasped this weak point of his proof, and took care to add, that this objection which might be brought against his cause *abunde solvetur, solvendo objectiones*. But if we will for an instant confine ourselves to precisely the word, it must be confessed that no more perceptible is it in the solutions to which we are referred; for the *prædeterminare* of the *Summa* (1, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1) and of the *Quodlibeta* (*Quodlib.* 13, a. 4) has nothing absolutely to do with "application" or "the concursus," since it there signifies nothing else but the pre-existence of the future in the divine intelligence, as St. Thomas shows clearly by the definition which he gives of providence and of predestination, to which exclusively is referred the use of the word *prædeterminare* in the two places we have just cited.

Goudin insists and tells us *movere ad agendum idem est ac præmovere, juxta illud D. Thomæ et Aristotelis: motio moventis est prior motione mobilis*. This is just the very reason which makes me think that St. Thomas never taught premotion. For, if to precede its effect, at least by a priority of nature, is essential to *every* movement, upon what title can you justify the use of the word premotion, if it signifies *naught else* but this essential priority of nature? By the very fact that St. Thomas regards this priority as essential to every movement, he neither could nor should in this place make use of the word premotion. In fact, either premotion means *nothing more* than the act of moving creatures to their operations, and then there is no reason for employing a new term; or it does mean something more, and then the argument of Goudin to show that St. Thomas teaches premotion proves nothing at all.

14. Read over the whole paragraph VIII. of art. 4, entitled: *probatur præmotio rationibus*, and you will see that this whole argument, all told, amounts to this conclusion, which wihtout going to such trouble, may be found in so many words of St. Thomas, and which no one has ever dreamt of questioning to wit, *that God is the universal mover in all the operations of creatures*, and that *in every mover, a priority of nature in relation to the subject which receives the motion, must be recognised*—(**Pecci**, *loc. cit.*).

Thomistas, qui post Angelicum sunt vera ornamenta Ordinis Prædicatorum.

Cajetanus (1469-1534) : " Dupliciter contingit secundam causam moveri a prima : uno modo *motione prævia propriæ actioni*, sicut baculus movet lapidem motus a manu ; alio modo, *motione cooperativa intrinsece propriæ actioni*. . . . Non enim oportet, quum aliquis vult aliquid, seu quum sol illuminat, primam causam *prævia motione cooperari*, sed sufficit et exigitur eam intrinsece cooperari tali electioni vel illuminationi " (In 1, q. 19, a. 8). Ergo hic celebris S. Thomæ interpres docet motionem, quæ a parte Dei requiritur in actionibus creaturæ non esse *prævium*, sed *cooperativam* seu simultaneam. Deinde in eodem loco addit hanc motionem *modificari ex natura causæ secundæ*.

Censet *Zigliara* (v. 2, p. 543) per verba Cajetani " non infirmari, sed plenissime confirmari doctrinam de divina præmotione." Quod assertum probandum suscipit. Aliter vero sonant ipsa verba, aliterque ea intelligunt plures alii operum Cajetani studiosissimi, v.g., *Liberatore, Schiffini, De Maria, Pecci*, necnon ipse *Bannez, loc. cit.*, n. 154.

Ferrariensis (1474-1528). " Si aliquid sit indeterminatum per modum materiæ et potentiæ passivæ, et sit ad utrumque ex parte virtutis, oportet, ut tale sit in potentia et ab aliquo extrinseco agente determinetur. Si autem sit indeterminatum per modum agentis liberi et ad utrumlibet se habentis ex parte ejus ad quod dicitur, *non oportet, tale esse in potentia, nec ab aliquo extrinseco determinari, sed ipsum se ratione suæ libertatis determinare potest* " (*In C. Gent.*, lib. 1, c. 82).

Capreolus (circa med. 15 sæc.) : " Voluntas, quantum est ex natura sua, est ad opposita, *ipsa tamen ratione libertatis suæ determina*) *se ad id quod vult, et it a non indiget alio determinante* " (In Sent., II., dist. 23, q. 1, ad 6). Capreolum ita docuisse ingenue fatetur *Bannez* (In 1, q. 23, a. 3).

Kœllin (1476-1556). " Testatur *Conradus Kœllin*, antiquior Thomista, quod motio Dei specialis ad actum ' non videtur esse mens D. Thomæ, sed solum quod Deus semper sicut universalis motor omnis voluntatis movet omnem voluntatem in ordine suo ad bonum ut sic, . . . sed hac motione præsupposita, *voluntas per innatam libertatem potest se determinare ad hoc vel illud bonum*.' Cum Kœllin concordant antiquiores et celeberrimi interpretes D. Thomæ, qui ante ortam litem de physicis prædeterminationibus claruerunt " (*Hermann*, Theol. Dogm., v. 2, p. 127).

Aravius. " ' Mirum plane est,' inquit *Aravius*, O.P., ' quod quidam novitii theologi (tempore Aravii), quorum multi absque ullo examine suorum magistrorum sectantur placita, tantam sibi fidem velint

haberi, *ut indubitanter posteri theologi credere teneantur hunc Dei physicum humanæ voluntatis prædeterminativum concursum cujus nec Concilia nec SS. Patres meminerunt*, sed ab eis fuit quodam fallaci discursu confictus'" (**Franzelin,** p. 438). *Aravius* 13 annis post Bannesii mortem per 20 annos prof. primarius fuit in Univ. Salm., postea Episc. Segoviensis.

Ex hic dictis colligi potest qualis sit traditio numquam interrupta supra affirmata. Concludimus verbis *Albertini*, O.P.: "Abhorrebant (ante controversias) Ordines celeberrimi (S. Dominici ac S. Francisci), a quibus universitates et cathedræ fere omnes regebantur, a *decretis antecedentibus* et *prædeterminantibus*. Quid igitur? Aut veteres Thomistæ S. Magistri sui doctrinam non intellexerunt aut eam nuperi non intelligunt. Ceterum rivuli, quo propius ad fontem accedunt, eo puriorem aquam deferunt" (apud *Schneemann*, op. cit., p. 125).[1]

§ 2. Sententia Molinistarum.

174. THESIS XXVI.—Ratio objectiva, cur actus liberi sint intellectui divino cognoscibiles, in eo est, quod in se habent veritatem determinatam in ipso actu secundo fundatam.

Stat. Quæst.—Thesis affirmat ipsum actum secundum

[1] Nuper *cl. Papagni* sic alloquitur sodalem: "I wrote to you that it was not my intention to criticise your work, but rather to put in evidence *the intrinsic falsity* of the opinion of those exaggerated Premotionists who would make out that a special motion is necessary for each and every action of a creature, and also *its pernicious influence on the interpretation of St. Thomas, to whose mind it is quite foreign, and whose vast, profound thoughts it weakens, changes, and falsifies.* Accordingly, I set forth the ideas and the interpretations which we ought to hold on the questions you treat, if we would conform to truth, and to the mind of the holy Doctor, and which spontaneously result therefrom, when that opinion is set aside. That opinion is the root of the erroneous interpretations, made by many, of the doctrine of St. Thomas in the fundamental questions of theology and metaphysics, to which may be added the wish to explain the divine foreknowledge more than the matter permits. There is thus given to the doctrine of the holy Doctor an aspect of harshness, which is not natural to it, and which estranges the minds of many, and does special injury to the young, turning them from the right path, and thereby depriving them of a magnificent body of doctrine, as sublime as it is safe. I regret that the aforesaid opinion is still maintained in the interpretation of the doctrine of St. Thomas, and that there is anyone who would take it as a guide in understanding his great thoughts. *All true Thomists ought absolutely and uncompromisingly exclude it, and thus liberate the interpretation of their holy doctor from its perverse influence.* The thomist doctrine would thus gain much in exposition and diffusion —in clearness, beauty, and attractiveness—and in the immense range of its conceptions" (*op. cit.*, p. 47).

liberi arbitrii, in aliqua temporis differentia positum, esse rationem fundantem æternam actus liberi veritatem, ideoque hanc æternam veritatem actus esse rationem ex parte objecti, ob quam Deus ab æterno actum liberum cognoscat. Hæc autem veritas, ut jam notavimus, non est ratio specificans vel determinans Dei cognitionem, sed solum conditio absolute requisita, ut cognitio divina habeatur. Enimvero, ex una parte, Deus, utpote ipsa intellectio subsistens, ex seipso determinatus est ad omne verum cognoscendum, nec proinde, ut cognoscat, aliud præsupponit vel requirit nisi objecti veritatem ; et ex altera parte, actus, quum supponatur nondum existens, nihil agere vel causare potest.

175. Quando dicitur veritatem actus liberi fundari in ipso actu libero, non censendum est hunc actum non pendere a Deo ; in hac enim sententia voluntas ponit actum independenter quidem a Deo prædeterminante, nequaquam vero independenter a Deo facultatem creante, conservante, in bonum universale inclinante, et cum ea ad agendum cooperante. Unde, actus quoad totam suam entitatem a Deo pendet ut a prima causa. Quare, sicut in sententia Thomistarum præscientia divina innititur in prædeterminatione physica, ita in sententia Molinistarum innititur in concursu simultaneo, quem oportet igitur hic explicare.

176. Concursus definitur *cooperatio Dei ad actus creaturarum.* Concursus dicitur *simultaneus*, si divina cooperatio nec prius nec posterius, sed simul cum activitate creaturæ, exseritur, ita ut tota actio a Deo et a creatura inchoetur et dependeat. Hic est concursus simultaneus *in actu secundo* seu *collatus*, quem distinguere necesse est a concursu *in actu primo* seu *oblato*, qui est ipsa Dei voluntas decreto æterno parata ad agendum cum causa creata ; et, si sermo est de causis liberis, ut fiat quæcumque actio libera, quam voluntas

eligat. Quare, *a*) concursus in actu primo est æternus, et proinde non solum natura sed etiam duratione præcedit actionem creatam, a qua igitur est realiter distinctus ; *b*) concursus in actu secundo non præcedit actionem sed simul est cum illa ; est enim ipsa actio creaturæ, non præcise prout procedit et pendet a creatura, sed prout procedit et pendet a Deo, quum omnis actio creata immediate et indivisibiliter ab utraque causa (prima *scil.* et secunda) procedit. Quod attinet ad actus liberos creaturarum, simultaneitas concursus et determinationis voluntatis exigitur ex una parte, ne voluntas vi concursus determinetur, antequam seipsam determinet, et sic libertas perdatur ; et ex altera parte, ne absolutum Dei dominium excludatur, si voluntatis determinatio fiat, antequam concursus conferatur. Restat igitur, ut concursus collatio et voluntatis determinatio sint simpliciter simul.

177. Ex consulto dicimus *simpliciter simul*, quia secundum unum respectum, determinatio voluntatis, ut conditio, præcedit concursus collationem, ut conditionatum ; quæ tamen prioritas non est realis sed tantum secundum nostrum modum concipiendi. Secundum alterum autem respectum concursus est prior determinatione. " 1°. Quia causa prima *altior* et *nobilior magisque independenti modo* influit in effectum. 2°. quia causa prima respicit per se primo actionem illam sub quadam *universaliori ratione* ; nam causa prima influit in quemlibet effectum vel actionem ex eo præcise, quod aliquid entitatis participat ; causa autem secunda semper influit sub aliqua posteriori magisque determinata ratione entis. Unde fit 3°. ut influxus causæ primæ ex se et ex suo genere dicatur etiam *prior subsistendi consequentia* ; nam influxus causæ primæ absolute non pendet a causa secunda, sed quantum est *ex genere suo* potest esse sine illa, non vero e converso " (**Suarez,** *Meta.*, disp. 22, s. 3, n. 10). Hæc est sola prioritas, quam causalitas causæ primæ habet respectu effectus causæ secundæ, teste *Cajetano*. Causalitas divina " non est sic intelligenda "

inquit, " quasi sit aliqua duratio naturæ, in cujus primo instanti causa prima respiciat effectum, et in secundo causa secunda ; *puerilis enim est hic sensus*, . . . sed est intelligenda *quoad independentiam et intimitatem* ; attingit enim prima causa effectum secundæ et independentius et intimius, quam secunda " (In 1, q. 19, a. 8).

178. Concursus indifferentia et determinatio.—Concursus Dei in actu primo spectatus indifferens esse debet, quum non sit nisi Deus ipse voluntati intime præsens et ad quamcumque, quam voluntas eligat, actionem juvandam paratus. Quare, necesse est, ut creatura aliquo modo hunc concursum indifferentem determinet et specificet.[1]

179. Determinatio autem est duplex, altera effectiva, objectiva altera. *Effectiva* peragitur per aliquam mutationem in re determinata causatam ; unde talis determinatio in causam primam cadere nequit. *Objectiva* autem solum exhibet rationem vel conditionem extrinsecam, cur aliquis se libere ad aliquid faciendum determinet. Hæc determinatio nullam per se importat imperfectionem in eo, qui determinari dicitur. Jamvero, hoc modo Dei concursus a causis secundis determinatur. " Deus enim tamquam provisor universalis ideo operatur omnia in omnibus causis secundis, quia complere debet earum virtutes activas, supplens nativam illarum deficientiam et impotentiam operandi sola sua virtute. Quare, non quamlibet actionem vel effectum, cum qualibet causa producit (nisi miracula patrare velit), sed cum aliis actus liberos, cum aliis necessarios, cum aliis hos, cum aliis illos gignit effectus, prout singula-

[1] Audi **S. Thomam** : " *Esse* est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia alia agunt ipsum, in quantum agunt in virtute primi agentis ; secunda autem agentia, *quæ sunt quasi particulantia et determinantia actionem primi agentis*, agunt, sicut proprios effectus, alias perfectiones, quæ determinant esse " (*C. Gent.*, l. 3, c. 66). " Licet causa prima maxime influat in effectum, tamen *ejus influentia per causam proximam determinatur et specificatur* "—(*Q. Disp.*, I., q. 1, a. 4, ad 3).

rium fert natura et ingenitæ virtutes. Ergo est certum, ut hunc vel illum concursum per suam omnipotentiam exhibere decernat, oportere, ut prius respiciat et consideret naturam specificam causæ, cui vult cooperari. Atqui hoc, et nihil aliud intendimus dicere, quando statuimus Deum quodammodo a causis secundis determinari *ad speciem actus*, nempe pure objective. . . .

Et idem etiam patet de determinatione *quoad exercitium actus*. Nam Deus per scientiam suam perfectissimam distinctissimamque cognoscit, quandonam causæ secundæ completæ erunt in suo ordine, et in quo præcise momento illæ operaturæ forent, si ipse suum offerret concursum, seu in quo tempore reliqua omnia, quæ ad actionem cujuslibet causæ concurrere debent, parata omnino erunt, ita ut si tunc actio non sequeretur solum tribuendum esset defectui influxus causæ primæ ; et quia vult se naturis et indigentiis creaturarum accommodare, tunc, et non prius nec posterius, decernit omnipotentiam suam applicare ad concurrendum. Atqui hoc est Deum a causis secundis quodammodo objective determinari ad *exercitium actus*. In quo nulla timenda est imperfectio Dei, tum quia objectiva hæc determinatio nihil, sive physice sive moraliter, causat in Deo, tum quia non datur ex ulla indigentia Dei, sed solum quia vult se accommodare naturis rerum, tum denique quia tota derivatur ex antecedenti libera voluntate et actione ipsius, qua res creavit, virtutibus variis instruxit, per suam providentiam certo in ordine distribuit, illasque, unamquamque secundum suam naturam, agere voluit. Nempe, Deus libera rerum creatione variaque providentiæ suæ dispositione, talem objectivum ordinem constituit, qui postulet, ut ille sic potius, quam aliter, pro hoc potius, quam pro alio tempore decernat parare concursum suum" (**Urráburu,** *Theod.*, v. 2, p. 911).

Quare, recte dici potest voluntatem creatam se deter-

minare *in virtute concursus divini*, ita ut determinatio voluntatis reddat concursum ex oblato collatum ; et pariter recte dici potest Deum conferre concursum *præsupposita libera voluntatis creatæ determinatione.* Primum dici potest, quia voluntas creata impotens est ad se hic et nunc actu determinandum, nisi habeat actualem concursum divinum. Alterum dici potest, quia ideo Deus ab æterno decrevit conferre concursum, quia ab æterno vidit quomodo voluntas se determinaret, si concursum haberet. Aliis verbis : non ideo voluntas creata Dei concursum determinat, quia actu hic et nunc se determinat ; sed potius, ideo ipsa Dei concursum determinat, quia Deus ab æterno prævidens quomodo voluntas se determinaret, si daretur concursus, concursum in tempore conferendum (eo fine, ut actio bona fiat, mala permittatur) ab æterno decrevit. Unde, id, quod concursum determinat, non est determinatio voluntatis ut hic et nunc posita, sed præsens voluntatis determinatio æternaliter prævisa ut futura, si concursus daretur. Divina cognitio, prout terminatur ad hæc futura conditionata ut talia, dicitur *scientia media* (n. 126) ; et hæc, sicut scientia simplicis intelligentiæ, prioritate rationis antecedit decretum divinum præbendi concursum, illudque quasi dirigit.

180. Dei et voluntatis in agendo cooperatio.—Nihil prohibet, quominus una eademque operatio immediate procedat a duobus agentibus, ita nimirum ut ab uno dependeat sub una ratione, ab altero autem sub alia ratione, quæ sit priori subordinata. Et revera res ita se habet in omnibus creaturarum operationibus ; in qualibet enim creata operatione invenitur ratio entis universalis et ratio entis particularis, *v.g.*, actus volitionis continet rationem entis et rationem actionis naturæ specialis. Manifestum autem est hanc alteram rationem essentialiter et intrinsece subordinari priori ; potest igitur operatio sub priori respectu a Deo pendere

et sub altera a creatura.[1] Hæc vero non ita intelligenda sunt, quasi rationes genericæ a Deo producantur et rationes specificæ a creatura (quia quum rationes specificæ sint cum genericis identicæ, hæ sine illis produci nequeunt) ; revera enim totus effectus secundum rationes genericas et specificas a Deo est, divina tamen operatio seu concursus determinatur a creatura ad speciem actus. Ratio enim, cur actio sit in tali vel tali specie non est a Deo, cujus concursus est per se indifferens, sed a creatura concursum determinans et specificans (n. 178-9). Et hæc de agentibus creatis generatim. Nunc autem de voluntate creata speciatim.

181. Voluntas creata quodammodo se habet respectu divini influxus, sicut se habet respectu habitus, quo informetur. Enimvero, 1°. actus secundum se totum immediate procedit a voluntate et habitu, sed ita, ut determinatio actus sit ab ipsa voluntate, cui nimirum soli, minime vero habitui, inest formaliter vis hunc actum eligendi vel illum. Sic, *v.g.*, habitus caritatis perinde se habet quoad omnes actus hujus virtutis ; a voluntate autem provenit, ut hic et nunc ponatur actus caritatis erga proximum potius, quam erga Deum. 2°. Hæc libera voluntatis electio seu determinatio non est nova entitas entitati actus, qui producitur, superaddita, sicut nec rationes specificæ alicujus rei sunt rationibus genericis adjectæ, sed est ipse actus, prout procedit ab agente, qui in signo proximo ante positionem actus potest illum elicere vel omittere. Si enim electio esset actus novus ab ipso velle distinctus, tunc, ut electio fiat, necesse esset admittere alium actum, quo actio eligendi eligeretur, et sic porro sine fine. Jam (quantum fert

[1] " Forma rei est intra rem et tanto magis, quanto consideratur ut prior et universalior ; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius *esse* universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 105, a. 5).

analogia) hæc omnia in cooperatione Dei et creatæ voluntatis verificantur. Nam 1°. "sicut habitus ita conjunctus est voluntati, ut ejus influxus in actum sit in potestate voluntatis ; ita Deus se eo modo voluntati accommodat et conjungit, ut concursus et influxus ejus sit in voluntatis potestate. Cum enim intime sit præsens rebus omnibus, easque suo substantifico influxu conservet, omnibus esse et vigorem impertiens, non est ei difficile, ita se illis attemperare, ut una cum illis operetur easque adjuvet" (**Lessius,** *De perf. div.*, lib. II, c. 4, n. 18).

2°. Libera determinatio, quæ, ut diximus, est ipsa actio libera, quoad efficientiam Deo et voluntati tribuenda est, quia neque voluntas potest quidquam agere sine immediato Dei influxu, neque potest Deus actum liberum creaturæ efficere sine libera creaturæ determinatione. Atvero, Deus efficienter influit per modum causæ necessariæ, non quidem simpliciter necessariæ, sed ex suppositione sui decreti liberi concursum præbendi secundum naturas et exigentias creaturarum. Voluntas autem efficienter influit per modum libere determinantis ; nullam enim habet necessitatem influendi, sed ex arbitrio suo influit vel non influit.

3°. Quum actus determinandi non addat ad ipsum velle voluntatis novam realitatem, sed novam dumtaxat formalitatem, novo concursu non eget, quippe qui tunc solum exigitur, quando nova realitas efficitur. —Ex quibus sequitur *a*) totam voluntatis actionem esse a Deo, non quidem a Deo determinante (quum non qui quomodolibet efficit actionem, dicatur illam determinare, sed qui illam efficit cum potestate hic et nunc illam omittendi), sed concurrente per modum causæ necessariæ, quemadmodum diximus totam actionem esse ab habitu ut a principio necessario influente. Sequitur *b*) nullam inesse voluntati operationem a Dei concursu ullo modo independentem, sed sicut in *esse*

omnem suam realitatem, ita in *operari* omnem suam efficientiam ab eo procedere.[1]

182. Concursus ad actum peccati.—Deus nequaquam auctor peccati evadit concursum simultaneum præbendo (*cf.* n. 158). In actu enim peccati tria distinguenda sunt : *a*) Ipsa entitas actus, quæ, utpote ens, Deo ut causæ universali est referenda ; *b*) determinatio voluntatis, quæ est formaliter ab ipsa voluntate ; *c*) inordinatio hujus determinationis. Jamvero, supposito concursu simultaneo tantum, ei tamquam auctori adscribenda est malitia actus, cui adscribendæ sunt determinatio actus formaliter sumpta et deficientia a norma rectitudinis cum hac determinatione intrinsece conjuncta ; *atqui* sub altero et tertio respectu actus peccati non est a Deo simultanee concurrente sed a voluntate sola ; quemadmodum, *v.g.*, devia motio navis non est a causa, cujus influxu motio fit possibilis (*v.g.*, vento leni), sed a gubernatore navem huc illuc inclinante (*cf.* n. 167, "*Ratio culpæ, etc.*"). Egregie **S. Bernardus:** "Soli inter

[1] The Angelic Doctor very clearly teaches that God is the universal principle of every interior human act ; but that it is the human will alone which *determines* itself to evil, or, in other words, God gives His general *concursus* for the performance of the *physical act* by which a man determines himself ; but in so far as that general *concursus* is determined, to be a *concursus* to a good rather than to a bad act, or to this rather than to that act, depends altogether on the active indifference of the human will, in which consists the very essence of liberty. If the determination came from any other source whatsoever, it would no longer be an active but a passive indifference, and therefore incompatible with true liberty. Therefore, the entitative act takes place with the aid of the general *concursus* ; but the election or determination, as a moral act, is due to the will alone.

If it be said that even in this restricted sense the determination is a true activity, and therefore, as such, needs its own special *concursus*, we deny the consequent. It is, indeed, a true activity, and a true activity proper to the will itself, is expressly asserted by St. Thomas, and cannot be denied by anyone who admits its *indifferentia activa* ; it does not therefore follow, however, that this activity requires a new *concursus*, distinct from that by which the physical act of the will is performed, because the determination is part and parcel of that act. In fact, it is the physical act itself, viewed in a certain aspect or relation, and therefore needs no *concursus* distinct from that by which the physical act of the will is performed—(**Healy,** *art. cit.*, p. 427).

animantia (inquit) datum est homini posse peccare, ob prærogativam liberi arbitrii. Datum est autem, non ut proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriosior appareret, si non peccaret, quum peccare possit. . . . Peccavit autem, quia liberum ei fuit ; nec aliunde profecto liberum, nisi ex libertate arbitrii, de qua utique inerat ei possibilitas peccandi. Nec tamen fuit culpa dantis, sed, *abutentis, qui ipsam videlicet facultatem* **convertit** *in usum peccandi*, quam acceperat ad gloriam non peccandi. Nam etsi peccavit *ex posse quod accepit ; non tamen quia potuit, sed quia voluit*" (*De gratia et lib. arb.*, c. 7, n. 22).[1]

183. Ex concursu Dei simultaneo ut supra explicato nihil provenire videtur, quod minus apte cohæreat sive cum libera electione voluntatis creatæ sive cum Dei sanctitate et supremo ejus dominio. Quodsi systema hoc non omnes quæstionis obscuritates dissipat—quod sane nos ultro fatemur—non ideo minoris momenti est

[1] The act of a rational creature can be considered in two ways : first, in general, *as motion* or *being*, and so far it is from nature ; and secondly *as such an act* done or omitted ; and in this way it is due to election. Wherefore, the act of a rational creature is imputable to it only as it is *such an act* done or omitted ; for thus only does the act originate in the choice of the creature, and only so far is the creature responsible for the act. . . . Now since God never influences the choice of a creature so that it may choose not to do an act that it ought, or to do a bad act, the moral badness has its origin solely in the choice of the creature. To the creature alone it is imputable, and the creature alone is responsible for it. . . .

There is then an essential difference between a good and a bad act with regard to God. A good act is intended by Him ; and, to obtain it, He gives the creature the being, force and motion required. But a bad act is not intended by Him ; and He places nothing in the being of the creature with a view to bring the act about. The very possibility of doing it is not left for this purpose ; and the creature ought not to abuse the power received for good acts, by employing it, contrary to the intention of the Creator, in producing bad ones. Therefore, good acts are attributable principally to God, and the creature is His instrument in performing them. But bad acts are in no way attributable to Him. *They are referable to Him only in this, that the power which the creature used in doing them was received in order to its acting well.* And for the same reason the creature is not the instrument of God in bad acts, because *the nature of an instrument essentially implies that the principal agent directs and moves the instrument to what it does.* But God does nothing of that kind in bad acts—(**Papagni**, *op. cit.*, p. 43).

habendum, imo et ex hac parte aliquid præ Thomismo in suum favorem lucratur (cf. n. 149) ; quodnam enim, quæso, dari posset systema verum mente humana excogitatum, quod plene penetraret et illustraret ' altitudinem divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei,' quodque ' vias ejus investigabiles ' investigaret ? Necesse enim est, ut ejus scientia semper ' mirabilis fiat super nos,' saltem dum a patria peregrinamur. Unde, non ut omnino certum, sed ut omnino rationabile, hoc systema defendimus.

184. Formulæ ad systema exprimendum. —Sæpe dicitur Deum videre futura libera ' ratione determinationis voluntatis,' vel ' in eorum veritate objectiva,' vel ' in concursu collato,' vel ' in seipsis ' ; quæ formulæ, ut patet ex proposita expositione, idem sonant. Vario autem sensu dici potest Deum cognoscere futura libera " in seipsis." 1°. ad significandum Deum rem cognoscere per speciem ab ipsa re acceptam, " sicut quum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis. . . . Sic dicendum est, quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso. Alia autem a se videt *non in ipsis, sed in seipso* " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 14, a. 15.) 2°. Ad significandum Deum non tantum rerum causas et exemplaria, sed ipsas res secundum proprium esse, quo a parte rei constituuntur, cognoscere in sua essentia. Probavimus (n. 120) Deum hoc sensu res omnes in seipsis cognoscere. 3°. Ad significandum Deum res cognoscere ratione actualitatis, quam, cooperante divina virtute, habent vel haberent in seipsis in aliqua temporis differentia (n. 174). 4°. Ad significandum Deum res cognoscere tum in sua essentia tum etiam immediate in seipsis, ita, *scil.*, ut divina cognitio directe et immediate terminetur ad res, " non transeundo (ut sic liceat loqui) per medium divinæ essentiæ visæ " (**Billot,** *De Deo*, p. 183). Ita nonnulli.

185. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Futura libera veritatem habent aut in aliqua causa prævia ad voluntatis determinationem (*v.g.*, in decretis prædeterminantibus), aut in seipsis seu in ipso actu secundo ; *atqui* in ulla causa prævia nequaquam veritatem habere possunt, quin eo ipso

negetur voluntatis libertas ; *ergo* veritatem non habent ante voluntatis determinationem ; et proinde ratio objectiva, cur Deus videat futura libera est ipsorum veritas in actu secundo fundata.

II.—Quod homines, secus ac Deus, actus futuros liberos non cognoscunt, inde provenit, quod intellectus humanus non est actus purus intelligendi, sed ab extra actuari debet, ut intelligat. *Atqui* libera futura neque per seipsa neque per aliam rem actualem, quacum determinatam habent connexionem, intellectum humanum actuare possunt ; *ergo*. *Prob. min. a*) *Non per seipsa*, quia, utpote futura, non coexistunt cum intellectu humano indigente eorum influxu, ut ea intelligat ; *b*) *non per aliam rem*, quacum determinatam habent connexionem, *scil.*, voluntatem humanam, quia actus liberi, priusquam ponantur, non habent determinatam connexionem cum voluntate humana, quæ, utpote libera, ad opposita se habet. Atvero, in Deo res est omnino aliter ; ipse enim non est in potentia ad intelligendum, sed est actus purus intelligendi, ipsa intellectio subsistens, et proinde ex seipso plenissime determinatus ad omne verum cognoscendum, et ratione suæ æternitatis omni temporis differentiæ præsens. Jamvero, ad cognitionem non requiritur nisi vis intelligendi et objectum cognoscibile actu præsens ; *atqui* in casu utrumque habetur, *scil.*, intellectio subsistens, et futura libera, in se cognoscibilia (*Th.*, 23) et æternæ intuitioni præsentia ; *ergo*.[1]

[1] It is the state of volition, the seat of free will, that decides the choice of man between the two motives of duty and passion. Suppose that state known, you would know what man would do in a given case, and in all cases where the knowledge of the soul would for you have preceded the action. *Such is the basis of human, as well as of divine knowledge.* Have you never confided your fortune or your honour to the word of a man ? You have done so. . . How are you certain that you will not expose your life to treason ? You are sure of it, because you know the soul to whom you abandon your own. . . . If it happen that you are deceived, what will you say ? You will say, " I was mistaken in that man ; I thought him

186. III.—*Ex mente S. Thomæ*, qui constanter docet futura libera non posse cum certitudine cognosci in suis causis antecedenter ad ipsum actum secundum, ideoque ut eorum absolute certam cognitionem Deo tribuat, provocat ad eorum præsentiam in divina æternitate, prout jam in tempore existunt ; unde fit, ut per æternam Dei cognitionem non magis imponatur liberis futuris necessitas, quam per visionem nostram necessitas liberis præsentibus imponitur.

Deus, inquit, " omnino æternaliter sic videt unumquodque eorum, quæ sunt in quocumque tempore, *sicut oculus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua* (*In Periherm.*, lib. 1, lect. 14) ; *atqui* oculus supponit præsentia (*v.g.*, Socratem sedentem) tamquam causam determinantem, ut ea cognoscat ; *ergo* a pari, intuitio divina supponit futura libera, non quidem ut causam, sed ut conditionem requisitam ad suam cognitionem terminandam. *Aliis verbis :* quemadmodum visio nostra sessionem Socratis non determinat sed præsupponit, ita visio divina sessionem Socratis futuram non prædeterminat, sed ut in seipsa determinatam supponit ; vel etiam : non ideo res sunt futuræ, quia Deus eas, cognoscit, sed ideo Deus cognoscit, quia sunt futuræ.

187. Cor.—Ergo libera conditionate futura prævidentur in seipsis, prout in certa temporis differentia

incapable of a bad action." Such is the chance which you would run, the chance of being mistaken ; because being a finite intelligence you cannot read directly in the soul of another, nor even in the depths of your own. Whence it results that you possess only a moral certainty of your judgments, and of your foresight only an assurance of the same degree. It is not the same with God. *God*, to use the expression of St. Paul, . . . *is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart* (Heb. iv. 12). We are eternally naked before Him. He sees with infinite precision *the state of our will*, and, knowing in the same light all the outward circumstances to which we are exposed, He possesses an infallible certainty of the choice we shall make between good and evil, between the motive of duty and passion. From that moment He knows our history. . . . And that anticipated knowledge of us *being in no way the cause of our acts*, no more obstructs our liberty than if it did not exist—(**Lacordaire,** God, conf. 6, p. 197).

sub quibusdam conditionibus existerent. Deus enim in seipsis videt omnia, quæ in seipsis habent veritatem determinatam, et prout in seipsis illam habent ; *atqui* libera conditionate futura in seipsis habent veritatem determinatam, præcise ut illam haberent, si conditiones verificarentur ; si enim verificarentur conditiones, non procederet a voluntate aliquid indeterminatum, sed omnino determinatum præ opposito, licet nos lateat, quale illud sit. Nec circa libera mere futuribilia major est difficultas quam circa libera absolute futura ; nam sicut futura, quæ pro nobis non sunt sed erunt, pro Deo, ratione suæ æternitatis, actu sunt ; ita etiam conditionate futura, quæ non sunt, sed essent, positis conditionibus, pariter pro Deo actu sunt. Merito autem quæritur, quomodo conditionate futura habeant determinatam veritatem, quum de eis Deus nihil decreverit. Sed imprimis, agnita incomprehensibilitate scientiæ Dei (n. 183), dicendum est Deum scientia simplicis intelligentiæ plene cognoscere singulos actus, quos voluntas in certis adjunctis constituta elicere posset ; deinde, scientia media cognoscere quemnam illorum eliceret, si in illis adjunctis poneretur et hunc vel illum concursum haberet.[1] Hæc autem voluntatis hypothetica actio non est nisi ipse concursus hypothetice collatus, sicut actio absolute futura non est nisi concursus absolute collatus.

[1] It is not because God foreknows (having foredecreed) a certain free act that the act takes place, but God foreknows it in the first instance because as a matter of fact it is going to take place. He knows it as a hypothetical objective fact before it becomes an object of the *scientia media*—or rather this is how, in order to safeguard human liberty, we must conceive Him as knowing it. It was thus, for example, that Christ knew what would have been the results of His ministry among the people of Tyre and Sidon. . . . If it be asked how we can conceive this knowledge to exist antecedently to and independently of some act of the Divine will, on which all contingent things depend, we can only say that the objective truth expressed by the hypothetical facts in question is somehow reflected in the Divine Essence, which is the mirror of all truth, and that in knowing Himself God knows these things also--(**Toner,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 6, p. 619).

Hic observa quod Deus, licet habeat decretum absolutum concurrendi ad futurum absolutum, non habeat aliquod decretum circa futurum conditionatum, sed tale decretum haberet, si daretur conditio, sub qua tale futurum verificaretur. Ad hoc enim, ut aliquid esset sub conditione, sufficit, ut esset pro tali hypothesi decretum concurrendi, seu, sufficit decretum tum subjective tum objective conditionatum. Quare, futuribilia nec in seispsis *esse* futurum habent, nec in seipsis cognoscuntur ut entia absoluta, sed sunt et cognoscuntur ut entia, quæ sub conditione forent.

188. Obj. 1. In toto hoc systemate voluntas creata se habet ut causa prima; *ergo.*

Resp. . . . Voluntas creata se habet ut causa prima *efficiens, neg.*; ut causa prima *determinans, subdist.* Si agitur de actione peccaminosa, *conc.*; de actione bona, iterum *subdist.* Se habet ut sola et prima causa determinationem *producens, neg.*; ut causa sola et prima *formaliter* determinans, *conc.* Nihil prohibet, quominus voluntas dicatur causa prima, non quidem efficiens sed *determinans* sui actus, sicut dicitur causa *merens* per suum actum. Immo hoc dici debet *a*) respectu actionis malæ, nisi velimus peccatum in Deum refundere eumque prædicare causam primam deficientem; *b*) respectu actionis bonæ, quia licet talis actio extrinsece determinetur in decreto, quo, consequenter ad scientiam mediam, Deus præsentem ordinem elegit; tamen, nisi libertatem tollamus, intrinsece et formaliter tribuenda est voluntati ut causæ primæ determinanti.

Obj. 2. Absolutum Dei dominium postulat, ut pro lubitu suo voluntatem creatam flectat ad hunc vel illum actum libere eliciendum; *atqui*, admisso hoc systemate, tale dominium haberi nequit *ergo.*

Resp. 1°. Ad absolutum Dei dominium non pertinet, ut impossibilia fiant. Nullo modo negamus Deum posse voluntatem creatam necessitare (*Psych.*, n. 320), sed repugnantiam involvit, ut Deus necessitet voluntatem ad libere agendum; nihil aliud revera sonat objectio allata.

Resp. 2°. Ad Dei dominium pertinet, ut quod vult, et quomodo vult, fiat; tamen non est assumendum sed probandum, tale dominium Deo abesse, nisi actus prædeterminetur. Revera, Deus modis fere infinitis influere potest in voluntatem creatam, illæsa hujus libertate; quare, Deus prævidens quemnam actum poneret voluntas,

si ei adesset talis vel talis concursus, concursum ad actum intentum accommodatum decernere potest, et sic per concursum simultaneum voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet actum libere volendum adducere potest. Ergo in hoc systemate Dei dominium in voluntatem plene salvatur.

189. Obj. 3. Fieri potest, ut existat aliqua voluntas, quæ obstinate resistat omnibus modis, quibus Deus simultaneo concursu influat, ut illa agat ; *ergo* in hoc systemate Dei dominium non satis salvatur.

Resp. 1°. Num ideo, quia talis voluntas est possibilis, necesse est Deum, ut suum dominium servet, omnes voluntates in omnibus eorum actibus prædeterminare ?

Resp. 2°. Si hujus voluntatis consensum Deus vellet absolute obtinere, posset eam pro eo casu necessitare ad consensum præbendum (*Psych.*, n. 320).

Resp. 3°. Spectatis innumeris modis Deo notis, quibus ipse influere potest, fieri nequit, ut voluntas ulla resisteret mediis specialibus a Deo adhibitis, ut voluntas certum actum eliceret.

CAPUT SECUNDUM.

De voluntate divina.

190. " In quolibet habente intellectum est voluntas, sicut in quolibet habente sensum est appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, quum sit in eo intellectus ; et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita suum esse est suum velle " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 19, a. 1). Præterea, si in Deo non esset voluntas, pluribus careret perfectionibus, quæ ad voluntatem referuntur, ut sunt amor boni, odium mali, justitia, benignitas, liberalitas, libertas, etc. Præcipuas quæstiones, quæ circa Dei voluntatem occurrunt, hic in ordine breviter tractabimus.

ART. I.

DE VOLUNTATE DIVINA IN SEIPSA CONSIDERATA.

§ 1. De Perfectione et Motivo Voluntatis Divinæ.

191. Dei voluntas infinita perfectione gaudet.—Prob. 1°. *Ratione sui;* nam, quum sit realiter identica cum essentia divina et cum suis operationibus (summa Dei simplicitas utrumque postulat), infinita essentiæ divinæ perfectio ei competit, eique demitur imperfectio, quæ in transitu a potentia ad actum volendi includitur.

2°. *Ratione finis;* quia voluntas divina, secus ac creata, ab æterno in infinito bono adepto cum infinito gaudio quiescit; est igitur immunis ab omni perturbatione, quæ ex tristitia, desiderio, aliave causa oriri potest.

Quare, Dei voluntas non est potentia, quæ ab objecto determinatur ad actus eliciendos, sed est volitio actualis et subsistens, unicus actus infinitus, Deus ipse.

192. Motivum voluntatis divinæ non est aliud quam essentiæ divinæ bonitas.—1°. Quia voluntas, quæ extra se habet vel habere potest motivum suæ volitionis, ab alio dependet, ut se ad agendum moveat. 2°. Quia Deus in seipso habet plenitudinem perfectionis et appetibilitatis; et proinde respectu ejus voluntatis res aliæ nullam habere possunt appetibilitatem. Quare, amor Dei erga creaturas est plane gratuitus, quum nullum commodum, nulla utilitas inde Deo derivetur. Ex quo sequitur creaturas a Deo amari amore non *concupiscentiæ* sed *benevolentiæ*, quum non suum commodum sed earum velit et quærat. "Deus (inquit **S. Th.**) alia vult in ordine ad bonitatem suam, non autem hoc modo, ut per ea aliquid bonitatis acquirat, sicut nos facimus circa alios bene operando, sed ita quod eis sua bonitate aliquid largiatur, et ideo liberalitas est quasi proprium ipsius, quia ex operatione sua non intendit aliquid sibi commodum provenire, sed vult bonitatem suam in alios diffundere, et ideo Aug. dicit, quod ipse utitur nobis

ad bonitatem suam et utilitatem nostram" (1° *sent.*, dist. 45, q. 1, a. 2).

Tamen, creaturas irrationales Deus amat "amore quasi concupiscentiæ, in quantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et etiam ad seipsum, non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis" (*Id.*, ib., 1, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3).

193. Deus hac quasi ratione *movetur* ad creaturis benefaciendum :—summa essentiæ divinæ bonitas voluntati divinæ proponitur ut ad extra communicabilis ; Deus autem amat suam bonitatem non solum ut est in se, sed etiam ut communicabilem. Unde, ex amore bonitatem suam communicat, et suam bonitatem communicatam amat, *i.e.*, creaturas amat, quia ejus bonitatem participant.

§ 2. De Objecto Voluntatis Divinæ.

194. THESIS XXVI.—Deus vult seipsum primario et necessario, alias vero res secundario et libere.

Stat. Quæst.—Objectum primarium voluntatis est id, quod propter se appetitur, et est ratio alia appetendi ; objectum vero secundarium propter aliud appetitur.

Quando dicimus Deum seipsum necessario, alia libere velle, non ponimus in Deo duos actus entitative distinctos, sed unicum dumtaxat, qui necessario terminatur ad divinam essentiam, et libere ad omnia alia. In divina enim voluntate, secus ac in creata, libertas non est indifferentia facultatis ad plures actus, sed est indifferentia ipsius actus seu volitionis ad plures terminos. Nimirum, æterna Dei volitio est libera, quatenus indifferens est, ut ad creaturas terminetur vel non terminetur, ut ad hanc vel illam creaturam terminetur. Quare, volitio nostra libera est quoad actum, non vero quoad terminum, quia, quando existit, necessario habet

suum terminum, a quo specificatur. Volitio divina non est libera quoad actum, sed tantum quoad terminum.

195. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*seipsum primario*) **Arg. I.**—Objectum primarium voluntatis est illud, quod propter se est volitum, et ratione cujus alia fieri possunt termini voluntatis ; *atqui* sic se habet essentia divina respectu voluntatis divinæ. Etenim quum divina voluntas, utpote perfectissima, omnia bona pro merito respiciat, eam bonum infinitum et imparticipatum essentiæ divinæ respicere oportet præ bonis finitis, quæ habent bonitatem a bonitate infinita derivatam ; *atqui* hoc perinde est ac dicere Deum seipsum velle primario ; *ergo*.

II.—Voluntas fertur in bonum, qualiter hoc ab intellectu apprehenditur ; *atqui* intellectus divinus primario apprehendit essentiam divinam (n. 131) ; *ergo* voluntas divina primario vult essentiam divinam (cf. *S. Th.*, C. Gent., l. 1, c. 74).

196. PARS 2ª (*necessario*) **Arg. I.**—De natura cujusvis voluntatis est, ut necessario feratur in suum objectum adæquatum, in suam beatitudinem (*Psych.*, n. 336) ; *atqui* infinita Dei bonitas est objectum voluntatem infinitam adæquans eamque infinite beatam constituens ; *ergo*.

II.—Voluntas divina eo, quod identica est cum essentia divina, non potest esse in potentia ad volendum, sed est actus volendi æternus et necessarius ; *atqui* actus æternus et necessarius postulat objectum æternum et necessarium, *scil.*, ipsum Deum ; *ergo*.

197. PARS 3ª (*alias res secundario*). **Arg. I.**—Bonitas divina est ultima ratio omnis bonitatis, quæ inest rebus a Deo distinctis ; hæ enim in tantum sunt bonæ, in quantum participant bonitatem divinam, ejus similitudinem referentes ; *atqui* nequit Deus, cujus voluntas est rectissima, primario velle ea, quæ ex se nullam habent bonitatem ; restat igitur ut ea secundario velit ;

secus enim ea nullo modo vellet seu in esse servaret, ipsis suam bonitatem impertiendo ; *ergo*.

II.—" Voluntas consequitur intellectum. Sed Deus suo intellectu intelligit se principaliter, et in se intelligit omnia alia. Igitur similiter principaliter vult se, et *volendo se vult omnia alia* " (**S Th.,** *C. Gent.*, l. 1, c. 75) ; *atqui* hoc est alia velle secundario ; *ergo*.

198. PARS. 4ª (*libere*). **Arg. I.**—Voluntas non necessitatur nisi ad finem ultimum (quæ nimirum undequaque explet voluntatis tendentiam), et ad ea, quæ cum fine necessariam habent connexionem (*Psych.*, n. 336) ; *atqui* neutrum obtinet in creaturis ; nam ex una parte nonnisi bonitas infinita beare potest voluntatem humanam, nedum divinam ; ex altera autem parte Deus est sibi sufficientissimus, nec, ut sit beatus, rebus finitis indiget ; et proinde, licet eas velle possit ut terminum communicationis bonitatis suæ, non minus potest eas nolle ; *ergo*.[1]

II.—Si Deus alia a se distincta non vult libere, necessario vult, vel ut omnia possibilia existant, vel ut quædam dumtaxat ; *atqui* repugnat, ut *omnia* possibilia existant, et proinde ut Deus ea velit. Nec fieri potest, ut *quædam* necessario vellet ; hæc enim necessitas volendi caret ratione sufficienti, quum præter illa, quæ Deus fingitur necessario velle, sint indefinite alia perfectioris naturæ, quæ ex suppositione non vult.

[1] God is absolute in the sense that He is self-sufficient and not dependent for His fulness upon relations to other realities. He is not incapable of entering into external relations ; but these relations are unnecessary for his self-sufficiency. They are voluntary. God brought the universe into being by His will ; and, although no finite being can exist except in relation to God, the fact that such beings exist at all is due to the divine will and not to any dependence of God upon either the act or the results of creation to complete the fulness of His being and life. If we call God the cause of finite things, we do not by using the term " cause " seek to describe His essential nature. We do indeed imply that God possesses a nature which makes all possibilities of causation reside ultimately in Him : so that, if finite things exist at all, they must owe their existence to Him. But that actually to be a cause is essential to God is a supposition which is neither required by any necessities of thought concerning Him nor consistent with revealed doctrine—(**Hall,** p. 236).

199. Cor. 1.—Ergo Deus nullam creaturam vult necessitate *absoluta ;* eas autem vult necessario *ex suppositione*, ut aiunt, quia propter suam immutabilitatem quidquid semel vult, ut semper velit necesse est. Insuper, Deus necessario ex suppositione vult ea, sine quibus creaturæ finem suæ naturæ congruum consequi nequeunt, et generatim omnia, quæ creaturis denegare nequit, quin contra suam sapientiam et bonitatem agat.

200. Cor. 2—Ergo nequit Deus velle peccatum intendendo vel eligendo illud. Peccatum enim consistit in aversione ab ultimo fine, a summo bono, a Deo ; *atqui* Deus seipsum necessario vult, nec res alias velle potest, nisi in ordine ad seipsum. Peccatum tamen permittit, non quidem eo fine, ut aliquod bonum eveniat, sed ne plura bona impediantur. " Dupliciter (inquit **Lessius**) potest aliquod malum permitti. 1°. *ex desiderio ut eveniat*, nimirum, ut inde habeas occasionem alicujus boni eliciendi, ut si medicus permittat morbum ingravescere, ut ex curatione plus lucretur vel artem suam magis ostentet ; et tunc ipsum malum directe est volitum, ut sit occasio illius boni. 2°. *non ex desiderio ut eveniat* (immo displicet, si evenerit), *sed ob aliam causam*, v.gr., ne videaris importunus, vel ut cognoscas conditionem hominis, ut cum pater permittit filium furari, ut ejus indolem exploret, et, si furetur, corrigat. Hoc modo Deus permittit peccatum, etsi summopere ei illud displiceat. Habet enim justissimam causam permittendi, nimirum, ut res sinantur agi suis motibus, et vires, quas ab ipso acceperunt, sponte in opus exserant. Ob hanc tamen causam (quæ est ejus bonitas) tantum malum non permitteret, nisi sciret ex illo aliud bonum elicere ; et ita hoc bonum est causa non *finalis*, sed *sine qua non* illius permissionis " (*op. cit.*, lib. 11, c. 6, n. 31). Malum vero physicum Deus vult, non quidem ut finem,

sed ut medium ad finem. " Malum culpæ, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult ; sed malum naturalis defectus, vel malum pœnæ, vult, volendo aliquod bonum cui conjungitur tale malum ; sicut volendo justitiam vult pœnam, et volendo ordinem naturæ servari, vult quædam naturaliter corrumpi " (**S.Th.**, 1, q. 19, a. 9).

201. Obj. 1. Deus vult res creatas propter suam bonitatem ; *atqui* necessario vult suam bonitatem ; *ergo* necessario vult res creatas.

Resp. *Conc. maj.* et *min.*, *neg.* consequens et consequentiam, " quia licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non tamen ex necessitate vult ea, quæ vult propter bonitatem suam, quia bonitas ejus potest esse sine aliis "—(**S. Th.**, *ib.*, a. 3, ad 2).

Obj. 2. Si Deus non decrevisset mundum creare, ipsi deesset perfectio, quam iste actus decernendi importat ; *atqui* impossibile est, ut ullus actus Deo deesset ; *ergo* necesse fuit, ut mundi existentiam vellet.

Resp. *Dist. maj.* . . . . ista perfectio deesset quoad terminum actus, *conc.* ; quoad entitatem actus, *neg.* *Contradist. min.*, et *neg. concl.* Entitas actus, utpote cum Deo ipso identica, Deo necessario inest, secus ac terminus actus, qui contingenter dumtaxat ei competit. Quare, quum terminus actus non sit aliud quam relatio logica divinæ voluntatis ad objectum volitum, ejus absentia non importat imperfectionem in Deo.

202. Obj. 3. Si Deus liber est in suis operationibus ad extra, necesse est in eo admittere actuum multiplicitatem, quia repugnat, ut actus, quo seipsum vult, sit idem ac ille, quo vult alia ; *ergo.*

Resp. *Dist. antec.* multiplicitatem quoad terminum, *conc.* ; quoad entitatem, *neg.* Entitas enim actus divini " *una* est, *simplicissima*, *absoluta*, *non relativa* ad aliud ; ejus vero terminatio potest nihilominus et *multiplex in infinitum* esse, et *diversa*. Quod sane ab infinita divini actus perfectione consequitur. Necessitas enim plurium actuum ab essentia distinctorum ad plura agenda ex eo procedit in essentiis finitis, quod essentia finita, quum non habeat actu totam eam perfectionem, quam habere potest, indiget novis accidentalibus determinationibus et actibus, quibus suppleatur, quod actualitati essentiæ deest ; quumque unusquisque ex hisce actibus sit finitæ virtutis, non potest essentia finita unico actu omnia attingere objecta, sed necesse habet diversis actibus diversa attingere objecta, immo ad objecta singula pluribus quandoque actibus redire. Divina autem essentia, quæ est actus infinitæ virtutis, novis hisce determina-

tionibus non indiget, sed id quod est in se manens, ad infinita objecta ac diversissimis modis, terminari potest. Sic, e.g., actus divinus, prouti terminatur ad res intelligibiles, est purissima intellectio, ideas complectens infinitas; prouti terminatur ad res creabiles est liberrima electio; prouti terminatur ad res creandas, est vis infinita tribuens eis, quæ non sunt, existentiam. Efficacia externa hujus actus in justo est amor benevolus, in impio est odium puniens, vel misericordia parcens. Unde, quum homo ab impio fit justus, intrinseca divini actus entitas non mutatur, sed tantum externa illius efficacia. Et ita dic de reliquis.

Hoc ut melius intelligâs, considera solem. Sol unicum actum exserit, si ita loqui fas est; radios videlicet quaquaversus emittit. Sed hic actus in sole unicus, pro terminorum, quos attingit, multitudine, diversitate, successione, multiplex fit ac mirifice varius. Sic eodem actu sol et colores rebus inducit diversos, et calorem ciet, alia obdurat, alia emollit, alia exsiccat, vapores elevat ventosque commovet, et dum vitam omnem fovet atque conservat, in multis illam exstinguit. Ipse non movetur, sed omnia circa ipsum moventur, et virtutis ejus termini successive fiunt. Disparitatibus manifestis non consideratis, simili quodam modo purissimus actus divinus, absolutus in se et unicus, habet in terminis denominationem et efficaciam multiplicem; termini sunt diversi, termini mutantur, quia efficacia extrinseca illius actus mutatur, sed ipse agens nec multiplices exercet actus, nec mutationem ullam patitur; unus hic ejus actus est esse quod est; hic unus actus ad omnia sufficit" (**Tongiorgi,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 404).

Ex hac solutione quodammodo fortasse colligi potest, quomodo Deus sit absolute immutabilis, et tamen perfectissime liber. Quæ quæstio "una est ex obscurioribus, quas de Deo tractant Theologi" (**Suarez,** *Meta.*, Disp. 30, s. 9, n. 4).

§ 3. De Affectibus, Virtutibus, et Divisionibus Voluntatis Divinæ.

203. Affectus.—Affectus *sensiles* seu passiones (*Psych.*, n. 258) Deo non posse adscribi per se patet.

Quod attinet ad affectus *spirituales* passionibus analogos, 1°. in Deo nullus est affectus *irascibilis*; hi enim affectus versantur circa bonum et malum, prout ardua sunt; Deo autem nihil potest esse arduum. Aliqua tamen controversia est utrum ira possit proprie, et non tantum metaphorice, Deo convenire. Communior

opinio negat. " Hæc enim est regula certa et communiter admissa pro divinis prædicationibus, ut ea proprie Deo asserenda sint prædicata, quæ in suo formali conceptu nullam essentialiter includunt imperfectionem ; ea vero solum improprie ac per metaphoram, quæ perfectionem involvunt admixtam imperfectioni. Atqui ira est hujus alterius generis prædicatum secundum probabiliorem doctorum virorum opinionem. Ergo quamvis ira, si solum importaret appetitum justæ vindictæ, posset Deo proprie asseri, non potest reapse convenire nisi improprie, quia non solum significat ejusmodi affectum, sed qui simul et tristitiam doloremve de accepta injuria supponat, et arduitatem quamdam in ultione sumenda significet " (**Urráburu,** *Theod.*, v. 2, p. 566).

204. 2°. Ex affectibus *concupiscibilibus*, sunt in Deo *a*) amor et gaudium sensu proprio circa suam bonitatem et pariter circa bonitatem creaturarum ; hi enim affectus nullam includunt imperfectionem.

b) Desiderium nequit Deo tribui respectu boni sui, quum desiderium sit boni absentis. Respectu bonorum, quæ a voluntate creata pendent, plures cum *Suarez* Deo competere desiderium autumant, quia quum hæc bona sint Deo externa, nullam in eo indicant boni carentiam. Alii cum *S. Thoma*, ut videtur, negant Deum proprie desiderare, quia desiderium tendit in bonum absens, sed futurum ; sed in conspectu Dei opera bona, quæ homines omittent, nullam habent futuritionem ; nemo autem desiderat id, quod numquam futurum esse conspicit.

c) Odium est duplex : *abominationis*, quod est displicentia de re mala, et *inimicitiæ*, quod est affectus, quo quis vult malum alicui, quatenus est malum illius. Jamvero, odio abominationis Deus prosequitur peccatum, et, quod consequens est, ipsum peccatorem qua talem. Quia quum Deus non possit non odisse peccatum, sequitur eum odisse subjectum peccato inquinatum qua

tale. Neminem autem Deus odit odio inimicitiæ, ne reprobos quidem ; hos enim Deus affligit non ut inimicus, set ut judex, *scil.*, non præcise, ut eis malum inferat, sed ut bonum justitiæ quærat, et ordinem moralem a reprobis violatum restituat.

d) De *fuga* eadem existit divisio opinionum sicut de desiderio ; alii enim, secus ac alii, fugam malorum, quæ creaturis accidere possunt, Deo proprie tribuunt.

e) *Tristitia*, ut per se patet, nequit ullo modo afficere Deum infinite beatum.

205. Virtutes quomodo voluntati divinæ conveniant.— Imprimis, ne metaphorice quidem, Deo insunt virtutes, quæ moderantur inclinationes in bona sensitive delectabilia, *scil.*, temperantia et partes ejus, præter mansuetudinem et clementiam. Deinde, metaphorice tantum Deo tribuuntur virtutes, quæ moderantur inclinationes in bona spiritualia, ut fortitudo et illius partes, *v.g.*, magnanimitas, constantia, patientia ; quia aliquod malum superandum vel tolerandum præ se ferunt.

Nullo modo Deo insunt virtutes, quæ subditos ad superiorem ordinant, ut obedientia, religio, humilitas. Aliæ autem virtutes (*v.g.*, benignitas, liberalitas, misericordia, sanctitas, veracitas, fidelitas, justitia distributiva), quæ nullam imperfectionem annexam habent, sensu proprio Deo adscribuntur (cf. *Hontheim*, *Urráburu*, *Janssens*, qui satis prolixe de his omnibus tractant).

206. Voluntatis divinæ divisiones.—Præter divinæ voluntatis divisionem in necessariam et liberam (n. 194), hæ aliæ species recenseri solent :—

a) Voluntas *beneplaciti* et *signi*. Prior est interna Dei volitio ; posterior est aliquid, quo interna voluntas manifestatur, quemadmodum testamentum morientis dicitur ultima *voluntas*. Quintuplici modo Deus suam nobis voluntatem significat : *præcipiendo*, *prohibendo*, *permittendo*, *consulendo*, *operando*.

b) Voluntas *absoluta* et *conditionata*. Illa est, qua

Deus vult aliquid aut independenter ab omni conditione, aut consequenter ad conditionem verificatam. *Conditionata* vero est ea, qua vult aliquid dependenter a conditione a creatura ponenda. Sic, Deus absolute vult mundi existentiam et, consequenter ad prævisionem bonorum operum, absolute vult sanctorum gloriam ; voluntate conditionata vult salutem omnium.

Obs. Voluntas conditionata est *efficax* vel *inefficax*, prout effectum suum obtinet (ut in beatis) vel non (ut in reprobis). Voluntas inefficax non est mera velleitas seu simplex complacentia, sed vera a parte Dei tendentia ad effectum attingendum, quem reapse attingit, si obstaculum non ponatur a voluntate creata.

c) Voluntas *antecedens* (primaria) et *consequens* (secundaria). *Antecedens* est illa, qua Deus vult aliquid ex sola sua bonitate, et proinde in signo priori ad scientiam visionis, seu, antecedenter ad visionem meritorum creaturarum. *Consequens* autem est illa, qua vult aliquid, præsupposita scientia operum liberorum.[1] Sic voluntas omnes salvandi est antecedens, voluntas impios puniendi est consequens.

207. Alii vero alio modo hanc divisionem explicant. Rationem enim voluntatis *antecedentis* desumunt, non ex bonitate divina, sed ex objecto in se considerato absque adjunctis ; et rationem *consequentis* ex objecto ut adjunctis modificato. Sic, " si consideratur salus reproborum, secundum quod habet adjunctam privationem aut carentiam majoris boni, videlicet, boni universi manifestationis justitiæ divinæ in reprobis et majoris splendoris misericordiæ ejus in electis, sic non est volita a Deo " (**Alvarez,** *De Aux.*, disp., 34, n. 3). Voluntas antecedens " dicitur conditionata hoc sensu, quod (Deus) velit omnes salvos fieri, si non obstent altiores fines, *v.g.*, bonum generale universi, ordo providentiæ, mutabilitas

[1] " Dicitur voluntas *consequens* eo, quod *præsupponit præscientiam operum*, non tamquam causam voluntatis (divinæ), sed tamquam rationem voliti "—(**S. Th.**, In 1°. *dist.* 46, q. 1, a. 1).

arbitrii, splendor misericordiæ, decor justitiæ" (**Billuart,** *De Deo*, Diss., 7, a. 6, § 2, post med.). Hi theologi pro sua sententia "innituntur locutioni ambiguæ D. Thomæ (1, q. 19, a. 6), ubi ait Deum qua voluntate vult *bonum secundum se consideratum*, antecedenter, qua vero rem consideratam *secundum omnia adjuncta*, consequenter, velle. Sed iste locus oppositum potius probat; paulo enim inferius D. Th. mentem suam explicat, exemplum inducens judicis volentis omnes homines salvare vel vivere, reos vero damnare.—Et sane salus omnium hominum, si esset absolute contra pulchritudinem universi, non amplius per se bona esset; nec ista pulchritudo recte adjuncta vocaretur.—Rursus, a pari arguendo, quis diceret Deum voluntate antecedente velle omnes homines esse angelos; consequenter tamen esse homines, propter mundi varietatem?" (**Janssens,** *op. cit.*, v. 2, p. 257). Hunc alterum modum intelligendi voluntatem antecedentem et consequentem contrarium esse doctrinæ Patrum testatur *Janssens*, illudque probant *Urráburu* et *Franzelin*. Pro omnibus audiatur **S. Bernardus**: "Verum id quidem: cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat: Sed quod miseretur, proprium illi est; *ex se enim sumit materiam et velut seminarium miserendi* (en voluntatem antecedentem). Nam quod judicat et condemnat, *nos eum quodammodo cogimus* (en voluntatem consequentem). . . . Recte igitur non Pater judiciorum vel ultionum dicitur, sed Pater misericordiarum, non modo quod pater videatur misereri potius quam indignari, sed eo magis quod *miserendi causam et originem sumat ex proprio, judicandi vel ulciscendi magis ex nostro*" (sermo 5, in Nat. Dom., n. 3).

§ 4. De Omnipotentia Voluntatis Divinæ.

208. Deo competere virtutem operandi ad extra constat ex argumentis, quibus ejus existentia probatur.

Hæc virtus est simpliciter infinita seu omnipotens, tum quia est cum essentia divina identica, tum quia secus Deus non esset infinite perfectus.

In operatione creaturæ intellectualis tria principia influunt : *a*) *intellectus* ut dirigens, *voluntas* ut imperans, *potentia* ut exsequens. Jam quæritur, utrum in divina operatione ad extra, potentia divina sit distincta a divino intellectu et voluntate ut perfectio alterius generis, sicut hæc ab invicem distinguuntur, an sit intellectus vel voluntatis functio specialis. Tres sunt sententiæ. Prima est *Suarez* (Meta., Disp. 30, s. 17, n. 45)[1] qui docet potentiam virtualiter distingui ab intellectu et voluntate. Atvero quum in Deo, secus ac in creaturis, potentia non sit principium actionis (est enim ipsa actio subsistens) et, hac mediante, principium effectus, non apparet ratio distinctæ virtutis exsequentis.

Altera sententia est Thomistarum,[2] juxta quos scientia Dei applicata et determinata a voluntate est principium exsequens, et ideo Dei potentia non distinguitur ab ejus scientia practica. Atvero, scientia practica dirigit potentiam in exsequendo, sed in se et immediate non dicit ordinem ad *esse* rerum.

Alii denique Dei potentiam consistere autumant in voluntate divina, scientia prælucente et dirigente, ita ut Deus sit formaliter et immediate res producens per volitionem suam. Quam sententiam " forsitan veriorem " pronuntiat *Cajetan* (In 1, q. 25, a. 1), eamque tuentur nobiles hodierni Scholastici ut *Lahousse*, *Urráburu*, *Boedder*, necnon *Hontheim* sic : " Censemus potentiam divinam proxime referendam esse ad voluntatem divinam, secundum quod est principium exsecutivum et effectivum. Nam 1°. ex nostra voluntate, quæ non

[1] Et *Chr. Pesch.* (v. 2, p. 227) ; " ceterum (addit) potest hic esse sola differentia circa modum loquendi."

[2] " Hinc inferes potentiam immediate effectivam rerum esse intellectum non voluntatem "—(**Billuart**, *Diss.*, 5, a. 3, appendix).

solum proprios actus elicit, sed alias quoque potentias ad actiones suas efficienter movet et applicat per illum actum, qui appellatur *usus*, facile colligi potest non esse præter naturam actus voluntatis, ut sit ex se efficax ad extra. Atqui voluntati Dei perfectissimæ omnis perfectio, quæ in voluntatem cadere potest, tribuenda est. Ergo voluntas divina per se est summe efficax ad extra neque potentia effectiva distincta a voluntate admittenda est.—2°. In nobis gradus intellectivus non habet nisi intellectum et voluntatem. . . . Atqui nulla est ratio censendi naturam rationalem non esse integram, sed mutilam et truncatam. Ergo neque in Deo tres facultates ponendæ sunt; sed potentia in aliis duabus includitur. Includitur autem in voluntate; nam intellectus non agit ad extra nisi media voluntate" (*op. cit.*, p. 700).

209. Obs. De mente *S. Thomæ* disputant auctores. Loca pro prima sententia valde clara apparent (cf. 1, q. 19, a. 4, ad 1; q. 25, a. 1, ad 4, et a. 5, ad 1). Numquam vero S. Doctor scientiæ practicæ tribuit operis exsecutionem, sed directionem dumtaxat. "Scientia," inquit, "significatur per hoc quod est aliquid in sciente, non ex hoc quod *aliquid sit a sciente;* et ideo *a scientia numquam procedit effectus nisi mediante voluntate, quæ de sui ratione importat influxum quemdam in volita;* . . . Inter scientiam Dei, quæ est causa rei et ipsam rem causatam invenitur duplex medium; unum ex parte Dei, scil., *divina voluntas;* aliud . . . causæ secundæ, *quibus mediantibus*, proveniunt res a scientia Dei" (*Qu. Disp.*, XI., q. 2, a. 14). Quo in loco indicat voluntatem esse causam *immediatam* effectus. Unde, "voluntas potius dicitur causa quam scientia" (In 1°, dist. 45, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1).

210. Potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata.—Hæc distinctio potentiæ divinæ triplici modo intelligitur. Potentia Dei 1°. dicitur *absoluta* quatenus consideratur in seipsa et in signo priori ad decreta divina; *ordinata*, quatenus ad hæc decreta comparatur. Aliis verbis: illa respicit omnia intrinsece possibilia, hæc omnia ab æterno decreta. Ita fere omnes, cf. *S. Th.*, 1, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1.

2°. Dicitur *absoluta* quatenus miracula operatur;

ordinata (melius, *ordinaria*), quatenus operatur juxta cursum consuetum sive naturalem sive supernaturalem.

3°. Dicitur *absoluta*, quatenus consideratur independenter a Dei sapientia ceterisque attributis ; ordinata, quatenus horum moderamini subest. Quamvis nihil prohibet, quominus Dei potentiam cum præcisione a reliquis attributis consideremus, " tamen, si potentiam absolutam et ordinatam hoc modo distinxeris, gravis erit error affirmare Deum posse potentia absoluta, quæ non potest potentia ordinata. Sequitur enim revera, quod Calvinus ex usitata distinctione derivari voluit : *esse in Deo, sicut in nobis, potentiam inordinate operandi.* At numquam veteres, quos veneramur, doctores distinctionem, qua utebantur, illo modo interpretati sunt : immo vero S. Thomas (*loc. cit.*) Jansenianam expositionem falsam esse ostendit " (**Kleutgen,** *De ipso Deo,* p. 385).

ART. II.

DE VOLUNTATE DIVINA IN SUO TERMINO CONSIDERATA.

211. Voluntas divina, prout ad creaturas terminatur, quadruplicem habet effectum, scil., *creationem, conservationem, concursum, gubernationem, i.e.*, res *creat,* ut sint ; *conservat,* ut permaneant ; cum ipsis *concurrit,* ut agant ; sua providentia *gubernat,* ut finem attingant. Jam satis de creatione in *Cosmologia* (PARS 1ª, c. 2) ; hic igitur quæstio erit de ceteris Dei ad extra operationibus.

§ 1. De Conservatione Divina.

212. THESIS XXVIII.—Omnes res creatæ indigent directo Dei influxu, ut in esse permaneant.

Stat. Quæst.—Notio *conservationis* duplex involvit elementum : *a*) permanentiam rei in existentia semel

accepta (conservatio *passiva*), *b*) et actionem, qua hæc permanentia rei tribuitur.—Hæc est conservatio *activa* et definitur : *actio, qua ens contingens in esse accepto persistit.* Ut hanc definitionem intelligas, scito effectum duobus modis a sua causa posse pendere, scil., *in fieri* tantum, vel *in fieri* et *esse.* Quod a sua causa pendet *in fieri* tantum, sine influxu causæ permanere potest, *v.g.*, horologium. Quod autem *in fieri* et *esse* pendet a causa, sine continuato influxu causæ in esse permanere non potest. Talis est dependentia cogitationis ab influxu intellectus, et soni tibicinis ab influxu aëris.

Conservatio (activa) est duplex : *a*) *indirecta, per accidens, negativa*, qua impediuntur vel removentur ea, quæ rei existentiam destruere possunt. Sic, indirecte sanitatem et virtutem is conservat, qui occasiones ægritudinis et peccati evitat. *b*) *Directa, per se,* vel *positiva*, quæ consistit in influxu positivo et immediato, quo res in esse accepto retinetur, vel : est quædam continuatio actionis, qua res primo producta est. Dicitur *continuatio* (non *iteratio*, quasi singulis momentis res desinat esse et iterum producatur), quia sicut res indiget positiva Dei actione, ut existere incipiat, ita hac eadem actione indiget, ut existere pergat. Quando dicitur Deum res conservare, sensus non est Deum eas conservare, ut semper sint, sed ut tamdiu sint, quamdiu earum natura et mutua interactio poscunt.

213. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Res creatæ, utpote ex natura sua contingentes, etiam dum existunt, retinent suam indifferentiam ad esse et non esse, et proinde quamdiu existunt, exigunt causam, qua ad esse determinentur, seu, in esse permaneant ; *atqui* hæc causa non alia est quam directa Dei actio conservativa ; *ergo. Prob. min.* 1°. Sicut a positiva Dei actione creaturæ habent inceptionem existentiæ, ita necesse est, ut ab eadem actione habeant existentiæ continuationem ;

" conservatio enim a Deo non est per novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis, qua dat *esse* " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4).

2°. Permanentia in esse est perfectio quædam ; *atqui* Deus est plenitudo perfectionis, et proinde ab eo provenire debet quidquid perfectionis creaturæ insit ; *ergo*.

II.—" Sicut opus artis præsupponit opus naturæ, ita opus naturæ præsupponit opus Dei creantis ; nam materia artificialium est a natura, naturalium vero per creationem a Deo. Artificialia autem conservantur in esse virtute naturalium, sicut domus per soliditatem lapidum. Omnia igitur naturalia non conservantur in esse nisi virtute Dei " (**S. Th.**, *C. Gent.*, l. 3, c. 65).

III.—*a*) Aër, dum dies est, singulis momentis sole illuminatur, et simul ac sol desinit illuminare, statim tenebris offunditur ; *ergo* nisi creaturæ singulis momentis habent *esse* a Deo, ita ut in nihilum statim deciderent si actio divina influere cessaret, dependentia creaturæ a Deo non præstaret quavis alia. *b*) Absolutum Dei dominium postulat, ut ipse possit in nihilum redigere creaturam quamcumque ; *atqui* non esset ita, si creaturæ non dependent directe a Deo quoad permanentiam in esse. Non enim eas annihilare posset *per suspensionem* actionis conservativæ, quum talis actio supponatur non existere ; nec *per actionem positivam* ad illarum destructionem ordinatam, quum actio positiva necessario terminetur ad effectum positivum, qui profecto in annihilatione non datur.

Schol. Indirectam rerum conservationem Deus efficit : *a*) *sua providentia*, qua ab æterno disposuit, quæ in tempore fiunt ; *b*) *cursu naturæ*, quia in ipsa rerum creatione statuit, " ut quædam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 104, a. 2, ad 1) ; *c*) *hominis interventu*, quia homo suis operibus bonis potest ordinem rerum promovere ; *d*) *ministerio*

angelico, quia Deus angelis suis mandavit ut homines custodiant.

214. Obj. 1. Agentia finita possunt effectus producere, qui in esse persistunt absque continua horum agentium actione conservativa : *ergo* a fortiori agens infinitum hoc efficere potest.

Resp. *Conc. antec. Neg. cons.* et *analogiam ;* ideo enim effectus agentis finiti in esse persistere potest, cessante agentis influxu, quia talis effectus non quoad *esse*, sed quoad *fieri* tantum, ab eo dependet. Deus autem " non potest communicare alicui creaturæ, ut conservetur in esse, sua actione cessante ; sicut non potest ei communicare, quod non sit causa illius. In tantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, in quantum *esse* effectus dependet a causa essendi. Unde non est simile de agente, quod non est causa essendi, sed fiendi tantum " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 104, a. 1, ad 2).

Obj. 2. Appetitus naturalis nequit esse cassus ; *atqui* quælibet res conservationem sui naturaliter appetit, immo plus minusve efficaciter seipsam conservat ; *ergo*.

Resp. *Conc. maj. Dist. min.* . . . appetit, ut directe conservetur ab alio, et plus minusve efficaciter seipsam indirecte conservat, præsupposito alterius influxu eam directe conservante, *conc. ;* appetit et efficit, ut seipsam directe conservet, *neg.* " Licet quælibet res naturaliter appetat sui conservationem, *non tamen quod a se conservetur sed a sua causa* " (**S. Th.**, *Q. Dist.*, I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 13).

Obj. 3. Spiritus, quum sint natura sua incorruptibiles, non indigent Dei influxu positivo, ut in esse permaneant, *ergo*.

Resp. Naturalis incorruptibilitas spirituum non significat eos in se habere rationem sufficientem, cur sine Dei influxu existere pergant, sed eos in se habere rationem *exigentem*, ut a Deo conserventur ; unde natura sua postulant continuationem divinæ actionis conservativæ. " Potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma talium creaturarum " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1).

§ 2. De Concursu Divino.

215. THESIS XXIX.—Deus immediate concurrit omnibus creaturarum operationibus.

Stat. Quæst.—Concursus *generatim* est cooperatio unius causæ cum alia ad eumdem effectum producen-

dum. Concursus *divinus* est operatio, qua Deus influit in operationes creaturarum. Hic concursus est *naturalis* vel *supernaturalis*, prout operatio, cui præbetur, ad ordinem naturalem vel supernaturalem pertinet.

Concursus (naturalis) dicitur *a*) *moralis*, si ad operationem concurrit Deus ut causa *moralis* (*Ont.*, n. 429) ; *b*) et *physicus*, si Deus concurrit physice influendo.

Concursus *physicus* est duplex : *a*) *mediatus*, qui in eo consistit, quod Deus dat et conservat vires agentis ; *b*) *immediatus*, quo Deus adjuvat vires creaturæ in ipsa actione elicienda. Hic concursus diversimode a diversis explicatur.—Alii supponunt eum esse concursum prævium et prædeterminantem, quem in eo esse docent, quod Deus causæ creatæ imprimat aliquam formam vel qualitatem, qua causa creata prædeterminatur ad unam actionem præ alia ponendam. Secundum hanc doctrinam efficacitas divinæ virtutis non terminatur immediate ad creaturæ actionem, sed ad aliquid in creatura producendum, quod deinde se habet ut conprincipium relate ad actionem a creatura ponendam (*cf.* n. 147 sqq.).

Alii hunc concursum prævium non agnoscentes docent Dei concursum non præcedere creaturæ actionem, sed eam *in fieri* comitari, ita ut actio sic a creatura procedat, ut æque immediate a Deo procedat (*cf.* n. 176 sqq.). Juxta hos igitur " neutra harum causarum prius quam alia influit, quia neutra influit in aliam, sed utraque in effectum vel actionem, et neutra applicat aliam aut facit illam facere ex vi hujus concursus " (**Suarez,** *De Concursu*, lib. 1, c. 15, n. 7).

Certum est et in comperto apud omnes Deum concurrere *moraliter* ad omnes actus bonos ; et concursu physice *mediato* ad omnes actiones creaturarum, quum hic concursus incidat in conservationem. " Quod attinet ad concursum *immediatum*, quamvis non sit expressum dogma Fidei hunc concursum esse necessarium, tamen

est communis sententia Doctorum, uno excepto Durando (qui putat Deum non concurrere cum creaturis ad operationem earum, nisi quatenus eis dedit vires operandi easque vires conservat), et consentiunt omnes Academiæ catholicorum" (**Lessius,** *op. cit.*, lib. II, c. 3, n. 8). "Sentiunt de hac veritate (Scholastici) ut de catholico dogmate" (**Suarez,** *Meta.*, disp. 22, s. I, n. 6).

216. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Quælibet operatio est realitas contingens; *atqui* realitas contingens indiget immediato Dei influxu, ut in esse accepto servetur; *ergo* a fortiori indiget immediato Dei influxu, ut incipiat esse; realitas enim *in fieri* est magis imperfecta et proinde magis dependens quam realitas in *facto esse* et perfecta.[1]

Idem paulo aliter et plenius. Deus immediate concurrit omnibus creaturarum operationibus, si constat has operationes *a*) habere entitatem propriam, *b*) quæ a physico Dei influxu immediate procedit; *atqui* ita res se habet. Etenim, *a*) quum actio sit perfectio, causa creata, dum ex actu primo suæ operationis ad actum secundum transit, revera perficitur, et quidem *b*) a Deo physice et immediate influendo, tum quia Deus solus est fons omnis perfectionis extra ipsum existentis, et

[1] As the world did not begin to exist but inasmuch as God produced it out of nothing, so it does not continue to exist but inasmuch as God preserves it. . . . All the beings of the universe, therefore, in all their grades, depend on the action, mediate or immediate, of God. Not only all their existence, but all their activity—be it mechanical, organic, sensitive, or intellectual—has its principle and its law in God, the primary cause, so absolutely universal that without His continual influx no secondary cause can subsist. Not, as pantheism dreams, that God is the only substance and the only activity in the world, so that being and action of all creatures in the world are but a mode of being and action in God; but in the sense intended by Christian Theism, namely, that all creatures, as they are *ab alio* and not *a se*, exist indeed, but in virtue of the creative and conservative action of God, and not at all in virtue of anything intrinsic or natural to themselves. Thus, they are causes *per participationem*, and not *per essentiam*. They act indeed, but their activity avails not without a primary impulse and a constant concurrence of the activity of God—(**Aus. Franchi,** *Ult. Crit.*, v. 3, p. 281).

ratione supremi sui dominii omnem realitatem sub sua potestate continet ; tum quia eo, quod Dei *velle* est *agere*, quem concursum Deus vult, illum præstat ea ratione, qua vult.

II.—Nulla causa secunda effectum suum attingere potest sub ratione *entis simpliciter*, sed sub ratione *hujus entis ; atqui* in omni effectu causæ creatæ producitur non solum ratio entis particularis, sed etiam ratio entis simpliciter (*cf.* n. 180) ; *ergo* in omni effectu causæ creatæ debet simul cum causa secunda immediate influere causa prima et universalis, cui soli proportionatur effectus sub ratione entis simpliciter.[1]

217. Cor. 1.—Ergo causæ creatæ Deo essentialiter subordinatæ sunt, non modo ut entia, sed etiam ut agentia, quatenus nulla ab eis exerceri potest activitas independenter a divina voluntate et concursu. Quare, sicut Deus res creatas annihilaret suam conservationem denegando, ita eas ad inertiam reduceret suum concursum retrahendo.

Cor. 2.—Ergo causa prima et causa secunda ita ad eumdem actum concurrunt, ut utraque influat in productionem totius effectus. Nihil igitur realitatis assignari potest in tali effectu, quod non sit totaliter a Deo, totaliter a creatura. Etenim, ex una parte, si quid esset, quod non procederet totaliter a Deo, id produceretur a creatura independenter a Deo, nec illud Deus impedire posset nisi objiciendo actionem contrariam vel negando concursum mediatum, *i.e.*, sine læsione naturæ agentis. Ex altera autem parte, quum Deus non exsequatur actum creaturæ, sed ut causa prima concursu suo facit, ut creatura agat, producitur actus, non quidem

[1] " Effectus suis causis proportionaliter respondent, ut scilicet effectus in actu causis actualibus tribuamus, et effectus in potentia, causis, quæ sunt in potentia, et similiter effectus particulares causis particularibus, universalibus vero causis universales effectus. . . . Causa igitur prima propria essendi simpliciter, est agens primum et universale, quod Deus est "—(**S. Th.**, *C. Gent.*, l. 2, c. 21).

divinus, sed qui vere et totaliter est creaturæ. " Si res naturalis (inquit **S. Th.**) producat proprium effectum, non est superfluum quod Deus illum producat, quia res naturalis non producit ipsum nisi virtute divina. . . . Patet autem quod non sic idem effectus causæ naturali et divinæ virtuti attribuitur quasi partim a Deo et partim a naturali agente fiat sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum ; sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus " (*C. Gent.*, l. 3, c. 70).

Cor. 3.—Ergo ut creatura agat, plenissime sufficit ut Deus *a*) producat creaturam cum viribus ad agendum aptis ; *b*) ut creaturam ejusque vires conservet ; *c*) ut tamquam causa prima et universalis creaturam ad agendum inclinet ; *d*) ut actiones creaturæ attingat sub generalissima ratione entis simpliciter. " Nullo modo neganda est creaturis vera efficientia ; alioquin frustra illis vires datæ essent. . . . Dicendum igitur creaturam posse operari et producere non solam, sed concurrente et adjuvante causa prima, cui primo et per se ipsum *esse* in quovis effectu respondet, ut multis locis docet S. Thomas " (**Lessius,** *loc. cit.*, n. 14).

§ 3. De Providentia Divina.

218. THESIS. XXX.—In Deo est providentia omnes creaturas in finem ordinans ; specialem autem providentiam Deus circa creaturas rationales exercet.

Stat. Quæst.—" Ad providentiæ curam duo pertinent : scil., *ratio ordinis*, quæ dicitur *providentia* et *dispositio ;* et *exsecutio ordinis*, quæ dicitur *gubernatio*. Quorum primum est æternum, secundum temporale " (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 22, a. 1, ad 2). Id est, providentia late sumpta

duplicem actum complectitur : unum, quo Deus fines proprios rerum earumque ad hos fines relationes concipit et decernit ; alterum, quo dispositionem conceptam et decretam exsecutioni mandat. *a*) Prior igitur, utpote actus Dei immanens, est æternus ; alter autem est temporaneus, quum rerum existentiam supponat. *b*) Ille est proprius Dei solius ; iste non obtinetur absque creaturarum cooperatione. Unde, " quantum ad primum, Deus immediate omnibus providet, quia in suo intellectu habet rationem omnium etiam minimorum, et quascumque causas aliquibus effectibus præfecit, dedit virtutem ad illos effectus producendos. Unde oportet, quod ordinem illarum in sua ratione præhabuerit. Quantum autem ad secundum, sunt aliqua media divinæ providentiæ ; quia inferiora gubernat per superiora, non propter defectum suæ virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suæ bonitatis, ut dignitatem causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet " (**S. Th.,** *ib.*, a. 3). *c*) Ille refertur ad divinum intellectum concipientem ; iste ad divinam voluntatem dirigentem. Quare, **Providentia,** ut hunc duplicem actum complectens, definiri potest : *actus, quo Deus creaturas ad finem tum singulis proprium tum omnibus communem disponit ac gubernat.*[1] Est igitur providentiæ divinæ creaturis præstituere fines juxta cujusque naturam, et media, quibus finis præstitutus attingatur, subministrare.

219. Duplex distinguitur providentia : *a*) *physica,* quæ omnibus creatis in communi præstatur, quatenus in communi habent *esse* et *operari ; b*) *moralis,* quæ est specialis cura, quam Deus exercet circa creaturas rationales ; et hæc *naturalis* vel *supernaturalis* est, prout ordinem naturæ vel gratiæ respicit. Quibus distinctionibus intellectis, sequitur Dei providentiam quasi componi divina conservatione, cooperatione, illisque

[1] Providentia Dei interna non cognoscitur nisi per Dei gubernationem, ideoque utramque per modum unius dehinc assumimus.

temporis et loci circumstantiis, atque auxiliis naturalibus et supernaturalibus, quæ Deus secundum consilium suæ sapientiæ adjiciat, ut creaturæ fines intentos commode assequantur.

220. Qui Dei providentiam inficiantur (*i.e.*, Deistæ), duplicis sunt classis : alii enim eam universim excludunt ; alii negant eam extendi ad res viliores et humanas, ne in illis regendis Dei majestas deturpetur, ne in his libertas nostra in discrimine ponatur.[1]

Thesis tria enuntiat : *a*) providentiæ *existentiam*, *b*) providentiam circa *singulas* creaturas, *c*) *specialem* circa entia rationalia providentiam.

221. Prob. Thesis. PARS I[a] (*in Deo est providentia*). **Arg.**—*a*) Omnia argumenta, quæ supra afferuntur ad Dei existentiam evincendam, præsertim sub conceptu ordinatoris sapientissimi, Deo inesse providentiam ostendunt.[2] *b*) " Quum optimi sit optima producere, non

[1] In the main, deism is no more than an application of critical principles to religion. But in its positive aspect it is something more, for it offers as a substitute for revealed truth that body of truths which can be built up by the unaided efforts of natural reason. The term deism, however, has come in the course of time to have a more specific meaning. It is taken to signify a peculiar metaphysical doctrine supposed to have been maintained by all the deists. They are thus grouped together roughly as members of a quasi-philosophical school, the chief and distinguishing tenet of which is the relationship asserted to obtain between the universe and God. God is held to be the first cause of the world, and to be a personal God. So far the teaching is that of the theists, as contrasted with that of the atheists and pantheists. But, further, deism not only distinguishes the world and God, as effect and cause ; it emphasizes the transcendence of the Deity at the sacrifice of His indwelling and His providence. He is apart from the creation which He brought into being, and unconcerned as to the details of its working. Having made Nature, He allows it to run its own course without interference on His part. In this point the doctrine of deism differs clearly from that of theism—(**Aveling**, *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 4, p. 680).

[2] The thesis of divine providence is implied in the very thesis of the existence of God, as the latter is implied in that of the world. If the world exists, God, who created it, necessarily exists. And if God created the world, the world must necessarily in every moment of its existence and in every motion of its activity, depend on the providential action of God. Wherefore, as it is absurd to admit the finite reality of the world and to deny the infinite reality

convenit summæ Dei bonitati, quod res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio uniuscujusque est in consecutione finis. Unde, ad divinam bonitatem pertinet, ut sicut res produxit in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat ; quod est gubernare " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 103, a. 1). *c*) Ordo moralis exigit Dei providentiam ; hac enim negata, plurimi omnia officia religionis abdicarent, quæ maxime in persuasione providentiæ supremæ fundatur. Quis enim amaret vel timeret Deum operum bonorum incuriosum, operum pravorum nec judicem nec vindicem ? " Si Dei providentia non præsidet rebus humanis, nihil est de religione satagendum " (**S. Aug.** *De utilit. credendi*, c. 16).

222. PARS 2ª (*circa singulas creaturas*). **Arg.**—Datur in Deo providentia circa singulas creaturas, si singulas Deus in finem præordinavit ; " ratio ordinandorum in finem proprie providentia est," inquit *S. Thomas* (1, q. 22, a. 1). *Atqui* Deus omnia ordinavit in finem ; conspicimus enim et omnes concedunt res mundanas multiplici eoque admirabili ordine ad invicem devinciri et in unum finem conspirare (cf. n. 40). Jamvero, " in tanta rerum vicissitudine et varietate, in tanta elementorum contrariorum pugna tam mirabilis consensio, conspiratio in unum, et ut ita dixerim, concentus, consistere nequaquam posset, nisi adesset moderator aliquis, cujus imperio parerent omnia ac nutibus temperarentur. An opinabimur navigium sine gubernatore velificari non posse ; urbem, remoto principe, destitui ordine ; gymnasium vel domum, si nemo adest, qui præsit et cui pareatur, dissolvi penitus ; rerum autem creatarum molem, illis omnibus longe ordinatiorem ac naturis magis dissentientibus coagmentatam, regente atque administrante nemine, posse servari ?," (**Liberatore,** *Theol. Nat.*, p. 544). *Ergo.*

of God, so it is absurd to admit a causal and final order in the world and to deny a guiding and controlling law of God—(**Franchi**, *loc. cit.*, p. 282).

Nec valet objicere: Dedecet Dei dignitatem curam habere de rebus vilioribus; *quia* imprimis si eum non dedecebat eas creare, haud apparet quomodo eum dedeceat curam suam eis porrigere. "Secundum eamdem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum et causam earum, quia ejusdem est rem producere et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis. Unde sicut nihil potest esse, quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse, quod ejus gubernationi non subdatur" (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 103, a. 5). Deinde, perperam quis fingeret, quod, quia non decet quosdam homines curam rerum viliorum suscipere, ideo Deum non decet curam de eis gerere; *enimvero* homines, utpote finitæ virtutis, non valent singuli omnia curare, et proinde, qui in majoribus gubernandis se occupant, minora ceteris curanda relinquere necesse habent. Deus autem omnia unico intuitu prospicit, unica volitione regit.

223. PARS 3ª (*specialem circa creaturas rationales*). **Arg.**—Providentia Dei summe sapientis, ordinatissima debet esse, ita ut res provisas, pro cujusque natura et dignitate, attingat; *atqui* creaturæ rationales, 1°. quia liberæ sunt, 2°. quia felicitatis et miseriæ capaces sunt, 3°. quia totius creationis materialis finis sunt, præ aliis creaturis naturam et dignitatem sortiuntur; *ergo* ob has rationes Deus specialem curam eis impendit.

Prob. minoris p. 1ª (*quia liberæ sunt*). Creaturæ rationales hoc ipso, quod sunt liberæ, secus ac aliæ, non necessario in finem suum feruntur, sed illum attingunt per actus intellectus et voluntatis; *ergo* ad Dei sapientiam et bonitatem spectat talem eis impendere providentiam, qualis requiritur, ut per dictamen rationis sine libertatis læsione finem consequi valeant.

— P. 2ª. (*quia felicitatis etc.*). Deus sincere vult (quod hic assumimus), ut creaturæ rationales felicitatem

consequantur ; cujus tamen assecutionem non absolute, sed conditionate vult, *i.e.*, si leges impositas illæ servaverint. Quare, Deus, tamquam certum argumentum suæ sinceræ voluntatis, eis confert opportuna media ad felicitatem consequendam ; quæ collatio est specialis ab eo exhibita providentia.

—P. 3ª (*quia totius creationis materialis finis sunt*). Imprimis creaturæ rationales in hoc ordinantur, ut possint finem totius creationis, quæ est Dei gloria (*Cosm.*, n. 48), in actum formalem reducere ; *atqui* illæ creaturæ, per quas Deus vult suam gloriam formalem procurare, et ad quas ceteræ creaturæ tamquam media ad hanc gloriam comparandam ordinantur, specialem Dei providentiam requirunt. Deinde, creaturis rationalibus, secus ac irrationalibus, Deus providet propter seipsas. Unde, in individuis rationalibus ipsi defectus et mala non ordinantur in bonum alterius (sicut, *v.g.*, mors agni ordinatur in bonum hominis), sed in bonum vel malum proprium, puta per præmium, si peccator resipiscat, vel in pœnam et punitionem, si nolit pœnitentiam agere ; quæ ratio præmii et pœnæ locum non habet in creaturis irrationalibus, sicut nec ratio culpæ.

224. Specialissimam autem providentiam exercet Deus circa homines probos, juxta *S. Th.* (1, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4) : " Hominum justorum (inquit) quodam excellentiori modo Deus habet providentiam, quam impiorum, in quantum non permittit contra eos evenire aliquid, quod finaliter impediat salutem eorum ; nam ' diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum ' " (*Rom.*, c. 8, v. 28). " Quare, in hoc reponit S. Thomas discrimen divinæ providentiæ respectu bonorum et malorum, ut illos quidem, quia recte ordinant actiones suas providendo illas secundum placitum divinæ voluntatis, Deus ita regat, ut nihil eis noceat, sed omnia, etiam adversa in bonum eorum cedant ; malos autem e converso, quia ordinant actiones suas more brutorum ani-

malium, Deus quoque gubernet quodammodo sicut bruta animantia, ut, scil., dum *ab uno ordine providentiæ exeunt nolentes facere voluntatem Dei, in alium ordinem dilabantur, in quo de eis divina voluntas fiat per ostensionem justitiæ in affligendis pro meritis pœnis*" (**Urráburu,** *Theod.*, v. 2, p. 1077).

225. Cor.—Ergo Dei providentia est *a*) *universalis*, seu, tam late patet, quam ipsa Dei causalitas. Unde, quando S. Paulus rogat "*numquid de bobus cura est Deo?*" (1 Corinth., c. 9, v. 9), non curam simpliciter, sed curam specialem a bobus removet (cf. *S. Th.*, ib., ad. 5); *b*) *suavis*, quia Deus res gubernat, prout postulat uniuscujusque naturalis inclinatio; *c*) *certa*, quia omnia contingunt, quæ Deus intendendo vel permittendo futura esse præstituit; *d*) *immediata*, quia, quod attinet ad *ordinem* divinæ providentiæ, "inconveniens videtur quod (Deus) singularia cognoscens, eorum ordinem non velit, in quo bonum præcipuum rerum constat, quum voluntas sua sit totius bonitatis principium. Oportet igitur quod, sicut immediate singularia cognoscit, ita immediate eorum ordinem statuat" (**S. Th.,** *C. Gent.*, l. 3, c. 76).

226. Schol. Mala, quæ in mundo abundant, Dei providentiæ non adversantur, quum talia mala, sive physica sive moralia, ex naturali creaturarum conditione proveniant.[1] Immo, mala physica divinam mundi provi-

[1] At the bottom of all trial of faith this mystery of evil lies; and it remains a mystery to every man till the hour of his death. Some souls are oppressed with it more than others. The best alleviation doubtless is to oppose mystery to mystery, and over against the *mystery of iniquity* (1. Thess. ii. 7) and pain to oppose the Mystery of the Cross (Eph. iii. 9), of God Himself in human nature suffering agony and crucifixion. What I have to contribute to the solution of the mystery is a philosophical suggestion, that may be found provisionally tenable. I suggest that a world all clear of evil is an intrinsic impossibility in the nature of things; and that the reason why God never made such a world is that it is not makable, just as a world where the truths of number should not hold good is unmakable. When we cry to be rid of all evil from the outset, without any effort and struggle, we are as children

dentiam maxime illustrant. Enimvero, quum bonum totius præstet bonum partis, ad sapientem gubernatorem pertinet negligere aliquem defectum bonitatis in parte, ut fiat augmentum bonitatis in toto. " Deus et natura et quodcumque agens facit, quod melius est in toto, sed non quod melius est in unaquaque parte nisi per ordinem ad totum. Ipsum autem totum, quod est universitas creaturarum, melius et perfectius est, si in eo sint quædam, quæ a bono deficere possunt, quæ interdum deficiunt, Deo hoc non impediente. Tum quia

crying for the moon. The most that God and nature can do for us is to put us in the way of victory over evil ; and to hold forth to us the prospect of a time of triumph, when evil shall be relegated to a region of its own, where none shall suffer it but they who richly deserve it, and have in a manner contracted alliance with it.

I am led to conjecture the intrinsic necessity of evil " patrolling," as Plato says, " all mortal nature and this region of earth," not from any speculation on the nature and attributes of God, but from consideration of the abyss of nothingness out of which every creature is drawn. This kinship with nothingness clings to all creation. The creature cannot put off the traces of its origin, and it is twofold. Inasmuch as it comes of God, it has whatever of goodness and positive being there is in it. But inasmuch as it is drawn out of nothingness, there attaches to it from the first a certain defectibility, proneness to decay and failure—in fact, evil. The life work of rational creatures is to prepare their own emancipation from evil. If I am right, blank nothingness, τὸ μηδέν, should hold the place which Matter, τὸ ὁρατόν, held in the Platonic philosophy as the root of evil. Had you asked a Greek of Plato's school, or of the Gnostic or Manichean school in early Christianity, how evil came to be, he might have clutched a handful of sand and told you, " This is evil, all stuff of this visible sort ; and consequently all being which it goes to constitute is beset with evil : only pure thought is good." The Buddhist will tell you that thought is evil, and only some sort of ecstasy or trance, carrying perfect rest from thought, is good. We shall not quarrel with Matter, nor with Thought, for they are both of God. A self-existent Matter, such as Plato supposed, would have been, as the Manicheans saw, another and a rival God. There is nothing to rival God : there is no self-existent Evil to counteract His goodness. Only one term, which we can hardly make an object of thought or language, stands out over against God, and is no creature of His : that is sheer nothingness. If God creates a world, He must raise it from Zero, out of Nothingness. That seems to me to involve the impossibility of a world without evil. Take the speculation for what it is worth : think it out and refute it, or adopt and improve upon it, or forget all about it, or (which will be my fault) fail to understand it—(**Rickaby**, *Oxford and Camb. Conf.* [1900-1901], p. 139).

providentiæ non est naturam destruere, sed salvare ; ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut, quæ deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant. Tum quia, ut dicit Aug., *Deus est adeo potens, quod etiam bona potest facere de malis.* Unde, multa bona tollerentur, si Deus nullum malum permitteret. Non enim generaretur ignis, nisi corrumperetur aër ; neque conservaretur vita leonis, nisi occideretur asinus " (**S. Th.**, 1, q. 48, a. 2, ad 3). Deinde, mala physica nobis inserviunt ut media aptissima ad finem ultimum consequendum, sive ea in aliis sublevando sive in nobismetipsis patienter tolerando, quando Deus, ut pater benignus, eis utitur tamquam virga ad nos filios inobedientes corrigendos ac erudiendos.[1]

227. Quod attinet vero ad malum morale, dicendum est facultatem peccandi, licet non sit de essentia libertatis (*Psych.*, n. 343), conjungi tamen cum libertate creaturæ ob naturalem hujus limitationem et imperfectionem. Quare, aut Deus a creaturas rationales creando abstinere deberet,—quo in casu libertas divina esset perfectio manca,—aut perpetuo miraculo has creaturas ab abusu libertatis impedire deberet, quod sane ordo naturæ prohibet, bonitas Dei non exigit, quum cuique personæ præsto sint media saltem sufficientia ad peccata vitanda. *Neve dicas :* potuit Deus abstinere a creando homines ultimatim damnandos, vel saltem eos e vita eripere antequam graviter peccaverint. *Resp.* Hæc potuit quidem facere, et revera aliquando facit, sed plurimis ex causis non expedit, ut illud semper vel sæpe faciat.[2] 1°. Quia creaturæ, quæ peccando liber-

[1] What are called physical evils often subserve beneficient purposes. Pain serves to warn us off from fatal dangers, and is a needed stimulus to action. Its disciplinary effects are often conspicuous, such as the refining, toughening, and ripening of spiritual character and the enlargement of human sympathies. Certainly pain and death are not what a malevolent God would have made them to be—(**Hall**, *op. cit.*, p. 191).

[2] Ad rem plane egregie **Lacordaire** : " If you grant that God is free, all His attributes considered, to create a being who may abuse

tate abutuntur, sibiipsis solis, minime Deo (qui eas, ne peccent, præmiis et pœnis continuo deterret) crimini vertere debent, quod pereant. 2°. Reprobi multa Dei attributa commendant, *v.g.*, longam ejus patientiam et liberalitatem erga eos admodum ingratos, ejus eximiam

the blessing of life, why should you wonder that in fact He has exercised that liberty which belongs to Him and which you attribute to Him ? You still say, however this may be metaphysically, the heart naturally rejects such a conclusion. Where is the father who would place a son in the world if he foresaw that life would even by his fault be a fatal gift to him ? And is not God our father ? Ought He not feel more tenderness towards us than is felt by a mortal man ? Here the comparison wants force, because it is wanting in justice. God has not created isolated individuals, or even worlds ; He has created one unique world in which beings are linked together by relations of mutual dependence and service, and not one of these can be withdrawn without entailing the suffering of all the others. In the human race especially, each man contains a posterity in himself whose term is not assignable, and which makes in its generations one united assemblage in which no single member can lose his place without drawing after him the multitude of his descendants. To suppress a single man is to suppress a race ; to suppress a wicked man is to suppress a people of just men who may spring from him. For good and evil are entwined together in the changeable course of mankind ; a virtuous son succeeds to a bad father, and the ancestor but too often contemplates in his distant progeny crimes which to him were unknown. Now the glance of God perceiving at once all the successions of life, all the regenerations of good in evil and of evil in good, no destiny appeared solitary to Him. . . . In His sight Adam, a prevaricator, included the whole posterity of the saints. To refuse being to him because of his crime, even had that crime never obtained pardon, would have been to destroy in him all the merits of the human race. How could the Goodness of God have required such a sacrifice ? How could it have required that the wicked should have been preferred to the just, that life should be withdrawn from those who would make good use of it because of those who would have turned it into a curse instead of a blessing ?

I know God, I love Him, I hope in Him, I bless Him in life and death : why should the fault of one of my ancestors, eternally foreseen by divine goodness, have intercepted my birth, and not have permitted me for a single day to respire in the mystery of liberty from whence my beatitude might result ? Why should I have been condemned to nothingness because one of my forefathers would have abused his existence ? Where in this would have been justice, wisdom, or Goodness ?

God had not to choose between creating and not creating a wicked man, but between creating and not creating generations of good and evil together ; and as all presented this mixture to His prophetic glance, He had to choose between creating the universe or not creating "—(*God*, conf. 3, p. 87).

sanctitatem, quæ nullum peccatum inultum relinquere potest, ac justitiam, quæ,dum acerbissimas pœnas exigit, misericordia temperatur. " In damnatione reproborum (inquit **S. Th.**,) apparet misericordia, non quidem totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter allevians, dum punit citra condignum " (1, q. 21, a. 4, ad 1). 3°. Etiam " beatis accrescit gloria de perditione malorum ; tum quia gaudent de vindicta eorum, juxta illud (Psalm. 57) : *Lætabitur justus quum viderit vindictam ;* tum quia ipsi eorum supplicia evaserunt. Et propter hoc in gratiarum actiones et laudem et reverentiam exuberant Creatoris, secundum illud (II. Machab., 1) : *De magnis periculis a Deo liberati, magnifice gratias agimus ipsi.* Unde dicitur (Psalm. 95) : *Lætetur mons Sion, et exultent filiæ Judæ, propter judicia tua, Domine* " (**S. Th.**, *Opusc.* 45).

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Typis BROWNE ET NOLAN, *Dublinii*.

SUMMULA

PHILOSOPHIAE SCHOLASTICAE

IN USUM

ADOLESCENTIUM

a

J. S. HICKEY, O.Cist.

Concinnata

VOLUMEN III.

(PARS ALTERA)

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ETHICA

SEU

PHILOSOPHIA MORALIS.

PROŒMIUM.

1. Definitio.—Philosophia moralis seu Ethica secundum etymologiam vocis, est scientia de moribus.[1] Mores autem significant uniformes agendi modos, quos ens rationale in agendo servat. Quare, ipsa re spectata, **Ethica** definitur : *scientia directiva actuum voluntatis secundum ultima principia rationis naturalis.*

Dicitur 1°. *scientia*, quia ex principiis certis et evidentibus conclusiones demonstratas et arcto nexu inter se colligatas logice deducit. Unde etiam veram certamque sui objecti cognitionem praebet per suam causam (cf. *Log.*, n. 2).

Dicitur 2°. *directiva actuum voluntatis*, quia Ethica est scientia practica, quæ non ad solam cognitionem, sed ad ipsam praxim ordinatur ; non enim eo tantum ordinatur, ut cognoscamus quænam actiones sint bonæ, quænam sint malæ, sed eo etiam, ut, ductu hujus cognitionis, ponamus actiones bonas malasque

[1] ' Moral Philosophy ' and Ethics are commonly used as synonymous. Etymologically, the Greek designation, Ethics (Ἠθικά, from ἦθος and ἔθος, custom, habit), refers to a more limited department of inquiry. It applies to conduct, taken in its more outward and historical aspects. The same limitation, however, exists in the Latin designation, Moral, since *mores* concerns primarily manners or customs. Aristotle, distinguishing ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή from ἡ διανοητικη ἀρετή, says, ' ethical virtue has its use from habit, whence also it has its name but slightly modified from ἔθος.' According to the best usage, however, the names Moral Philosophy and Ethics are equivalent—(**Calderwood,** *Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 1).

vitemus, et sic, vita recte ordinata, finem ultimum tandem consequamur.[1]

Dicitur 3°. *secundum ultima principia*, quia hæc scientia, utpote pars Philosophiæ, non versatur circa rationes quascumque, sed circa rationes simpliciter *ultimas* ordinis moralis.

Dicitur 4°. *rationis naturalis*, quia Ethica est scientia naturalis; media enim, quæ adhibet ad veritates morales comparandas, sunt notiones lumini naturali immediate obviæ, ex quarum analysi et comparatione prima principia moralia emergunt; quibus principiis deinde ad liberas voluntatis actiones applicatis, practicas conclusiones de harum actionum moralitate mens efformat.

2. Hic observare oportet, in ordine practico, sicut in ordine speculativo, existere quasdam veritates primitivas per se evidentes, vel nonnisi facillimo discursu indigentes, ut cognoscantur, et ex quibus aliæ veritates cognitu difficiles deducuntur. Jamvero, quemadmodum homines, etiam ii, qui intellectum minus evolutum habent, facillime cognoscunt prima principia ordinis speculativi, ita iidem facillime cognoscunt prima principia ordinis practici et moralis, *v.g.*, malum est vitandum, parentes sunt amandi, nemini est nocendum. Et quemadmodum in casu priori non est necesse admittere aliam præter intellectum facultatem, ita in

[1] The scope of Ethics is the formulation and establishment of the laws of human conduct—those laws following which conduct tends to man's ultimate end and is good, violating which conduct is bad. Ethics is thus a normative science—it prescribes norms or rules of action. . . .

Now, many modern ethicians take quite another view—a very erroneous view—of the scope and subject-matter of Ethics. They maintain that the proper subject-matter is not the *laws* of morals, the laws to which conduct *ought* to conform, but what they call the *facts* of Ethics—by which they mean the moral customs and beliefs of various peoples in different ages and under different conditions, the scope of Ethics being, according to these ethicians, to describe and correlate these facts (without reference to their being right or wrong) —to give their origin and the laws of their development—(**Cronin**, *The Science of Ethics*, v. 1, p. 5).

altero casu non est opus alia facultate speciali et ab intellectu distincta, ut docet schola scotica.[1]

3. Consectaria.—1°. Ethica est vera scientia ; habet enim certa principia, ex quibus veritates, quæ ad ordinem moralem spectant, quæque ad invicem colligantur, processu logico derivantur, id quod conceptus scientiæ importat.

[1] There is a hot controversy as to how primary moral judgments arise in the mind. The coals of dispute are kindled by the assumption that these moral judgments must needs have a totally other origin and birth in the mind than speculative first principles, as, that the whole is greater than the part, that two and two are four, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. The assumption is specious, but unfounded. It looks plausible because of this difference, that moral judgments have emotions to wait upon them, speculative judgments have not. . . Commonly a man cannot contemplate his duty, a difficult or unfulfilled duty especially, without a certain emotion, very otherwise than as he views the axioms of mathematics. There is a great difference emotionally, but intellectually the two sets of principles, speculative and moral, are held alike as necessary truths, truths that not only are but must be, and cannot be otherwise : truths in which the *predicate* of the proposition that states them is contained under the *subject*. Such are called *self-evident propositions*, and the truths that they express, *necessary truths*. . . . Thus the propositions that *right is to be done, benefactors to be requited*, are self-evident, necessary truths, to any child who has learned by experience the meaning of *right*, of *kindness*, and of a *return of kindness*. ' Yes, but,'—some one will say—' how ever does he get to know what *right* and *wrong* are ? Surely sensory experience cannot teach him that.' We answer, man's thoughts begin in sense, and are perfected by reflection. Let us take the idea of *wrong*, the key to all other elementary moral ideas. The steps by which a child comes to the fulness of the idea of *wrong* may be these. First the thing is *forbidden ;* then one gets *punished* for it. Punishment and prohibition enter in by eye and ear and other senses besides. Then the thing is *offensive* to those we love and revere. Then it is *bad for us*. Then it is *shameful, shabby, unfair, unkind, selfish, hateful to God*. All these points of the idea of wrong are grasped by the intellect, beginning with the sensory presentations of what is seen and felt and heard said. Again with the idea of *ought*. This idea is sometimes said to defy analysis. But we have gone about to analyse it into two elements, *nature requiring, nature's King commanding*. The idea of *wrong* we analysed into a breach of this natural requirement, and this Divine command or law. Primary moral ideas, then, yield to intellectual analysis. They are of this style : *to be done as I wish to be rational and please God ; not to be done, unless I wish to spoil myself and disobey my Maker*. But primary moral ideas, compared together, make primary moral judgments. Primary moral judgments, therefore, arise in the intellect, by the same process as other beliefs arise there in matters of necessary truth—(**Rickaby**, *Moral Phil.*, pp. 137-9).

2°. Ethica, sicut Logica, est scientia practica, talis scilicet, quæ non ad solam cognitionem, sed ad agendum ordinem dicit. Nam sicut Logica dirigit operationes intellectus, ita Ethica dirigit operationes voluntatis ; quam ob causam nonnumquam vocatur *scientia recte volendi ;* et quum voluntas ceteris facultatibus ita imperet, ut perinde sit recte ordinare voluntatem ac recte ordinare totam hominis vitam, jure merito dici potest *scientia honeste vivendi.*[1]

3°. Certitudo, quam scientia Ethicæ gignit, est, *a*) quoad principia ejus et conclusiones, quæ ex his principiis proxime et facili ratiocinio proveniunt, *absoluta* seu *metaphysica ; b*) quoad conclusiones remotiores, est tantum *moralis,* non solum propter distantiam conclusionum a principiis, sed speciatim propter naturam ejus objecti (*scil.*, actus humani), cujus rectitudo moralis a circumstantiis multum dependet. " Quia enim ratio speculativa (inquit *S. Th.*) præcipue negotiatur circa necessaria, quæ impossibile est aliter se habere, absque aliquo defectu invenitur veritas in conclusionibus propriis sicut in principiis communibus. Sed ratio practica negotiatur circa contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes humanæ ; et ideo, si in communibus sit aliqua necessitas, quanto magis ad propria descenditur, tanto magis invenitur defectus " (1, 2, q. 94, a. 4).

[1] Practical philosophy concerns itself with what *ought to be,* or with the order of acts which are human, and which, therefore, depend on our reason. It is divided into logic and ethics. The former rightly orders the intellectual activities and teaches the proper method in the acquirement of truth, while the latter directs the activities of the will. . . . Hence Ethics may be defined as the science of the moral rectitude of human acts in accordance with the first principles of natural reason. Logic and Ethics are normative and practical sciences, because they prescribe norms or rules for human activities and show how, according to these norms, a man ought to direct his actions. Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive ; for it orders the activities of the will, and the latter it is which sets all the other faculties of man in motion. Hence to order the will is the same as to order the whole man. Moreover, Ethics not only directs a man to act if he wishes to be morally good, but sets before him the absolute obligation he is under of doing good and avoiding evil—(**Cathrein,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 5, p. 556).

Unde, certitudo, quam Ethica gignit possibilitatem contradictorii non excludit *simpliciter*, sed tantum secundum communem ordinem agendi inter homines.

4°. Inepte Rationalistæ et Positivistæ conantur Ethicam a Metaphysica separare, ac scientiam moralem exstruere nulla ratione habita scientiæ Dei et hominis. Nam quum moralitas necessario importet relationem convenientiæ aut repugnantiæ actuum nostrorum cum natura humana et divina, sequitur scientiam moralem necessario supponere scientiam Dei et hominis, *i.e.*, Theodicææ et Psychologiæ, quæ sunt præcipuæ simul et altiores Metaphysicæ partes.[1]

5°. Non minus inepte Positivistæ confundunt Ethicam cum scientia physica. Enimvero, Ethica est scientia *practica*, quæ versatur circa id, quod fieri *debet ;* quælibet vero scientia physica eatenus est *speculativa*, quatenus versatur circa id, quod naturaliter fit. Porro, Ethica pro objecto habet actiones liberas, quæ vel positis omnibus adjunctis requisitis, possunt non fieri, ac sæpe fiunt modo diverso ab eo, quo fieri debent ; physica autem scientia pro objecto habet phænomena necessaria, quæ, positis conditionibus, non possunt non fieri, nec fieri modo diverso ab eo, quo fiunt. Jamvero, quæ fieri *debent*, quæque, si fiunt, libere fiunt ac persæpe fiunt modo diverso ab eo, quo fieri debent, sunt e

[1] Sound Ethics must be based on sound Metaphysics. Sound Ethics, therefore, must start by recognizing especially—(1) The existence of one God, omnipotent, creator, infinitely wise and just ; (2) The finite nature of man, composed of animal body and rational soul, which form one person ; (3) The veracity of the faculties ; (4) The immortality of the human soul ; (5) The liberty of the human will. . . . Because (1) To deny the existence of God would be to deny the binding force of all law upon the will of man. (2) To deny man's finite composite nature would be to deny him to be what he is, and hence to deny the purpose of Ethics. (3) To deny the truthfulness of the faculties would be to doubt everything, and thus render all reasoning useless. (4) To deny the immortality of the soul would be to take away the final safeguard for the observance of the rule of right and wrong. (5) To deny human liberty would be to deny all responsibility on the part of man ; and hence to deny the very distinction between right and wrong in the human act—(**Poland**, S.J., *Fundamental Ethics*, p. 11).

regione diversa ab iis, quæ naturaliter et necessario fiunt, nec unquam fieri possunt alio modo quam actu fiunt.[1]

4. Ethicæ Objectum.—Objectum *materiale* hujus scientiæ sunt *actus humani* seu *liberi*. Quare, actus sensuum, immo actus intellectus et voluntatis, quatenus hi sunt necessarii vel indeliberati non pertinent, saltem directe, ad Ethicam. Ad ejus vero materiam pertinent, quatenus influunt in causam vel effectum actus humani.

Objectum *formale* est *rectitudo actuum humanorum i.e.*, eorum ordinatio in *ultimum hominis finem* rationi pervium.

[1] I very confidently affirm that the progress of the physical sciences has not in the least changed the conditions of human existence. And Mr. Huxley must pardon me if I say that when he tells us "Natural Knowledge, in desiring to ascertain the laws of comfort, has been driven to discover those of conduct," he does but darken counsel by words without knowledge. It would be as reasonable to assert that ethical knowledge affords an explanation of the common pump. Ethics are concerned with the actions of man; physics with the properties of matter.

There is this essential difference between the natural and the moral order, that physical science deals with facts, and the generalisations obtained from them by means of the principle—assumed but never proved—of the uniformity of nature; while ethical science starts from self-evident intuitions and categorical assertions. . . . In its own sphere morality is autonomous. It is absolutely independent both of religious systems and of the physical sciences. It is a branch of what Leibnitz called *perennis quædam philosophia*—a universal metaphysic which endures though "creeds pass, rites change, no altar standeth sure"; though steam and electricity and dynamite revolutionise the external conditions of human life. That philosophy—whether we term it natural, or intuitive, or traditional—embodies a number of first principles which are part of our intellectual heritage, and of which we may say, in the words of the tragic poet: "They are from everlasting, and no man knoweth their birthplace." Among these are the ideas and principles which are creative of ethics. The savage who does not in some way distinguish between right and wrong is not extant; and if he were, he would not be man, but something lower. There is, there can be, no new morality in the sense of new original principles. The conception of moral right was not absent from mankind before biology became a science, or until the Royal Society was founded; neither by any process of chemistry or mechanics can it be reduced to the attractions or repulsions of matter, or its presence detected by instruments, however fine. The rule of Ethics is the natural and permanent revelation of reason.—(**Lilly**, *Right and Wrong*, p. 98).

5. Quo melius hoc objectum formale intelligatur, juvat notare, quomodo hæc scientia ab aliis ipsi affinibus discriminetur. Aliter enim ac in Ethica, actus humani considerantur in Psychologia, in Theologia morali, reliquisque scientiis ad mores spectantibus.

1°. Psychologia actus humanos speculative considerat ut eorum *esse physicum* cognoscat, abstractione facta ab honestate vel inhonestate, quam secum ferunt; eos autem, præcise ut *esse morale* habent, Ethica scrutatur.[1]

2°. Theologia moralis et Ethica considerant actus humanos comparatos ad ultimum finem; finis autem ultimus ab utraque scientia consideratus non est idem. "Sola enim Theologia moralis *supernaturalem* finem considerat, qui re ipsa unicus finis ultimus homini præstitutus est; Ethica solum *naturalem* finem potest considerare, quem verus hominis finis includit, at etiam excedit. Unde necesse est relationem ad finem ultimum, prout a Theologia morali aut ab Ethica consideratur, in humanis actibus diversam esse.

"Nihilominus in multis ambæ disciplinæ conveniunt. Objectum scil. moralitatis bifariam dividitur, in bonum moraliter et malum. Quamquam igitur non ex eo, quod aliquid naturaliter bonum est, etiam supernaturalem bonitatem habet; tamen quod malum est ex discrepantia cum naturali fine et ex rationalis naturæ principiis, id etiam secundum fidei principia et ex discrepantia cum fine supernaturali malum dici prorsus necesse est. Similiter, quæ bona sunt naturaliter, etiam secundum fidei principia bona sunt, utut sufficientem bonitatem ad ultimum finem comparandum non habent" (**Lehmkuhl,** *Theol. Mor.* Proleg.).

[1] In Psychology reason merely plays the part of *knower*. It tells us what *are* the objects of the faculties, what *are* the relations between the faculties and the soul, etc. In other words, whereas Psychology treats of *what is*, Ethics treats of an "order" in our acts which perhaps *is not*, but which, if conduct is to be rational, *ought* to be, and which can only be set up in the will by Reason itself.—(**Cronin**, p. 10).

3°. Ceteræ scientiæ naturales, quæ ad ordinem moralem spectant, ultima moralitatis principia non investigant, sed ea ab Ethica mutuantur, cui proinde subordinatæ existunt ; nec porro omnes actus humanos considerant, sed has vel illas species, quas sane non dirigunt ad supremum et universalem finem, sed ad aliquos intermedios et particulares, *v.g.*, ad legitimam interpretationem et applicationem legum civilium (*Jurisprudentia*), ad justam civium gubernationem (*Politica*),[1] ad justam divitiarum acquisitionem et distributionem (*Œconomia politica*).[2] Porro, hujusmodi scien-

[1] A man is always a member of some kind of community. As Aristotle said, he is a Political animal. Hence the science of Ethics is very closely related to that of Politics. We cannot well consider the virtues of the individual without considering also the society to which he is related, and the way in which it may help or hinder the development of his life. The ideal also which we lay down for the individual will necessarily suggest an ideal arrangement of society which will be best fitted to enable the individual to realize the highest aims. For this reason, Aristotle even went so far as to say that Ethics is essentially a part of Politics. If we accept this statement, however, we must employ the term Politics in a very wide sense. In this wide sense it is, perhaps, better to use the term Social Philosophy. But even in the narrower sense of the term, it is evident that the relation of Ethics to Politics must be a very intimate one—(**MacKenzie,** *Manual of Ethics*, p. 32).

[2] Among the departments of Political Philosophy to which Ethics is closely related there is one to which great importance has been attached in recent times—the science of Political Economy. Economics, like Ethics, is concerned with *goods*, *i.e.*, with things having value with reference to certain human ends. But while the goods with which Ethics deals are those of acts which are the conditions of the attainment of the highest end of life, economic goods are merely those objects which are the means of satisfying any human want. It follows that if we are really to understand the worth of economic goods, we must consider them in close relation to the ethical good. Food, for instance, clothing, house-room, and the like, are economic goods, and they serve a variety of purposes—the support of life, the development of life, the prolongation of life, the promotion of enjoyment, the attainment of independence, the furtherance of peace, decency, and security, and so on. And the worth of the good will depend on the importance of these ends. Now, the importance of these ends can be ascertained only by observing their relation to the supreme end of our lives. Hence a certain knowledge of Ethics is presupposed in the intelligent study of Economics. This truth has frequently been overlooked. The study of Economics has too often been conducted in such a way as to suggest that wealth is an end in itself ; and this has the practical effect of retarding social reforms, and encouraging those who are already too much prepared to pursue riches at any price. For this

tiæ efficiunt hominem bonum *secundum quid* et *cum addito* (ut bonum œconomicum), Ethica autem eum bonum *simpliciter* et *sine addito*, scil., bonum hominem, efficit ;[1] " non enim in hac scientia scrutamur, quid sit virtus, ad hoc solum, ut sciamus hujus rei veritatem ; sed ad hoc, quod acquirentes virtutem, boni efficiamur " (**S. Th.,** *in I. Ethic.* lect. 1ª).

6. Habitudo inter Ethicam et Revelationem.—Philosophus, licet in investigandis et statuendis regulis morum non utatur nisi principiis, quæ lumine rationis innotescunt, tamen, ne a veritatis tramite aberret, præ oculis habere debet tamquam " stellam rectricem " veritates supernaturaliter revelatas. Quamvis enim ratio humana potest sua nativa virtute plures veritates morales certo cognoscere, nihilominus, tanta est ejus ingenita infirmitas, tot sunt impedimenta, quæ ex illecebris sensuum ejus investigationi obstant, ut nonnisi a divina revelatione adjutæ possibile sit ei totum complexum veritatum, etiam earum, quæ lumen naturale non excedunt, sine erroris admixtione attingere. Quod sane experientia sæculorum luculenter demonstrat. Notum enim est omnes populos divina revelatione destitutos in turpissimos errores morales prolapsos fuisse. Neminem latet quam absurda et impia systemata moralia, nostra præsertim ætate, prodierint ex castris Rationalistarum asserentium rationem solam

reason some of the leading writers on Political Economy have been severely criticised by Carlyle and Ruskin and other moralists, and it is now generally recognized that the two sciences of Ethics and Economics must be brought into closer relationship to one another, at least if Economics is to be treated as, in any degree, normative and practical—(*Idem. ib.*)

[1] We here limit the terms, good and bad, to the extent in which they are applicable to the *human being*, so that for the act in question the individual acting may be called a *good* or a *bad man*. One may be a good man and not a good mechanic ; and one may be a very good mechanic, etc., and yet be a very bad man. Moral good and evil characterize the acts of the *man* as *man*, that is the free acts of the free rational being. What might be good for the man, considered merely in his animal nature, might be bad for the entire personality, *man* taken as a unit—(**Poland,** *op. cit.*, p. 41).

sibi sufficere ad veritates morales ad recte vivendum necessarias comparandas. Quare, cultores Philosophiæ moralis ita se gerere debent, ut, dum notiones boni et mali moralis atque præcepta honestatis et justitiæ naturalis ex ipso naturæ lumine derivant, dogmata religionis christianæ nunquam oblivioni amandent.

7. Ethicæ utilitas.—Influxu suo in bonum et perfectionem generis humani præcellit Ethica ceteras partes Philosophiæ et scientias naturales quascumque. Perficit enim voluntatem humanam, eam in vita honesta instituenda dirigendo, et proinde in sui ultimi finis adeptione adjuvando. Moderatur omnes relationes (juridicas, sociales, politicas), quæ inter homines vigent; quum vero hæ relationes, hisce præsertim temporibus non parum obscurentur opinionibus perversis, quæ late disperguntur, nemo non videt quam utile immo necessarium sit, ut, qui suo vel alieno bono morali prospiciat, principia sanæ Ethicæ clare dignoscat. Unde, fieri non potest, quin scientia ethica rite exculta in animis hominum uberrimos honestatis fructus producat, sicut, e converso, errores in hac disciplina practica magnas societatis perturbationes magnaque individuorum mala moralia generare solent.[1]

[1] It is not necessary to prove in many words that Christian Ethics is, by its nature, bound to exercise a wholesome influence on man and on society. History evinces it as an undeniable fact. Not as if there had been a time in which the expounded ethical doctrine had, apart from supernatural revelation, served as a guide of conduct. Unaided reason has never devised a moral theory free from grave pernicious errors. Only the Christian religion has taught pure, untarnished morality, and has given sufficient strength to practise it. Still all the ethical tenets which sound reason deduces from self-evident principles underlie Christian morals as a basis. The Christian religion presupposes God as the natural end of man, but elevates the union finally to be effected between the Creator and the creature to one of a higher order. It presupposes the natural law of morality insomuch that it can demand general acceptance only on this ground; it presupposes eternal retribution, though it enhances the same in proportion to the higher end of the redeemed; it presupposes and takes up into its system the moral precepts contained in rational Ethics, omitting or contradicting none, but developing them to greater perfection. From all this it is to be inferred that the influence exercised by Christian morals evidences also the influence proper

8. Fontes Ethicæ.—Hi fontes sunt *principia rationis* et *experientia* tum propria tum aliena. Illa requiruntur, ut moralitas actuum humanorum scientifice cognoscatur; hæc vero, quia ex factis experientia cognitis ad existentiam et naturam moralitatis attingimus. Unde, *methodus* Ethicæ nec est pure analytica, ut Positivistæ et Evolutionistæ volunt; nec ex toto synthetica, ut docent Rationalistæ, sed utraque simul, *i.e.*, analytico-synthetica (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 14-23).

9. Ethicæ Divisio.—Ethicam dividimus in *generalem*, quæ considerat naturam, proprietates, fines et regulas generales actuum humanorum, nulla ratione habita conditionis vitæ hominis individualis, vel relationum hominum ad invicem; et *specialem* quæ particulares hominum conditiones et ad invicem relationes considerat, atque juxta regulas in Ethica generali statutas discernit, quænam hanc vel illam conditionem vitæ deceant.

Quare, 1°. Ethica generalis ad trutinam revocat actus humanos, in ipsis considerando quasnam conditiones habere debeant, ut morales et honesti dicantur; Ethica specialis investigat diversam actuum humanorum materiam, quatenus homo multiplici jure fruitur, multiplici officio obstringitur.

2°. Ethica generalis inspicit et exponit honestatem et inhonestatem in actibus humanis inhærentem; Ethica specialis quod honestum est jubet, inhonestum vetat.

Obs. Sunt auctores, qui scientiam moralem in *Ethicam* et *Jus naturæ* dividunt. Quæ divisio quoad rem et horum auctorum mentes non differt ab illa, quam post veteres et complures recentiores supra dedimus. Minime igitur intelligenda est in pravo sensu Rationalistarum (ducibus Thomasio et Kantio), qui Ethicam a Jure naturæ non solum distinguunt, sed omnino separant, easque ut duas

to the ethical doctrine of sound philosophy, in the same way as the solidity of the structure is a proof of the solidity of the foundation, and as the effect produced by the total cause manifests the efficacy of the partial causes—(**Ming,** *The Data of Modern Ethics Explained*, p. 381).

scientias mutuo independentes et coordinatas proponunt. Ethica, juxta hos, regit actus internos dumtaxat ; ex conscientia solum pendet ; docet quid sit bonum in se ; obligationem imperfectam generat, et habet sanctionem in sola conscientia positam. Jus autem naturæ non regit nisi actus externos, pendet a potestate civili, docet quid sit *legale*, generat obligationem juridicam, sanctionem habet in lege civili. Atvero, hæc minime sustineri possunt. Nam tum Ethica tum Jus naturæ habent idem objectum materiale, scil., actus humanos tam internos quam externos, et idem objectum formale, hoc est, directionem horum actuum ad debtum finem, licet Ethica directe versetur circa ordinationem actuum internorum et indirecte circa actus externos ; et vicissim Jus naturæ, etsi actus externos directe dirigit, tamen eos dirigit quatenus humanos et morales ; non enim entia pure corporea regit, sed homines anima et corpore constitutos (cf. *Meyer*, Inst. Juris Nat., p. xlvi.).

ETHICÆ PARS PRIMA.

Ethica Generalis.

In hac parte exordium ducimus a consideratione actuum humanorum tum in se tum in ordine ad finem ultimum spectatorum, deinde de moralitate actuum humanorum et de mediis, quibus actus moraliter boni foventur aut impediuntur, seu de virtutibus et vitiis ; denique de lege et conscientia, quæ sunt normæ actuum moralium directivæ.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De Actibus humanis.

ART. I.

DE ACTIBUS HUMANIS IN SE SPECTATIS.

§ 1. De Notione Actus Humani.

10. Non omnes actiones, quæ ab homine procedunt *humanæ* dicendæ sunt, sed illæ tantum, quæ sunt propriæ hominis, in quantum homo est. Jamvero, triplici modo actus, qui ab homine procedunt, dici possunt

humani, nimirum, *a*) quoad *substantiam*, quia in suo ipsorum esse a facultatibus homini propriis procedunt, quales sunt *omnes* actus intellectus et voluntatis ; *b*) quoad *modum* tantum, scil., actiones facultatum organicarum libere positæ (*v.g.*, ambulatio), quia non necessario, ut accidit in brutis, sed modo humano seu libere ponuntur ; *c*) quoad *substantiam* et *modum*, actus nimirum, qui non solum a facultatibus hominis propriis, sed etiam modo humano seu libere eliciuntur. Quum vero munus Ethicæ sit docere, quomodo actus nostros recte dirigamus in ultimum finem nostrum, illi soli actus, quos dirigere possumus (*i.e.*, actus liberos), apud Moralistas *actus humani* vocantur. Quare, actiones, quæ hominis propriæ sunt solummodo quoad substantiam (ut volitio beatitudinis), necnon eæ, quæ, licet a facultatibus hominis propriis procedant, tamen fiunt absque mentis advertentia vel contra intentionem et imperium voluntatis, et præsertim, eæ, quæ, ne quoad modum quidem, sunt hominis propriæ, non actus *humani*, sed actus *hominis* dicuntur.[1]

Apposite **S. Thomas**: "Actionum, quæ ab homine aguntur, illæ solæ proprie dicuntur *humanæ*, quæ sunt propriæ hominis, in quantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab

[1] When a man acts without a purpose can we call his act a human act ?

No. Because he does not bring into play those very faculties, intelligence and free will, which characterize him as a human being.

What, then, do you call such an act performed without a purpose, that is, performed without intelligence or free will ?

It is called simply an *act of the man*, but not a *human act*. This is the case whenever either knowledge or free will is wanting. Thus, when persons walk in their sleep, they do not perform human acts, because they do not *know* what they are doing. On the other hand, a person may stumble and fall. *He* really falls. He knows at the time that *he* is falling, but the *falling* is not the result of his free will ; it is against his will. The act is not a human act. Again, a person may drink poison, thinking it to be pure water. He knows that he is drinking, and he drinks of his own free will. In so far, therefore, as the mere drinking is concerned, there may be said to be a human act. But he neither knows that he is *drinking poison*, nor does he will to *drink poison*. Hence his *drinking poison* is not a human act. He knows and wills the *drinking*, but not the *drinking poison*—(**Poland**, p. 12).

irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illæ solæ actiones proprie *humanæ* vocantur, *quarum homo est dominus*. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem ; unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illæ ergo actiones proprie *humanæ* dicuntur, quæ ex voluntate *deliberata* procedunt. Si quæ autem aliæ actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem actiones *hominis*, sed non proprie *humanæ*, quum non sint hominis, in quantum est homo " (1, 2, q. 1, a. 1).

Unde, actus humanus est *actus, qui ponitur cum advertentia rationis et libertate voluntatis*, seu, *actus conscius et liber*, vel etiam, *actus, qui ex voluntate deliberata procedit.*[1]

11. Consectaria.—1°. "Actus *humanus*, actus *liber* et actus *moralis* non *re*, sed *ratione* distinguuntur. Actus dicitur *humanus*, quatenus est hominis proprius quoad modum ; *liber*, quatenus procedit a voluntate sine interna determinatione ad unum ; *moralis*, quatenus aptus natusque est ad mores efficiendos" (**Cathrein,** *Phil. Moralis*, p. 2).

2°. Actus humani spectari possunt, vel quatenus eliciuntur a voluntate, et in ipsa sistunt, et vocantur *actus eliciti*, vel quatenus ex imperio voluntatis ab animæ facultatibus sive internis sive externis proce-

[1] Actions, in order to be truly and perfectly human, must be done with *knowledge*, with *deliberation*. They must be the result of a free determination of the will ; they must be truly traceable to the agent, and, therefore, imputable to him. Such are the only actions that deserve praise or censure, reward or punishment. . . .

Human actions must be *conscious*, that is, they must be known to the agent. They must be accomplished for some end or purpose. In fact, the last condition involves all the others. A man who acts with the view to obtain a certain end acts with some degree of deliberation; he exercises his understanding, for without understanding no deliberation is possible. Hence we may briefly define a human act: " That which is freely accomplished by man with a view to an end." It follows from this definition that if a man moves about without any aim at all, if he be idiotic, insane, asleep, or in a trance, his act is not fully human ; in other words it is not such as the powers *distinctly human* would make it, were they brought into play—(**Holaind,** S.J., *Nat. Law and Legal Practice*, p. 77).

dunt, et dicuntur *imperati* (*Psych.*, n. 317, 2°). Jamvero, Ethica actus elicitos præcipue considerandos assumit ; quidquid enim moralitatis actibus imperatis competit, id totum ab actibus elicitis originem ducit (cf. *Cronin*, p. 32).

3°. Actus humanus est necessario *voluntarius*, quum a voluntate procedat. Attamen actus humanus et actus voluntarius non idem sonant ; actus enim voluntarius potest esse necessarius, quod sane actui humano repugnat. Porro, fieri potest et sæpissime fit, ut quo magis voluntarius sit actus, eo minus sit liber et proinde humanus. Quare, ut indolem actuum humanorum intimius cognoscamus, oportet ipsum "voluntarium " investigare, et ea, quæ voluntarium immutant vel tollunt exponere. Jam, actum intellectus requisitum ad voluntarium constituendum tollit vel immutat *ignorantia*, actum voluntatis pariter requisitum tollunt vel immutant *concupiscentia*, *metus* et *violentia*. De his igitur nunc agendum est.

§ 2. De Notione et Divisione Voluntarii.

12. Voluntarium definitur ; *quidquid a voluntate procedit cum debita cognitione finis.*

Dicitur 1°. *quidquid*, quia non solum *actiones* sed etiam *omissiones* possunt esse voluntariæ, immo ipsi effectus actionum et consequentiæ omissionum voluntaria vocantur.

Dicitur 2°. **a voluntate** *procedit*, quia ut aliquid dicatur voluntarium, necesse est illud *effective*, et non solum *objective*, voluntati tribuatur, seu, debet esse vere voluntarium, et non solum volitum. " Voluntarium " enim a " volito " in hoc differt, quod voluntarium est effectus voluntatis, " volitum " est *objectum* a voluntate appetitum.[1]

[1] When a movement of the will which proceeds from previous intellectual knowledge is absolute, the idea of the *voluntary* is complete, and the act which results is a voluntary act. That act is the

Dicitur 3°. *cum debita cognitione finis*, quia actio, quæ fit cum cognitione rei, quæ est finis, sed absque cognitione rationis finis (ut actio bruti animalis) dici quidem potest *spontanea*, haud vero *voluntaria*, quum actus voluntatis in finem tendentis præsupponat actum intellectus finem et proportionem mediorum ad finem cognoscentis.

13. Consectaria.—1°. Differunt inter se notiones *naturalis, spontanei, voluntarii, liberi*, quamquam in eo conveniunt quod sint a principio interno. *Naturale* (in hoc contextu) dicitur quod ab intra procedit, sed sine ulla cognitione, ut contingit in vegetantibus. *Spontaneum* præsupponit aliquam imperfectam cognitionem finis, ut fit in brutis. *Voluntarium* perfectam seu intellectualem cognitionem finis præsupponit. *Liberum* voluntario superaddit indifferentiam electionis. Unde, naturale latius est quam spontaneum, et spontaneum

legitimate offspring of the will, whose name (*voluntas*) it bears, as the will is not merely an appetite, but is the rational appetite. When the movement of the will is not absolute, but is, as it were, suspended, and dependent on some condition, there is then a *wish* rather than a *will*. It is then more—I would, than—I will. This wish, if it is to be called a will, must be qualified with some additional distinction. It must, in order to distinguish it from an absolute and efficacious will, be called an *inefficacious* will, or a will of mere *complacence*. An efficacious will proceeds to action, and takes the means towards the end which it desires, and which is represented to it as possible of attainment. If the end is not presented to the will as possible, the will does not adopt the necessary means, and therefore it is inefficacious. Inasmuch, however, as the will rests with pleasure on the end which it would have willed and sought after, if attainment of that end had appeared to be possible, or if that end could have been arrived at without use of the means in question as a necessary condition, this resting with pleasure on the unattempted end is called a will of *complacence*.

An object may be willed with a great desire of its existence, or through the will's resting with pleasure on its existence when it occurs, while at the same time the existence or attainment of that object does not proceed from the will as an effect proceeds from its cause. So far as the object is concerned, it may be said to be *willed*, but since the existence of the object has not proceeded from the will, it is not said to be *voluntary*. Concurrence of the will and the will's use of means are both of them necessary to the idea of the *voluntary* in connection with that which is willed—(**Humphrey,** S.J., *Conscience and Law*, p. 9).

quam voluntarium ; voluntarium autem compatitur necessitatem, liberum eam excludit.[1]

2°. Quum ad rationem voluntarii requiratur, ut a voluntate procedat cum debita cognitione finis, intelligitur *involuntarium* esse id, quod vel a voluntate non procedit, vel ab illa procedit sed absque debita finis cognitione. Hinc causatur sive a re aliqua mentem obnubilante circa actionis honestatem sive ab aliquo principio extrinseco vim inferente.[2] Quod fit aut omittitur vi externa, voluntate repugnante, est proprie et *positive* involuntarium ; *privative* involuntarium seu non-voluntarium dicitur, quod quis inadvertenter facit.

14. Voluntarii divisiones.—Præter voluntarium *elicitum* et *imperatum*, variæ aliæ afferri solent voluntarii divisiones. *V.g.* :—

[1] We can understand how an act might be entirely voluntary, that is, altogether according to inclination of the will, yet not so free that the will could choose to have it omitted, or to do the contrary. Thus by the very necessity of our nature we must have a sort of general tendency towards our highest good and hence towards perfect happiness, so much so that it is not in our power to really wish deliberately to be absolutely miserable. This general wish for happiness motives all our acts. It is not free ; we cannot choose misery as such. Yet though not free, it is voluntary ; for it is an act of the will, is approved of the will with knowledge of the case. It is to be specially noted, however, that with the exception of this one particular instance, every voluntary act in our present state of existence is also free. . . .

If we consider the other life with the highest good once attained and perfect happiness secured, the enjoyment of that happiness will certainly be voluntary, for it will be an act of the will with full approbation and full knowledge of the case. Yet it will not be free. And why ? Because then we shall not be able to choose otherwise. The happiness will be perfect with the knowledge that it is perfect : so that the intellect cannot present to the will anything as containing an element wanting to its highest good or to its perfect happiness—(**Poland,** p. 33).

[2] An act is involuntary when it is done either without knowledge of the case in question ; or, if with knowledge, still against the choice of the will. Thus one man may take another's umbrella, thinking it to be his own. He does not voluntarily take *another's* umbrella ; because not knowing it to be *another's*, his will is not directed to the taking of *another's* umbrella. Or, again, a man may wish to close his eyes and not to see. Somebody may keep his eyes open by force and oblige him to see. He sees ; he knows he is seeing : but it is against his will. The act of seeing isnot voluntary—(**Poland,** p. 31).

1°. *Voluntarium in se* et *voluntarium in causa*. Voluntarium in se dicitur omne, quod sive immediate sive mediate intenditur ab eo, qui actum ponit vel omittit (vol. directum). Unde, effectus, qui etiam remote consequuntur ex aliqua actione sunt ponenti actionem *voluntarii in se*, si ab illo revera intenduntur.

Voluntarium in causa est, quod non est in se volitum, sed in alio, ex quo prævidetur sequi, tamquam effectus e causa (vol. indirectum). Unde illud : qui vult antecedens, vult etiam consequens. Sic, *prævisi* effectus ebrietatis, etsi non intenti, sunt voluntarii homini, qui vino immoderate indulget.

Ad voluntarium in causa revocatur, quod volumus in alio tamquam partem ejus aut tamquam rem cum illo necessario connexam ; quo pacto, qui vult finem, dicitur velle media.

15. Obs.—Ut effectus (malus) vere dicatur *voluntarius in causa*, tria requiruntur :

1um. Ut agens prævideat (vel, saltem confuse, potuerit prævidere) talem effectum esse secuturum ; secus enim deesset debita cognitio ;

2um. Ut agens hunc effectum prævidens, possit illius causam non ponere ; secus enim effectus non esset voluntarius, utpote non a voluntate, sed aliunde procedens ;

3um. Ut agenti, ne hic effectus sequatur, obligatio incumbat causam non ponere ; secus enim non habebitur *voluntarium*, sed *permissum*, i.e., aliquid, quod agens cognoscit ut connexum cum sua actione, quod tamen nec vult nec impedire tenetur.[1]

[1] An effect which follows from an action or from an omission may be *voluntary*, not in itself, but in its cause. We are not now speaking of an effect which is *intended*. Such an effect is voluntary in itself. It is in reality an end. The effect to which we refer is an effect which is not an end, and which does not move to action. It is not a motive of the action of which it is an effect. Although such an effect is not sought in itself, and is outside the intention, it nevertheless follows from the action. It is also a bad effect, for here there is no question of a good effect, since there cannot be moral goodness in any act if the will which precedes and causes that act is not good. By reason of a bad effect, which I do not intend or desire, but which I know will follow from a certain action, I am bound to abstain from that action, and I am responsible for this bad effect if I do not abstain from the action which is the cause of it. In order to induce this responsibility, however, three conditions are required. One must, in the first place, have *knowledge of the evil effect*, since nothing is willed which is not foreknown. One must, secondly, be *free not to do* the action, and so

2°. *Actuale, virtuale, habituale.* Actuale est, quod hic et nunc elicitur vel imperatur a voluntate, *v.g.*, volo orare. *Virtuale*, quod habetur, quando actuale moraliter perseverat in agente et in ejus operationem influit, etsi de ipso volens hic et nunc non cogitat, *v.g.*, actuale velle orare per distractionem involuntariam interruptum. *Habituale*, quod olim fuit actualiter volitum, nec postea revocatum, nunc vero nullo modo in actum influit, *v.g.*, susceptio Extremæ Unctionis in moribundo sensibus subito destituto, qui prius elicuit hujus sacramenti desiderium. Addunt *interpretativum* seu id, quod voluntas nec vult nec voluit, sed vellet vel saltem præsumitur velle, si, attentis præsentibus adjunctis, de eo cogitasset. Quo modo voluntaria est susceptio Extremæ Unctionis in Catholico, qui subito sensibus privatur, quin umquam illius sacramenti desiderium elicuerit; item consensus superioris absentis rationabiliter præsumptus, Atvero si quis recte considerat, hoc non est proprie voluntarium, quum a voluntate nullo modo procedat, sed, ad summum, dicendum est non esse contra voluntatem (*v.g.*, infirmi, superioris).

16. Obs.—Quomodo voluntarium virtuale vim suam mutuetur ab actuali, explicari forte potest ad modum influxus causæ efficientis. Nam, sicut causa efficiens, quæ jam agere cessavit, potest adhuc causare virtute a se relicta, ita volitio actualis, postquam desinit, potest suam virtutem relinquere seu virtualiter permanere. Est enim in intentione virtuali quædam actionum concatenatio, quarum altera alteram pellit, et sic prima volitio per seriem actionum conservatur. Et licet hæc concatenatio sæpe interrumpatur (*v.g.*, per somnum), in memoria tamen aliquid illius intentionis retinetur, ita ut post interruptionem continuetur intentio virtualis, quin actualis iteretur (cf. *Frins*, De Act. Hum., v. 1, pp. 59-66).

place the cause which has the evil effect. One must, thirdly, be *bound not to do* the action, and bound, moreover, for this special reason—lest that evil effect should follow. Unless a man is bound not to act, he is free to exercise his right of action. Unless a man is bound to refrain from an action lest an evil effect of it should follow, he, in placing the cause by doing the action, does not will the evil effect. He only *permits* the evil effect. There is no affection in his will towards the evil effect, as towards an end. Where there is no such affection the result is not willed, but only permitted—(**Humphrey**, p. 12).

Ad rite intelligendum indolem et differentiam voluntarii virtualis et habitualis, notetur actum præteritum relinquere in memoria et voluntate quamdam dispositionem, quæ consistit in dictamine practico, *v.g.*, sacramentum Extremæ Unctionis accipere volo. Hæc dispositio virtualiter continet actum præteritum seu intentionem, nec tollitur nisi per actum contrarium. Jam, prout dispositio influit vel non influit in actionem subsequentem, habetur voluntarium virtuale vel habituale.

3°. *Expressum* et *tacitum*, prout verbis aliisve signis externis declaratur, aut ex verbis, factis (vel ex eorum omissione) colligitur, juxta illud : "*qui tacet, consentire videtur.*"[1]

4°. *Voluntarium simpliciter* et *secundum quid*. Prius est, quod agens definitive vult, etsi fortasse inclinationem habeat in oppositum illius, quod vult. Alterum est, quod agens non vult quidem, sed vellet sub aliis conditionibus. Sic, pecuniæ traditio est *simpliciter voluntaria*, ejus retentio *voluntaria secundum quid*, in eo, qui eam ex metu mortis latroni tradit.

5°. *Perfectum* et *imperfectum*, prout fit ex plena intellectus cognitione et plena voluntatis consensione, vel ex utriusvis imperfectione, ut contingit in repentinis eventibus, *v.g.*, in subita ira. In voluntario imperfecto " multiplex habetur gradatio, et sæpissime homo, sedata animi tempestate, seu, pleniorem ac tranquilliorem rei cognitionem adeptus pœnitentiæ sensum experitur seque imprudentem fuisse clamitat ; quod signum est identidem voluntarium fuisse imperfectum " (**Ballerini,** *Opus Mor.*, v. 1, p. 13).

1 The common saying, that silence seems to give consent, requires some interpretation. He who keeps silence with regard to matters which are in favour of himself, is held to give consent—because in cases of doubt that is rightly presumed to exist to which natural tendency or inclination leads. Again, one is held to have given consent by silence when he would have easily prevented his own loss by means of express dissent, or when he could in the same way have easily prevented an evil which he was bound to prevent, and he, nevertheless, kept silence. Silence, however, never gives consent when words or express signs of consent are demanded by law in order to the existence of legal consent. When there is adequate proof of dissent, it is clear that mere silence cannot then be held to have given consent—(**Humphrey,** p. 11).

§ 3. De Ignorantia.

17. THESIS I.—Ignorantia, si invincibilis est, tollit voluntarium ; si vincibilis est, voluntarium non tollit, sed illud ordinarie minuit.

Stat. Quæst.—Ignorantia est *carentia cognitionis in subjecto cognitionis capaci.* Ignorantia induit rationem *a*) *privationis* (ignorantiæ proprie dictæ) si alicui deest cognitio, quam habere debet ; et *b*) *negationis*, si deest cognitio, quam quis habere non tenetur.

Divisiones ignorantiæ desumuntur ex parte *objecti subjecti* et *actus.*

1°. **Ex parte objecti** seu rei ignoratæ dividitur in ignorantiam *juris* et *facti.* Prior habetur quando ipsa legis existentia ejusve ambitus ignoratur. *V.g.*, si quis ignorat contractum cum amente initum esse invalidum. Occurrit ignorantia *facti* quando ignoratur substantia vel aliqua circumstantia rei, quæ fit aut omittitur. *V.g.*, si quis ignorat eum, quocum contractum init, esse amentem, vel eum, quem percutit, esse suum patrem.

2°. **Ex parte subjecti** dividitur in *invincibilem* et *vincibilem. Invincibilis* est, quæ depelli non potest. Hæc impossibilitas provenit *a*) sive quia ne suspicio quidem de obligatione eam depellendi occurrit ; *b*) sive quia, suspicione excitata, et morali diligentia ad debitam scientiam acquirendam adhibita, veritas detegi nequit.[1]

[1] There are two ways in which a man may be *invincibly* ignorant. The first way is when the thought of enquiry into the truth of a matter does not occur to his mind, or when, even if the thought of enquiry does occur, it is not of such a kind as to make him think there and then that he is bound to inquire. This is most properly invincible ignorance. Another way in which a man may be invincibly ignorant, is when, suspecting his ignorance concerning something he is bound to know, he uses moral diligence—that is to say, such diligence as is fairly within his power, and such as the importance of the matter demands—and nevertheless he does not succeed is dispelling his ignorance. Moral diligence does not mean all possible diligence, but such diligence as is usually exercised by persons of prudence. Moral diligence is to be measured not only by the importance of the matter, but also by the qualities and opportunities of the person, since all have not the same capacity, and all have not the same means for learning within their reach—(**Humphrey,** p. 17).

Ignorantia *vincibilis* est ea, quæ, adhibita diligentia morali, depelli potest, et tamen ex negligentia culpabili non depellitur. Triplicis est gradus :—*a*) *simpliciter vincibilis*, si aliqua, haud vero sufficiens, diligentia adhibetur ; *b*) *crassa* seu *supina*, si nulla vel fere nulla diligentia adhibetur ; *c*) *affectata*, si ex industria, ne veritas molesta detegatur, aliquis declinat requisitam investigationem facere, ut accidit, *v g.*, quando minister falsæ religionis, ne pingue stipendium perdat, mentem suam a dubiis circa suam religionem occurrentibus avertit.

3°. **Ratione actus** dividitur in *antecedentem, concomitantem, subsequentem.* Ignorantia *a*) dicitur *antecedens*, quando præcedit omnem voluntatis consensum ; et quia tollit scientiam, quæ si adesset, actio non poneretur, dicitur *causa* actionis. Talis est ignorantia venatoris, qui putans se occidere feram occidit amicum. *b*) Dicitur *concomitans*, quando actionem ita comitatur, ut etiamsi haberetur cognitio, actio poneretur ; quam igitur nec causat nec impedit. *V.g.*, quum aliquis occidit inimicum, quem interficiendum quærit, putans se feram occidere. *c*) Dicitur *subsequens*, quando voluntatis consensum sequitur atque ab eo dependet, ut quum aliquis operatur contra legem, quam cognoscere noluit.

Ignorantia antecedens ab invincibili non differt, nec subsequens a vincibili.

18. Prob. Thesis. Pars 1ª (*ignorantia invincibilis tollit voluntarium*). **Arg.**—1°. Voluntarium supponit cognitionem ; *atqui* homo ignorantia invincibili laborans nullam habet cognitionem objecti, circa quod ejus versatur actio, quæ proinde a voluntate non procedit. 2°. Quod fit cum ignorantia invincibili, non est voluntarium *in se*, utpote incognitum ; non est voluntarium *in causa* quum ipsa ignorantia invincibilis sit causa actionis ; *ergo.*

Pars 2ª (. . *vincibilis non tollit* . .). **Arg.**—Quod ex ignorantia vincibili fit, est vere voluntarium in causa,

scil., in ignorantia, quæ, si sit affectata, est voluntaria *in se* ; et quæ, si sit non-affectata, est voluntaria in alio, *i.e.*, in omissione debitæ diligentiæ in cognitione adipiscenda ; qui enim vult aliquid ignorare, eo ipso vult ea, quæ, in confuso saltem, videt habere connexionem necessariam cum ista ignorantia ;[1] *ergo*.

Pars 3ª (. . . *minuit*). **Arg.**—Quod est voluntarium tantum in alio, est minus voluntarium quam id, quod est voluntarium in se ; illud enim voluntas minus prosequitur. *Atqui* quod fit ex ignorantia vincibili non est voluntarium in se, quum sit in se volenti incognitum ; *ergo*.

19. Schol.—Plures docent ignorantiam affectatam non minuere sed potius augere voluntarium. Hoc autem non per se sed tantum per accidens verum esse dici debet. Enim, vero, ad voluntarium requiritur cognitio ; *atqui* in eo, cujus ignorantia est affectata, haud secus ac in eo, cujus ignorantia est crassa, cognitio procul dubio deest. Porro, ignorantia affectata nonnumquam a pœnis ecclesiasticis excusat, quod factum ostendit eum, qui ex ignorantia affectata legem violat, minus voluntarie agere. " Pejus est (inquit *Lugo*) violare præceptum notum, quam nolle illud cognoscere, ut sine remorsu violetur ; plus enim reverentiæ et timoris ostenditur in secundo casu quam in primo " (*De Pœnit.*, disp. 16, n. 183 ; cf. *Frins*, De Actibus Hum., v. 3, p. 9).

§ 4. De Concupiscentia.

20. THESIS II.—Concupiscentia antecedens minuit voluntarium.

Stat. Quæst.—Concupiscentia hic intelligitur non fomes peccati seu deordinatio virium, quæ ex privatione justitiæ originalis subsequitur, sed *quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod bonum delectabile tendentis*. Duplex est : *a*) *antecedens* quæ prævenit ac-

[1] When one adverts to his ignorance, and does not take such measures to correct it as the gravity of the case demands, he thereby voluntarily accepts the consequences that follow from neglect of the care due to the gravity of the case—(**Poland**, p. 37).

tum voluntatis ipsumque causat, *v.g.*, subita ira ; et *b*) *consequens*, quæ ab ipsa voluntate excitatur, ut accidit quando aliquis super injurias sibi illatas reflectens desiderium vindictæ in se fovet

Concupiscentia consequens, qua talis, non influit in actum voluntarium, et proinde illum nec auget nec minuit ; est enim hujus actus effectus ; effectus autem non mutat causam. Dixi *qua talis*, quia fieri potest, ut concupiscentia, quæ est effectus respectu unius actus, sit causa respectu alterius. Quare, quæstio nostra est de concupiscentia antecedente, et quidem relate ad actum voluntatis, qui inde excitatur.

21. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Quum de natura voluntatis sit, ut judicio rationis dirigatur in sua operatione, ejus motus seu actus eo minus dicendus est voluntarius, quo minus intellectu dirigitur ; *atqui* experientia et ratione constat concupiscentiam antecedentem minuere influxum intellectus in actum voluntatis ; *ergo.*

Prob. min. 1°. Constat *experientia*. Qui concupiscentiam boni sensibilis (*v.g.*, cibi, vindictæ) experitur, minus facile considerat alia bona, quæ hujus adeptione excluduntur, et mala, quæ forte cum tali bono connectuntur, et proinde minus aptus est ad rationes pensandas, cur illud bonum velle aut non velle debeat. " Si (inquit **Suarez**) in tali objecto, nimirum, bono sensibili, quod concupiscentiam movet, aliquid est difficultatis aut incommodi, illud occultat seu facit ut non attente consideretur ; et ideo dicitur corrumpere æstimationem prudentiæ, et propterea illud tempus, in quo homo est affectus hujusmodi passione aliqua, non censetur aptum ad consilium neque ad judicium ferendum de rebus agendis " (In 1, 2, tr. 2, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 1).

2°. Constat *ratione*, quia, quum appetitus sensitivus et voluntas in eadem anima radicentur, quo intensior fit actus appetitus sensitivi circa aliquod objectum, eo minus scientiæ et voluntarietatis circa illud objectum habetur.

" Quando passio est fortis circa aliquod particulare, repellit contrarium motum scientiæ circa idem particulare, non solum distrahendo a consideratione scientiæ, sed etiam corrumpendo per viam contrarietatis ; et sic ille, qui in forti passione est constitutus, etsi considerat aliquo modo in universali, in particulari tamen impeditur ejus consideratio " (**S. Th.**, *Qu. Disp.*, De Malo, q. 2, a. 9).[1]

Confirmatur thesis sensu communi hominum. Omnes persuasum habent peccata ex concupiscentia antecedente commissa (subito impulsu passionis, ut aiunt), esse minus culpabilia, magisque digna venia ; *atqui* ita reputantur, quia minus voluntaria esse censentur. Apposite **S. Thomas** : " Quando ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non *ex impulsu passionis*, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens ; et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, *in quantum minuit voluntarium* " (1, 2, q. 77, a. 6).

22. Cor.—Ergo nec vera nec doctrinæ S. Thomæ conformis est sententia eorum qui dicunt concupiscentiam antecedentem augere voluntarium :—*non vera*, quia actus procedens a voluntate sub influxu concupiscentiæ antecedentis est minus proprius voluntatis et proinde minus voluntarius quam foret, si ab ea procederet absque tali influxu ;—*doctrinæ S. Thomæ non conformis ;* S. Doctor enim sic sibi objicit : " passio impellens vo-

[1] Passion clouds and sometimes fetters the judgment of the reason and consequently diminishes the voluntary element in its act. If the act is a sinful act, the sinfulness of it is thereby lessened.

Since all the powers of the human soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, when one power is intense in its own action, another power must be remiss, and may even be wholly hindered in its action. When, therefore, a movement of the animal appetite is intense, the movement of the rational appetite, or deliberate will, is correspondingly affected, and is lessened, if not wholly prevented. Passion concerns and concentrates itself upon, not the universal, but a particular object. Knowledge concerns the universal, and knowledge of the universal is not proximately the principle of any act. It is a principle of an act only as it is applied to that particular act. When a passion is intense it repels the contrary movement of knowledge with regard to the same act—(**Humphrey**, p. 22).

luntatem facit eam vehementius ferri in actum peccati; ergo passio aggravat peccatum," et respondet : " etsi *motus voluntatis sit intensior* ex passione incitatus, *non tamen ita est voluntatis proprius*, sicut si sola ratione moveretur ad peccandum " (*loc. cit.*, ad 3). Ergo actus ex concupiscentia antecedente positus, utpote minus voluntatis proprius, minus voluntarius dicendus est. Pro sententia nostra vide *Walsh*, De act. hum., 114; *Ballerini*, op. cit., v. 1, p. 59; *Schiffini*, Phil. Mor. v. 1, p. 85; *Noldin*, De act. hum., p. 49. Pro opposita cf. *Liberatore, Zigliara, Meyer*, v. 1, p. 98.

23. Schol. 1.—Diximus concupiscentiam consequentem voluntarium non afficere. Nam per eam voluntas trahitur in unam partem potius quam in aliam, unice quia id ex proposito voluit. Unde, quidquid boni vel mali oritur ratione concupiscentiæ consequentis voluntati adscribendum est.

Schol. 2.—Inter actum voluntatis et motum appetitus sensitivi triplex invenitur relatio, scil., *consensus* seu *pax*, *ariditas*, *lucta*. Habetur *pax*, si cum actu voluntatis conjungitur consentaneus motus passionis, *v.g.*, tristitia sensitiva cum tristitia rationali. Si hæc conformitas passionis cum voluntate abest, exurgit animæ *ariditas*. Tandem, ardet *lucta*, quando actibus voluntatis reluctatur motus appetitus sensitivi. Hæc lucta, ex ipsa constitutione naturæ humanæ sponte profluit, et proinde licet in præsenti ordine sit pœnalis, per se *naturalis* est. Naturale enim est, ut appetitus sensitivus tendat in objectum sensibile, quod ei ut delectabile a sensu proponitur, vel ab objecto inconvenienti refugiat. Qua ex causa naturaliter fieri nequit, quin in homine exurgant motus sensibiles dictamini rationis et motibus voluntatis repugnantes. Attamen per donum gratiæ, ut accidit in statu innocentiæ protoparentum, hæc lucta absens esse potest.[1]

[1] As the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, it might be supposed that such would be the terms of the soul with the body, that nothing could possibly be in the body contrary to the soul whereby the body lives; and in like manner, as reason in man is associated with sensitive appetite and other sensitive powers, it might be expected that reason would not be hampered by those sensitive powers, but rather would rule them. In accordance with these natural anticipations, we lay it down, according to the doctrine of faith, that the original constitution of man was such that, as long as

§ 5. De Metu.

24. THESIS III.—Quæ ex metu, quamtumvis gravi, fiunt, per se sunt simpliciter voluntaria, plerumque tamen manent involuntaria secundum quid.

Stat. Quæst.—Metus definitur : *Mentis trepidatio ex aliquo imminente malo exorta.* Dividitur :—

1°. Ratione *intensitatis* in *gravem* et *levem*, prout malum, quod imminet tamquam grave vel leve apprehenditur.

2°. Ratione *originis* in *intrinsecum* et *extrinsecum*. Prior est, qui procedit ex ipsa mentis vel corporis dispositione, ut, *v.g.*, si quis metum gehennæ in se ultro excitaret vel metum mortis conciperet considerando morbum ingruentem. Alter est, qui ab aliqua causa externa (sive naturali sive libera) gignitur, ut, *v.g.*, metus ex incendio, ex sicario. Quando a causa libera gignitur, *juste* vel *injuste incussus* dicitur, prout agens habuit vel non habuit jus metum inferendi. Advertendum est aliud esse *ex* metu, aliud *cum* metu agere. Qui *ex* metu agit, ponit actionem, quam, metu absente, non poneret. Qui vero *cum* metu agit, ita agit, ut idem ageret, immo libentius ageret, metu absente. Sic, latro *cum* metu pecuniam exigit, viator *ex* metu eam tradit.

In voluntate metu affecta duplex existit propensio : altera absoluta et efficax (propensio, *v.g.*, ad vitam

his reason was subject to God, his lower faculties served him without demur, and no bodily impediment could stand in the way of his body obeying him, God and His grace supplying whatever was wanting in nature to the achievement of this result. But when his reason turned away from God, his lower powers revolted from reason ; and his body became subject to passions contrary to the [rational] life that is by the soul. Thus, then, though it may be admitted that these defects are natural, if we look on human nature on its lower side ; nevertheless, if we consider divine providence and the dignity of the higher portion of human nature, we have a fairly probable ground for arguing that these defects are penal—(*Of God and His Creatures* (iv. c. 52), Trans. of the Summa C. Gent. by *Joseph Rickaby*).

servandam, pecuniam latroni tradendam) ; altera conditionata et inefficax (propensio ad pecuniam retinendam). Quare, actionem ex metu positam voluntas vere vult ratione prioris propensionis ; quam tamen actionem ratione posterioris propensionis quodammodo involuntarie ponit.[1]

25. In thesi diximus actionem ex metu positam *plerumque* esse involuntariam *secundum quid ;* quia metus quandoque tollit omnem affectionem erga actionem oppositam. Sic, qui ex metu divinæ justitiæ sincere dolet de suis peccatis, vi hujus metus omnem affectionem erga peccatum excludit. Scit enim (vel scire debet) pœnitens affectum etiam inefficacem erga peccatum, quum sit ipse peccatum, obstare pœnarum evitationi, quam vult pœnitendo ; pœna enim peccati necessario profluit ex ipso peccato. Aliter vero res se habet in aliis rebus ; nam desiderium, quod viator, *v.g.*, habet suam pecuniam servandi, non inducit nec auget periculum mortis, ut facile intelligitur.

26. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (. . . *simpliciter voluntarium*). **Arg.**—Illud est simpliciter voluntarium, quod, perspectis omnibus adjunctis, efficaciter volumus ; " unumquodque enim *simpliciter* esse dicitur, secundum quod est in actu " (**S. Th.,** 1, 2, q. 6, a. 6), etiamsi voluntas in aliis circumstantiis constituta id minime vellet. *Atqui* quod fit ex metu, efficaciter eligitur ut medium ad evitandum malum imminens ; *ergo* quod fit ex metu, revera procedit a voluntate patientis metum, seu, simpliciter voluntarium est.

PARS 2ª (. . . *involuntarium secundum quid*). **Arg.**—Ubi datur aliqua voluntatis repugnantia, ibi agnoscere oportet quamdam involuntarietatem ; *atqui* quæ sub

[1] Fear, like the other passions, may be so strong as totally to destroy one's liberty, and the act so done is not a human act. But, if fear be not so strong as to destroy freedom, the act done under its influence is free and human, in the degree in which Reason is allowed to play its part—(**Cronin,** p. 45).

metus influxu fiunt, nonnisi cum aliqua voluntatis repugnantia fiunt ; quod patet ex eo, quod metum patiens non ageret, si metus abesset ; *ergo* quæ ex metu fiunt, sunt involuntaria secundum quid.[1]

27. Cor.—Ergo quæ ex metu fiunt, minus libera sunt, et proinde, si prohibentur, minus peccaminosa, quam si eadem fierent, metu non urgente. Atvero, etsi minus libera et peccaminosa sint, manent tamen reipsa libera et peccaminosa. Nonnunquam tamen contingit, quod metus a peccato vel obligatione excusat, quatenus legislatores, præsertim humani, actiones ex metu vehementi positas omissasve e suis legibus excipere solent. Contractus ex metu initos leges humanæ irritant vel rescindibiles reddunt, non quidem quasi libertas ad actum humanum requisita deesset in pacto, sed quia bonum commune postulat, ut nemini fraus sua prodesset.

28. Schol.—Magnum existit discrimeninter actum ex metu et actum ex concupiscentia positum. Etenim " in eo, qui per metum aliquid agit, *manet repugnantia voluntatis* ad id, quod agitur, secundum quod in se consideratur. Sed in eo, qui agit aliquid per concupiscentiam, *non manet prior voluntas*, quæ repudiabat illud, quod concupiscitur, sed mutatur ad volendum illud, quod prius repudiabat. Et ideo, *quod per metum agitur, quodammodo est involuntarium, sed quod per concupiscentiam agitur nullo modo* " (**S. Th.,** *loc. cit.*, a. 7, ad 2).

[1] In what sense or when can fear be said to affect the voluntariness of an act ?

In this sense : that were it not for the fear, the act would not be willed. The act is not at all desired *in itself*, but only as a means to escape from an evil that is feared. Thus, a merchant in a storm at sea throws his cargo overboard. He knows fully what he is doing, and chooses to do it under the circumstances. He makes the sacrifice in order to avoid what he regards as a greater loss, the loss of his life. So also one will take a bitter medicine to avert a dangerous illness. In both cases there remains an aversion to the thing which is done—the throwing away of the goods and the taking of the medicine. Still both are voluntary, as the person retains the power not to do them. In the sense then that a thing is done only through fear, and would not otherwise be done, fear is said to diminish the voluntariness of an act—(**Poland,** p. 38).

§ 6. De Violentia.

29. THESIS IV.—Quod fit ex violentia perfecta, est omnino involuntarium.

Stat. Quæst.—Violentia definitur: *vis extrinsecus illata, repugnante patiente* (*i.e.*, subjecto, cui vis infertur). Id quod sic efficitur, dicitur *violentum*.

Si patiens violentiam totis viribus obsistit, violentia dicitur *perfecta;* si patiens se habet mere passive, aut non resistit, quantum *debet*, est *imperfecta* et *secundum quid*. Diximus *quantum debet*, quia non semper necesse est resistentiam physicam opponere; interdum enim sufficit resistentia moralis, idque præsertim, "quando scilicet ex una parte resistentia physica foret inutilis, ex altera autem agitur de materia minus periculosa. Sic martyres ducti ad templa paganorum non peccabant, quamvis ambulabant" (**Gury,** *De act. hum.*, n. 21).

Ex dictis in *Psych.* (n. 319) intelligitur violentiam inferri non posse ipsi voluntati, sed tantum membris corporis, phantasiæ, appetitui sensitivo; potest enim dæmon, *v.g.*, excitare phantasiam vel passiones, voluntate frustra reluctante.

30. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Actio voluntaria est, quæ (mediate vel immediate) a voluntate procedit; *atqui* actio, quæ sub influxu principii externi ab aliqua facultate procedit, contra voluntatem illius, qui violentiam patitur, minime procedit a voluntate patientis, ut per se patet, et proinde est omnino involuntaria; *ergo*.

31. Schol. 1.—Patet violentiam imperfectam non tollere voluntarium; ubi enim voluntas non resistit, quantum debet, ibi manet aliqua ratio voluntarii. Constat autem eam esse minus voluntariam, quia solum propter vim illatam, licet moraliter superabilem, voluntas ponit actum alioquin non ponendum. Et quo major est vis illata, et repulsu difficilior, eo minus voluntaria est actio.

Schol. 2.—Discrimen inter actus ex metu et violentia

positos sic clare ostendit **S. Thomas**:—"Ea quæ aguntur per metum et per vim, non solum differunt secundum præsens et futurum, sed etiam secundum hoc quod in eo, quod agitur per vim, voluntas non consentit, sed omnino est contra motum voluntatis. Sed id, quod per metum agitur, fit voluntarium ideo, quia motus voluntatis fertur in ipsum, licet non *propter se* sed *propter aliud*, scil., ad repellendum malum, quod timetur; sufficit enim ad rationem voluntarii, quod sit propter aliud voluntarium. Voluntarium enim est non solum quod propter seipsum ut finem, sed etiam propter aliud volumus ut propter finem" (*loc. cit.*).

ART. II.

DE FINE ACTUUM HUMANORUM.

32. Per actus humanos bene ordinatos homo in suum proprium finem progreditur. Quæritur igitur quinam sit finis iste. Et quæstio est de fine ultimo et quidem *naturali*, ex cujus scilicet assecutione homo secundum mensuram suæ naturæ plene perficitur. Sub duplici autem respectu considerari potest ultimus finis, scil., ut finis ultimus *appetitus* et ut finis ultimus *assecutus*. Prior, qui dicitur finis *objectivus*, est *summum illud bonum, quod sua possessione reddit aliquem beatum;* alter vero (finis *subjectivus*) est *possessio summi illius boni appetitui rationali plenissime satisfacientis*, non quidem eo sensu, quod omnis activitas rationalis tunc cessat —quod sane absurdum foret—sed eo sensu, quod non amplius in tendendo, sed in fruendo tota exercetur. Quare, in assecutione finis ultimi reperit homo quietem sui appetitus; et proinde finis ultimus, si consideratur in ordine ad appetitum, quem explere et quietare debet, dicitur felicitas seu beatitudo, quæ et ipsa potest esse vel *objectiva* vel *subjectiva* seu *formalis*, sicut ipse finis.[1]

[1] The end, in general, may be defined as that in which our desire rests, and which, consequently, is willed for itself, that is, for its own intrinsic goodness and perfection; whereas, on the contrary, that which is not willed for itself, but for some other thing to which it leads, is called a means. But an object may be desirable for itself or for its

De beatitudine objectiva et subjectiva et de tempore, quo beatitudo obtinetur, in hoc articulo agemus.

33. Hominem naturaliter tendere in beatitudinem constat ex eo, quod unusquisque sibi intime conscius est se in beatitudinem vehementer trahi; quod sane experientia externa evincit de ceteris hominibus, quos videmus semper et ubique beatitudinem appetere, nec ulli labori parcere, ut illam sibi comparent (cf. *Theol. Nat.*, Th. x.). "Est autem hæc appetitio beatitudinis non *expressa* et *formalis*, sed *tacita* et *virtualis*, ratione innati ponderis nostræ voluntatis, quo anima nostra in suam perfectionem et completam beatitudinem propendet; ex cujus propensionis ac ponderis vi omnis appetitio cujusvis particularis boni sequitur. Itaque, quia omnis appetitio sequitur ex illo pondere voluntatis, quo anima in beatitudinem inclinatur, eoque tendit ut appetitus aliquando satietur, recte in eo pondere tacita quædam beatitudinis appetitio contineri et per illud ipsa beati-

own intrinsic perfection, and may, in addition, because conducing to a higher end, be wished for also as a means. If a thing is thus presented to us, the will resembles a traveller, who on his way sojourns in a town or provincial city to admire its beauty or treasures of art, yet does not make it his final resting-place, the capital being the goal of his journey. There is, however, an end which is willed only for itself and in no way for any other purpose. In it the will rests without any desire of an ulterior object, as the traveller rests in the capital without intending to go farther. This end we call the last or ultimate end. Very appropriately is it defined as that for which all other ends are willed, because every other desire is directed towards it, and every other end is intended as subservient to it. Furthermore, since good is the proper object and the aim of the will, and the goodness of a thing is that which renders it desirable, the ultimate end coincides with the supreme good or that to which every other good is subordinate, and which itself, being absolutely perfect, is subordinate to none.

In all languages one and the self-same term often signifies both the act and the object of the same, both the operation and the effect produced. In like manner, the end may denote not only the thing which by its goodness solicits the will, and when obtained, stills its desire, but also the possession of the said object and the rest of the will in its possession. The thing desired or desirable is the objective, the possession of it the subjective end. An objective end, for instance, is the money wished for by the merchant, a subjective end is wealth, the possession of money. Both ends may, in their own kind, be ultimate or proximate—(**Ming,** *Data of Modern Ethics Examined*, p. 43).

tudo in genere appeti dicitur, sicut appetitio finis continetur in appetitione mediorum, et dum media appetuntur ex affectu finis, ipse quoque finis virtute et tacite appeti censetur" (**Lessius,** *De Summo Bono*, l. 1, c. 2 n. 8).

§ 1. De Beatitudine Objectiva.

34. THESIS V.—Beatitudo objectiva hominis non inveniri potest in ullo bono creato, sed in summo bono increato.

Stat. Quæst.—Diversæ opiniones existebant et existunt circa ultimum hominis finem seu supremam ejus beatitudinem. Alii enim beatitudinem reponunt in bonis corporis, ut Epicurei; quorum doctrinam plus minusve restaurant hodierni Materialistæ et Communistæ. Alii (Stoici) eam reponunt in bonis animæ hic in terra obtinendis, ut sunt scientiæ, et artes liberales, ac virtutes morales. Alii (Kantiani) arbitrantur eam consistere in continuo progressu ad perfectam conformitatem cum lege morali. Alii denique (Pantheistae) in progressu continuo et indefinito facultatum humanarum. Qui omnes in eo conveniunt et a veritate errant, quod bonum aliquod finitum constituunt ut objectum, quo adepto, nihil amplius requiritur, ut homo beatus fiat.

35. Prob. Thesis. Pars 1ª (*Beatitudo objectiva in nullo bono creato inveniri potest*). **Arg.**—Bonum constituens hominem absolute beatum tale esse debet, *a*) ut propter se et non propter aliud appetatur; secus enim voluntatis tendentiæ non satisfaceret, nec proinde voluntas in eo quiesceret; *b*) ut possideatur, excluso omni malo et amissionis periculo; secus enim possessor, utpote timore affectus, non esset beatus; *c*) ut sit in potestate omnium, secus non esset finis ultimus naturæ humanæ præstitutus. *Atqui* liquido constat hujusmodi characteres non inveniri in bonis creatis; *ergo* (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 54-78).

Prob. min. Bona creata, quæ characteres beatitudinis secum ferrent, aut essent bona corporis, aut bona animæ, aut bona externa, aut denique hæc omnia simul habita. Jamvero :—

1°. *Bona corporis*, quales sunt sanitas, pulchritudo, voluptas, *a*) non debent appeti propter se, quum natura sua subordinentur bonis animæ, et proinde non finem sed media ad finem constituunt ; nec bonis hujusmodi sed bonis spiritualibus delectatur homo ut est ens rationale ; *b*) cum plurimis malis, ut paupertate, ignorantia, vitio, conjungi possunt ; et valde instabilia sunt et celeriter omnino deficiunt ; *c*) ex causis exterioribus maxima ex parte dependent, et multi, sine ulla suiipsorum culpa, illis perpetuo carent.

2°. *Bona animæ*, quæ sunt scientia, ars, virtus, *a*) non appetuntur et excoluntur propter se sed propter verum, pulchrum, bonum respective, ideoque ultimatim propter beatitudinem ; et licet dignissima sint, quæ præ ceteris bonis creatis appetantur, tamen nunquam in hac vita summo gradu possidentur, immo, quo magis crescunt, eo magis eorum desiderium augetur ; *b*) consistere possunt cum corporis et animæ angustiis, quas quidem ipsa non raro progignunt, eo quod non sine magno labore acquiruntur, non sine jugi cura conservantur, et facillime amittuntur ; nec votis animæ humanæ ultimum complementum suppeditant ; hæc enim, utpote rationalis, bonum infinitum ut sibi conveniens cognoscit atque perfecta ejus possessione potiri cupit ; *c*) ab omnibus obtineri nequeunt, saltem scientia et ars.[1]

[1] There are some properties which the hedonists agree in attributing to the last end, and which undoubtedly must be attributed to it, yet which, however necessary they may be, cannot, on hedonistic presuppositions, consistently be predicated. The ultimate end must be such that we can find complete rest in it, all desires of rational nature being satisfied, and such, moreover, that all without exception can know and attain it. . . . Man, prompted by an irresistible tendency inherent in his nature, desires happiness, and rests only when he has achieved it, full, supreme, and endless. If any sorrow or any loss yet afflicts him, he is anxious to rid himself of this evil, and the more so

3°. *Bona externa*, ut sunt divitiæ, honores, amicitia, *a*) appetuntur ut bona, quæ conferunt ad bona corporis et animæ comparanda, et proinde non propter se, sed ut media ad alia appetuntur ; ideoque desiderium beatitudinis minime satiant ; *b*) non excludunt mala e possessore, et mala sibi propria afferunt ; nam cum labore acquiruntur, cum sollicitudine et continuo timore, ne amittantur, possidentur ; *c*) maxima pars hominum ea numquam assequuntur ; dependent enim ab externis causis, in quas homines potestatem exercere non valent.

4°. *Omnia bona creata simul sumpta* nequeunt hominem beatum reddere, *a*) quia crescente rerum quantitate, non mutatur earum qualitas ; constat autem singulas res creatas natura sua carere conditionibus beatitudinis, et proinde res creatas, quantumvis accumulentur, prædictis conditionibus adhuc carere ; *b*) non excludunt incommoda senectutis malumque supremum

the greater it is. He is not yet at rest. If he lacks any enjoyable good or any degree of felicity, he strives for its attainment, with longing the more eager and efforts the more energetic the more excellent the thing is which is wanted. He is still restless. Having arrived at the goal of his wishes, if he foresees some danger, or even mere possibility of being deprived of anything that enriches, gladdens, and ennobles him, he is seized with fear and filled with care to ensure the permanence of his prosperity. Accordingly the happiness we long for is the perfect and everlasting possession of the highest good, with the exclusion of all evil. Any other state short of this is not deemed to be happiness, or, at least not such happiness as gives us ultimate rest.

It is unnecessary to say that the happiness held out by hedonistic philosophers lacks completeness, sureness, and endlessness Even the normal state of mankind, as described by them, is not free from evil, pain being reduced to a minimum, but not altogether removed. Nor are the enjoyments perfect. Every pleasure is limited in time and degree, and frequently interrupted, no matter whether it be grossly sensuous or highly intellectual ; every good possessed is finite and deficient, whether it consists in wealth or in the esteem and friendship of others. Much less can we regard as perfect happiness the greatest surplus of pleasure possible in the present life, when the struggle for existence is yet going on, when poverty and hard labour yet oppress the greater portion of mankind, when disease destroys individual existence, and corruption and dishonesty undermine society ; when science, thought to be the highest accomplishment of man, must yet strive for more light—(**Ming,** p. 69).

mortis, includunt autem sollicitudines et anxietates pene infinitas ; hæ enim, teste experientia, cum bonorum hujus mundi augmento pari passu succrescunt ; *c*) nemo umquam omnes species horum bonorum simul possessas habuit ; quodsi talis existeret, procul dubio videret, sicut videbat Solomon, in omnibus inesse vanitatem et afflictionem animi, nihilque permanere sub sole.

Ergo fas est universim concludere in nullo bono finito nec in omnibus simul possessis beatitudinem objectivam seu ultimum finem hominis consistere posse.[1]

36. PARS 2ª (*in summo bono . . .*) **Arg. I.**—Absonum est et Dei bonitati et providentiæ repugnans, ut desiderium beatitudinis, quod homo experitur, non haberet objectum sui satiativum (*Theol. Nat. Th.* x.) ; *atqui* ex dictis sequitur nullum bonum creatum posse hoc de-

[1] The happiness-giving object must of its nature content all the longings of the human heart, not for a time and partially, but completely and for ever. It must consequently contain all good, be immutable, and always enjoyable, and shield the soul from even the danger of evil. In the objects which the world presents, these qualities, it is clear, cannot be found. Whatever earth offers to man for his enjoyment must necessarily be limited by nature ; and being thus limited it cannot be the source of all good, nor give to man an unfailing warrant of security against all impending evils. Finite it is and finite it must be in its effects. It is changeable ; it can be added to and subtracted from, and when men say that it gives them complete contentment, they are only striving to check the yearnings of their souls in order to be consistent in adhering to their prejudices. Finite goods are the external goods of fortune—such as riches, glory, honour, power ; interior bodily goods, such as sensible pleasure, health, strength, beauty ; or the adornment of mind, such as science, art, æsthetics, moral virtue. Now, it is evident that not one of these qualities or goods contains the rest in any way whatever, which, however, would be required were it to be the source of every good and of all happiness to man. There is not one of these goods, moreover, which a man may not possess, though he be at the same time weighted with the greatest evils ; not one of them which cannot be increased or diminished, while many of them, such as those of fortune and of bodily well-being, are transitory and changeable. And what these qualities are, when taken separately, that they also are taken collectively. Even if one were in possession of all the goods of earth, he would not be contentedly nor perfectly happy. The King of old has left us his experience on this subject. After having tasted of all the pleasures of life, and enjoyed the good which earth could give, he records that in all he found but vanity—(**Ronayne,** S.J., *God Knowable and Known*, p. 281).

siderium satiare; *ergo*. Et revera, intellectus sistere nequit in entibus particularibus cognoscendis, sed necesse habet se porrigendi ad ens, qua late patet, cognoscendum, et similiter voluntas nullo bono particulari satiatur, sed appetit bonum universale. *Atqui* hujusmodi bonum realiter existens et adeptu possibile non est nisi summum bonum increatum. Apposite **S. Thomas:** "Beatitudo est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum; alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Objectum autem voluntatis, quæ est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum, sicut objectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis nisi bonum universale; quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo. . . . Unde, solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit (1, 2, q. 2, a, 8).[1]

[1] Were all the mysteries of nature unravelled, were all its provinces explored, and all its laws discovered, were the interdependence of all its parts, and the constitution of every body and organism, from the lowest up to the best evolved, laid open, the human mind would not rest satisfied. The question will still present itself: Whence is this wonderful universe? Where did its successions originate? . . . . Questions like these will always demand an answer, and the mind will never come to rest until it has risen to the Self-existent Being above the finite world, to the personal Deity, infinitely wise and perfect, to the source of all being, of all beauty and order, to the Providence that superintends all and directs each being to its proper end. In this ultimate and universal cause the mind finds higher truth and the will more perfect goodness than here below; nay, in the infinity of the same, mind and will meet with all truth and all goodness. The object, therefore, of blissful contemplation and love is the Deity.

The reason why the human mind takes such a lofty flight lies in the unlimited scope of its faculties. The understanding is fit to apprehend all being, and likewise the will is fit to desire all good. Nay, the object of the intellect is the very essence of all being, and, therefore, the will also inclines to the good as such, to the very nature of good. The consequence is that understanding and will have a boundless compass, and can be filled with nothing short of the infinite; that the one penetrates to the ultimate cause of all that is, to the self-existent, and the other tends to the last source of good, to goodness itself. Hence we also understand why He who is the highest in being—God—is also the highest object attainable to the human faculties, and, therefore, the object of happiness; for the highest act must necessarily refer to the highest object—(**Ming,** p. 92).

Arg. II.—Deo insunt omnia requisita objecti appetitus humani satiativi. Etenim *a*) quum sit ens omnium perfectissimum, voluntas eum non ut ad aliud conducentem appetit, sed propter se ; *b*) quum sit bonum infinitum, ita voluntatis capacitatem replet, ut nihil ulterius desideretur, et proinde simul cum eo consistere nequit ullum malum ; et, *c*) quum tendentia animæ humanæ in bonum infinitum illusoria esse nequeat, homines, dummodo velint, eum assequi possunt, et quidem modo stabili et indefectibili.

37. *Dices* 1°. Bonum increatum, utpote spirituale, nequit satiare appetitum sensitivum ; *ergo.*

Resp.—Duplici modo fieri potest, ut appetitus humanus satietur, *directe*, scil., et *indirecte.* Appetitus satiatur *directe* possessione objecti explentis capacitatem totius appetitus, ita ut nihil supersit desiderandum ; *indirecte*, possessione objecti adeo explentis capacitatem superioris appetitus, ut desiderium boni appetitui inferiori connaturalis ultro dimittatur et pro nihilo reputetur. Jamvero, bonum increatum, quamvis priori modo non satiat appetitum sensitivum, eum posteriori modo vere satiat, quum bonum increatum omne aliud bonum eminenter comprehendat. " In perfecta beatitudine perficitur *iotus homo*, sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a superiori " (**S. Th.,** 1, 2, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3 ; cf. *Cronin*, pp. 82-3).

Dices 2°. Christiani Paradisum desiderant propter gaudium ex ejus possessione resultans ; *ergo* gaudium seu voluptatem summum bonum et ultimum finem existimant.

Resp.—Paradisum desiderant primario et unice propter ipsius voluptatem, *neg.* ; secundario et ut consequens possessionis summi boni, *conc.* Qui Paradisum quæreret unice vel primario propter voluptatem illic fruendam, Deum super omnia non amaret, nec proinde ut verus Christianus censeri deberet. Nam qui rationabiliter et honeste operatur, præ omnibus et super omnia diligit bonum objectivum, summe honestum, ab aliis independens, non autem bonum subjectivum seu voluptatem, quæ est modificatio transiens hominis a bono objectivo omnino dependens. Porro, voluptas, ut rite appetatur, appeti debet ut subsidium et stimulus ad promptius et facilius agendum, et proinde ut medium ad

finem ; finis autem ultimus, eo ipso quod est ultimus, ut ad aliud conducens appeti nequit.[1]

Dices 3°. Virtus appetenda et excolenda est propter seipsam ; *ergo* virtus est finis ultimus et summum bonum hominis.

Resp.—Virtus appetenda et excolenda est propter seipsam *conc.* ; propter seipsam *solam*, seu in ulteriorem finem ordinari non debet, *neg.* Et sane, virtus est habitus bene agendi. Jamvero, ut quis bene agat, suas actiones in finem bonum ordinare debet. Quare, licet virtus, ut bonum honestum, appeti possit propter seipsam, et, ut bonum honestum maximum, quod in hac vita assequi possumus, appeti debeat super omnia bona temporalia etiam intellectualia, tamen non est finis simpliciter ultimus nec bonum simpliciter summum, nec proinde appeti potest unice propter se. *Quod sane confirmatur*

1°. quia virtus in homine semper est imperfecta, facilis

[1] Since the highest perfection intrinsic to any intelligent being consists in the most perfect rational activity ; and since the object of the latter is the infinite considered absolutely ; God, as contemplated in Himself and loved for His own sake, is the highest extrinsic good of man. True it is, God may be loved as beatifying us, and filling our heart with delight. He is, in fact, the source of the purest and sublimest enjoyment. Every suitable object when reached is pleasurable; for pleasure is the rest of the faculty in its proper object attained by action. Our mind, therefore, delights in the beauties of nature and the works of art, our will in love and friendship, or in honours and treasures longed for, and at last obtained. How much more delightful must God's infinite beauty, perfection, and bounty be when perfectly contemplated, ardently loved, and inseparably embraced. Still, as pleasure is not happiness, but only its necessary concomitant, so is God, considered as the source of delight, not the ultimate end ; the delight which springs from Him is only consequent on our having embraced Him as our end by the most perfect activity. In the right order delight can never be an ultimate end. Our faculties and acts are directed to the objects to which they are adapted, and not to the satisfaction attending the attainment of the object, just as the dart in motion tends directly to the goal, and only indirectly to rest in the goal when reached. Rational faculties, in particular, are made to pursue the intrinsic truth and goodness of their objects. Even when the animal appetite pursues its object as pleasurable, pleasure is by nature intended as a complement of efficient operation, and, at the same time, as an inducement for the agent to repeated actions, necessary for the preservation of self, or of the species, and hence as a means of further purpose. Thus every consideration leads to the conclusion that nothing but God Himself, His absolute perfection, not His delightfulness, is our ultimate end—(**Ming,** p. 94).

perditu, plurima mala compatitur ; quæ omnia ultimo fine excluduntur ;

2°. quia virtutem comitatur quædam lucta perpetua pro boni honesti acquisitione et mali moralis fuga vel extirpatione ; repugnat autem finem ultimum hominis esse luctam sive ad bonum acquirendum sive ad malum vitandum.

Dices 4°. Appetitus humanus est finitus ; *ergo* bonum finitum ei satisfacere debet.

Resp.—Appetitus humanus in se consideratus seu subjective, est quidem finitus ; objective autem seu quoad objectum in quod tendit, est infinitus. Aliis verbis : Actus voluntatis non est infinitus, sed finitus ; atvero voluntas isto actu finito capax est appetendi objectum infinitum, non secus ac intellectus, cui conformari debet, capax est objectum infinitum intelligendi.

38. Schol.—Homo ad perfectam beatitudinem pervenire nequit nisi fretus speciali Dei auxilio non quidem naturam humanam *elevante*, sed eam inter suos terminos *adjuvante*. Agitur de beatitudine naturali, et proinde non est quæstio de gratia, quæ requireretur in hypothesi, quod Deus voluerit hominem ad statum supernaturalem evehere. Et revera, quamvis homo naturaliter feratur in Deum tamquam in summum bonum, eum tamen super omnia diligere difficile est, et sæpe viribus humanis moraliter impossibile ; talis enim amor implicat omnium Dei præceptorum observationem, eemque voluntatis dispositionem, quæ parata sit ad omnia præsentis vitæ bona perdenda potiusquam aliquid contra divinas ordinationes faciat.[1]

§ 2. De Beatitudine Subjectiva.

39. THESIS VI.—Beatitudo subjectiva, quoad suum perfectum statum, includit cognitionem et amorem Dei Summi Boni.

Stat. Quæst.—Beatitudinem subjectivam seu adeptionem beatitudinis objectivæ consistere *in aliqua opera-*

[1] " Etiam in ordine naturali ad acquirendam Dei cognitionem abstractivam vere beantem (clarissimam, certissimam, nullo errore admixtam, indefectibilem, etc.) homo indigeret *speciali aliquo concursu divino*, qui tamen, utpote a natura postulatus, naturalis dicendus est. Hic concursus diversus esset (id enim sanctio ordinis moralis exigeret a divina providentia) pro diversitate meritorum et cujusque proximam capacitatem determinaret "—(**Cathrein,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 23).

tione et quidem *animæ rationalis propria* nullo negotio ostenditur. Enimvero, nonnisi per unionem cum summo bono homo beatur, quæ quidem unio effici nequit nisi per aliquam operationem illius, qui beatus redditur ; *atqui* hæc operatio, utpote quæ versatur circa ens immateriale, debet esse et ipsa immaterialis ; proportio enim requiritur inter operationem et suum objectum.

Utrum prædicta operatio formaliter consistat in actu intellectus an in actu voluntatis an in utroque, controvertitur (*cf.* n. 44). Quidquid sit, certum est et omnes concedunt beatitudinem quoad suam integritatem et in concreto includere utrumque actum. Visio enim summi boni amorem ejusdem exigit, amor vero necessario præsupponit visionem.

Beatitudo *subjectiva* est duplex, altera *supernaturalis*, *naturalis* altera. Prior consistit in intuitiva Dei visione et in amore hanc visionem connaturaliter consequente. Beatitudo *naturalis* consistit in Dei cognitione hausta ex notitia adeo perfecta rerum creatarum, ut intellectus plene satietur veritate, et voluntas gaudio intensissimo perfruatur.

40. Quum, ut Theologi probant, beatitudo supernaturalis revera sit, in præsenti generis humani conditione, finis ultimus hominis, consequitur ordinem et beatitudinem mere naturalem non esse nec fuisse statum realem sed hypotheticum. Sed non licet exinde inferre beatitudinem naturalem in ordine præsenti omni realitate carere. Nam, ut docet Suarez, " nunc est eadem natura, et consequenter eadem capacitas ; unde, quum gratia non destruat naturam, sed perficiat, non privat illam hac perfectione naturali. Et ita *certum est in supernaturali beatitudine habiturum hominem omnem perfectionem sibi connaturalem*, quomodo probat Divus Thomas hominem videntem Deum non privari cognitione naturali Dei ; quin potius maxime in illa perfici ; et idem proportionaliter est de amore " (*De fine ult.* Disp. 4, s. 3, n. 4).

41. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Beatitudo subjectiva est summi boni possessio ; *atqui* hæc possessio non attingitur nisi per intellectum et voluntatem ; *ergo*.

Prob. min. Consecutionem summi boni fieri oportet per perfectiores hominis facultates ; hujus enim boni consecutio est ultima hominis perfectio nec obtineri potest nisi per facultates proportionem ei habentes. *Atqui* tales facultates sunt intellectus et voluntas (facultates enim sensiles nequeunt attingere objectum immateriale, qualis est Deus) ; intellectus autem per *cognitionem* intentionaliter conjungitur Deo Summo Bono, et voluntas per *amorem* eidem realiter adhæret, seu anima rationalis Deum possidet effective et affective. *Ergo* beatitudo quoad suum statum perfectum hunc duplicem actum requirit.[1]

[1] The ultimate end of man is to be placed in perfect rational activity, in ultimate perfection, and in happiness, not as in three different things, but as in one and the self-same ; the three conceptions being resolvable into one another, and each one of them denoting a goal of human tendency, a limit beyond which no desire remains to be satisfied. We meet here with a peculiarity of the ancient teaching. Nearly all philosophers consider happiness as our destiny ; many also agree that happiness is man's ultimate perfection and implies his vital actions ; but that happiness, as our ultimate end, consists in perfect rational activity is the special view of Christian moralists. And we must add, that it is a view very forcibly insisted on by them as exhibiting the very essence of happiness. On this account they go on to analyse the activity that renders us at once happy and ultimately perfect.

This activity must be supreme in kind, degree, and order, most pleasant and permanent ; it must regard the highest object and effect the closest union with it. What function, or what collection of functions is vested with these attributes ? Intellect and will being the highest faculties of the rational soul, happiness, as perfect rational activity, implies the knowledge of truth, the love of good and the delight attending either of these two acts. Delight is necessary to happiness. Every perfect action is followed by delight ; for it lies in the nature of a faculty that, having discharged the function for which it was made, perfectly and normally, it comes to rest and is satisfied. But for the very reason that delight is not the action itself, but merely its result or concomitant, it cannot be an essential constituent of happiness : it is but one of the necessary attributes that adhere to it as beauty does to youth.

Perfect intellection and volition are undoubtedly both required for happiness both of them achieving the possession of the highest object, the one as representation, the other as love. The act of the intellect, however, is considered, if not as the only, at least the principal constituent of happiness—(**Ming,** p. 88).

42. Cor.—Ergo beatitudo subjectiva semel obtenta *perpetua* debet esse, secus enim non satiaret animæ humanæ capacitatem, nec esset plena possessio summi boni, quum amitti posset. Porro, beato inesse debet illius beatitudinis *certa cognitio* et consequenter *securitas plena* se bonum, quod possidet, numquam esse amissurum.

Quare, beatitudo non datur *per fidem*, quia cognitio Dei per fidem quamvis perfectissima sit ex parte objecti cogniti, tamen valde imperfecta est ex parte intellectus cognoscentis, quippe qui assentitur veritatibus, quas non intelligit; et proinde per fidem non quietatur naturale desiderium sciendi, sed potius incenditur.

43. Schol. 1.—Tum in ordine naturali tum in ordine supernaturali innumeri gradus beatitudinis reperiuntur juxta gradus capacitatis et potissimum morales dispositiones et merita uniuscujusque beati; atvero non propterea putandum est fruentes cognitione et amore inferioris gradus aliquo dolore vel desiderio inexpleto affici. "Nam in eo statu perfectæ unionis cum Deo per ejus cognitionem et amorem nullus hominis appetitus actualis supponi potest nisi *rationalis*, *i.e.*, cum objectivo rationali ordine, qui est ordo divinæ sanctitatis, et bonitatis, plane consentiens. Irrationalis autem dicenda esset appetitio rei, quæ sit individuali capacitati naturæ disproportionata et hinc secundum rectum ordinem impossibilis. Et sane, quum jam in præsenti vita, quo purius rectus ordo et sanctissima Dei dispensatio perspicitur et amatur, eo minus invidiæ vel idiopathicæ æmulationi locus relinquatur, pro certo habendum est a fortiori in statu perfecti amoris illam sortis inæqualitatem singulorum felicitati nihil detrahere" (**Meyer,** v. 1, p. 55).

Schol. 2.—Sicut beatitudo naturalis consistit in possessione, qua anima separata Deum abstractive cognoscit eique ut Summo Bono adhæret, ita damnatio naturalis, si daretur, in eo consisteret, quod anima ex ejus perversione et corruptione non posset Deum attingere ut bonum suum, sed jugiter contra naturam suam, tamen secundum ejusdem perversam dispositionem, bono creato tamquam ultimo fini adhæreret.

Sicut beatitudo diversos admittit gradus, secundum di-

versas perfectiones in anima ex actibus vitæ moralis remanentes, ita similiter damnatio varios gradus admittit secundum pravas dispositiones in anima relictas. Et sicut beati, quidquid volunt, id sub ratione finis ultimi boni volunt, ita damnati omnia sub ratione finis ultimi pravi quadam voluntatis immobilitate et obstinatione intendunt.[1]

44. Schol. 3.—In quo formaliter consistat beatitudo. Quum beatitudo dicat adeptionem ultimi finis, quæritur quinam sit ille actus, cui *formaliter* competit adeptio finis ultimi et proinde beatitudinis. Circa quam quæstionem tres sunt sententiæ. Nam juxta *S. Thomam* aliosque maximi nominis auctores, beatitudo subjectiva sita est in actu intellectionis, ad quem actum sequitur, ut proprietas, actus voluntatis. Consecutio ultimi finis, inquiunt, est actus facultatis spiritualis, et tamen non est formaliter actus voluntatis. Actus enim voluntatis circa finem sunt *amor, desiderium, gaudium.* Jamvero, amor, quum a præsentia objecti amati præscindat, procul dubio non potest esse ipsa objecti adeptio ; desiderium, quum sit tendentia in objectum, hujus actualem possessionem excludit ; gaudium denique, quum sit de bono possesso, non est formaliter boni adeptio, sed illud adeptum necessario præsupponit ; non enim propterea

[1] L'homme qui finit son temps d'épreuve, obstiné dans le mal, doit être privé de sa fin. Cette privation que nous appellons en langage chrétien un état de damnation, exclut le bonheur ; mais pourquoi et comment est-elle le malheur suprême ?

Il y a conflit entre la nature du damné et sa libre volonté. La nature de tout son poids, entraîne l'homme vers Dieu, seule fin légitime de tout être humain ; la volonté du damné, de toute son énergie, répudie Dieu. La nature se détourne des biens créés, qui ne peuvent la satisfaire ; la volonté les desire obstinément. De là, un conflit sans issue, toujours recommençant. Et de ces deux tendances contraires, aucune n'est capable d'atteindre jamais, chez le damné, son objet ; ni la nature, car Dieu est irrévocablement perdu pour elle, ni la volonté, les biens créés ayant disparu ; il y a donc là deux mouvements qui se perdent désespérément dans le vide.

C'est une faim insatiable qui, éternellement, n'a que le néant pour âture; une soif inextinguible qui, éternellemeut, n'a que le vide pour s'étancher. Les fables du paganisme avaient mis en tableaux ce supplice et cette rage : Ixion tournant incessamment sa roue ; Sisyphe roulant un rocher qui retombe sans cesse ; et Tantale dans ce fleuve d'eau vive qui fuit impitoyablement ses lèvres brûlantes.

La lutte entre la nature et la volonté est d'autant plus vive que la connaissance de la bonté souveraine de Dieu et de l'inanité de biens créés est devenue plus évidente ; le désespoir est d'autant plus intense et plus douloureux que les illusions sont dissipées et que le réprouvé a la claire vision qu'il pouvait être heureux s'il l'avait voulu—(**Mercier,** *Psych.*, v. 2, p. 361, n. 289).

quis possidet bonum, quia de ipso gaudet, sed, e contra, gaudet de bono, quia illud consecutus est. In nullo igitur voluntatis actu formaliter inest finis ultimi consecutio seu beatitudo, et proinde in actu intellectus collocanda est.[1]

Porro, beatitudo subjectiva est hominis perfectio, et proinde debet formaliter consistere in actu facultatis nobilissimæ ; *atqui* intellectus est voluntate nobilior, quum non ipse a voluntate, sed voluntas ab ipso dimanet et dependat.

Denique, bonum intelligibile (*v.g.*, scientia) appetitur voluntate, sed apprehenditur, *i e.* ,possidetur intellectu, et similiter bonum sensibile (*v.g.*, musicæ harmonia) apprehenditur et possidetur auditu, non appetitu ; *ergo* dicendum est non actu appetitus sed actu cognitionis (*scil.* intellectivæ) summum bonum formaliter possideri.

Scotus vero et sua schola essentiam beatitudinis reponunt in actu voluntatis Deum amantis ; actum intellectus existimant non esse nisi conditionem prærequisitam ad beatitudinem habendam. Solo amore, inquiunt, Deo conjungimur vinculo amicitiæ, dum ope cognitionis solum intentionaliter Deus fit nobis præsens.

Alb. Magnus, S. Bona., Suarez, quos sequuntur multi, docent beatitudinem formaliter consistere in actu intellectus Deum cognoscentis et voluntatis eo perfruentis. " Sed si accurate quis attenderit, quæ ab his scriptoribus proferuntur, videbit probari quidem indubitanter ad beatitudinem requiri actum utriusque facultatis, non vero probari per actum utriusque facultatis Deum formaliter possideri, quia actus voluntatis vel tendit ad bonum nondum possessum vel

[1] If any act of will were happiness itself, that act would be either desire or love or delight Now it is impossible for desire to be the last end ; for desire obtains inasmuch as the will tends to something which it has not yet got ; but such straining after the absent is inconsistent with the idea of an achieved last end. Love again cannot be the last end ; for good is loved not only in its presence but also in its absence ; for it is from love that good already not possessed is sought for by desire. And though the love of good already attained is more perfect, that access of perfection is to be ascribed to the attainment and established possession of the good loved. The attainment of good, then, which is the end is a different thing from the love of good, which love is imperfect before attainment, and perfect after attainment. In like manner neither is delight the last end ; for the very possession of good is the cause of delight, while we either feel the good now possessed, or remember the good possessed before, or hope for the good to be possessed in future ; delight therefore is not the last end. No act of the will, therefore, can be the substance of happiness—(**St. Thomas,** *God and His Creatures,* B. 3, c. 26).

quiescit in bono, quod jam ratione prius possidetur ; seu illi scriptores assignant physicam essentiam beatitudinis, non metaphysicam (**Chr. Pesch,** *Prælect. Dogm.* v. 3, p. 232).

45. Est observatu dignum S. Thomam expresse loqui de beatitudine *supernaturali*, in qua intuitiva Dei visio est ipsum Deum intellectualiter adipisci et possidere. Aliter autem res se habet in beatitudine *naturali*, in qua cognitio foret tantum *abstractiva*, quæque proinde dici non posset vera Dei possessio. " Quis enim dicat dæmonem esse essentialiter beatum naturali beatitudine, quia habet perfectam cognitionem naturalem Dei, quum non habeat amorem " (**Suarez,** *De ult. fine hom.* Disp. 15, s. 1, § 6).

Unde, sunt, qui ad tertiam sententiam cum prima reconciliandam, arbitrentur visionem intuitivam formaliter constituere beatitudinem supernaturalem, beatitudinem autem naturalem sitam esse is Dei cognitione et amore.

§ 3. De Tempore, quo Beatitudo Obtinetur.

46. THESIS VII.—Aliqua imperfecta et quasi inchoata beatitudo possibilis est in hac vita ; beatitudo autem perfecta reservatur obtinenda in vita futura immortali.

Stat. Quæst.—Beatitudinem imperfectam intelligimus eam, quæ proprietates beatitudinis quodammodo participat. " Duplex (inquit **S. Thomas**) est hominis beatitudo, una perfecta et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quæ attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quæ non attingit, sed participat quamdam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem. Sicut est perfecta prudentia in homine apud quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in quibusdam brutis, in quibus sunt quidem particulares instinctus ad quædam opera similia operibus prudentiæ " (1, 2, q. 3, a. 6).

Hæc beatitudo imperfecta duplici ex causa venit, *scil.*, ex parte objecti et ex parte modi, quo objectum possidetur :—*Ex parte objecti*, quando objectum non est tale, quale requiritur ad tendentiam voluntatis quie-

tandam, ut si bona creata possidentur ; *ex parte modi*, quando bonum adæquans tendentiæ voluntatis possidetur quidem, sed non adeo plene et secure ac possideri potest. Quo modo probi in stadio mortalitatis beati dicuntur.

47. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*aliqua beatitudo . . . in hac vita*). **Arg.**—*a*) Consensu omnium est quædam legitima fruitio bonorum creatorum sive sint homini externa (ut divitiæ, honores), sive sint corporis (ut sanitas), sive sint animæ (ut scientia, ars) ; *ergo*.

b) Beatitudo perfecta consistit in Dei cognitione et fruitione, quas anima separata possidet ; *atqui* anima etiam in hac vita quamdam Dei cognitionem et fruitionem et proinde beatitudinem imperfectam assequi potest, tum quia Deum intelligendo et amando consimiles actus exercet ac tandem exercebit, quando beata evasura est ; tum quia ordinem moralem observando spem acquirit adipiscendi, post cursum hujus vitæ, beatitudinem ; qui autem spe cujusdam boni fruitur, is illud bonum jam prægustat et quodammodo possidet.

PARS 2ª (*beatitudo perfecta reservatur . . .*). **Arg.**—Beatitudo perfecta omne malum excludit, omne desiderium explet, inamissibilem summi boni possessionem includit ; *atqui* status viæ *a*) non excludit mala, quum in corpore morbi et dolores abundent, in anima anxietates multiplexque cæcitas, ignorantia, dubitatio ; quibus datis, sequitur beatitudinem hujus vitæ *b*) non explere omne desiderium ; et quum in hac vita nihil, ne virtus quidem, reperiatur fixum et permanens, *c*) beatitudinem vitæ mortalis non esse inamissibilem. Restat igitur, ut homo in vita futura immortali beatitudinem perfectam obtinere possit, quum Dei bonitati et sapientiæ repugnet hominem serius ocius finem suum ultimum obtinere non posse.[1]

[1] Though happiness is most certainly attainable, it cannot be enjoyed during this earthly life. This truth does not need demonstration. Happiness, as was said above, must be everlasting ; life on earth is

48. Cor. 1.—Ergo finis hujus vitæ est, ut sit via ad alteram vitam ut ad terminum ; homo enim per suos actus se disponere debet ad ultimum finem suum consequendum. Quare, hæc dispositio, utpote necessaria ad perfectam beatitudinem, recte dicitur finis *proximus* hominis, *i.e.*, finis attingendus in hac vita veluti quædam præparatio ad finem ultimum in altera vita attingendum ; talis enim inter utramque vitam debet esse colligatio, ut bonum hujus vitæ ad bonum alterius ducat, ipsiusque sit tamquam initium.[2]

Si vero quæratur, quodnam sit illud bonum, quod, in ordine ad alteram vitam beatam, oportet nos in vita præsenti prosequi, respondendum est illud bonum honestatem vitæ unice esse. Enimvero, vitæ honestas unica res est, quæ in omnium potestate constituitur ; secus enim ac reliqua bona creata, a causis extrinsecis minime dependet, sed solummodo a sincera hominis voluntate. *Atqui* medium ad assecutionem finis ultimi requisitum tale debet, ut ab omnibus, si velint, haberi

short and mortal. Happiness is the perfect contemplation of the supreme truth, and the perfect love of the supreme good. During this life the cognition, as well as the love, of any supersensible object is imperfect and deficient. Happiness must be steady, sure, undisturbed, never mixed with any evil. This life is incompatible with constant, deep and attentive thought, is liable to sufferings, is bound down to many bodily needs, is unsteady and uncertain, always ebbing and flowing. We must, therefore, conclude that after the death of the body the surviving soul, the immaterial subject of our mental faculties, will, if duly prepared, enjoy the bliss of divine contemplation and divine love in a life entirely spiritual and immaterial —(**Ming,** p. 97).

[2] What, then, is the purpose of this earthly life ? What immediate object must it pursue, and what relation has it to the last end ? Since the tendency to happiness is intrinsic to us and irresistible, mortal life is but a preparation for the immortal life to come, and earthly existence but a movement towards the ultimate goal beyond. To this end all our actions must be directed, though from afar, as the steps of a traveller are in the direction of the distant city he is to reach. And so they will be directed, if, through them, the Deity is ever better known and ever more desired and loved, and if we are brought into ever greater harmony with supreme truth and goodness. In as far as such harmony is now attained, so far will our earthly life be anticipated happiness. In a word, the immediate end of this life consists in the pursuit of the last end—(**Ming,** p. 98).

possit; alioquin Deus homini præstituisset finem simulque medium isti fini accommodatum denegasset. Unde, non sunt audiendi, qui " duplicem quodammodo hujus vitæ finem statui volunt : alterum *primarium* et essentialem, qui in moralitate, *i.e.*, in recta actionum dispositione ad finem ultimum in vita futura consequendum, alterum *secundarium*, qui in vitæ præsentis prospera fruitione consistat, quatenus tamen hæc fini morali non adversetur. Quam sententiam, licet ambiguam magis quam erroneam, non tamen plane innocuam arbitramur " ; admodum enim difficile est eam " cum certis vitæ christianæ principiis atque evangelicis consiliis ita conciliare, ut non absurdum dissidium inter veritatem ordinis naturalis et veritatem fide revelatam admitti videatur " (**Meyer,** v. 1, p. 60).

Cor. 2.—" Ergo *a*) beatitudo futura homini nonnisi conditionate, *i.e.*, sub conditione vitæ honestæ, promissa est ; *b*) iidem actus, quibus homo virtutem colit et Deo gloriam exhibet summum bonum hujus vitæ constituunt. Inde sequitur : *c*) quum inter omnes virtutum actus supremi sint actus amoris Dei, iidemque præ ceteris Deo gloriam afferant, hos eosdem actus esse supremum hominis bonum in hac vita ejusdemque potissimam dispositionem ad vitam futuram " (**Cathrein,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 33).

49. *Dices :* Si vita honesta est conditio unica et necessaria ad beatitudinis æternæ assecutionem, homo in vita præsenti unice incumbere debet in vita morali excolenda, prætermissa cura vitæ temporalis, *v.g.*, commercii, artium et ceterorum, quæ maxime conferunt ad prosperitatem vitæ humanæ.

Resp.—Nego suppositum, scilicet, quod cultura vitæ moralis inimica sit vitæ temporalis prosperitati, immo magnopere erraret, nec ad normam vitæ moralis se conformaret, qui ad virtutem excolendam vitæ prosperitatem prætermitteret vel parvi penderet. Hæc enim prosperitas et omnia, quæ ad illam conferunt, si juxta præscripta rectæ rationis

quæruntur, sunt et ipsa partes vitæ moralis, cui proinde maxime favent, nedum adversantur; quam ob causam a philosophis christianis et ab ipsa Ecclesia fuerunt semper commendata et enixe promota. Deinde, historia et experientia testantur honestatem vitæ esse causam efficacissimam prosperitatis tum individualis tum socialis.[1]

[1] " In spite of the repression of individuality," " the shifting of the moral centre of gravity to another life," and other economic faults of which Catholicism is guilty, he [Sir Horace Plunkett] says that :— " Roman Catholicism has at different periods of history advantageously affected economic conditions . . . and that during the Middle Ages when Roman Catholicism was freer than now to manifest its influence in many directions, owing to its practically unchallenged supremacy, it favoured, when it did not originate, many forms of sound economic activity, and was, to say the least, abreast of the time in its conception of the working of economic causes." " But," he continues, " from the time when the Reformation by its demand for what we Protestants conceived to be a simpler Christianity, drove Catholicism back on its first line of defence, and constrained it to look to its distinctively spiritual heritage, down to the present day, it has seemed to stand strangely aloof from any contact with industrial and economic issues."

Now, a Roman economist in the early days of Christianity might have said the same of the Church of that time. The business of the Church has been by its institution, and at all times to guard " its distinctively spiritual heritage," and it has always stood " strangely aloof from any contact with industrial and economic issues " unless in so far as these have fitted into the spiritual concerns of man, or have helped the march of human civilization as a whole. Sir Horace Plunkett says that the " spiritual and economic ideals should be co-ordinated." What he plainly means by this is that Catholicism should modify its principles and practices in order to fit in with industrial and economic movements. I should rather say : ignore man's spiritual interests, cast his soul and its concerns aside as things not to be thought of, or else give them their due place in human life and action. If man's spiritual interests are to be considered at all, they must be immeasurably more important than his temporal interests which are bounded by the present time. And if either is to be modified, in the process of co-ordination, for the sake of the other, interests which end in time should give way to those that are eternal. . . . I, of course, admit the need of co-ordination ; it stands to reason as well as to religion ; and since the present life is a phase of human existence it must have its due place and attention. But Sir Horace's co-ordination is like that which the American discerned in the preacher's quotation from Isaiah : " and the wolf will lie down with the lamb "—" yes ; I guess the lamb will lie inside." But he greatly misrepresents the principles of Catholicism when he says that it " completely shifts the moral centre of gravity to a future existence." Like non-Catholics generally, and those nondescripts who have learned " Catholic " teaching in non-Catholic Colleges and go by the name of " Catholic," he can tell us more about our principles than we know ourselves.

CAPUT SECUNDUM.

De Moralitate actuum humanorum.

50. Quæ de moralitate actuum humanorum occurrunt dicenda in quattuor articulos dividimus, quorum primus agit de moralitate in seipsa considerata, alter de fontibus, unde moralitas in actibus humanis dimanat, tertius de moralitatis consectariis, quartus de adjumentis et impedimentis moralitatis.

ART. I.

DE MORALITATE IN SEIPSA CONSIDERATA.

§ 1. De Moralitatis Notione.

51. In actibus humanis duplex distinguitur entitas, altera *physica*, *moralis* altera. *Physica* eorum entitas in eo est, quod sint operationes vitales mediate vel

Since I learned my Penny Catechism as a little boy, I have thought that it is sinful to neglect the duties of the present life. It is true, the Church does not say to us : " Attend to your daily occupations, or you will lose money " ; but, seeing a plain moral duty in the business of daily life, it says : " If you seriously and habitually neglect your daily duties you will lose your soul." . . .

To use the words of Card. Newman : " The world believes in the world's ends as the greatest of goods; it wishes society to be governed simply and entirely for the sake of this world. . . " On the other hand, the Church " considers the action of this world and the action of the soul as simply incommensurate, viewed in their respective spheres ; she would rather save the soul of one single bandit of Calabria, or whining beggar of Palermo, than draw a hundred miles of railroad through the length and breadth of Italy, or carry out a sanitary reform, in its fullest details, in every city of Sicily, except in so far as these great national works tended to some spiritual good beyond them. . . . If she encourages secular enterprises, studies, or pursuits, as she does, or the arts of civilization generally, it is either from their indirect bearing upon her great object, or from the spontaneous energy which great ideas, such as hers, exert, and the irresistible influence which they exercise, in matters and in provinces not really their own." And if we acknowledge the soul to be a substantial element of man's nature at all, and the future life to be a reality in man's existence, is not the philosophy of the Church the philosophy also of common sense ?—(**O'Riordan,** *Catholicity and Progress in Ireland*, c. 3, pp. 55-8).

immediate a libera voluntate procedentes; entitas autem *moralis* eis competit, quatenus propriæ eorum regulæ conveniunt. Quare, actuum humanorum moralitas non est aliquid absolutum, sed relativum; quod sane colligitur ex horum actuum denominationibus; solent enim hi actus vocari *recti* vel *non-recti* seu *pravi*, *i.e.*, juxta vel contra regulam facti. Et quum actus, prout recti vel pravi sunt, agenti *honorem* afferunt vel adimunt, *honesti* vel *inhonesti* dicuntur. Unde, **moralitas** definiri potest: *illa proprietas, vi cujus actus humani honesti vel turpes dicuntur*, vel: *habitudo actuum humanorum ad regulam honestatis;* et actus morales sunt illi, qui libere et cum advertentia ad regulam honestatis ponuntur.

52. Consectaria 1°. "Moralitas necessario præsupponit *libertatem*, quia actus, qui non procedit a ratione deliberativa, non est proprie loquendo moralis" (**S. Th.**, 1, 2, q. 18, a. 9); quia non reddit hominem simpliciter bonum vel malum. Unde, in brutis animalibus nulla invenitur moralitas, et proinde, qui de brutorum moralitate loquuntur, aut metaphorice loquuntur, aut veram moralitatis notionem pervertunt, sicut pervertunt notiones intelligentiæ et libertatis.[1]

[1] Mr. H. Spencer, as I understand him, ascribes morality to the acts of brutes,—meaning by brutes, animals endowed with conscious perceptions, but inferior to man.

In section 8 of the *Data of Ethics*, speaking of conduct under its ethical aspect, he says: "Observation shows that we apply them [the terms 'good' and 'bad'] according as the adjustments of acts to ends are, or are not, efficient." And again: "Acts are called good or bad, according as they are well or ill adjusted." This becomes more definite in section 9: "Is there any assumption in calling good the acts conducive to *life*, in self and others, and bad those which directly or indirectly tend towards *death*?" Plants, however, and beasts live; hence it would seem that the action of sun or rain on grass, or the action of a bird in feeding its young, is ethically good, since it conduces to life.

Later on we read: "The moral consciousness proper is rightly occupied by the recognition of, and regard for, these conditions by fulfilment of which happiness is achieved or avoided." It would seem, therefore, that the life to which good acts can conduce can be only that of conscious beings, since these only are capable of happiness;

53. Cavendum autem est, ne libertas actus cum ipsa moralitate actus confundatur ; valde enim ab invicem differunt ; concipi enim potest alicujus actus libertas, quin ideo concipiatur ejus moralitas, et quidem præcise quia nondum concipitur moralitatis regula, vel habitudo actus cum regula. Immo idem actus *liber* ex una moralitatis specie ad aliam transire potest, ut quum aliquis ex motivo bono actionem incipit, quam postea ex motivo malo perficit (cf. *Walsh*, n. 361, sq.). Errat igitur schola Kantiana *bonitatem* moralem cum libertate confundens (*Cronin*, p. 201).

2°. Actus moralis duobus elementis constituitur : *elementum materiale*, quæ est substantia actus liberi seu ejus entitas physica ; et *elementum formale*, quæ est habitudo actus ad regulam honestatis. Elementum materiale bonum, immo optimum, esse potest in suo genere, sed nihilominus elementum formale potest esse malum, et vicissim. *V.g.*, actio latronis dextre surripientis res alienas est materialiter bona, formaliter mala ; e contra est in actione innocentis inefficaciter se defendentis.

3°. Bonum morale et bonum honestum hic, ut solent, promiscue adhibentur ; nihilominus non idem signifi-

and also that whatever actions promote the conditions by fulfilment of which any kind of happiness, even of brutes, is achieved, these actions are morally good. I find, however, another statement to the effect that " Ethics has for its subject-matter the most highly evolved being, man." But even in man a good digestion or heart-action tends to prolong life and to secure pleasure, is it therefore moral ? . . .

Who ever thinks of morally good or bad animals or plants ? Is it wrong on the part of wolves or sharks to eat men ? If cattle are allowed easy access to a hay-rick, they will waste a quantity of hay ; is this immoral ? Is a partridge virtuous when it defends its young ? Why should we attach new meanings to words ? Morality and intelligent self-direction are correlative, as has been said ; but who would think of making laws or rules for the self-guidance of beasts ? I will take it, then, that to the ordinary man who does not allow philosophical speculation to run away with his common sense, no creature lower than man is capable of acting morally—(**M'Donald,** *Principles of Moral Science*, pp. 5-7).

cant ; bonum enim morale, nisi analogice sumatur, semper includit libertatem ; bonum vero honestum, seu, bonum, quod hominem decet, a libertate præscindit. Et quidem actus, qui hominem maxime decent (*v.g.*, actus primi intellectus et voluntatis, appetitio et fruitio beatitudinis), quippe qui non sunt libere exerciti, non sunt actus morales. Sed hujusmodi actus, quia nos disponunt ad actus liberos exercendos, aut actus libere exercitos præsupponunt, *morales* dici possunt sed sensu analogico, sicut etiam facultates, quibus exercentur, et leges quibus diriguntur, atque virtutes ac obligationes, quas efficiunt, *morales* dicuntur.

§ 2. De Discrimine inter Bonum et Malum Morale.

54. THESIS VIII.—Existit discrimen intrinsecum et essentiale inter bonum et malum morale.

Stat. Quæst.—Non agitur de existentia alicujus discriminis inter bonum et malum morale—id namque omnes concedunt,[1] etiam Materialistæ, licet moralitatem funditus evertant actus morales in operationibus

[1] Moral Philosophy takes it for granted that there is in human actions a moral quality : that is that a human action may be either right or wrong. Everyone knows that we may contemplate the same action as wise or unwise ; as courteous or impolite ; as graceful or awkward ; and, also, as right or wrong. It can have escaped the observation of no one that there are consequences distinct from each other which follow an action, and which are connected, respectively, with each of its attributes. To take, for instance, a moral quality. Two men may both utter what is false ; the one intending to speak the truth, the other intending to deceive. Now, some of the consequences of this act are common to both cases, namely, that the hearers may, in both cases, be deceived. But it is equally manifest that there are also consequences peculiar to the case in which the speaker *intended* to deceive ; as, for example, the effects upon his moral character, and upon the estimation in which he is held by the community, and thus, in general, Moral Philosophy proceeds upon the supposition that there exists in the actions of men a moral quality, and that there are certain sequences connected with the exhibition of that quality—(**Wayland,** *Moral Science,* p. 24).

virium materialium reponendo—sed quale sit illud discrimen, utrum, scil., sit *extrinsecum* et *accidentale* an *intrinsecum* et *essentiale*. Hoc alterum discrimen fundatur in ipsa natura actuum humanorum et omnem legem positivam antecedit (moralitas *intrinseca*) ; prius vero discrimen debetur alicui rei ipsis actibus extrinsecæ, *v.g.*, voluntati superioris actum per se indifferentem præcipientis vel vetantis (moralitas *extrinseca*).

55. Jamvero, sunt qui negent ullos actus esse ex natura sua bonos vel malos, et proinde hi philosophi omne discrimen inter bonum et malum morale repetunt ex causa *extrinseca* et *positiva*, quorum igitur systema *Positivismus moralis* vocatur. Sed quum illa causa extrinseca possit esse *Deus* vel *homo*, habetur distinctio systematis in *Positivismum divinum* et *humanum*. Ille totum discrimen inter bonum et malum morale derivat a *libera Dei voluntate*, ita ut, Deo sic volente, alii actus (*v.g.*, blasphemia, mendacium), essent moraliter boni ; e contra vero, alii actus (*v.g.*, Dei cultus, veracitas) essent moraliter mali. Ita Cartesiani conformiter ad suam sententiam de fundamento essentiarum (*Ont.*, n. 309),[1] necnon plures Protestantes post Puffendorf.

Positivismus humanus causam discriminis reponit vel in influxu educationis, vel in opinionibus et consuetudinibus populorum, vel in lege civili (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 110-118).

Non affirmamus omnes actus humanos esse ex sua natura et independenter a quacumque ratione extrinseca bonos vel malos ; plures enim sunt ex se indifferentes et nonnisi consequenter ad aliquam legem sive

[1] " Quidam dixerunt nullum esse actum voluntatis ita malum, quin possit esse non malus, quamvis libere et humano modo fiat, quia putant omnem malitiam pendere ex voluntate Dei, quæ libera est in omnibus effectibus ad extra, quorum unus est prohibitio seu præceptum. Ita Nominales fere sentiunt ; Ochamus, . . . Gerson, . . et fere consentit Scotus in 4 dist. 26, q. 1, ubi tamen excipit odium Dei "—(**Suarez,** *De bon. et mal.*, dist. 7, s 1, n. 2).

divinam sive humanam boni malive evadunt. Negamus vero omnes actus esse hujusmodi.

56. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Actiones, quæ ex natura sua hominem ad finem ultimum conducunt, sunt ex natura sua ei moraliter bonæ, et e contra, actiones, quæ ex natura sua assecutionem hujus finis impediunt, moraliter malæ dicendæ sunt ; *atqui* aliæ actiones, ut actus amoris divini, ex natura sua hominem in suum finem ultimum conducunt ; aliæ vero eum ab hujus finis assecutione impediunt ; *ergo*. Ad rem **S. Thomas** : " Unicuique naturaliter conveniunt ea, quibus tendit in suum finem ultimum ; quæ autem e contrario se habent, sunt ei naturaliter inconvenientia. Ostensum est autem, quod homo naturaliter ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem. Ea igitur, quibus homo inducitur in cognitionem et amorem Dei, sunt *naturaliter recta ;* quæcumque vero e contrario se habent, sunt *naturaliter homini mala*. Patet igitur quod bonum et malum in humanis actibus non solum sunt *secundum legis positionem* sed etiam *secundum naturalem ordinem*" (*Cont. Gent.*, l. 3, c. 129).

II.—Omnes populi, barbari non minus quam culti, antiquiores simul cum recentibus, quadam persuasione insuperabili tenuerunt plurimas actiones semper et in omnibus quibuscumque adjunctis esse bonas moraliter ; et vicissim plurimas actiones semper et in omnibus quibuscumque adjunctis esse moraliter malas. *Atqui* hujus facti constantis et universalis ratio sufficiens reperiri non potest nisi in intrinseco et essentiali discrimine inter bonum et malum morale. Etenim imprimis quum hoc factum sit constans et universale, ratio facti pariter constans et universalis debet esse ; hæc autem alia esse nequit nisi ipsa intrinseca rerum natura.

Præterea, causæ extrinsecæ et contingenti referre persuasionem, quæ nec diuturnitate potest deleri nec tumultu passionum, quibus est maxime molesta, labe-

factari, est effectum sine causa adstruere. Denique hæc persuasio, utpote constans et universalis, errori obnoxia esse nequit.[1]

57. Nec valet objicere, "quod homines aliqui sint, qui *externe* contrarium profitentur ; quum id non judicio vere intellectuali, sed voluntatis potius arbitrio et quasi violenter faciant, sibi ipsis videlicet id persuasuri, si quo modo possent. Ceterum quidquid isti subjective sentiant, detrahere nihil possunt humani generis persuasioni, quam communem fuisse et esse omnium populorum ac temporum non minus historia, quam psychologia testatur, et quam gentilis quoque philosophia passim supponit" (**Meyer,** *op. cit.*, p. 120).

58. III.—Discrimen inter bonum et malum morale 1°. *non provenit a libera Dei voluntate,—a*) quia si antecedenter ad liberum divinæ voluntatis decretum nihil est moraliter bonum vel malum, neque consequenter ad tale decretum quidquam evadit moraliter bonum vel malum, quum in tali hypothesi Deo obedientiam præstare non esset ex seipso malum ; *b*) quia si nulla datur actio ex seipsa bona, nulla ex seipsa mala, sequitur nullam esse actionem adeo turpem et inhonestam, quin

[1] In the general moral course of human life there is nothing that comes out to view so strikingly as the distinction that exists between some actions as essentially good and others as essentially bad. This distinction is by its nature objective and intrinsic, universal and immutable. Being outside of the human faculties, it is not dependent on them or made by them, but springs from the very essence of things, and is the same everywhere and at all times. . . . The worship of the Deity, filial duty, justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, have been held to be laudable in themselves by all men, and at all times, and in all places ; whereas blasphemy, impiety, injustice, intemperance, etc., have been regarded as vicious always and everywhere. There is, therefore, between the morally good and the morally bad a fundamental distinction,—not changeable by any notion or efforts of men, and not suppressed by any viciousness or cruel legislation. It is the distinction that makes morals to be morals. Let it be capricious or changeable, and then what is essentially good to-day can be evil to-morrow ; injustice in one will be justice in another ; blasphemy now can be afterwards an act of virtue, and thus, the whole moral order being reversed, moral scepticism becomes a rule for human thought —(**Ronayne,** *God Knowable and Known*, p. 263).

ex libero divinæ voluntatis decreto decora et honesta fieri potuerit, et vicissim ; quod sane manifeste repugnat ipsi divinæ naturæ ; nam ut Deus blasphemiam, sui odium, etc., ut actus moraliter bonos decernat, debet seipsum existimare ut contumelia et odio dignum, et proinde ut ens valde imperfectum ; *c*) quia si ratio boni et mali moralis pendet unice a libera Dei voluntate, non possumus naturaliter, seu absque divina revelatione, scire quid Deus naturaliter præcipiat, quid prohibeat, et proinde cum Traditionalistis dicere necesse esset naturam humanam ineptam esse ad notitiam veritatum ordinis moralis assequendam citra divinum magisterium.

2°. Non provenit *a*) *ex educatione*, quia hæc pro diversis ætatibus diversisque regionibus mutatur ; judicium vero hominum de plurium saltem actionum moralitate semper et ubique idem plane et immutatum permanet ; *b*) nec *ex opinionibus et consuetudinibus*, tum quia hæ sunt maxime variabiles, tum quia non paucas opiniones et consuetudines ut turpes ac hominibus indignas repudiamus ; *c*) nec *ex lege civili*, quia (præterquam quod leges civiles diversissimæ sunt apud diversos populos), ideo lex humana obligare cognoscitur, quia prius omni lege humana cognoscitur hoc principium : *Moraliter bonum est legem humanam servare, moraliter malum est illam violare.* Porro, in hac sententia, nulla posset esse lex injusta, sed quidquid lex statueret, bonum esset ; malum vero quidquid vetaret. " Si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur " (**Cicero,** *De Leg.*, l. 1, c. 10). *Atqui* talem abnormitatem natura rationalis evidenter respuit (cf. *Cronin*, p. 111).

59. Cor.—Ergo antecedenter ad quamlibet voluntatem imperantem vel prohibentem inest pluribus actionibus bonitas vel malitia moralis, ratione cujus præcipi vel

prohiberi debent ; et ideo, *licet aliæ actiones sint bonæ vel malæ, quia præceptæ vel prohibitæ, aliæ tamen sunt præceptæ vel prohibitæ, quia bonæ vel malæ.*[1]

Generatim actiones præceptæ vel prohibitæ, quia bonæ vel malæ " sunt omnes, quæ hominem respectu finis ultimi recte disponunt, ut, *v.g.*, amor Dei, vel ab eo retrahunt, ut odium, contemptus Dei, blasphemia, etc. Item omnes actiones, quæ partem superiorem hominis inferiori subordinant, naturæ humanæ disconveniunt. Similiter actiones, quæ natura sua vitam socialem impediunt, ut homicidium, furtum, etc., sunt disconvenientes naturæ humanæ sociali " (**Cathrein,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 60).

60. Obj. 1.—Apud omnes gentes etiam excultas nonnunquam summa apparet discordia circa notitiam moralitatis, quæ discordia est evidens indicium non existere immutabilem, universalem, ideoque actibus humanis intrinsecam, moralitatem.

Resp.—Hæc discordia obtinet circa moralitatem extrinsecam et accidentalem, non vero circa moralitatem intrinsecam et essentialem saltem plurimarum actionum, *v.g.*, circa moralitatem veracitatis et mendacii, gratitudinis et ingratitudinis, pietatis et impietatis, etc., in quibus nimirum omnes, etiam gentes maxime feræ, moralitatem agnoscunt. Si vero in praxi umquam existit discordia circa moralitatem intrinsecam, id raro accidit ex defectu cognitionis, sed potius ex influxu indomitarum passionum, quas in vita practica et præsertim morali vim magnam exercere omnes norunt.[2]

[1] Some things are good in themselves and not merely inasmuch as they have been prescribed. They are prescribed because they are good, and that inasmuch as they are in accordance with necessary order. Some things are evil in themselves, and not merely inasmuch as they have been forbidden. They are forbidden because they are evil, inasmuch as they are opposed to that necessary order which springs from the nature of things. The things thus prescribed or forbidden are *intrinsically* either good or evil. Those things which being indifferent in themselves, and neither good nor evil, become good because they have been prescribed, or become evil because they have been forbidden, are said to be *extrinsically* good or evil—(**Humphrey,** *Conscience and Law*, p. 34).

[2] In the common language of mankind there are no words of more frequent occurrence than " good " and " bad," " right " and " wrong ; " " this thing ought to be done ; " " you have no right to

Obj. 2.—Si non existeret lex aut divina aut humana alias actiones præcipens alias prohibens, omnes essent moraliter indifferentes ; *ergo* moralitas a lege dependet.

Resp.—*Nego antecedens* et *suppositum*, nimirum moralitatem et obligationem idem esse. Latius enim patet moralitas quam obligatio. Huic quidem originem dat lex ; at plurimi actus (*v.g.*, actus charitatis heroicæ) sunt morales, qui tamen minime sunt obligatorii ; et proinde eorum omissio non est de se mala. Et " sunt multi actus boni, qui licet non sint optimi, et ideo non sint in consilio, nec etiam sint necessarii, et ideo non sint in præcepto, nihilominus sunt honesti et licite fieri possunt, ut actus matrimonii " (**Suarez**, *De leg.*, lib. 2, c. 7, n. 11).

Verum quidem est aliquos actus objective indifferentes fieri honestos vel inhonestos eo, quod a legislatore sive divino sive humano legitime præscribuntur aut vetantur, sed tunc etiam illa moralitas extrinseca, quam accipiunt, fundatur in alia intrinseca ; ideo enim illi actus objective indifferentes in honestos aut inhonestos convertuntur, quia intrinsece et sine ullo respectu ad præceptum sive divinum sive humanum superioribus obedire est honestum, eis non obtemperare inhonestum.

Obj. 3.—Si nulla esset lex divina, nullum esset peccatum ; *ergo* moralitas actus peccaminosi ex lege divina derivatur.

Resp.—Nullum esset peccatum theologicum, *i.e.*, transgressio contra legem divinam, *conc. :* nullum esset peccatum philosophicum, *i.e.*, difformitas, indecentia, repugnantia cum ipsa natura humana, *neg.*

that object ; " " A behaved nobly ; B's conduct was disgraceful." Such phrases as these are constantly in everybody's mouth, and whilst the application of them is one of the most abundant sources of disagreement, nobody fails to recognize and all are agreed upon the ideas conveyed. There are men to be found whose moral judgment is so unenlightened that they take as good conduct that which the verdict of mankind brands as wicked. This fact proves, not that such men are without the notion of right and wrong, but that they misapply it in their practical judgment of conduct. An enterprising Bedouin will rob, perhaps kill, a defenceless traveller without scruple, yet, at the same time, he will feel bound to respect the life and property of an enemy who has succeeded in putting himself under the ægis of hospitality. The standard which this man has of right and wrong is perverted ; but a standard of some kind he evidently recognizes and applies. A thief will steal your purse without ceasing to believe that it rightly belongs to you, and that he ought not to deprive you of your own. This notion of the difference between right and wrong, giving rise to duty and obligation, lies at the root of all morality—(**Fox**, *Cath. Univ. Bulletin*, v. 3, no. 3, p. 295).

ART. II.

DE ESSENTIA MORALITATIS.

§ 1. De Falsis Systematibus circa Moralitatis Essentiam.

61. THESIS IX.—Nec Utilitarismus, nec Sentimentalismus, nec Rationalismus moralis essentiam moralitatis explicat.

Stat. Quæst.—Utilitarismus seu Hedonismus[1] est systema, quod essentiam moralitatis collocat in utilitate actionum humanarum ad bona vitæ præsentis comparanda; et proinde moraliter bonæ vel malæ judicandæ sunt actiones, prout ad assecutionem horum bonorum conferunt vel non.[2] Triplex est :—

a) Utilitarismus *individualis* seu *egoisticus*, qui affirmat actiones esse moraliter bonas vel malas, prout agenti voluptatem et præprimis sensibilem afferunt vel non. Unde etiam vocatur *Sensualismus* et, post ejus auctorem, *Epicurismus*.[3]

b) Utilitarismus *socialis* seu *Altruismus*, qui statuit

[1] Recent writers on Ethics distinguish two systems of Hedonism—that of Egoistic and that of Universalistic Hedonism. The first is the doctrine that the end of each man is his own personal pleasure. The second is that the end of the individual is the pleasure of the whole race. But many Ethical writers use the word Hedonism to signify the first theory only, and Utilitarianism to signify the second—(**Cronin**, v. 1, p. 264).

[2] The principle which is common to all the forms of utilitarianism may be formulated as follows : *Utility is the true standard of morality : if you wish to know whether an action is good or bad morally, find out whether it is useful or not. If useful, it is good ; if hurtful, it is bad. Virtue, no doubt, is an excellent thing in its way, but it is excellent because it gives the greatest amount, and the highest order of pleasure.*

Here is the whole system, stripped of its accessories and of its sentimental dress. For the thoroughgoing utilitarian there is no difference between utility and morality—they are convertible terms —(**Holaind**, *Nat. Law and Legal Practice*, p. 118).

[3] Egoistic Hedonism has been generally abandoned. Its chief upholders were the ancient Cyrenaics and Epicureans. Some more modern writers, however,—such as Bentham and Mill—did not clearly distinguish between egoistic and universalistic Hedonism, and, consequently, though in the main supporting only the latter, often seemed to be giving their adhesion to the former—(**MacKenzie**, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 241).

actiones esse bonas vel malas moraliter, prout prosperitatem societatis humanæ promovent vel impediunt. Præcipui ejus fautores, nonnihil tamen ab invicem differentes, sunt *Bentham, Mill, Comte, Littrè, Lotze* (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 305 sqq.).[1]

c) Utilitarismus *individualis-socialis*, qui utilitati individuali et sociali simul consulit. Hanc theoriam *Herbert Spencer*, "Evolutionismi philosophus," conformiter ad systema Evolutionismi, fuse elaboravit in suo opere *The Data of Ethics*.[2] Moraliter bonæ, juxta

[1] Modern hedonism, gradually developing through the successive modifications made by Paley, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, differs from the old chiefly because it professes to take for its standpoint, not the individual, but society or mankind. The old hedonism was egoistic, the new altruistic Paley progressed but little beyond the old hedonistic lines, recognizing no difference in pleasures, except in their continuance and degrees of intensity, and his utilitarianism is still egoistic. Bentham admitted a variable value, but laid down no principle by which to discriminate higher from lower pleasures; and he advanced towards the altruistic position. J. S. Mill, rejecting the narrow and obviously false principle that all pleasures are alike in quality, endeavoured to give the system a wider basis by distinguishing between the higher and lower pleasures, and holding that quality is of more importance than quantity. Besides, he makes the happiness which is the end of conduct, not the individual's, but society's. The introduction into hedonism of these two principles ruins utilitarianism. He fails to reconcile egoism with altruism, or to show any basis for distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures—(**Fox,** *loc. cit.*, p. 293).

[2] The entirely empirical value given to morality in Mill's system was observed by H. Spencer, who endeavoured, by bringing the theory of evolution to bear on conduct, to rehabilitate utilitarianism, and give its morality a necessary character by deducing from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness.

These two philosophers have not evolved from their own principles any practical code of morality. They have appropriated the existing one, founded on natural, and developed under the influence of supernatural religion. Ardent advocates of a positive philosophy which denies or ignores all religion, they reject those fundamental principles which sustain the moral law. Then, that the entire structure may not tumble into ruin, they set themselves to the task of constructing out of their own creeds a support to fill the vacuum left by the rejected corner-stone. Though Mill taxes Mr. Spencer with being a foe to utilitarianism, and the Spencerian theory of Ethics is founded on the doctrine of evolution, with which Mill has no concern, yet their leading principle is the same: happiness constitutes the good, and the right and wrong of conduct are decided by the criterion of pleasure and pain—(*Idem, ib.*).

Spencer, sunt actiones, quæ vitam tum agentis tum aliorum augent et conservant, exclusa omni doloris admixtione. Homines enim, sic ille, primum non aliud appetiverunt quam suam utilitatem et voluptatem; deinde vero, societate humana inita, alii aliis sese accommodabant et nexibus socialibus ad invicem sese ligabant. Ex hac mutua beneficentia evenit, ut singuli utilitati aliorum studentes propriam voluptatem percipiebant, simulque quasdam inclinationes sociales evolvebant, quæ per hereditatem transmissæ in leges morales transibant. Admittit quidem *Spencer*, propter præsentem imperfectam generis humani evolutionem, nondum existere harmoniam, sed potius oppositionem, inter utilitatem individualem et socialem, ideoque modum agendi omnibus numeris honestum nondum esse possibilem, et proinde nonnumquam temperamenta ("compromises") inter utramque fieri oportet. Progrediente vero evolutione morali hæc oppositio cessabit. Tunc enim singuli homines ita societati accommodabuntur, ut quærendo et promovendo utilitatem socialem maximam voluptatem propriam accipient (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 358 sqq.).[1]

[1] How personal happiness is the ultimate end and social welfare the proximate end, the latter being a means to the former, he [*H. Spencer*] shows in the following line of thought. Perfect happiness, the greatest possible happiness of each and all, coincides with perfect morality, that is, the highest evolved conduct of the highest evolved being. For perfect moral conduct is the perfect adjustment of our actions to the completion of life. But every act perfectly adjusted to its proper end is pleasurable, and even purely pleasurable, if the adjustment is altogether complete, as, on the contrary, every act incompletely adjusted is more or less painful. Want of adjustment is the cause of all our pains, and the perfection of it the source of all our happiness. At first man is incompletely adapted to the social state, his self-regarding impulses yet prevailing. Hence struggles arise in man between his egoistic and altruistic instincts, struggles among individuals, the one committing aggressions on the other for egoistic purposes, and, if society is once formed, struggles among different nations. Even when the warlike state has passed by, and peace and industry are fostered, there yet remains for a long time an imperfect adaptation to industrial life, and a disproportion between mankind and the environments from which it derives its means of subsistence. But, as evolution

Ad Utilitarismum socialem accedit *Progressus socialis*, qui moralitatis essentiam reponit in progressu culturæ, scientiarum et artium (Ita *Wundt*).

Essentiam Utilitarismi sic expressit *Pius IX* (*Syll.*, § 8, n. 58): " . . . Omnis morum disciplina honestasque collocari debet in cumulandis et augendis quovis modo divitiis ac in voluptatibus explendis."

62. Sentimentalismus, statuens quemdam sensum moralem ab intellectu distinctum, docet actiones nostras esse honestas vel inhonestas, prout sunt huic sensui conformes vel ab ipso difformes, vel prout determinant in nobis sympathiam aut antipathiam, benevolentiam aut malevolentiam, etc. Hoc systema defendunt quidam præsertim ex schola scotica.[1]

ever goes on, adjustments become ever more perfect. At last a stage of mankind will come in which wars will be abolished and industry will be predominant. The population will then be in proportion to the means of subsistence afforded, the human organism will be healthy and fitted for the highest intellectual activity, undue egoistic impulses will be habitually restrained, sympathy will be fully developed, and social functions will be spontaneous. Adaptation thus having reached its highest degree, pain will be reduced to its minimum, and every action will yield the purest pleasure.

This is the normal state of mankind, in which all is perfect, and every perfection assumes an ideal form, the climax of evolution and morality, the paradise of happiness, the fullness of the purest pleasures, in which, as in his ultimate end, man shall find his final rest. It is a happiness, however, which, though enjoyed by all, is essentially personal. For, arising as it does from individual adjustments, it is directly the gratification of everyone's individual desires and inclinations. Yet co-operation is therefore not excluded, but is, on the contrary, required, both to reach the necessary adjustment and to enjoy beatific bliss. For the requisite adjustment can be attained only in social life, and perfect bliss results, to a great extent, from the pleasures of all shared by each through disinterested sympathy. In short, general happiness refers to special happiness as a means to the end. Such is the new heaven promised by Herbert Spencer, to be enjoyed, not in an uncertain life to come, but on earth, in the natural course of things and according to the laws of the visible universe—(**Ming,** *Data,* etc., p. 48).

[1] That there is a special faculty for the perception of Ethical distinctions among acts, and for that end alone, has been the assumption underlying many Ethical theories both ancient and modern. What that faculty is, whether it is a perceptive sense, a feeling or sentiment, a spiritual power, or even a Divine power transcending, yet dwelling in, human nature, are questions in which schools are very much

63. Rationalismus moralis contendit moralitatem unice pendere ex ratione humana, et proinde actiones esse honestas unice quia dictamini rationis sunt conformes, et malas quia ab hujus dictamine discrepant. Hoc systema antiquitus professi sunt *Stoici*, quorum formula (quæ non ut verba sonant, sed ut ab ipsis intellecta, est falsa) fuit : " *naturæ convenienter vivere.*" Naturam, cui convenienter vivendum est, intellexerunt rationalem, ita ut motus passionum tamquam omnino rationi contrarii habendi sint. In " apathia " virtutem constituerunt. Horum errorem suscitavit *Kant*, juxta quem ratio practica, quæ, si Kantio fidas, identica est cum voluntate, est finis in se, norma ultima et absoluta moralitatis, simulque lex universalis, quæ " imperativo categorico " se manifestat hoc judicio synthetico a priori : *Sic age, ut dictamen tuæ rationis lex universalis agendi constitui possit.*[1] Dicitur *categoricus*, quia categorice,

divided. Jouffroi claimed that it was a sense akin to the ordinary five; Fichte and Bradley that it was a rational sentiment or feeling ; Reid and Hutcheson that it was a sense of decidedly spiritual nature, more affective than perceptive, but distinct from every other faculty within us ; More, that it was a purely spiritual faculty, worthy of a separate name, the " boniform faculty "—to distinguish it off from the ordinary Reason to which it is allied. But on one matter these theories are all in agreement, viz., on the originality of the moral faculty—that is, on its separateness from every other faculty and on the limited character of the function assigned it—that of cognising moral distinctions, or rather the moral qualities of acts—(**Cronin,** v. 1, p. 451).

[1] Kant is led to give, as the content of the categorical imperative, this formula : "Act only on that maxim (or principle) which thou canst, at the same time, will to become a universal law." He illustrates the application of this formula by taking such a case as that of breaking promises. It is wrong to break a promise, because the breach of a promise is a kind of action which could not be universalised. If it were a universal rule that everyone were to break his promise whenever he felt inclined, no one would place any reliance on promises. Promises, in fact, would cease to be made. And, of course, if they were not made, they could not be broken. Hence it would be impossible for everyone to break his promise. And, since it is impossible for everyone, it must be wrong for anyone. The essence of wrong doing consists in making an exception. Similarly it may easily be shown that we could not, without a certain absurdity, have universal suicide, or universal stealing, or even universal indifference to the misfortunes of others. Since, then, we cannot really will that such

i.e., absolute, suiipsius gratia, non conditionate et hypothetice, imperat.

Huic principio rationis parendum est ex pura reverentia legis, non vero intuitu alicujus boni obventuri aut alterius motivi præter ipsam legem. Unde, ut actus existimetur honestus, oportet voluntas agat non tantum *secundum* legem, sed etiam *propter* legem, *i.e.*, præcise quia actus præcipitur ; secus enim actus, licet *legalis* quidem, non esset bonus seu moralis, sed turpis (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 245 sqq.).[1]

64. Prob. Thesis.—Pars 1ª (*Utilitarismus non explicat essentiam moralitatis*). **Arg. I.**—Fundamentum Utilitarismi in eo consistit 1°. quod ultimus finis hominis situs est in possessione bonorum hujus præsentis vitæ, et 2°. quod actus humani sunt moraliter boni vel mali, prout conferunt vel non conferunt ad horum bonorum assecutionem ; *atqui* 1°. ultimum finem hominis non consistere in possessione bonorum hujus vitæ jam probatum est (n. 35) ; ex quo sequitur 2°. falso supponi actus humanos moraliter bonos vel malos esse, prout conferunt vel non conferunt ad prædictum finem. Quod sane probatur *a*) ex conscientia, quæ testatur non quemcumque actum ad bonum individuorum vel societatis conducentem eo ipso esse moraliter bonum, nec quemcumque actum tali bono adversantem eo ipso esse moraliter

acts should be done by everyone, we have no right to will that we ourselves should do them. In fact, the moral law is : Act only in such a way as you could will that everyone else should act under the same general conditions—(**MacKenzie,** *Manual of Ethics*, p. 191).

[1] In Kant's opinion human reason is supreme, absolute, an end untoitself. Hence, he infers that its dictates are the supreme standard, and must be obeyed on their own account, insomuch that in complying with them out of mere respect for their authority the very essence of morality consists. Obedience to them from any other motive, or from the desire of any good to be obtained, he would not regard as moral. Even happiness as the supreme good, and virtue as the necessary condition of the latter, ought not to be aspired to for their own desirableness, but because reaosn by its laws commands us to create them—(**Ming**, p. 113).

malum.[1] Nam, ut *Cicero* apposite notat, " nemo est qui hanc affectionem animi non probet atque laudet, qua non modo utilitas nulla quæritur, sed contra utilitatem etiam servatur fides " (*De fin. bon. et mal.* lib. 5, c. 22); *b*) ex sensu communi hominum, quum sint actiones plurimæ, quæ licet ad temporalem hujus vitæ prosperitatem obtinendam maxime conferant, nihilominus sententia omnium ut turpes reprobantur; et, e contrario, sint actiones, quæ, licet minime ad illam prosperitatem conducant, immo maxime ei opponantur, tamen ut bonæ et laudabiles ab omnibus existimantur.[2]

[1] When moralists assert that what we call virtue derives its reputation solely from its utility, and that the interest of the agent is the one motive to practise it, our first question is naturally how far this theory agrees with the feelings and with the language of mankind. But if tested by this criterion, there never was a doctrine more emphatically condemned than utilitarianism. In all its stages, and in all its assertions, it is in direct opposition to common sentiments. In all nations, and in all ages, the ideas of interest and utility on the one hand, and virtue on the other, have been regarded by the multitude as perfectly distinct, and all languages recognize the distinction. The terms, honour, justice, rectitude or virtue, and their equivalents in every language, present to the mind ideas essentially and broadly differing from the terms, prudence, sagacity, or interest. The two lines of conduct may coincide, but they are never confused, and we have not the slightest difficulty in imagining them antagonistic—(**Lecky,** *European Morals*, v. 1, p. 34).

[2] We will make bold to suggest an instance in which conscience strictly prohibits a practice, distinctly beneficial to the material progress and welfare of the human race. . . . In all circumstances, but especially in congested centres, where the populations are unusually dense, and life, even for the strong and healthy, is a hard and continuous struggle, it would be a very great advantage (merely, of course, from a *utilitarian* point of view) to destroy, by some painless anæsthetic, every diseased, deformed, or hopelessly imbecile infant as soon as possible after it is born. Any unbiassed man, looking *exclusively to the terrestrial good of the race as a whole*, and to the formation of a more robust and healthier people, and to an exchequer less burdened by debt, must confess that the practice of such a carefully discriminating infanticide would be a decided gain. . . .

A practice so beneficial as this, when once introduced, should most assuredly (on the evolutionary hypothesis) have impressed the human conscience with a sense of its utility, and become binding as a permanently fixed moral institution. And since such " moral sentiments as tend to the improvement of the tribe must be not only self-preserving but self-accumulating, under utilitarian sway of natural selection," the practice should by this date have secured for itself not merely

65. *Dices:* Nihil est vere utile nisi honestum sit; *ergo* utile et honestum sunt unum idemque.

Resp.—Ergo vera utilitas actionis ex ejus honestate, non vero honestas ex utilitate dijudicanda est. "Est nihil utile (inquit *Cicero*) quod idem non honestum, nec quia utile, honestum est, sed quia honestum, utile" (*De Off.*, l. 3, c. 30). Adversarii confundunt bonum utile, quod habet tantum rationem medii ad aliud bonum acquirendum, cum ipso bono honesto, quod sui causa appeti potest, quamvis in aliud ducat.[1]

66. II.—Utilitarismus aut individualis est aut socialis aut individualis-socialis; *atqui* in nullo ex his inveniri potest moralitatis essentia.

tolerance, but the highest approval of moralists. To destroy unprofitable infants should be one of the highest and sublimest virtues, almost qualifying for canonization. So much for the postulate of the theory. But what is the fact? While from a *purely utilitarian* point of view its advantages are *self-evident and undeniable*, nevertheless, from a moral point of view, its deformity and iniquity are more self-evident still. No Christian would or could allow it—(**Vaughan,** *Faith and Folly*, p. 156, ed. 2ª).

[1] For the thoroughgoing utilitarian there is no difference between utility and morality—they are convertible terms. The first question suggested by the theory is this: As a fact, is it true that utility and morality mean the same thing? When a man says that such an action is morally good, does he mean that it is useful? And when he says that another act is morally wrong, does he mean that it is hurtful? The answer must evidently be negative, and the two concepts are different. When we say that to help the needy is morally good, we mean that it is in accordance with a standard of right which our mind accepts as absolutely true, whether or not the action be useful to ourselves or to others. Our help may be misapplied by the recipient, and involve on our part a sacrifice, without bringing as a compensation the good of our neighbour; but, if so, it is the fault of the recipient, not ours. If our gift has been dictated by charity and regulated by prudence, we feel that the action is truly good, its accidental sequence having nothing to do with its intrinsic worth. Again, when we say that to secure a competence for our old age is useful, we do not consider *how* the competence is secured. It may be by means which are in themselves wrong, and consequently the act of saving or accumulating may have been tainted with moral obliquity; yet the act of securing what will be needed at a future period remains useful to us, perhaps to others. No doubt, in the long run, utility and morality must coincide—at least if we admit a final judgment by which each one will be rewarded or punished according to his deeds; but, in the meantime, utility and morality may walk different paths, to meet only when utility is final, and has reached the supreme good—(**Holaind,** *Nat. Law and Legal Practice*, p. 118).

1°. *Non in Utilitarismo individuali, a*) quia, ex una parte, hæc theoria condemnat ut moraliter malas omnes actiones, quæ in privatam utilitatem non conferunt, et proinde mortem subire in defensionem religionis, patriæ, etc., actiones nimirum sententia omnium gloriosissimas, scelestissimas existimare necesse habet ; et, ex altera parte, dum approbat omnes actiones, quæ in privatam utilitatem temporalem conferunt, *egoismum* summam virtutem constituit ; eo autem minus (ut omnes sentiunt et profitentur) bonitatis moralis habet aliqua actio, quo magis ob utilitatem temporalem et privatam ponitur ; *b*) quia funditus diruit virtutem, quoniam, assignando utilitatem privatam ut finem ultimum hominis, unumquemque a Deo et societate independentem facit, nec Dei gloriam nec societatis bonum, sed suum personale commodum quisque quærere tenetur ;[1] *c*) quia perpetuam et necessariam ordinis socialis perturbationem inducit ; nam si finis ultimus hominis est utilitas propria temporalis, unusquisque tenetur summam propri-

[1] This system, so far from furnishing a true standard of morality, is a real negation of it. The philosophy of pleasure, according to its advocates, is merely subjective ; its measure and joys are only in the soul, and, as they maintain, are its highest good, its *summum bonum*. This philosophy is consequently as changeable as are the dispositions of men, and is modified by age, education, and talent. In its working such a *norma* of moral action would be the perversion of all moral notions. If pleasure alone were to be the rule of the good, then religion itself would be commendable only inasmuch as it were pleasurable, and things that in themselves are reeking all over with moral turpitude would be good when pleasurable, and evil only when painful. Then, too, duty's sanction would be pain or pleasure, and conscience should be guided in its rulings only by the disagreeable or delectable. How such a base rule of conduct would work for evil every day's experience bears witness to. The pleasurable, unfortunately, is the rule of life which many follow, and to what horrors of degradation it leads them the world itself is almost ashamed to record. Still such is the standard of moral worth upheld by such writers as Hume, Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and even Mr. Herbert Spencer, who defines that " the good is universally the pleasurable." These writers, however, protest that they have nothing to do with Epicurus, and disclaim all connection with the voluptuous philosophy of Aristippus. Pleasure, they say, to be a fit rule of action, must be limited by the useful, or utilitarianism is the ground and law of life—(**Ronayne,** p. 267).

am utilitatem quærere, in qua quærenda utilitas summa unius cum summa utilitate alterius vel totius societatis componi nequit ; et proinde (pro diversitate finis, quem quisque sibi proponit obtinendum) uni, utpote dominandi ambitioso, utile et hinc honestum erit alios homines sibi subjicere vel etiam opprimere ; alteri, quia nimirum opum penuria laborat, utile et honestum erit has opes aliis hominibus arripere, et sic de ceteris ; quæ consequentiæ procul dubio admitti debent, si honestum cum privato bono temporali coincidit.[1]

2°. *Nec in Utilitarismo sociali, a*) quia repugnat personali dignitati hominis, qui numquam tamquam ens irrationale in merum medium in commodum societatis immolandum converti potest ; nec, quum animam immortalem habeat, licet ei bonum societatis suum finem ultimum constituere, etsi ad bonum istius societatis adlaborare debeat, dum in ea vitam degit ;[2] *b*) quia, quum

[1] Take, for instance, the good old precept, " Thou shalt not steal." I urge this injunction upon a young man who has a fair chance to run away with $100,000, or to a politician who is offered a share of State money, in so discreet a manner that no trace of the transaction shall remain to fix the guilt on the perpetrator of the crime. He replies, reasonably enough : " Why should I not steal ? " " Because it is for the general interest, which is, in truth, your own interest, that you should not. Don't you see ? Some day, when you feel secure in the possession of your wealth, a gang of robbers may conspire against you, rob you of all your money, perhaps kill you." " May—yes ; but I shall take good care that they do not. Moreover, the danger is so remote that I am willing to take the risk. Meanwhile, I'll fill my pockets and go to foreign parts ; it is not every day that a fellow gets a chance to capture $100,000. Hypocrites (whom you call honest people) never get such chances, or do not know how to avail themselves, and they have to drudge and live from hand to mouth. Serve them right—honesty, when conflicting with utility, is thoroughly immoral." " But this is contrary to the greatest happiness of the greatest number." " I don't know ; this money does not do much good here, and I intend to use it well. Besides, why should I sacrifice my own interest to the happiness of men whom I do not know, who, perhaps, are yet unborn ? Is not pleasure the sovereign master ? I find great pleasure in laying my hands on this little bundle of papers ; hence it is supremely moral to take them "—(**Holaind,** p. 128).

[1] Altruism overlooks the fact that man, as compared with other men , is a *person*, the centre of his own acts, not a *thing*, to be entirely referred to others. He is in relation with others, as child, father, husband, master, citizen ; but these relations do not take up the

theoria non assignet quænam actiones ad bonum societatis conferant, quænam non conferant, unusquisque potest sub specie boni ad utilitatem societatis conferentis actiones atrocissimas patrare easque ut honestas et laudabiles jactare ;[1] *c*) quia, quum systema reprobet omnes actiones, quæ ad communem utilitatem non conferunt, simulque approbet omnes actiones, quæ huc referuntur, ex una parte actus interni vel etiam externi ad bonum et malum sociale nihil conducentes, necnon actus hominis extra societatem degentis, omnes mali habendi sunt ; ex altera parte omnia guberniorum edicta quantumvis iniqua, dummodo ad bonum commune ordinentur ut honesta et sancta haberi debent. Quod sane defen-

whole man. There is a residue within,—an inner being and life which is not referable to any creature outside himself, but only to his Creator. For this inner being man is responsible to God alone. The good of this, the " inner man of the heart," is each individual's proper and primary care. . . .

Another confusion that the Greatest Happiness Principle involves is the mistaking the political for the ethical end of life. The political end, which it is the statesman's business to aim at, and the citizen's duty to subserve, is " the natural happiness of the commonwealth, and of individuals as members of the commonwealth, that they may live in it in peace and justice, and with a sufficiency of goods for the preservation and comfort of bodily life, and with that amount of moral rectitude which is necessary for this outward peace and preservation of the commonwealth, and the perpetuity of the human race "—(**Suarez**, *De Leg.*, iii., xi., 7). This is all the good that the Utilitarian contemplates. He is satisfied to make a good *citizen*, a good *husband*, a good *father*, for the transactions of this life. He has no concern to make a good *man*, up to the ethical standard, which supposes the observance of the whole natural law, duties to God, and duties within himself, as well as duties to human society, and by this observance the compassing of the everlasting happiness of the man's own individual soul—(**Rickaby,** *Moral Phil.*, p. 182).

[1] If a man be convinced that nothing which is useful can possibly be criminal, if it be in his power, by perpetrating what is called a crime, to obtain an end of great immediate utility, and if he is able to secure such absolute secrecy as to render it perfectly certain that his act cannot become an example, and cannot, in consequence, exercise any influence on the general standard of morals, it appears demonstrably certain that, on utilitarian principles, he would be justified in performing it. If what we call virtue be only virtue *because* it is useful, it can only be virtuous *when* it is useful. The question of the morality of a large number of acts must, therefore, depend on the probability of their detection, and a little hypocrisy must often, not merely in appearance, but in reality, convert a vice into a virtue—(**Lecky,** p. 43).

sores systematis per inauditam impudentiam asserere non hæsitant ; nam " tum cujusque sanctissimi juramenti violatio, tum quælibet scelesta flagitiosaque actio sempiternæ legi repugnans, non solum haud esse improbanda," inquiunt, " verum etiam omnino licita, summisque laudibus efferenda, quando id pro patriæ amore agatur " (**Pius IX.,** *Syllab.* prop. 64).

3°. *Non in Utilitarismo individuali-sociali, a*) quia hic nullam statuit normam, qua determinetur utrum utilitas propria utilitati sociali an utilitas socialis utilitati propriæ præferri debeat, quoties occurrit actio, quæ alteram promovet, alteram impedit ; *b*) quia nullam moralitatem iis tribuit actionibus, quæ vel solum individuo vel solum communitati prosunt, dum simul approbat omnes actiones etiam turpissimas, quæ ad bonum privatum et publicum conducunt ; *c*) quia theoria hæc incidit in Utilitarismum individualem moralitatem cum voluptate confundentem ; " practicus enim modus propriam et alienam delectationem conciliandi, quotiescumque delectationi propriæ propter alienam renuntiatur, non habetur, nisi ut ex ipso hoc sacrificio alia delectatio quæratur, aut ex laude aliorum, aut ex repræsentatione propriæ virtutis, aut ex spe retributionis, aut ex ipso sympathetico quodam affectu. Unde, hoc systema nonnisi ad subtiliorem quemdam egoismum dirigit, qui specie nobilitatis cujusdam illudit " (**Costa-Rossetti,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 118).[1]

Non est, cur immoremur in systemate Progressus culturæ refellendo, tum quia nihil habet cum moralitate

[1] Granted that it is an end of this life to contribute towards other people's happiness, this being a means to attain self-happiness, the motive of benefiting others will always be egoistic. The most generous beneficence will then consist in doing good to others for the reason that doing so is a source of special self-gratification—a way of dealing just as selfish as assistance given to the poor for the purpose of being loved and honoured by them. The much vaunted conciliation between the pursuit of general and personal happiness turns out to be the absolute reign of egoism—(**Ming,** *Data*, etc., p. 67).

cummune, tum quia proponit normam pluribus omnino imperviam.[1]

67. PARS 2ª (*Sentimentalismus non explicat essentiam moralitatis*). **Arg.**—Id, secundum quod actiones intrinsece honestæ ab intrinsece inhonestis decernuntur, debet esse objectivum, immutabile, certum ; nam quidquid judicamus intrinsece honestum vel inhonestum, id a parte rei et absolute tale esse affirmamus, quemadmodum affirmamus circulum a parte rei et absolute esse rotundum. *Atqui* Sentimentalismus moralitati adimit omnem objectivitatem, immutabilitatem, certitudinem. Et revera :—

Adimit *objectivitatem*, quia si sensus moralis instinctive operatur, non habemus, quo securi reddamur de conformitate hujus operationis cum objectivo ordine morali ; " nam (præterquam quod multi ideo sensum moralem admittunt, quia rationem ineptam habent ad moralitatem dijudicandam), judicium intellectus solo gustu vel instinctu subjectivo innixum mere subjecti-

[1] Taken in the abstract, progress is merely a word ; but viewed in the concrete, it possesses only what is put into it. As generally used, the word stands for material or scientific development, and to speak of it in this sense as furnishing the materials of morals would be tantamount to speaking of the morality of a railroad or the electric telegraph. Sometimes, however, it is made to stand for culture, which, in the minds of its votaries, implies some moral excellence. In its range it embraces education in all its methods and departments, together with the opinions and manners and customs of civilized society. Now to form one, absolute, unchangeable moral type out of these elements, partial, changeable, and contradictory, is more than even Moses could have done. But does culture by itself imply morality ? To have an eye for the beautiful, to be an acute art-critic, to have a graceful literary style, do not, by themselves, necessarily imply any moral excellence ; again, in regard to scientific attainments, no one would hold that the *Principia* of Newton are the data of ethics, that the law of gravitation is a moral law, or that the invention of the telescope was in itself a moral act ; and, furthermore, in general, it will be granted that bare intellectualism does not make morals. It is known to all that simple-minded, illiterate persons have often been found to possess an exalted moral sense, and to lead the purest moral lives, having nothing to guide them but a few points of doctrine and the voice of conscience within them. While, on the other hand, it is notorious that persons of high intellectual culture have been worthless in point of morals—(**Ronayne,** *God Knowable and Known*, p. 273).

vum erit, nec intellectus ullum objectivum, internum, immutabile et universale discrimen percipere et dijudicare poterit" Nec valet dicere "Deum ita sensum moralem conformasse, ut ejus affectiones sint objectivo ordini morali conformes; hoc enim *a*) probari nequit, nisi ordo objectivus ratione cognoscatur; at si ita est, ratio ipsa aptissima est ad moralitatem dijudicandam, sensus vero moralis superfluus erit; dein *β*) si ita esset, Deus certe effecisset, ut omnibus hominibus esset persuasum sensum optimum ducem esse in vita morali, quod minime obtinet; ex omnium enim intima persuasione morales controversiæ gustu dirimi non possunt, nec per adagium: 'de gustibus non est disputandum,' quod in moralibus absurdum est" (**Costa-Rossetti,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 122).

Adimit *immutabilitatem*, quia affectus, qui morales vocantur, a diversis statibus agentis maxime dependent, et proinde pro hominis ætate, indole mentali, corporis constitutione, educatione, etc., variantur, immo in eodem homine non semper iidem manent circa idem objectum.

Adimit *certitudinem*, quia sensus moralis instinctive et absque comparativa terminorum cognitione judicia moralia elicere asseritur; *atqui* judicia elicita absque cognitione relationis inter terminos vigentis nequeunt esse judicia *certa*, quippe quæ in clara terminorum cognitione innituntur; *ergo*.

68. Porro, hæc theoria facultatem aut inutilem aut superfluam homini tribuit:—*inutilem*, si cum Materialistis hanc facultatem esse organicam affirmas, quia facultas organica non porrigitur ultra facta particularia, concreta, temporanea; moralitas autem actionum est aliquid universale, abstractum, relativum, a tempore et loco independens (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 463-6);—*superfluam*, si cum aliis eam inorganicam consideras, quum omnis facultas inorganica, quocumque nomine vocetur, ad in-

tellectum vel voluntatem reduci debeat. Et re quidem vera, facultates, ipsis sensus moralis fautoribus annuentibus, tunc solum ut realiter distinctæ haberi debent, quando earum operationes et objecta formalia in idem reduci nequeunt. *Atqui* laudatus sensus moralis aut est facultas cognoscitiva, tuncque ejus operationes versantur circa verum, quod est objectum intellectus ; aut est facultas appetitiva, quo in casu ejus operationes versantur circa bonum, quod constituit objectum voluntatis. Frustra igitur ingeritur facultas specialis ab his realiter distincta.[1]

69. *Dices :* Omnes, non exceptis philosophis scholasticis, admittunt sensum moralem ; *ergo.*

Resp.—Admittunt sensum moralem proprie dictum, *neg.*, improprie et metaphorice loquendo, ad exprimendam sensibilem affectionem, quæ naturaliter sequitur apprehensionem boni vel mali moralis, necnon quamdam aptitudinem sive innatam sive acquisitam vel infusam, quæ animæ inest ad judicia circa res morales formanda, *conc.* Unde in libro Sapientiæ (c. 7) dicitur : " Optavi et datus est mihi *sensus.*"[2]

[1] Applying the principle known as *Occham's razor*, that " entities are not to be multiplied without reason," we refuse to acknowledge any Moral Sense, distinct from Intellect. We know of no peculiar faculty specially made to receive " ideas, pleasures and pains in the moral order " (Mackintosh). Most of all, we emphatically protest against any blind power being accredited as the organ of morality. We cannot accept for our theory of morals that everything is right which warms the breast with a glow of enthusiasm, and all those actions wrong at which emotional people are prone to cry out, *dreadful, shocking*. We cannot accept emotions for arbitrators, where it most concerns reasonable beings to have what the Apostle calls " enlightened eyes of the heart " (Eph. i. 18), that we may " know to refuse the evil and to choose the good " (Isaias vii. 15). A judge may have his emotions, but his charge to the jury must be dictated, not by his heart, but by his knowledge of the law. And the voice of conscience, whatever feelings it may stir, must be an intellectual utterance. . . . A subjective and emotional standard of right and wrong is as treacherous and untrustworthy as the emotional justification of those good people who come of a sudden to " feel converted "—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 141).

[2] If you ask whether there is a moral sense different from the intellect, by which truths of the moral order may be perceived, I answer that I do not like the word " sense " in this connection. It is apt to convey the idea of something organic, gross ; whereas it is only the

70. PARS 3ª (*Rationalismus moralis non explicat essentiam moralitatis*). **Arg.**—Rationalismus moralis affirmat rationem humanam unicam normam moralitatis esse ; *atqui* hoc assertum multiplicem errorem involvit. Enimvero 1°. supponit omne discrimen inter honestum et inhonestum esse mere subjectivum ; nam si ratio humana unica est norma nec datur norma ulterior, a qua in judicando de rebus moralibus pendeat, actiones humanæ ideo erunt bonæ vel malæ, quia ratio humana eas bonas vel malas esse judicat, non e converso, ratio humana ideo judicat eas esse bonas vel malas, quia in seipsis ita sunt ; *atqui* hoc perinde est ac dicere discrimen inter bonum et malum morale a ratione humana pendere seu esse mere subjectivum, quum, si daretur discrimen objectivum, eo ipso daretur norma objectiva, a qua ratio et rationis judicium mensuram haberent.

2°. Contra testimonium conscientiæ (quo quisque intime conscius est propriam suiipsius rationem non condere, sed cognoscere veritates et leges morales atque juxta eas ad operandum moraliter constringi) fingit rationem humanam esse sui legislatricem, seu eam non habere suam rectitudinem ab alio, sed esse *de se* rectam. Jamvero, quod est de se rectum, nullo umquam in casu non rectum fieri potest ; *atqui* ratio humana haud raro non solum non-recta est, sed etiam corrupta, ut cujusque experientia docet.[1]

spiritual faculty—the intellect—that can perceive the moral order. If however by moral sense you mean some spiritual habit, . . . different from the intellect itself, being a modification of intellect ; and different from all other intellectual modifications whereby we become acquainted with the other sciences ; if by moral sense you mean a peculiar intellectual habit of this kind, I reply that there is such a thing, not merely for moral science, but for every science or department of science that it is possible to distinguish. Only remember that it is the same soul that understands and wills, and the same faculty of understanding—the intellect—that is moved this way or that, according as it perceives truths of this or that kind or department,—physics, mathematics, psychology, ethics, and the rest—(**M'Donald,** *Principles of Moral Science,* p. 50).

[1] Another school of modern thought holds that reason alone, without any reference to a Supreme Being, is the sole, ultimate, and objective

3°. Delet omne discrimen inter bonum obligatorium et bonum non obligatorium seu liberum ; nam si bonum morale consistit in eo, quod actio fit secundum categoricum imperativum et propter reverentiam legis, id quod est bonum confunditur cum eo, quod est præceptum ; aliis verbis : quod fit juxta præscriptum legis, sed non præcise quia præscriptum est seu ob puram legis reverentiam, id objective quidem *legale* est, sed subjective et moraliter est *turpe*. Quod sane " est fundamentum totius doctrinæ Kantianæ, ex quo omnia reliqua dependent. Sed tantum abest, ut id possit (cum Kantio) ex communi opinione supponi, ut potius eidem adversetur. Nam homines sæpe actiones vocant honestas, quæ nulla lege præcipiuntur, *v.g.*, si quis ultro se servitio pauperum et ægrotorum vel obsequio patriæ mancipet. Multo minus hominibus persuasum est has actiones esse

basis of morality,—that in itself reason is an absolute standard of moral worth, and that reverence for it is the great means of forming and promoting moral principles, of creating " independent morality." There is question, not of the proximate rule of morals, let it be remembered, but of the objective, ultimate basis of the moral order ; not of reason as an immediate law of conduct, but of reason as a first objective source of morals. But how reason could form such a basis, or source, is not intelligible, since it is not in keeping with its nature. In itself, reason is within man, not outside him ; it is subjective, not objective ; it is a faculty of his nature, not an external faculty above him. It is in us as a principle, not for generating obligation, but for knowing it. It often hesitates before judging, and often doubts about its act. Nay, on the subject of morals, misguided reason has led men into the grossest errors. With Locke and his school it has sanctioned utilitarianism ; with Hobbes and Puffendorf, it has made state-power and civil law the great fountains of moral goodness ; and with French infidels it has lent itself to approving self-love, or interest, or animal appetite as the source of morality. In our day men use their reason in striving to divest themselves of their moral attributes, and in place thereof to take to themselves the bestial instincts and habits of the gorilla or the orang-outang. Make reason or rational nature to be the ultimate fountain-head of moral goodness, and you have as many standards of that goodness as there are men, as many variable tests of morality, practically, as the judgments of men are often practically variable. In reason there is unquestionably a light that enables it to perceive the distinction between right and wrong, between the good and the bad. But these, while it perceives them, t does not make any more than the eye makes the sun or the stars that shine in upon it—(**Ronayne,** p. 271).

tunc solum honestas, quando unice fiunt ex præscripto legis. Ex communi enim opinione potest quis honestissime agere ex motivo misericordiæ, amoris proximi, etc." (**Cathrein,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 84).[1]

4°. Pantheismum adstruit ; nam si ratio humana est in agendo independens ab omni lege sibi extrinseca, debet et in existendo similem independentiam habere ; quæ sane independentia nonnisi enti infinito, nempe Deo, competere potest. Porro, si ratio humana est fons unicus et supremus moralitatis, est pariter fons unicus et supremus veritatis et entitatis, quum harum conceptus in conceptu moralitatis necessario includantur ; *atqui* fons unicus et supremus veritatis et entitatis dicitur Deus ; *ergo*.[2]

[1] It is obvious that if such acts alone are morally good as are done for the sake of duty, then only such acts are good as are actually obligatory. Hence works of supererogation could not possibly be morally good, since works of supererogation are not our duty. We believe, however, that to exclude works of supererogation from the sphere of moral action would be to go dead against the common sense of mankind. For common sense affirms that he who is bound to give five pounds to the poor, and yet gives two hundred pounds, is morally a better man, ceteris paribus, than he who barely fulfils his obligation —(**Cronin,** p. 247).

[2] Man's rational nature is not its own ultimate end, and consequently it is not the ultimate standard of morality either. All that the human understanding can do consists in pointing out the right direction to the infinite good. Nor is it in doing so of supreme and absolute authority. Such attributes belong only to the Self-existing Being. What is created is essentially dependent on God, and, therefore, has no absolute power ; not existing of itself, it is subject to Him. What authority it may have is derived from the Divine Authority, and manifests the same as first and supreme. Human reason is, as it were, a ray, a likeness of Divine Reason, not as an emanation from God ; but as a production by God from nothing. Consequently it has not first conceived the laws of free action, nor has it established the necessity of their existence. . . .

Accordingly we must regard the autonomy of reason as a mere philosophical fiction, altogether irreconcilable with truth. Not even consistency can be claimed for it by its inventor. Our rational nature can be termed supreme and absolute only when, as from a pantheistic point of view, divine and human reason are confounded, and only after such confusion may the Stoic axiom hold that to live according to nature is man's ultimate end and the height of morality. The Stoics were pantheists, supposing God to be the soul of the world. But Kant did not embrace pantheism, nor can anyone who knows creation to be finite—(**Ming,** p. 113).

71. Cor. 1.—Ergo jure merito sequens Rationalistarum propositio (3ª *in Syllabo Pii IX.*) condemnatur ; " Humana ratio, nullo prorsus Dei respectu habito, unicus est veri et falsi, boni et mali arbiter, sibi ipsi est lex, et naturalibus suis viribus ad hominum et populorum bonum curandum sufficit."

Cor. 2.—Ergo systema Kantianum, quippe quod hominem sibi ipsi finem constituit ita, ut nulli fini altiori subordinetur, moralitatem avellit a religione, quæ proprie importat ordinationem nostrarum actionum ad Deum ut ultimum finem.

72. Obj.—Qui non agit propter reverentiam legis, sed ex alio motivo, *v.g.*, ex spe retributionis vel metu pœnarum, serviliter et ad modum mercenarii agit.

Resp. 1°.—Qui non agit propter reverentiam legis, potest agere propter motivum nobilius, tale esset amor Dei vel honestatis ipsius, ita ut idem ageret, etiamsi non esset lege præceptum ; in quo modo agendi, nihil servile, nihil mercenarium, procul dubio inveniri potest.

Resp. 2°.—*Dist. antec.* . . . Improprie serviliter, improprie ad modum mercenarii, agit, *conc.* ; proprie, *i.e.*, exclusive ex spe retributionis vel metu pœnarum, agit, *neg.* Quidquid dicatur de motivo, quod Kantius proposuit, non idcirco alia incitamenta actionum tamquam turpia haberi debent. " Sic, spes futuræ remunerationis aut æternarum pœnarum metus optime animum impellere poterunt, ut bonum prosequatur, et malum declinet. Nam si homo ad felicitatem tandem aliquando capessendam conditus est, eaque se dignum actibus suis efficere debet ; profecto actus hujusmodi, respectu felicitatis, se habent ut media ad finem. At vero quis non videt nihil inordinatum aut præposterum esse in hoc, quod media propter finem adhibeantur ? Maxime vero id locum habet, si exinde præstantius operandi motivum, ne præcisione quidem mentis, excludatur ; sed eo præ oculis retento, cetera tamquam adjumenta voluntatis admittantur. Accedit, quod iste modus operandi consonat intentioni divinæ ; cui si actio conformatur, inhonesta dici, sine impietate, non potest. Et sane sapiens legislator idcirco præmia proponit, ut subditum ad legi obtemperandum alliciat. Ita igitur moveri aliquando ad legem servandam, ipsius legislatoris intentioni respondet. Ergo modus hic agendi inordinatus dici nequit, quin ipse legislator inordinationis accusetur. Idem dicendum est de metu pœnarum. Nam sanctio pœnalis ideo legi conjungitur, ut ii, quibus lex fertur, a transgressione deterreantur. Qui igitur, ne pœnam incurrat, flagitium vitat ab eoque affectum retrahit, is perfecto juxta mentem legislatoris operatur. . . . Postremo, rem aversari, quatenus mala est, juxta ordinem profecto est.

Atqui in flagitioso opere reapse inest debitum pœnæ, in qua malum procul dubio cernitur. Ergo exinde moveri ad ipsum opus odio habendum, juxta ordinem rationis est ; licet longe melius sit ex interna objecti turpitudine, vel etiam nobiliore motivo ad scelus fugiendum induci. At aliud est minori bonitate donari, aliud vero nullam continere, aut etiam nota pravitatis inuri.

" Verum, si Kantianæ opinioni fucus omnis detrahatur, abjecta potius et vilis apparebit. Nam Kant voluntatem *autonomam* seu suimetipsius legislatricem statuit. Unde, legem vel cum ipsa voluntate libera, ut sæpe repetit, vel cum ratione hominis, per se et absolute spectata, confundit. Quare, ejus sententia obsequium legi præstitum, aliud non erit nisi obsequium præstitum propriæ libertati aut rationi. Hoc autem turpissimum inducit *egoismum*, si non sensilem saltem rationalisticum" (**Liberatore,** *Instit. Ethicæ et Juris Naturæ*, p. 155)

§ 2. Doctrina Scholastica circa Moralitatis Essentiam.

73. THESIS X.—Essentia moralitatis consistit in convenientia aut repugnantia actuum humanorum, proxime cum natura humana complete et in concreto spectata, remote cum divina essentia.

Stat. Quæst.—Natura humana spectatur *complete*, quatenus consideratur secundum omnes suas partes constitutivas et relationes ad entia externa. Et revera, natura humana est substantia animalis-rationalis, et proinde principium activitatis vegetativæ et sensitivæ æque ac rationalis ; in tantum vero activitates vegetativæ et sensitivæ morales sunt, in quantum activitati rationali subordinantur atque ab ea dirigi possunt.

Deinde, insunt homini relationes *a*) ad Deum ut suum primum principium et finem ultimum ; *b*) ad alios homines, et sane vel ex ipsa naturæ humanæ conditione (ut relationes æqualitatis et dependentiæ), vel ex naturæ humanæ propensione (ut relationes sociales) promanantes ; *c*) ad cetera entia inferiora, quibus uti debet, non autem abuti, ut mediis ad finem ultimum consequendum.

74. Natura humana spectatur *in concreto*, quando considerantur circumstantiæ (ætatis, conditionis, etc.) quæ eam in singulis hominibus semper comitantur. Sicut

enim ex consideratione naturæ humanæ in se et in suis relationibus necessariis et universalibus colliguntur principia moralia, quæ necessaria sunt, et pro omnibus hominibus eodem modo valent, ita, ut recte judicetur, an talis vel talis actus sit mihi moraliter bonus necne, oportet meam naturam considerari in illis circumstantiis specialibus, quibus individuetur. Ut rem exemplo illustremus, "ex natura in abstracto (seu in seipsa) considerata sequitur regula : temperantiam esse servandam, *i.e.*, inferiorem partem ita esse regendam in usu delectabilium, ut subserviat parti rationali. Hæc regula est prorsus immutabilis et valet pro omnibus hominibus in quacumque conditione. Quid autem in concreto temperantiæ lex postulet, dijudicandum est ex ipsa natura, prout in concreto hic et nunc est. Non solum enim pro diversis hominibus, sed etiam pro eodem individuo diversis temporibus et circumstantiis lex temperantiæ diversa in concreto præscribit" (**Cathrein,** p. 65).

Sed non modo naturæ humanæ, sed etiam divinæ conveniunt vel repugnant actus humani, et proinde remote et fundamentaliter morales sunt hi actus juxta eorum relationem ad essentiam divinam.[1]

75. Quæri autem potest, utrum essentia moralitatis reponenda sit in essentia divina, ut hæc antecedit legem æternam, an in ipsa lege æterna ; sunt enim qui nullam honestatem, nullam turpitudinem, ante legem æternam admittere velint. Ast vero in actionibus lege æterna præceptis aut prohibitis duplex bonitas, duplex malitia, agnoscenda est : altera *antecedens* exigens, ut actio præcipiatur vel vetetur, altera *consequens* ad legem æternam præcipientem aut vetantem. Prior, secus ac altera, non importat plenam et formalem rationem honestatis aut malitiæ. Jamvero, lex æterna est quidem ratio ultima

[1] Right is right and wrong is wrong because the prototype of the created order, of which the moral law forms a part, is the Divine Nature itself, the ultimate ground of all truth intellectual and moral —(**Fox,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 5, p. 216).

plenæ et *formalis* honestatis et malitiæ actionum humanarum, et cujusvis obligationis moralis ; non autem est ratio earum honestatis et turpitudinis simpliciter ultima. Nam, ut dictum est (*Ont.*, n. 314), intellectus divinus in se continet ideas exemplares secundum quas res esse vel fieri debent, quasque ideas efformat intuendo infinitas divinæ essentiæ perfectiones. Quare, quum lex æterna non aliud sit quam conceptus divini intellectus, in lege æterna formaliter, in essentia divina fundamentaliter, ponenda est ratio moralitatis.

76. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*proxime cum natura humana*. . .). **Arg.**—Actiones cujuslibet entis bonæ vel malæ dicuntur, prout illius naturæ conveniuntaut repugnant (cf. *Ont.*, n. 297) ; *atqui* ut actiones humanæ homini vere conveniant aut repugnent, debent convenire aut repugnare ejus naturæ complete et in concreto spectatæ ; si enim homini actus sui conveniunt, quatenus est vegetans vel sentiens, sed ei repugnant, quatenus est rationalis, tunc hi actus non erunt *vere* et *simpliciter* boni, sed *apparenter* dumtaxat et *secundum quid*, i.e., non erunt honesti sed inhonesti, etsi fortasse sint delectabiles et utiles. Inhonesti pariter erunt, si, dum ejus naturæ in se spectatæ conveniunt, ei non conveniunt, consideratis ejus ad alia entia relationibus, et in concreto. *Ergo* boni vel mali moraliter erunt actus humani, prout naturæ humanæ complete et in concreto spectatæ conveniunt aut repugnant.[1]

[1] There are certain activities naturally suited to man, and these activities are in themselves right, and not merely by positive law. Where there is a definite nature, there must be definite activities proper to that nature ; for the proper activity of every nature is consequent upon the nature. Now, it is certain that man's nature is definite, there must, therefore, be certain activities that in themselves befit man.

Wherever a thing is natural to anyone, another thing also is natural, without which the first cannot be had, for nature fails not in necessaries. But it is natural to man to be a social animal. Those things, therefore, naturally befit man, without which the maintenance of human society would be impossible. Such things are the se-

77. PARS 2ª (. . . *remote cum natura divina*). **Arg. I.** —Probavimus actus humanos proxime honestos aut inhonestos esse, prout naturæ humanæ conveniunt aut repugnant ; *atqui* quidquid proxime convenit aut repugnat naturæ humanæ, naturæ divinæ remote convenire aut repugnare necesse habet, quum natura humana non sit nisi quædam participatio et imago naturæ divinæ ; *ergo*.

II.—Lex æterna necessario supponit discrimen inter bonum et malum morale, tum quia ista lex in eo est, ut ordo naturalis servetur, tum quia voluntas divina plura præcipit et prohibet eo præcise, *quia* sunt bona, *quia* sunt mala ; *atqui* ordo naturalis necnon illa bonitas vel malitia intrinseca quarumdam actionum pendent formaliter ab intellectu divino intuente essentiam divinam, et proinde ultimum fundamentum habent in essentia divina.[1]

curing to every man of his own and abstinence from wrongdoing. Some points therefore of human conduct are naturally right.

The use of lower creatures to meet the need of human life is a natural property of man. Now, there is a certain measure in which the use of aforesaid creatures is helpful to human life. If this measure is transgressed, as in the disorderly taking of food, it results in harm to man. There are therefore certain human acts naturally appropriate, and others naturally inappropriate.

In the natural order, man's body is for his soul, and the lower powers of the soul for the reason. It is therefore naturally right for man so to manage his body and the lower faculties of his soul as that the act and good of reason may least of all be hindered, but rather helped. Mismanagement in this regard must naturally be sinful. We count, therefore, as things naturally evil carousings and revellings, whereby the act of reason is impeded and subjected to the passions, which do not leave the judgment of reason free.

To every man those things are naturally befitting, whereby he tends to his natural end ; and the contraries are naturally unbefitting But God is the end to which man is ordained by nature. Those things therefore are naturally right, whereby man is led to the knowledge and love of God ; and the contraries are naturally evil for man—(**S. Thomas,** *Contra Gent.*, Bk. 3, c. 129, Trans. p. 291).

[1] The relation of the Divine Will to the Divine nature must be such that the former, as expressed in creation, is the exponent of the latter. Moral obligation and responsibility imply the exercise of Divine control. We may, therefore, affirm that the source of all morality is in the Divine Will, but this can rank only as a provisional and partial statement, leaning upon the excellence of the Divine nature. . . . Human

78. Cor. 1.—Ergo Deus est fons omnis moralitatis, et proinde scientiæ morales tradi non possunt, nisi Deum ut originem moralitatis spectemus ; falsa igitur et sine fundamento est doctrina de " moralitate independente," ut aiunt, *i.e.*, de moralitate sejuncta ab omni cum Deo relatione.[1]

Cor. 2.—Ergo " intelligitur 1°. quomodo honestas hominem perficiat. Nam actio naturæ congruens hujus est

morality cannot have its ultimate source in mere command, or exercise of authority. Such a supposition would imply either that God might act capriciously, that is, without regard to His own perfection ; or that He might act in violation of His own perfection. In appealing to the Divine nature it is simply affirmed that the action of the Deity must be in accordance with the perfection of His own nature—that Divine action can never fall beneath that.

In this appears the illogical character of an assertion of William of Occam : " there is no act which is wrong except as it is forbidden by God, and which cannot be made right if commanded by God." Such a position can have no metaphysical sanction, being irreconcilable with the testimony of our own moral nature, as that is a witness for the righteousness of the moral Governor—(**Calderwood**, *Handbook of Mor. Phil.*, p. 284).

[1] Kant assumed reason to be the ultimate basis of obligation ; the final sole source of any obligation thus being that the contrary, opposite, or contradictory is against reason or, in other words, unreasonable. This is a false position because it makes man a law-giver to himself ; whereas man cannot give a law to himself, because he is not his own superior—jurisdiction demanding distinction of persons. Besides, reason does not constitute the source of the obligation ; it merely recognizes the existence of the obligation. Law must be imposed by the will of a person, and of a person distinct from the one upon whom the obligation is imposed. Hence, according to the assumption of Kant and his followers, there can be no obligation of any kind at any time. Whence, it would follow that there could be no right or wrong in human action, and, therefore, no practical morality. The dictate of reason pointing out the obligation does not create the obligation, or, in other words, there is no such thing as " independent morality "—that is, morality without the law-giver prescribing the natural law. Under the assumption of Kant, if a man chooses to go against his reason, or, in other words, to do what we all recognize as evil, he can be called to account by no one ; for the Kantian doctrine releases man from all authority, making him amenable to his own reason only, which is not and cannot be a law-giver. Thus there could be at most what is called a " philosophical " sin ; and the most that could be done to any wrongdoer would be to say to him that he has not acted reasonably ; it being impossible for him to become strictly a law-breaker, in a theory which takes no account of the essence of law as coming from a real law-maker—(**Poland**, *Ethics*, p. 58).

perfectio ; intelligitur 2°. quomodo quælibet actio honesta conferat ad finem ultimum hominis. Nam saltem confert ad gloriam Dei extrinsecam objectivam. Quum enim homo sit similitudo et imago Dei per suam naturam, eo ipso, quod conformiter ad suam naturam agit eamque perficit, perficit in se imaginem Dei. Præterea, natura humana in ordine physico est expressio legis æternæ. Sicut omnes alias creaturas, ita etiam hominem Deus per ipsam naturam movet in finem ultimum. Ergo eo ipso, quod homo sequitur impulsum naturæ rationalis, qua talis, explet legem æternam et meretur a Deo beatitudinem " (**Cathrein,** p. 69).

Cor. 3.—Ergo norma directiva totius moralitatis sic exprimi potest : *vive convenienter tuæ naturæ et Dei.* Hæc enim regula complectitur omnes sanæ moralitatis characteres. Et re quidem vera, est *a*) *objectiva,* quum innitatur in natura humana et natura divina ; *b*) *universalis,* quum omnis actus, qui huic duplici naturæ convenit, eo ipso honestus sit ; et omnis actus eidem repugnans, eo ipso inhonestus ; *c*) *suprema,* suppetit enim ultimam rationem, cur aliæ actiones sint moraliter bonæ, aliæ moraliter malæ ; *d*) *certa,* quia fit juxta normas infallibiles.[1]

[1] The result of the above reasoning, if result it has, is to justify the Stoic rule *naturæ convenienter vivere,* to live according to nature. But some one will say : " That is the very ideal of wickedness : all good in man comes of overcoming nature, and doing violence to natural cravings : live according to nature and you will go straight to the devil." I answer : " Live *according to a part of your nature,* and that the baser and lower, though also the more impetuous and clamorous part, and you will certainly go where you say : but *live up to the whole of your nature* and you will be a man indeed, and will reach the goal of human happiness." But again it may be objected that our reason, to which the rest of our nature is naturally subordinate, frequently prompts us to go amiss. The objection is a just one, in so far as it goes upon a repudiation of the old Platonic position that all moral evil comes from the body. . . . Were that so, all sins would be sins of sensuality. But there are spiritual sins, as pride and mutiny, self-opinionatedness, rejection of divine revelation. The objection turns on sins such as these. The answer is that spiritual sins do not arise from any exigency of reason, but from a deficiency of reason ; not from that faculty calling on us, as we are reasonable men, to take a certain

Pro hac sanæ philosophiæ regula varias alias substituunt modernorum systematum moralium cultores. En hujus varietatis specimina : " Vive propter voluptatem " (*Egoistæ*) ; " Diliges te super omnia et alios homines propter te " (*Fichte*) ; " Vive pro bono societatis," (*Utilitaristæ*) ; " Sequere tuos affectus sympathiæ et antipathiæ " (*Sentimentalistæ*) ; " Sequere rationem tuam ut supremum legislatorem " (*Rationalistæ*).

79. Schol.—Haud multum a sententia exposita differt sententia eorum, qui essentiam moralitatis reponunt in conformitate vel difformitate actionum humanarum respectu finis ultimi. Bonitas enim moralis est quædam rectitudo, quæ respicit aliquam regulam, a qua actio nec in hanc nec in illam partem deflectere potest, quin moraliter mala evadat. Nam quemadmodum inter sagittarios ille solus actum suæ artis perfectum ponit, qui punctum seu finem determinatum ex innumerabilibus aliis attingit, ita etiam in re morali unus finis ex innumerabilibus, qui eligi possunt, proponitur attingendus, in relatione cum quo fine ipsa moralitas actus consistit ; *atqui* hic finis est ipse Deus. In hoc tamen differre videntur, quod natura humana sit norma, a qua actus humani, si huic naturæ conveniunt, rationabilitatem, dignitatem bonitatemque accipiunt ; finis autem ultimus sit norma, a qua actus humani, naturæ humanæ convenientes, habent suum valorem et quidem quasi infinitum ; tendunt enim in Dei gloriam, qui est terminus infinitus. Jamvero, quum actus, naturæ humanæ convenientes, ex se in hunc finem tendant, eo ipso tales actus jure dicuntur morales ; sed ut sciamus quinam actus huc tendant, opus est alia norma. Quare, actus humanus judicandus est *moralis* ex ejus habitudine ad naturam humanam, *valor* hujus actus moralis judicandus est ex ejus habitudine ad finem ultimum.

course, *in accordance with a just and full view of the facts of the case*, but from reason failing to look facts fully in the face, and considering only some of them to the neglect of others, the consideration of which would alter the decision. Thus, a certain proud creature mentioned in Scripture thought of the magnificence of the throne above the stars of God, on the mountain of the covenant, on the side of the north : he did not think how such a pre-eminence would become him as a creature. He had in view a rational good certainly, but not a rational good for him. Partial reason, like a little knowledge, is a dangerous thing—(**Rickaby**, *Mor. Phil.*, p. 112).

Minus differunt a nobis ii, qui dicunt "moralitatem immediate pendere ab ordine objectivo rerum per rationem apprehenso; mediate vero ab ordine divinæ sapientiæ et bonitatis" (*Liberatore*); nam *ordine objectivo* exprimitur id, quod supra exprimitur per naturam humanam complete et in concreto spectatam.

Nec falsa sed minus clara et explicatione indigens est sententia, quæ eam in conformitate cum recta ratione constituit. Nam ratio est recta, quando judicat actiones juxta relationem convenientiæ et repugnantiæ quam revera habent, seu, quando cognoscit naturam in se et in suis ad alia entia relationibus. Patet vero non ideo actiones nobis convenire aut repugnare, quia ratio ita judicat, sed, e contrario, quia nobis conveniunt aut repugnant, ideo præcise ratio judicat eas nobis convenire aut repugnare.

ART. III.

DE FONTIBUS MORALITATIS.

80. Explicata in Art. II. moralitatis essentia, hic quæritur, ex quo actus humanus in concreto ejus substantialem bonitatem vel malitiam derivet, et quænam sint ea, quæ hanc bonitatem vel malitiam quocumque modo moraliter afficiunt. Hæc sunt objectum, finis et circumstantiæ actus. Omnis enim actus humanus circa aliquod *objectum* versatur, aliquibus *circumstantiis* individuatur, et propter aliquem *finem* ponitur. Quæ tria itaque vocantur *fontes* vel *principia* moralitatis.

Ut actus sit simpliciter bonus, requiritur, ut quoad nullum ex his tribus deficiat a regula morum; quodsi actus vel quoad objectum vel quoad finem vel quoad circumstantiam ullam difformis est, simpliciter difformis est seu malus.

§ 1. De Objecto Actus Moralis.

81. Objectum actus moralis est id, in quod actus voluntatis primario tendit, seu, est finis operis, *i.e.*, finis

intrinsecus actionis positæ (*Ont.*, n. 433).[1] Actio enim humana ex sua natura tendit in aliquem finem, qui finis est actionis objectum. Sic, *v.g.*, honor divinus, levamen pauperis, ablatio rei alienæ, sunt objecta orationis ferventis, eleemosynæ, furti.

Non solum *res*, sed etiam *actiones*, tum imperatæ tum elicitæ, fieri possunt objecta actus moralis, quum circa omnem actionem nostram actus voluntatis versari possit, ut quum approbamus vel reprobamus præteritas nostras volitiones.

Objectum actus moralis est triplex : *a*) *bonum*, si regulæ honestatis convenit, *b*) *malum*, si ei repugnat, *c*) *indifferens*, si nec convenit nec repugnat. Atvero, dum objectum bonum vel malum bene determinatum est, ita ut circa illud, prout est, actus voluntatis poni possit, circa objectum indifferens nullus actus habere potest locum, nisi aliquid addatur. Sic, *v.g.*, nemo ambulat, nisi ex aliqua ratione, et prout variatur illa ratio, varium censetur objectum. Quare, objectum actus moralis debet esse vel bonum vel malum.

82. Consectaria.—1°. Objectum non accipitur *materialiter*, prout est res hujus vel illius naturæ, sed *formaliter*, scil., sub illo peculiari respectu, quo ab actu voluntatis attingitur. Sic Deus, *prout bonus*, est objectum actus amoris ; *prout justus*, est objectum actus timoris.

2°. Prima et specifica moralitas actus humani ex objecto derivatur. Quemadmodum enim in ordine physico, actus, qui est quidam motus facultatis in objectum sicut in suum proprium terminum, speciem accipit ex objecto, ita in ordine morali actus moralis, quippe cujus terminus est natura humana et divina, specificari debet ex objecto, prout hoc efficit, ut actus conveniat aut repugnet naturæ humanæ et divinæ. Porro, moralitas, quæ actui ex objecto convenit, ante omnem aliam con-

[1] Hic finis, quia subordinatur fini operantis, aliquando dicitur *medium*.

cipitur. Et quidem, quando aliquem actum ponere volumus, semper et ante omnia quærere solemus, utrum illius actus objectum nobis conveniat necne ; *atqui* hæc convenientia vel discrepantia constituit moralitatem objecti, quæ est specie diversa pro diversa objectorum natura. Sic, *v.g.*, actus eleemosynæ ideo concipitur esse actus eleemosynæ atque ut talis regulæ honestatis convenire, quia pro objecto habet levamen pauperum ; et actus furti concipitur esse actus furti et regulæ honestatis repugnans, quia pro objecto habet rem alienam ut auferrendam. Jam, quod primo concipitur in re, ejus naturam specificam constituit ; *ergo*.

83. *Dices :* Si ita esset, moralitas, quæ ex objecto actui advenit ab hoc separari non posset, et falso diceretur actionem ex objecto bonam fieri malam ob malum finem aliamve malam circumstantiam.

Resp.—Quando dicitur actionem ex objecto bonam fieri malam ob malum finem etc., id unice intelligitur actionem sub uno respectu seu *secundum quid* bonam posse esse nihilominus *simpliciter* malam, juxta illud : " bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu," *i.e.*, ut actio denominetur bona *simpliciter*, nullam ei malitiam inesse oportet, sive ex objecto, sive ex circumstantiis, sive ex fine. Malitia autem moralis, quæ actioni inest ratione objecti, ita inseparabiliter ei inhæret, ut neque per bonum finem operantis neque per circumstantias quantumvis bonas auferri possit.[1]

[1] To justify his act, not only the end which a man proposes to himself must be lawful, but the means thereunto, or the act itself, must also be lawful, together with the circumstances that accompany or qualify the act. The badness of an evil end, therefore, affects means legitimate in themselves, and means that are vicious vitiate an end otherwise laudable, while the very circumstances that qualify an act may often render it unlawful. A man who steals in order to give alms sins by his act ; a man who gives alms in order to gain applause sins also ; and a man who, to the great detriment of his family, gives large alms, acts also unlawfully. His obligation to his family springs from justice, and justice here goes before charity. To make an act lawful, then, the end, the means, and the circumstances must combine ; either of these three conditions failing, the action becomes unlawful—(**Ronayne,** p. 389).

84. Obs.—Actus ex triplici causa moralitatem habere potest, non ratione objecti seu per se, sed ratione intentionis agentis seu per accidens :—1°. quando ejus objectum est moraliter indifferens ; 2°. quando actus est subjective bonus, sed objective malus, *v.g.*, siquis vellet mentiri existimans ex ignorantia invincibili mendacium esse licitum ; 3°. quando ex perversa voluntate elicitur actus malus circa objectum bonum, ut odium Dei.

§ 2. De Circumstantiis Actus Moralis.

85. "Quæcumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum circumstantiæ dicuntur" (**S. Th.**, 1, 2, q. 7, a. 1). Unde, *circumstantia* definitur : *accidens actum humanum aliquo modo afficiens secundum esse morale.* Dicitur *secundum esse morale*, quia circumstantia, si non superaddat aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, non est circumstantia moralis sed physica. Ita, *v.g.*, in furto ablatio majoris potius quam minoris quantitatis est circumstantia moralis ; non autem quod res manu dextra vel sinistra aufertur.[1]

[1] We must note that if we are to understand the ethical significance of a man's circumstances, we must clear our minds of that view according to which circumstances are simply the external environment in which a man's life is passed. Understood in this sense, any contemporary event might be called a circumstance—*e.g.*, the position of the planets, the state of the tides, the direction of the winds. But for most purposes, such conditions are not to be classed as circumstances at all. . . . Riches and poverty, health and disease, are generally circumstances of more importance ; and so are, in general, a man's social surroundings. From such considerations as these we may see that it is not so easy as it might at first appear to determine what a man's circumstances are, in any sense that is ethically significant. Circumstances in this sense are not anything external to the man, but only external conditions in so far as they enter into his life. What are to be reckoned circumstances in this sense is a question that depends on the character of the man. Hence it is somewhat misleading to speak as if character and circumstance were two co-ordinate factors in human life : since it depends largely on character whether anything is to be reckoned a circumstance or not. . . . Thus it is to a considerable extent a question of the point of view from which a thing is regarded, whether it is to be described as an element of character or of circumstance. Probably by far the greatest part of any man's present circumstance is simply the expression of what his past character has been.

Hence when we say that a man's actions are the result of his char-

86. Circumstantiæ ad septem reduci solent, quæ hoc versiculo continentur :

" Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando."

Ratio numeri.—In actione aliqua tria considerari possunt, *scil.*, ipsa actio, ejus causa, et effectus. Jamvero, 1°. *Ex parte actionis*, tres occurrunt circumstantiæ, nimirum, *a*) specialis modus actionis (*quomodo*), *v.g.*, fitne intense an remisse, ex metu an ex malitia, etc. ; *b*) qualitas vel quantitas temporis in agendo vel omittendo consumpti (*quando*) ; *c*) specialis conditio loci actionis (*ubi*), *v.g.*, quod fit publice vel private, in loco sacro vel profano.

2°. *Ex parte causæ*, tres aliæ habentur circumstantiæ ; inquiri enim potest *a*) specialis conditio vel qualitas causæ efficientis (*quis*), utrum, *v.g.*, sit superior an subditus, lege speciali obstrictus necne, etc. ; *b*) specialis finis, cujus gratia actio exercetur (*cur*) ; *c*) specialis qualitas mediorum, quæ agens adhibuit (*quibus auxiliis*), *v.g.*, verba sacra ad iram exprimendam.

3°. *Ex parte effectus* habetur circumstantia *quid*, quæ respicit specialem qualitatem vel quantitatem objecti, circa quod actio versatur, *v.g.*, quod res furata sit sacra, magni valoris.

87. Actus morales *accidentalem* bonitatem vel malitiam ex circumstantiis habent ; circumstantiæ enim actus convenire aut repugnare regulæ honestatis possunt. Sic, actibus in se moraliter bonis vel malis accedit multiplex bonitas vel malitia moralis pro circumstantiis personæ agentis, temporis, loci, etc. Præterea, sicut res

acter and his circumstance, we must remember that two men living to all appearance in the same general conditions may in reality be in wholly different circumstances. What stimulates one may depress another, just as " the twilight that sends the hens to roost sets the fox to prowl, and the lion's roar which gathers the jackals, scatters the sheep " (Art. " Psych." in *Encycl. Brit.*). What is physically the same is in such cases, to all intents, a different circumstance—(**MacKenzie**, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 86).

naturales suam perfectionem accidentalem desumunt ex quibusdam adjunctis, *v.g.*, ex figura, colore aliisque hujusmodi ; ita etiam in rebus moralibus circumstantiæ ad earum moralitatem conferunt.

§ 3. De Fine Actus Moralis.

88. Finis hoc loco intelligitur finis *operantis ;* ex hoc enim fine, non ex fine operis (qui sane cum ipso objecto coincidit) actus humanus novam, præter illam, quam ex objecto habet, moralitatem nanciscitur. Finis operantis *a*) aut causa partialis est finis operis—ut quum aliquis eleemosynam largitur ad indigenti succurrendum et simul ad laudem captandam—*b*) aut est causa totalis, cur actio ponatur, ut quum *v.g.*, unice ad laudem captandam aliquis eleemosynam largitur. Si primum, operans utrumque finem vult ; sin alterum, operans non vult finem operis, nisi ut medium ad finem operantis assequendum. Quare :—

1°. Actus ex objecto bonus ad bonum finem ordinatus, præter bonitatem essentialem ex objecto, aliam accidentalem ex fine mutuatur, ut si quis oraret ad Deum honorandum et ad peccatorum conversionem impetrandam. Et ratio est, quia actus duplicem conformitatem ad regulam honestatis habet.

2°. Actus ex objecto malus in malum finem ordinatus, duplicem malitiam contrahit, quia duplicem difformitatem habet.

3°. Actus ex objecto indifferens, sed in bonum finem ordinatus, bonitatem a fine accipit ; nam *finis sanctificat media*. Hinc intelligitur utilitas bonæ intentionis in omnibus, etiam indifferentibus, actionibus. E contra, actus indifferens in malum finem ordinatus, fit ipse malus.

4°. Actus ex objecto malus, etiamsi in bonum finem ordinatur, non evadit bonus, aliis verbis : *finis non justificat media*.

APPENDIX.

De Actibus Indifferentibus.

89. Hic quærendum occurrit, num dentur actus moraliter indifferentes, actus nimirum tum bonitate tum malitia in genere morum carentes. Jamvero, hæc indifferentia potest esse *supernaturalis* vel *naturalis*, prout in ordine supernaturali vel in ordine naturali aliqua actio nec bona nec mala esse dicitur. Nemo negat dari actus supernaturaliter indifferentes, *i.e.*, actus, qui ex una parte non sunt mali, ex altera vero parte nullo merito supernaturali digni inveniuntur, ut, *v.g.*, sunt actus boni ethnicorum vel etiam christianorum extra statum gratiæ viventium.

90. Iterum indifferentia actus considerari potest secundum *speciem actus*, *i.e.*, ex parte objecti, ex quo actus speciem suam desumit (seu, ut alii volunt, *in abstracto*, *i.e.*, sine circumstantiis, quibus in individuo actus afficitur), vel secundum *individualitatem actus* (seu *in concreto*), *i.e.*, attentis circumstantiis, quibus actus, prout hic et nunc ponitur, invenitur affectus. Jam, nullum existit dubium, quin dentur actiones, quæ *quoad speciem* nec bonæ nec malæ sunt, *v.g.*, ambulare, edere, loqui, etc. Quod attinet vero ad indifferentiam actionum *in individuo*, duæ existunt sententiæ. Enimvero, alii contendunt actiones in specie indifferentes posse in individuo manere indifferentes ; tales, inquiunt, non sunt bonæ, quia non ordinantur in aliquem finem honestum, sed tantum in finem utilem vel delectabilem, et nulla existit obligatio omnes actiones nostras in finem honestum ordinandi ; nec malæ sunt, quia non ordinantur in finem inhonestum. Ita Scotistæ, quorum sententiam, ut probabiliorem, defendit *Walsh* (De Act. Hum., n. 588).

91. Alii post S. Thomam negant actiones in individuo posse esse per se moraliter indifferentes. Indifferentia, inquiunt, quæ quibusdam actionibus inest, soli intellectus præcisioni debetur, quemadmodum animal, qua tale, considerari potest absque notis " rationalis " et " irrationalis." At sicut a parte rei dari nequit merum animal, sed necesse est ut ab alterutra ex oppositis differentiis coarctetur ad speciem, ita nonnulli actus, etsi in abstracto nec boni nec mali dici possint, tamen in individuo et prout ab agente ponuntur,

notam malitiæ vel notam bonitatis acquirunt. Et revera, necesse est, ut actus humanus fiat propter aliquem finem sive explicite sive implicite intentum ; qui sane finis aut bonum *honestum* aut bonum *delectabile* est (bonum *utile* non habet rationem *finis* sed *medii*, ideoque omittitur). *Atqui* actus humanus in bonum *honestum* ordinatus, si aliunde nihil deficiat, eo ipso moraliter bonus constituitur ; actus vero in bonum *delectabile* ordinatus, est et ipse moraliter bonus, si tale bonum appetitur modo rectæ rationi consentaneo ; Deus enim " *institutor naturæ delectationes apposuit propter operationes* " (**S. Th.**, 1, 2, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2), et proinde eas ordinate quærere, est ordinate et moraliter agere. Actus autem, e contra, moraliter malus erit, si bonum delectabile modo rectæ rationi non consentaneo appetitur, eo quod libere et scienter ponitur actus a regula honestatis discrepans. Ergo omnis actus humanus aut bonus aut malus moraliter est, et proinde non dantur actus humani moraliter indifferentes (cf. *Cronin*, p. 97 sqq.).

92. *Dices* 1°. Nimis durum est, ut homo, ne male operetur, finem honestum semper intendat ; *ergo*.

Resp. Dist. antec. Nimis durum est, ut in omnibus suis actionibus tum deliberatis tum indeliberatis finem honestum intendat, *conc.* ; in suis actionibus deliberatis, *subdist.*, ut hunc finem *explicite* intendat, *conc.*, *implicite*, *neg.* Nam ut actio sit moraliter bona, sufficit, ut agens actionem suam referat ad aliquem licitum finem proximum (*v.g.*, ad indigentiam vel commoditatem naturæ suæ), quin ulteriorem finem vel motivum virtutis explicite intendat ; quum actio sic ordinata in finem sibi debitum, sua quasi natura in finem ultimum tendat. Nam ad bene agendum " satis est ut 1°. bonum noscatur conveniens homini vel secundum animam vel secundum corpus vel secundum res exteriores, quæ propter alia duo quæruntur ; 2°. ut nihil adsit contrarium illi bono, quod est homini secundum rationem ; 3°. ne peccetur vel defectu vel excessu. Porro, quod homo tendat ad bona naturæ suæ convenientia, id habet sponte a natura et ita sit oportet, ut possit dici inclinatus ad finem ab auctore naturæ. Est tamen officium rationis duo præstare : 1°. *ut videat, ne quid sit inordinatum*, 2°. *ut servetur mensura immunis a defectu et excessu.* Ergo quoties duo ista absunt incommoda, tendentia est recta ; adeo ut norma fere huc recidat, *ut bonum censeatur quidquid non apparet malum.* Quæ tamen norma non laborat incommodo illo, quod est in effato : bonum est quidquid permittitur. Nos enim dicimus præterea : ubi adest ista permissio,ibi quoque adest rectitudo ex ratione : loquimur autem de permissione ex parte Dei et opus permissum a Deo non opponitur bono, sed bono meliori "—(**Ballerini,** *Op. Mor.*, v. 1. p. 99).

Dices 2°. Actus morales dicuntur laude vel vituperio digni · *atqui* nemo laude vel vituperio dignos reputat actus, quos Scotistæ indifferentes esse affirmant ; *ergo.*

Resp. Conc. maj. Dist. min. 1°. Nemo hos actus laudat, etc., quia non solent homines laudare vel vituperare nisi actus insigniores, *conc.*, . . . quia hi actus non sunt vere laudabiles vel vituperabiles, *neg.* 2°. Nemo tales actus secundum speciem consideratos reputat laude, etc., dignos, *conc* . . . secundum finem et circumstantias, *neg.*

ART. IV.

DE CONSECTARIIS ACTUUM MORALIUM.

93. Actus morales, eo quod liberi sunt, agenti, a quo procedunt, laudi vel culpæ referuntur ; eo quod bonum vel malum alteri afferunt, rationem meriti vel demeriti habent ; meritum vero est aliquod jus ad præmium, et demeritum aliquod debitum ad pœnam.

§ 1. De Imputabilitate Morali.

94. Imputabilitas generatim est proprietas, vi cujus ipsa actio (ejus consequentia vel omissio) alicui tamquam suæ causæ tribuitur. Duplex est : *physica*, qua actio agenti ut causæ physicæ tribuitur ; et *moralis*, qua actio agenti ut causæ morali tribuitur, ita scilicet, ut bonitas vel malitia actus in laudem vel vituperium agentis redundet.[1]

[1] Any action that proceeds from an agent is attributable to the agent, whether the agent acts with liberty or not. Thus heat is attributable to the sun ; health to a climate. Any effect is attributable to any of its causes. . . .

Though in common discourse, the words *attributable, imputable, to attribute, to impute*, are sometimes used synonymously, still in the strict philosophical sense, the word *imputable* is the more limited. It is applied only where the agent acts with knowledge and liberty. A headache may be attributed to overwork. It will not be imputed to overwork. It may be imputed to the person who has knowingly strained himself by overwork. In the strictest philosophical sense, the word *imputable* is applied to actions (whether elicited or commanded) which are regarded as *morally good* or *morally bad*. And these actions are said to be morally imputable to the person who by his free will elicits or commands them—(**Poland,** *Ethics*, p. 50).

Ex imputabilitate morali actionis sequitur *responsibilitas* agentis, *i.e.*, ea agentis habitudo, ratione cujus suarum actionum ita habendus est causa, ut de eis rationem reddere earumque consequentias in se suscipere teneatur.[1]

95. Consectaria.—1°. Imputabilitas moralitatem semper comitatur; actibus enim indifferentibus non admissis, omnis actus liber est bonus vel malus et proinde in laudem vel culpam agentis verti potest. Earum tamen conceptus non sunt confundendi, quum moralitas dicat ordinem ad regulam honestatis; imputabilitas vero ad libertatem (cf. *Cronin*, p. 544).

2°. Quidquid auget, minuit, tollitve libertatem cognitionemque moralitatis actionis, eadem proportione auget, minuit vel tollit actionis imputabilitatem et agentis responsibilitatem. Quo fit, ut qui vult minuere vel etiam a se removere alicujus actionis imputabilitatem et responsibilitatem, soleat dicere se in agendo non fuisse liberum vel nescisse actionis moralitatem.

3°. Quum imputabilitas importet relationem causalitatis inter rem imputabilem et personam, cui imputatur, *nullam* imputabilitatem admittere possunt, qui principium causalitatis rejiciunt. Nec possunt Deterministæ, Fatalistæ, Evolutionistæ admittere imputabilitatem *moralem*, quum libertatem humanam, quæ imputabilitati morali præsupponitur, non agnoscant.[2]

[1] Imputability is *the character of an act* which is freely performed so that the good or evil of it is attributable to him who performs it. Responsibility is *the condition of a man*, who, having sufficient knowledge, and being free from coercion, can act or not as he chooses, and is, therefore, accountable for his determination—(**Holaind,** p. 84).

[2] Are you thief, traitor, assassin? You are not to blame. Or saint, philanthropist, hero? You deserve no praise. The mill grinds, the deed follows. Is not that a fine human Gospel? But you may read it in Mill, Huxley, Tyndall, Spencer, Hæckel, and a thousand more. It is the sum of their Ethical teaching.

In his celebrated address at Birmingham, John Tyndall affirmed that offences against society ought to be punished, although neither society nor the offenders against it had any power of choice. Mill believed in the "Philosophical Necessity," and pronounces it to

4°. Alicui imputatur bonitas vel malitia non solum actionum propriarum, sed etiam alterius, quocum in agendo aliquo modo (*positive*, scil., vel *negative*) co-operatur, jubendo, suadendo, laudando, silendo, etc.

96. Notanda.—1°. Ut *malitia* alicujus *actionis* imputetur, "satis est, ut agens illam malitiam, confuse saltem, *advertat;* e contra, ut *bonitas* imputetur, non sufficit advertentia, sed requiritur, ut voluntas illam aliqua ratione *intendat.* Ratio hujus disparitatis in eo sita est, quod subjectum rationale, quam primum *advertit* aliquid esse malum, illud omittere debet, quodsi nihilominus admittat, merito illud *libere* velle censetur; contra, non omnis bonitas, quam quis in actu a se suscipiendo *advertit,* eo ipso etiam positive volita censeri potest, quia nihil impedit, quominus intuitu finis principaliter intenti illam *toleret* potius aut permittat, quam positive velit. Jamvero, unumquodque imputatur, secundum quod est *formaliter* objectum liberæ volitionis" (**Meyer,** *Instit. Juris Nat.*, p. 174).

2°. Ut malitia alicujus *effectus* actionis liberæ imputetur agenti, mera advertentia seu prævisio effectus mali non sufficit; nulla enim necessaria connexio datur inter advertentiam rationis ad consequentiam malam et liberam tendentiam voluntatis in eamdem consequentiam, etiamsi hæc cum libera actione necessario conjungatur. Et re quidem vera, "si omnes effectus mali, quomodocumque cum actionibus nostris connexi, eo ipso, quod prævisi fuerint, tamquam voluntarii imputandi essent, aut si malum ex rationabili causa *non im-*

be "a truth of experience that volitions follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity and the same certainty as physical effects follow their physical causes." . . .

Let me hasten to point out the actual consequences of this dogma fatal to men. Once the human animal thinks itself answerable to no judge, it will throw conscience out of doors, strip itself naked, and take to its vile pleasures. If it can get no more pleasure, if pain is too much, or evil threatens, it will do what the lower brutes cannot manage, and by the easiest way it will seek suicide—(**Barry,** *Thoughts for Freethinkers*, p. 31).

pedire idem esset ac illud *in causa voluisse*, sequeretur : *a*) hominis jura plane illusoria esse, quum ex malitia hominum fere semper effectus mali cum illorum usu conjungi extrinsecus possint ; *b*) ipsi Dei sanctissimæ voluntati, quod nefas est vel cogitare, imputanda esse omnia mala, quæ cum humana libertate, Deo creatore præsciente, connectuntur " (**Meyer,** *ib.*, p. 178). Theologi minutius determinant, quando quispiam jus habeat ponendi causam effectus mali, quin effectus certo secuturus agenti imputetur (cf. *Cronin*, p. 39).

§ 2. De Merito et Demerito.

97. " Meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad retributionem, quæ fit secundum justitiam. Retributio autem secundum justitiam fit alicui ex eo, quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius " (**S. Th.,** 1, 2, q 21, a. 3). Unde, *meritum* (in abstracto) est *jus quoddam ad retributionem ob emolumentum alteri collatum.* Demeritum autem in eo consistit, quod quis, ob detrimentum alteri illatum, pœnæ subeundæ fit obnoxius.[1] Ipsa actio libera, quæ in bonum aut nocumentum alterius cedit, dicitur meritum vel demeritum *in concreto.*

98. Fundamentum meriti et demeriti consistit in ordine debitæ proportionis inter partes mundi moralis ; qui ordo postulat, ut qui bona agendo emolumentum alteri affert, bono æquivalenti vel saltem gratitudinis exhibitione compensetur ; et, ut qui ex alio detrimentum passus est debitam satisfactionem accipiat.[2] Et

[1] In its relation to justice demerit differs from merit in one important particular, namely, that merit is *not always ex rigore justitiæ*, whereas demerit always is. No man can punish unless he has the strictest right in justice to do so. With this exception, demerit and merit, and consequently punishment and reward, follow exactly the same laws and are built on the same foundations—(**Cronin,** p. 554).

[2] Another effect of imputation is merit, because if the act imputed tends to the advantage of another, the natural idea of equality carries with it, as a consequence, the idea of compensation, which makes a balance between him who confers and him who receives the advan-

sane, quum omne agens in propriam suam perfectionem tendat, is qui suam actionem in commodum alterius dirigit, a se alienat aliquod suæ perfectionis elementum ; alter autem consequitur perfectionem, cujus non est auctor nec proinde naturalis dominus. Jamvero, hæc proprii boni alienatio et boni alieni acceptatio ordinem naturalem perturbarent, nisi beneficium acceptum retribueretur. Beneficium retribuendum dicitur *præmium*, si nullum præcesserit pactum ; et *stipendium*, si pactum intervenerit. Malum pro demerito infligendum dicitur *pœna* vel *supplicium*.

99. Meritum dividitur 1°. in *a*) *naturale*, quod retribuitur actionibus naturaliter honestis, ideoque in naturalem finem directis ; et *b*) *supernaturale*, quod auxilio gratiæ acquiritur et in finem supernaturalem tendit.

2°. In meritum *a*) *condignum* seu *stricte dictum*, quod *ex justitia* retributionem exigit, et *b*) meritum *congruum*, quod non ex justitia sed ex quadam *congruitate* seu *decentia* recompensari debet. Sic, miles se fortiter gerens in bello meretur stipendium *de condigno*, promotionem *de congruo*.[1]

tage. And whence this necessity of equality ? From the idea of order and symmetry that presides in the moral as well as in the physical world. . . . This principle of unity is a primitive fact that we must learn from the voice of nature ; it admits of no further demonstration, unless in so far as it manifests to us the unity of that infinite cause from whom everything has existence. Applied to a finite creature, it shows us that there ought to be equality between that which it gives and that which it receives ; for, otherwise, a due proportion would not be observed—there would be an excess on one side and a deficiency on the other. Hence it is easily seen that from the same principle we derive the idea of *demerit* in regard to him who injures another—(**Taparelli,** *Diritto Naturale*, v. 1, p. 77).

[1] The essential difference between *meritum de condigno* and *meritum de congruo* is based on the fact that, besides those works which claim a remuneration under pain of violating strict justice, there are also other meritorious works which at most are entitled to reward or honour for reasons of equity or mere distributive justice, as in the case of gratuities and military decorations. From an ethical point of view the difference practically amounts to this, that, if reward due to condign merit be withheld, there is a violation of right and justice and the consequent obligation in conscience to make restitution,

100. Conditiones meriti.—Ut actioni insit exigentia retributionis, debet esse :—

1°. *libera*, nemo enim retributionem exigere potest pro opere, cujus non habuit dominium ;

2°. *moraliter bona*, secus enim non præmium sed pœnam meretur ;

3°. *alteri bonum afferens*, secus enim *donatio* fortasse exspectari posset, irrationabiliter vero retributio exigeretur ;

4°. *non aliunde debita ex justitia*, quia talis actio non inducit, sed removet inæqualitatem ordinis moralis ;

5°. *ab altero acceptata*, quum secus imponi nequeat obligatio ex justitia actionem præmiandi. Deficiente hac conditione, non habetur nisi meritum de *congruo*.

101. Obs.—Conditiones demeriti sunt, ut actio sit *libere facta, moraliter mala, alteri nociva*. Fieri tamen potest, ut actio sit alteri nociva, quin notam demeriti habeat, *scil.*, *a*) si nocumentum sit alteri debitum ex justitia, ut quum judex nocentem condemnat ; *b*) si adsit ratio sufficiens permittendi, ut aliquid alteri nocivum ex nostra actione sequatur.

102. Ex prædictis meriti conditionibus, quæ sane in ipsa meriti definitione includuntur, sequitur hominem apud ceteros homines sive singillatim sive in societate conjunctos posse mereri, eo præcise quod potest *libere* ponere actionem, *moraliter bonam*, quæ *in emolumentum alterius*, vel totius societatis, cedat ; quæ actio ab individuo vel societate, cui prodest, ut exigens retributionem, *acceptatur*.

103. Omnes actus boni eorum, qui in societate degunt, rationem meriti habent apud illam societatem, sive immediate sive mediate in bonum societatis vergunt. Immo actus, quibus homo seipsum perficit habent meritum apud societatem, quatenus magnum est societatis bonum bona habere membra ; quod meritum

while, in the case of congruous merit, to withhold the reward involves no violation of right and no obligation to restore, it being merely an offence against what is fitting or a matter of personal discrimination (*acceptio personarum*). Hence the reward of congruous merit always depends in great measure on the kindness and liberality of the giver, though not purely and simply on his good will—(**Pohle,** *Cath. Encycl.* v. 10, p. 202).

plerumque compensatur per commoda, quæ ex societate bene ordinata in singula membra redundant.

104. Apud Deum possumus mereri, quia quum liberi simus, servando ordinem moralem, aliquid, cujus domini sumus, conferimus, non quidem ad internam Dei perfectionem, sed ad externam ejus perfectionum manifestationem, et quamvis nihil habemus, quod a Deo non accepimus, tamen Deus non omnia bona præcipit, immo quæ præcipit non solo titulo supremi dominii, sed, præmio proposito, injungit. Exinde intelligitur actibus nostris nos posse apud Deum demereri, quia male agendo, gloriam extrinsecam Deo debitam auferimus, quod sane pro nocumento reputari debet ; et proinde tenemur, pœnam subeundo, læsum honorem compensare.

105. Obs.—Quærunt auctores utrum Deus ex justitia stricta seu commutativa se obligare possit ad merita remuneranda. Alii, ut *Suarez* et *Bellarminus* quibuscum consentit *Costa-Rossetti*, affirmant : alii post *S. Thomam* et *Scotum* negant, quorum sententiam probabiliorem existimant *Urráburu* (*Theol. Nat.*, v. 2) et *Cathrein*.

§ 3. De Præmio et Pœna

106. Nomine *præmii* intelligitur *bonum, quod pro actione meritoria agenti tribuitur ; pœna* autem est *malum, quod pro actione demeritoria agenti retribuitur*.

Duplex præmii et pœnæ existit finis : alter *antecedens* et notioni præmii et pœnæ intrinsecus, ut nimirum ordo justitiæ servetur respectu meriti et demeriti, quæ actibus humanis insunt ; alter *consequens* et prædictæ notioni extrinsecus, qui in eo consistit, quod spe præmii homines incitentur ad ordinem moralem servandum, et metu pœnæ ab illo ordine transgrediendo deterreantur.

107. Triplex datur ordo moralis ab homine conservandus et promovendus : *a*) *personalis* inter suas potentias vegetativas, sensitivas, intellectivas, quo nimirum actiones potentiarum inferiorum subduntur dictamini rectæ rationis ; *b*) *socialis* inter omnia ejusdem

societatis membra, quo unus homo subditur gubernationi alterius sive spiritualiter sive temporaliter; *c*) *universalis* inter homines et Deum, quo homines subduntur obligationi seipsos et cetera entia mundana in gloriam Dei ordinandi. Jamvero, juxta hunc triplicem ordinem, triplex existit genus præmiorum et pœnarum, quibus homines remunerantur vel puniuntur. Nam, *a*) prout servant aut violant ordinem *personalem*, remunerantur conscientiæ tranquillitate, aut remorsu puniuntur; *b*) prout ordinem *socialem* servant aut violant, remunerantur aut puniuntur publica fama aut infamia, quiete aut perturbatione sociali, prosperitate aut adversitate, necnon præmiis et pœnis auctoritate publica statutis; *c*) prout ordinem *universalem* servant aut violant, beatitudinis consecutione remunerantur aut ejus amissione aliisque pœnis puniuntur.

108. *Quædam speciatim de pœna.* Pœna juxta fautores Determinismi et Evolutionismi non infligitur, ut delictum puniatur, sed ut transgressores coerceantur et curentur (*pœna medicinalis*), aliique, si non amore virtutis, saltem timore mali physici a delictis abstineant (*pœna exemplaris*). Quare, totum finem pœnarum reponunt in aliqua utilitate sociali, excluso munere expiatorio, quo, per justitiam vindicativam, ad perturbatam ordinis moralis harmoniam restituendam, congrua pœna pro culpa et pro injuria societati illata nocentibus impenditur. Atvero, totus scopus pœnæ non est medicinalis vel exemplaris, delictum enim quodcumque, etiam internum, lædit ordinem moralem simpliciter, et proinde, etsi nequeat justitia humana puniri, debet subjacere pœnali justitiæ Rectoris supremi et universalis. Delicta externa lædunt ordinem justitiæ *commutativæ*, quatenus privatis personis damnum inferunt, et ordinem justitiæ *legalis*, quatenus juri societatis circa suum proprium finem opponuntur.[1]

[1] This is the essential element in punishment—the infliction of pain upon a man for ill-gotten pleasure—a pleasure unduly received at the

ART. V.

DE VIRTUTIBUS ET VITIIS.

§ 1. De Virtutibus et Vitiis in Genere.

109. Ut tractatus de actuum humanorum moralitate compleatur, nonnulla scitu necessaria de virtutibus et vitiis oportet nos adjicere ; virtutes enim et vitia, utpote habitus, potentias animæ inflectunt et quasi determinant ad actus morales sive bonos sive malos, et proinde adjumenta moralitatis dici possunt.

110. Virtus moralis definitur : *habitus bonus perficiens potentiam rationalem ad honeste operandum.*

Dicitur 1°. *habitus*, ut ejus genus proximum indicetur ; virtus enim non est qualitas quæcumque, sed qualitas stabilis, quam subjectum ut suam *habet.*

Dicitur 2°. *habitus* **bonus,** ut indicetur differentia, qua virtus decernatur a vitiis et ab habitibus moraliter indifferentibus, *v.g.*, scientia, arte.

Dicitur 3°. *perficiens potentiam* **rationalem,** ut indicetur subjectum virtutis. Nomine *potentiæ rationalis* intelliguntur non modo illæ, quæ tales sunt per essentiam (*scil.*, intellectus et voluntas), sed etiam quæ tales sunt per participationem, nimirum, appetitus concupiscibilis et irascibilis in homine, quatenus regulæ rationis subduntur.[1]

expense of another. That other is either God or Society, or an individual man, for all three have rights which may be offended. Punishment, therefore, is primarily and essentially retributive in its character—that is, its effect is retrospective not prospective, and whatever other function may belong to punishment such function depends upon and presupposes the retributive or retrospective function—(**Cronin,** p. 555).

[1] The irascible and concupiscible faculties may be considered in two ways : in one way in themselves, as they are parts of the sensitive appetite, and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. In another way they may be considered as partaking in reason by the fact of their being naturally apt to obey reason ; and thus the irascible or concupiscible faculty may be the subject of human virtue. . . . .

The irascible and concupiscible faculties, considered in themselves

Dicitur 4°. *ad honeste operandum*, ut indicetur finis intrinsecus virtutis, quippe quæ ad hoc ordinatur, ut homo, juxta normam honestatis se gerens, evadat simpliciter bonus, *i.e.*, bonus ut homo.

111. Consectaria.—1°. Virtus nequit esse principium actus mali, quia nemo potest uti virtute nisi ad honeste operandum ; ideoque si quis virtute præditus respectu illius virtutis male agit, non agit ex influxu virtutis, sed potentiam, in qua virtus residet, adhibet ad male agendum. Ex quo intelligitur definitio virtutis a *S. Aug.* data : "bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, *qua nullus male utitur*."

2°. Virtus moralis, *a*) quum resideat in potentiis rationalibus, in hominibus, non autem in brutis animalibus, invenitur ; *b*) quum exerceri debeat juxta rectam rationem, non in amentibus aut quibuslibet aliis, qui sunt sui impotes, sed in iis, qui sunt sanæ mentis, invenitur ; *c*) quum sit qualitas stabilis, et quidem repetitis actibus bonis acquisita, non invenitur in ignavis et levibus, qui huc illuc suis passionibus agitantur, sed in hominibus boni propositi tenacibus et contra tentationes strenuis.

3°. Virtus est causa efficiens characteris moralis. Tunc enim homo characterem moralem habere proprie dicitur, quando constanter et juxta rectam rationem operatur ; nec defectus characteris moralis alii causæ adscribendus est quam defectui educationis moralis et culturæ virtutis.[1]

as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and brutes ; but inasmuch as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, they are proper to man, and in this way they may be the subject of human virtue—(*Aquinas Ethicus* (1, 2, q. 56, a. 4)—A Trans. of the Principal Portions of the 2nd Part of the *Summa Theologica* by J. Rickaby).

[1] Character is the moral texture or disposition which is formed in a person as the result of repeated action and of habitual thought. We say that one is a man of character if we find him showing persistent activity in striving after some purpose which he has set before himself, or in suffering trial and loss for a principle. For character is proved in passivity as well or even more than in activity. The early Christian martyrs proved themselves men and women of character by

4°. Ut homo vere dicatur virtuosus *a*) non sufficit, ut identidem, sed requiritur, ut *constanter*, bene operetur ; virtus enim est stabilis ; *b*) non sufficit, ut post longam deliberationem et mentis hæsitationem se ad operandum quasi impellat, sed requiritur, ut *prompte* agat ; virtus enim determinat potentiam ad unum modum agendi ; *c*) non sufficit, ut sine repugnantia agat, sed requiritur, ut *delectabiliter* agat ; habitus enim est operanti quasi altera natura ; operatio autem, quæ naturæ convenit, delectat, quum convenientia sit causa delectationis. Unde, ad perfecte vivendum homo virtutibus indiget, et quidem eo fine, *a*) ut sit uniformitas in operatione, *b*) ut operatio ponenda in promptu habeatur, *c*) ut ipsa delectabiliter peragatur.

5°. Erraverunt, qui cum Socrate et Platone virtutem moralem cum scientia confuderunt. Si enim unum idemque essent, ad bene moraliter agendum sufficeret, ut mens honestatem actionis cognosceret ; atvero, cuique certum est mentem meliora videre et approbare, voluntatem autem pejora sequi (cf. *Cronin*, p. 570).[1]

sacrificing their lives for their principles. . . . Our fathers, who gave up their lives as well as their lands in Ireland for their principles, proved themselves thereby to be men of character ; otherwise they would have kept their lands and saved their lives, as they might easily have done, by turning their backs on their principles and by lying to themselves. . . . The purpose towards which one directs his activity, or the principle for the sake of which one suffers, colours the nature of the character that is formed or revealed, although the character itself is proved by the persistency with which one pursues or suffers for a cause. Hence a man of character is one whose individuality comes out, shows, and asserts itself in doing difficult deeds, or in bearing great trials—(**O'Riordan,** *Catholicity and Progress in Ireland*, pp. 124-5).

[1] It is certainly untrue to say that the one thing which we need in order to overcome sin and to attain to perfection is a more perfect knowledge of our own nature and its laws. We do not find that the best physiologists and the best psychologists are necessarily the best men. Indeed, if we know ourselves at all, we are painfully conscious that under great temptation we often act in direct opposition to our knowledge. The drunkard and the sensualist know full well that they are ruining the health of mind and body, but I doubt if this knowledge alone has ever succeeded in making one or other either temperate or pure. Indeed, according to the teaching of our Lord, this is taken for

Non minus erraverunt Stoici arbitrantes virtutem moralem in apathia seu in absentia omnis sensibilitatis, omnis passionis, consistere. Tantum enim abest, ut res ita se habeat, ut virtus sæpe suas inchoationes, semper validas adjutrices in passionibus inveniat. Deinde, passiones, utpote per se physice bonæ, non sunt extirpandæ sed rectæ rationis dictamine moderandæ.

112. De Medietate virtutis.—Homines communiter loquuntur de moderatione ubique adhibenda, de extremis vitandis, de aurea via media tenenda, quibus locutionibus indicare volunt unicuique virtuti duo vitia (alterum per excessum, alterum per defectum) opposita inveniri. Unde : " In medio stat virtus," " ne quid nimis." Virtus enim, ut habitus bonus, facit operationem bonam, *i.e.*, conformem regulæ morali, ita ut nec superexcedat mensuram ista regula præscriptam, nec a mensura præscripta deficiat, quomodo, *v.g.*, virtus liberalitatis inter prodigalitatem (excessum) et avaritiam (defectum) consistit.

113. Solet vero in hoc contextu distingui duplex medium, scil., *medium rei* seu ex parte objecti, et *medium rationis* seu ex parte subjecti. Medium rei semper et pro omnibus idem manet ; est enim objectum, abstractione facta a conditione agentis. Obtinet in justitia, quæ cuique suum, nec plus nec minus, tribuit. Medium rationis diversificatur pro diversitate status aetatis, dispositionis, etc., agentium ; ex quo fit, ut quod in uno homine excedit mensuram recti, in alio (vel in eodem alio tempore) illam mensuram non excedat, vel etiam non attingat. Quodsi nonnullæ virtutes (*v.g.*, fortitudo)

granted : " He that knew his Lord's will and did it not shall be beaten with many stripes." The mere knowledge of what we ought not to do, often even of the disastrous results of what we are tempted to, will not necessarily hold a man back from doing it. St. Paul utters the experience of every man who has striven after a high standard when he says, " I cannot do the things that I would " ; and again, " The good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not that I do "—(**Maturin,** *Self-Knowledge and Self-Discipline*, p. 84).

ad *extrema* se extendunt, id fit, quia in his ipsa extrema rationem virtutis habent.[1]

114. De virtutibus theologicis speciatim observandum est eas non quidem *per se* et ratione *objecti* in medio consistere (quum Dei veracitas, omnipotentia, bonitas, quæ sunt motiva fidei, spei, caritatis, excedant omnem facultatem humanam), sed tantum *per accidens* et ratione *subjecti*, quatenus de Deo credere vel ex eo sperare possumus, quod non debemus, vel amorem erga eum exprimere modo, quo non debemus.

115. De Vitiis.—Vitium non est mera carentia virtutis, sed est *habitus operativus moraliter malus*.

Ergo 1°. vitium et peccatum, licet sæpe confundantur, sunt revera distincta, quum vitium sit *habitus* subjectum ad peccandum inclinans ; peccatum vero sit *actus* vitium generans vel ab eo generato promanans.[2]

2°. Omne vitium est naturæ rationali repugnans, quum inclinet agens ad agendum contra rectam ratio-

[1] The mean and extremes in actions and passions are determined according to circumstances : and circumstances differ. Hence there is nothing to hinder a virtue exhibiting what is an extreme according to one circumstance, and yet is a mean according to other circumstances by conformity to reason ; and such is the case with munificence and magnanimity. For if we consider the absolute quantity of that unto which the munificent and magnanimous man tends, it will be called an extreme and a maximum : but if this same degree is considered in respect of other circumstances, at that rate it has the character of a mean, because the said virtues tend to this maximum according to the rule of reason, *where* they ought, and *when* they ought, and *for the motive* for which they ought: whereas excess would be to tend to this maximum *when* one ought not, or *where* one ought not, or *for a motive* for which one ought not ; and defect would be not to tend to this maximum *where* one ought and *when* one ought—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 1, 2, q. 64, § 2 ; cf. *Cronin*, p. 571).

[2] It is important to observe that virtue and vice are not acts, but habits. Vices do not make a man guilty, nor do virtues make him innocent. A man is guilty or innocent according to his acts, not according to his habits. A man may do a wicked thing and not be vicious, or a good act and not be virtuous. . . . When sin is taken away by God and pardoned, the vice, that is the evil habit, if any such existed before, still remains, and constitutes a danger for the future. The habit can only be overcome by watchfulness and a long continuance of contrary acts. But vice is not sin, nor is sin vice, nor a good deed virtue—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 69).

nem ; immo sunt vitia (*v.g.*, intemperantia), quæ non solum naturæ rationali sed etiam animali contrariantur.

3°. Licet vitia virtutibus opponantur, tamen vitia *capitalia* non sunt quattuor (ut sunt virtutes, n. 116), sed septem, quia dum virtus est in medio, peccari potest per excessum vel defectum. Et quidem 1°. per excessivum amorem boni nostri proprii habentur *superbia* et *gula ;* boni nostri ad speciei conservationem habetur *luxuria ;* boni externi, *avaritia.* 2°. Per defectum et odium boni habetur *acedia* circa bonum nostrum spirituale ; *invidia* circa bonum alienum, prout est boni nostri impeditivum, et *ira*, qua contra bonum alienum insurgimus (cf. *S. Th.*, Q. Disp. II., q. 8, a. 1).

§ 2. De Virtutibus et Vitiis in Specie.

116. Omnes virtutes morales reducuntur ad quattuor principales, quæ *cardinales* vocantur, quia super eas quodammodo, sicut motus ostii super cardines, tota vita moralis vertitur. Hæ sunt *prudentia, justitia, fortitudo, temperantia.*

Ratio hujus divisionis colligitur ex consideratione tum subjecti tum objecti virtutis :—

1°. *Ex parte subjecti.* Quadruplex est subjectum proximum virtutis moralis, *scil.*, intellectus, quem perficit *prudentia ;* voluntas, quam ordinat *justitia ;* appetitus sensitivus irascibilis, quem moderatur *fortitudo ;* appetitus sensitivus concupiscibilis, quem regit *temperantia.*

2°. *Ex parte objecti.* Ut moraliter agamus, imprimis debemus objectum actionis ejusque ad normam honestatis relationem inspicere ; hoc autem est munus *prudentiæ.* Quod ut honestum cognoscimus, id exequamur oportet sive erga alios per *justitiam*, sive erga nos ipsos, et quidem vel firmantes animum contra pericula per *fortitudinem*, vel illum refrænantes a delectationibus per *temperantiam.*

117. Partes harum virtutum.—Reliquæ virtutes ad

unam aliamve virtutum cardinalium, sive ut partes *subjectivæ*, sive ut partes *integrales*, sive ut partes *potentiales* seu *annexæ* reducuntur.

Partes subjectivæ sunt virtutes, quæ sub aliqua virtute cardinali, sicut species sub genere, continentur.

Partes integrales sunt virtutes, quæ concurrunt, ut operatio virtutis cardinalis sit perfecta.

Partes potentiales sunt virtutes, quæ ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus virtutis cardinalis.[1]

A.—DE PRUDENTIA.

118. Prudentia definitur : *virtus, qua intellectus judicat, quid, in quovis casu particulari, sit honestum et agendum, quid turpe et vitandum.*

Dicitur 1°. *qua* **intellectus** *judicat*, quia ad intellectum pertinet dirigere actus humanos ad eorum finem verum, *i.e.*, ad vitæ honestatem ; hoc autem exsequi nequit nisi aliqua virtute (*scil.*, prudentia) perficiatur ad eligendum actus fini præstituto accommodatos.[2]

[1] A *part* is threefold—*integral*, as *wall*, *roof*, and *foundation* are parts of a house ; *subjective*, as *ox* and *lion* are parts of *animal* ; and *potential*, as *nutritive* and *sensitive* are parts of the soul. In three ways, therefore, may we assign parts to any virtue. In one way, according to the likeness of *integral* parts, calling those things parts of any virtue that must needs concur to the perfect act of the said virtue. Again by the *subjective* parts of a virtue we understand its different species. . . . Lastly, by the *potential* parts of virtue are understood the adjoining virtues that are directed to secondary acts or matters, and have not the full force of the primary virtue—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 2, 2, q. 48, a. 1).

[2] Prudence is a virtue especially necessary to human life. For to live well is to work well, or display a good activity. Now, for activity to be good, care must be taken not only of what the agent does, but of how he does it : to wit, that he go to work according to right election, not by the mere impetus of passion. But since election is of means to the end, rightness of election requires two things, a due end and a proper direction of means to that end. Now, to the due end man is properly disposed by the virtue which perfects the appetitive part of the soul, the object whereof is that which is good and that which ranks as an end. But towards the proper direction of means to a due end, a man must be positively disposed by a habit of reason : because deliberation and election, which are both means to the end, are acts of

Dicitur 2°. *quid sit* **honestum,** *quid* **turpe,** quia per hæc verba indicatur prudentiæ objectum tum materiale tum formale. Objectum ejus *materiale* sunt agibilia seu actus humani immanentes ; et in hoc differt ab *arte*, quæ versatur circa *factabilia* seu actus externos. Ejus objectum *formale* est *moralis rectitudo actuum humanorum.* Unde et definitur : *recta ratio agibilium.*

Dicitur 3°. *quid* **agendum,** *quid* **vitandum,** quia nemo certe eum prudentem diceret, qui, etsi quid sit honestum vel turpe in quolibet negotio facile cognosceret, nihilominus vel honestum omitteret vel turpe ageret.

Dicitur 4°. *in quovis casu particulari,* quia ope prudentiæ applicantur principia generalia Ethicæ ad negotia singularia, ut quid in concreto sit honestum aut secus dignoscamus. Unde etiam definitur : *virtus dirigens rationem practicam in recta applicatione principiorum moralium ad actiones et circumstantias particulares.*

119. Consectaria.—1°. Prudentia, ratione *subjecti*, non secus ac scientia vel ars, est virtus *intellectualis ;* ratione tamen *objecti* est virtus *moralis,* quum eo spectet, ut recte ordinentur actus morales. Immo quum ad ipsam pertineat reliquis virtutibus præscribere medium, ne per excessum vel defectum ad opposita vitia declinent, merito dicitur " non tam virtus, quam quædam moderatrix et auriga virtutum, ordinatrixque affectuum et morum doctrix. Tolle hanc, et virtus vitium erit " (**S. Bernard,** *In Cant.*, serm., 49, n. 5 ; cf. *Cronin,* p. 565).

2°. Prudentia tres includit functiones, quæ sunt : *a*) *bene consultare,* quærendo quænam media requirantur, ut opus honeste fiat ; *b*) *bene judicare,* recognoscendo aptitudinem mediorum ; *c*) *bene præcipere,* movendo alias virtutes morales ad opus exsequendum. Hic ter-

reason. And, therefore, there must be in reason some intellectual virtue, whereby the reason may be perfected so as suitably to regard the means to the end ; and that virtue is prudence—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 1, 2, q. 57, a. 5).

tius actus est propria prudentiæ functio, duo priores sunt potius partes potentiales.

120. Partes prudentiæ.—*Partes subjectivæ* sunt prudentia *personalis*, qua quis regit seipsum, et *gubernativa*, qua alios regit.

Partes integrales sunt *memoria* præteritorum, qua ex experientia colligitur, quid in tali vel tali negotio expediat; *intelligentia* præsentium, ne moralitas actus ex adjunctis vitietur; *providentia* futurorum, ne actus malas habeat consequentias (cf. 2. 2, q. 48-9).

Partes potentiales sunt *eubulia* seu habitus recte consultandi; *synesis*, quæ est habitus recte judicandi secundum communes regulas et verbum legis; *gnome*, quæ est habitus recte judicandi juxta altiora principia vel spiritum legis.

121. Vitia prudentiæ opposita.—*Per defectum* ei opponitur imprudentia, quæ diversa est pro diversis prudentiæ partibus. *Per excessum*, et sub falsa specie, ei opponitur *a*) *prudentia carnis*, quæ ingeniose quærit media in finem *pravum*; *b*) *astutia*, quæ finem vel bonum vel malum per media *prava* prosequitur. Si hæc media sint verba, habetur *dolus*; si facta, habetur *fraus*.

B.—DE JUSTITIA.

122. Justitia est *virtus moralis voluntatem inclinans ad suum cuique tribuendum.*

Dicitur 1°. *virtus moralis*, ut genus ejus indicetur.

Dicitur 2°. *inclinans* **voluntatem,** ut indicetur ejus subjectum et distinguatur a prudentia.[1]

Dicitur 3°. *ad* **cuique** *tribuendum*, ut justitia, quæ perficit hominem in ordine ad alios, distinguatur a reliquis virtutibus cardinalibus, quæ hominem perficiunt in seipso.[2]

[1] Justice is not directed to the guidance of any cognitive act; for we are not called *just* for the fact of our knowing anything correctly. And therefore the subject is not the intellect or reason, which is a cognitive power. But because we are called *just* in this that we do a thing rightly, and the proximate principle of action is the appetitive faculty, some portion of the appetitive faculty must be the subject of justice. . . . But the rendering to everyone of his own cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite; because the apprehension of sense does not extend to the consideration of the proportion of one thing to another; that is proper to reason. Hence neither the irascible nor the concupiscible faculty can be the subject of justice, but the will alone—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 2, 2, 58, a. 4).

[2] The behaviour of a man in regard of himself is sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions, which is the work of the other moral virtues; but the behaviour of one man towards another man

Dicitur 4°. *suum*, ut hæc virtus distinguatur a ceteris illis virtutibus (*v.g.*, liberalitate, caritate) quæ inclinant voluntatem ad bona aliis tribuenda, sed non ita, ut talia bona *ex jure* debeantur. *Suum* enim est, quod ad alicujus utilitatem destinatur, ut ab ipso possidendum.

123. Quare, 1°. Objectum *materiale* justitiæ est omne illud, quod homo tamquam suum sibi vindicare potest, sive res sive actio sive etiam omissio actionis, qua suum jus violaretur. Objectum *formale* est specialis rectitudo cuique suum tribuendi.

2°. Ad notionem justitiæ tria concurrunt : *a*) *debitum ;* ideo enim aliquis opus justitiæ ponit, quia in alio est facultas seu titulus illud opus exigendi ; *b*) *æqualitas*, quia is formaliter est *justus*, qui quod debet, nec majus nec minus, tribuit; *c*) *altereitas* (*i.e.*, distinctio personarum), quia justitia importat æqualitatem; nihil autem est sibi æquale sed alteri.

124. Partes justitiæ.—*Partes subjectivæ* enumerantur tres : *generalis* seu *legalis*, *distributiva*, *commutativa*. Justitia enim ordinat hominem ad alios, vel ut *partem ad totum* (justitia legalis), vel ut *totum ad partem* (justitia distributiva), vel ut *partem ad partem* (justitia commutativa).

Justitia *legalis* est habitus inclinans voluntatem ad præstanda omnia, quæ societati debentur in ordine ad bonum commune. Hanc virtutem exercent subditi leges servando, tributa solvendo.

Justitia *distributiva* inclinat societatem (presse, societatis rectorem), ut bona et onera communia membris societatis distribuat secundum eorum merita et vires.

Justitia *commutativa* inclinat privatum ad alteri privato tribuendum, quod ei rigorose debetur. Unde, locum habet inter unum hominem et alterum, quatenus sunt æquales seu homines ; inter unam societatem et alteram, quia hæ ad instar privatorum se habent.

Partes integrales sunt habitus faciendi bonum alteri debitum et habitus declinandi a malo alteri nocivo. Uterque, ut patet, requiritur ad justitiæ integritatem (cf. 2. 2, q. 79, a. 1).

Partes potentiales sunt *religio*, qua Deo cultum debitum reddimus ; *pietas*, qua sanguine nobis junctis et patriæ officium et amorem

needs a special rectification, not in relation to the agent only, but likewise in relation to the other person with whom he deals. And therefore there is a special virtue concerned with that behaviour, namely, justice—(*op. cit.*, 2, 2, q. 58, a. 3).

tribuimus ; *observantia*, qua hominibus dignitate aliqua præcellentibus honorem congruum exhibemus ; *veracitas*, qua tales nos verbis et factis exhibemus quales reapse sumus ; *gratitudo*, qua memoriam beneficii retinemus, ut illud recompensemus ; *amicitia*, qua ad invicem sinceram benevolentiam fovemus ; *affabilitas*, qua in conversatione ad unumquemque nos habemus, prout decet.

125. Vitia justitiæ opposita.—Huic virtuti, utpote æqualitatem importanti, nullum vitium opponitur *per excessum* : *per defectum* justitiæ *legali* opponitur *contemptus boni communis* : justitiæ *distributivæ* opponitur *acceptio personarum*, per quam aliquid commune (*v.g.*, magistratus) alicui præstatur, non propter meritum vel aptitudinem, sed ex alia ratione ad bonum commune non pertinente; justitiæ *commutativæ* opponuntur omnia, quæ alterum injuste lædunt in persona, in honore, in bonis externis.

C.—DE FORTITUDINE.

126. Fortitudo est *virtus firmans appetitum irascibilem in periculis gravioribus aggrediendis et malis sustinendis*. Et quum mala præcipua vitæ naturalis sint mors et mortis pericula, circa ea fortitudo primario versatur, secundario autem circa alia mala et pericula.

Munus fortitudinis est duplex : *aggredi* et *sustinere*. "*Aggredi* pertinet ad fortitudinem secundum quod moderatur audaciam ; sed *sustinere* sequitur repressionem timoris. Aggredi facilius est et honorabilius apparet, sustinere autem difficilius et laudabilius ; difficilius enim est timorem reprimere, quam audaciam moderari, eo quod ipsum periculum, quod est objectum audaciæ et timoris, de se confert aliquid ad repressionem audaciæ sed operatur ad augmentum timoris " (2, 2, q. 123, a. 6).

127. Fortitudo, utpote virtus, supponit, *a*) cognitionem periculi vel mali, quod aggreditur vel sustinetur, *b*) amorem virtutis, ob quam exercetur, *c*) finem moraliter bonum. Unde fieri potest, ut quis *fortiter* agat, et tamen virtute fortitudinis careat, *scil.*, si agat *a*) ex ignorantia periculi vel certitudine illud evadendi, *b*) experimenti causa, *c*) ob lucrum vel aliquid hujusmodi.[1]

[1] A man may brave death in a good cause, and not be doing an act of fortitude. So he may subscribe a large sum to a charitable purpose

128. Partes fortitudinis.—Partes *subjectivas* non habet fortitudo, seu, " non dividitur in multas virtutes specie differentes, quia est circa materiam valde specialem " (2, 2, q. 128), quæ est mortis periculum, vel aliud fere æquivalens.

Partes integrales et *potentiales* ejus eædem sunt ; sed eo differunt quod *integrales* vocantur, si circa propriam fortitudinis materiam versantur ; et *potentiales*, si sunt circa alias res minus difficiles. Tales sunt *patientia*, quæ nos firmat ne malis imminentibus frangamur in bono agendo, et *perseverantia*, quæ nos sustinet, ne a bono suscepto desistamus propter difficultates diuturnas.

129. Vitia opposita *per excessum* sunt *temeritas*, quæ plus audet quam debet, et *intimiditas*, quæ non timet, quando debet ; *per defectum* sunt *ignavia*, quæ non audet, quando debet, et *timiditas*, quæ plus timet, quam debet.

D.—TEMPERANTIA.

130. Temperantia est *virtus moderans appetitum concupiscibilem circa vehementiores delectationes sensitivas.* Delectationes vehementiores pertinent ad gustum et tactum, qui ideo speciali virtute eas moderante indigent. Circa delectationes ceterorum sensuum temperantia nonnisi secundario versatur, prout nimirum ad priorum delectationes conferunt.

131. Partes temperantiæ.—*Partes subjectivæ* sunt *abstinentia* et *sobrietas* delectationes cibi et potus moderantes, *castitas* delectationes carnis refrænans, *pudicitia* cohibens omnia, quæ ad has delectationes disponunt.

Partes integrales sunt " *verecundia* per quam aliquis refugit turpitudinem temperantiæ contrariam ; et *honestas*,[1] per quam aliquis

without any exercise of the virtue of charity. A virtue is then only exercised when its outward act is performed from the proper motive of the virtue and not from any lower motive. Thus the proper motive of fortitude is the conviction that death is an evil, the risk of which is to be left out of count as a circumstance relatively inconsiderable, when there is a question of the defence of certain interests dearer to a good man than life. An improper motive would be anger, which, however useful as an accessory, by itself is not an intellectual motive at all, and therefore no motive of virtue. The recklessness of an angry man is not fortitude. It is not fortitude to be brave from ignorance or stupidity, not appreciating the danger : nor, again, from experience, knowing that the apparent danger is not real, at least to yourself. The brave man looks a real danger in the face, and knows it, and goes on in spite of it, because so it is meet and just, with the cause that he has, to go on—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 96).

[1] Sense of propriety—(*Cronin*, p. 582).

amat pulchritudinem temperantiæ. Nam præcipue temperantia inter virtutes vindicat sibi quemdam decorem, et vitia intemperantiæ maxime turpitudinem habent" (2, 2, q. 143).

Partes potentiales sunt 1°. circa tendentias *internas*, *continentia* refrænans pravas concupiscentias, ne voluntas vincatur; *humilitas* moderans appetitum excellentiæ; *mansuetudo* et *clementia* moderantes iram. 2°. Circa tendentias *externas* versatur *modestia* moderans actiones, ut personis et adjunctis congruant. Est igitur quasi virtus generalis, cui adscribuntur *ornatus* et *simplicitas* moderantes usum vestium et supellectilis, *austeritas* moderans colloquia, *eutrapelia* (festivitas) moderans ludos et jocos ad animi solamen utiles, *studiositas* moderans inordinatum appetitum sciendi.

132. Vitia temperantiæ opposita.—*Per excessum* ei opponitur *intemperantia*, cujus species sunt *crapula*, *ebrietas*, *iracundia*, *loquacitas*, *scurrilitas*, *superbia*, *luxus*. *Per defectum* opponitur *insensibilitas*, qua quis ita aversatur delectationibus sensuum, ut eis uti renuat, quando, quomodo, et quantum oportet. Est vitium perrarum (cf. *Cronin* p. 581).

CAPUT TERTIUM.

De Normis actuum humanorum directivis.

133. Normæ, quibus voluntas humana in agendo dirigitur, sunt *lex* et *conscientia*. Lex autem est norma *objectiva* et *remota*, et ideo ejus objectiva vis obligandi nequit in actu secundo suam efficaciam exserere, nisi subditis legis innotescat, et per judicium rationis ad singulas actiones applicetur. Hæc applicatio fit per conscientiam moralem, quæ ideo est actuum humanorum norma *subjectiva* et *proxima*. De utraque norma in hoc capite agimus.

ART. I.

DE LEGE.

§ 1. De Legis Notione.

134. Lex a "ligare" derivari videtur, et significat universim normam agendi constantem et uniformem, ut quum loquimur de legibus physicis, physiologicis, logicis.

Lex autem sensu proprio est norma actiones humanas dirigens, et definitur : " *ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam habet communitatis, promulgata* " (**S. Th.**, 1, 2, q. 90, a. 1).

Dicitur 1°. *ordinatio*, quia proprium est legis actus regere, eos ordinando in debitum finem. Hæc autem ordinatio non est mere directiva, sed directiva simul et obligativa. Discrimen enim inter simplicem regulam et legem in eo est, quod simplex regula tantummodo *dirigit*, lex vero non solum id præstat, sed insuper etiam *adigit* seu obligat.

Dicitur 2°. *rationis*, quia lex, etsi, quatenus est obligativa, pendet a voluntate legislatoris, tamen quatenus est directiva, consistit in dictamine rationis, cujus est in finem ordinare ; nec concipi potest obligativa, nisi prius concipiatur directiva.[1]

Dicitur 3°. *ad bonum commune* (*i.e.*, ad bonum, in cujus assecutionem tendit communitas seu societas perfecta), quia subjectum, cui lex imponitur, non est unum alterumve individuum sed ipsa communitas. Bonum commune igitur est causa *finalis* vel tota ratio legis.

135. Obs.—Opus non est, ut lex totam communitatem, saltem immediate, respiciat ; ferri enim potest pro una persona vel aliqua personarum classe (*v.g.*, pro exercitu), quarum operationes totam communitatem directe afficiunt.

Haud vero negatur fieri posse, ut lex ob utilitatem communem lata aliquod damnum privatorum permittat vel etiam intendat (bo-

[1] Though law proceeds from Reason, it bears also some reference to Will. For, law being a rule of action, it has two essential elements—it is a plan and a directing or moving force. . . . Intellect is the planning, the thinking, the arranging power—will the moving, the binding power. Yet primarily and essentially, law is a function of Reason or intellect, and not of will ; for will in binding us, receives its direction from Reason. Will urges to the doing of a certain act ; but it urges, in the case of a genuine law, under the guidance of intellect. The will that binds a subject independently of intellect is a principle not of law but of confusion and destruction (*magis iniquitas quam lex*). Hence, inasmuch as the guiding power is always principal, and of more consequence than that which is guided, we regard law as primarily and essentially a function of Reason—not of will—(**Cronin** v. 1, p. 599).

num enim commune est privato præferendum), modo tamen damna privata tot non sint, ut bono communi præponderent, nec sub specie boni communis procurentur.[1]

Dicitur 4°. *ab eo, qui curam communitatis habet,* quia lex, ut diximus, ordinem dicit ad bonum commune ; " ordinare autem aliquid in bonum commune, est vel totius multitudinis, vel alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis ; quia et in omnibus aliis ordinare in finem est ejus, cujus est proprius ille finis. Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem, vel ad personam publicam, quæ totius multitudinis curam habet " (*loc. cit.*, a. 3).

Dicitur 5°. *promulgata,* quia in tantum lex potest subditos ordinare et obligare, in quantum iis fuerit authentice intimata ; quæ sane *authentica intimatio* dicitur *legis promulgatio.*

136. Lex a præcepto differt.—Licet lex et præceptum soleant promiscue usurpari, tamen in multis differunt. Et quidem :—

1° *Ratione finis,* quum lex directe intendat bonum commune, præceptum vero bonum privatum sive jubentis sive cujuspiam alterius.

[1] I have said that a law is for a community, that it requires amplitude and large area. A law is not laid down for an individual, except in so far as his action is of importance to the community. The private concerns of one man do not afford scope and room enough for a law. Neither do the domestic affairs of one family. A father is not a legislator. A law aims at a deep, far-reaching, primary good. But the private good of an individual, and the domestic good of a family, are not primary goods, inasmuch as the individual and family are not primary but subordinate beings not complete and independent, but dependent and partial ; not wholes but parts. The individual is part of the family, and the family is part of a higher community. It is only when we are come to some community which is not part of a higher, that we have found the being, the good of which is primary good, the aim of law. Such a community, not being part of any higher community in the same order, is in its own order a perfect community. Thus, in the temporal order, the individual is part of the State. The State is a perfect community ; and the good of the State is of more consequence than the temporal well-being of any individual citizen. The temporal good of the individual, then, is a matter of law, in so far as it is subservient to the good of the State. We have, then, to hold that a law is given to the members of a perfect community for the good of the whole—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 127).

2°. *Ratione auctoris*, quia ad legem condendam requiritur auctoritas publica et potestas jurisdictionis, ad præceptum sufficit auctoritas privata et potestas dominativa, qualem habet pater, herus.

3°. *Ratione subjecti*, quum lex feratur in communitatem perfectam, præceptum in communitatem imperfectam (*v.g.*, familiam) vel etiam in personam particularem.

4°. *Ratione extensionis*, quia lex extra territorium legislatoris non obligat, quum nonnisi mediante territorio afficiat subditos ; præceptum vero *ossibus hæret*, ut aiunt, quum subditos directe afficiat eosque ubique comitetur.

5°. *Ratione durationis ;* lex enim semel lata per se habet durationem indefinitam, quum auctoritas publica non cesset cessatione personæ legislatoris ; at præceptum per mortem præcipientis vel etiam ejus ab officio remotionem, ut plurimum, cessat. Unde, ad dignoscendum num jussum aliquod sit lex an præceptum hæ differentiæ attendendæ sunt.

137. Legis divisio.—Lex dividitur in *increatam* seu *æternam* et *creatam* seu *temporalem*, prout ab æterno existit vel in tempore fertur.

Lex temporalis est duplex : *naturalis* et *positiva*. Illa fundatur in ipsa natura humana, et per lumen rationis interne promulgatur ; hæc vero (sive fundatur in natura humana sive non) est per aliquod signum externum subditis intimata. Unde, hæc divisio desumitur ex modo promulgationis.

Lex positiva est *divina* vel *humana*, prout auctor legis est ipse Deus, vel homo potestate a Deo habita præditus. Lex *divina* dividitur in *veterem* et *novam*, lex *humana* in *ecclesiasticam* et *civilem*.

Obs. 1°.—Lex divino-positiva est lex temporalis, non quidem active sumpta seu prout est in Deo, sed passive sumpta seu prout est in homine. Lex autem humana non solum ut est in subditis, sed etiam prout est in legislatore, est temporalis, quum immediate procedat a ratione humana.

Obs. 2°.—Aliæ leges dicuntur *affirmativæ*, aliæ *negativæ*, prout aliquam actionem ponendam vel omittendam jubent. Negativæ dicuntur obligare *semper et pro semper*, quia semper tenemur malum vitare ; affirmativæ dicuntur obligare *semper*, *sed non pro semper*, quia, licet bonum facere teneamur, tamen non tenemur singulis momentis.

Porro, leges dicuntur *punientes* et *irritantes* prout pœnam aliquam infligunt vel aliquem actum irritum reddunt.

138. Legis effectus.—Legis effectus est duplex : *proximus* et *remotus*. Effectus proximus est *obligatio*, quæ est *necessitas quædam moralis ea faciendi vel omittendi quæ a legislatore præcipiuntur*.

Dicitur 1°. *necessitas*, quia proprium legis est ligamen aliquod imponere.

Dicitur 2°. *moralis*, quia necessitas, de qua agitur, non aufert libertatem physicam sed *moralem*, *i.e.*, *jus* eligendi oppositum ; proponitur enim intellectui aliquid, quod voluntas *libere* facere debet, ita tamen, ut possit obligationem spernere.

Dicitur 3°. *ea faciendi . . . quæ a* **legislatore** *præcipiuntur*, quia solus ille, cui competit nos in finem ordinare, nos adstringere potest ad alias actiones ponendas, alias omittendas. Hinc, sola divina voluntas est causa efficiens *primaria* cujuscumque obligationis, licet voluntas humana, vi auctoritatis divinitus communicatæ, potest, tamquam causa *secundaria*, obligationem imponere.[1]

[1] The necessity which moral obligation lays upon us is the necessity, not of the determinism of nature, nor of the physical coercion of an external and stronger force, but it is of the same general character as the necessity that we are under of employing the necessary means in order to attain an end which must be obtained. There is, however, a special quality in the necessity of moral obligation which is peculiar to itself. We all appreciate this when we say that children are " obliged," to obey their parents, that they " ought " to obey them, that it is their " duty " to do so. We do not mean by these assertions that obedience to parents is a necessary means towards their own education, and for securing the peace, harmony, and affection, which should reign in the home. . . . There is a peremptoriness, a sacredness, a universality about the obligation of duty, which can only be explained by calling to mind what man is, what is his origin and what is his destiny. Man is a creature made by God, his Creator, with whom he is destined to live for all eternity. That is the end of man's life and of his every action, imposed on him by his Maker, who in making man ordered every fibre of his nature to the end for which he was made. That doctrine explains the peremptoriness, the sacredness, the universality of moral obligation, made known to us, as it is, by the dictates of conscience—(**Slater,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. ix., p. 189).

Remotus legis effectus est subditos reddere bonos ; legis enim est ordinare in finem ; *atqui* homo ordinatus in finem recte ordinatur seu bonus efficitur. Et quidem lex *civilis* facit, ut homines sint boni *cives*, lex *naturalis*, ut sint boni *homines*.

139. Sanctio legis.—Quum lex non reputetur definitive statuta nisi assignetur præmium iis, qui illam observaverint, et pœna iis, qui illam violaverint, usu venit, ut nomine sanctionis intelligantur *præmia et pœnæ a legislatore statuta pro observantibus vel transgredientibus legem a se latam*. Ita vocatur, quia per præmia pœnasque legi adjecta legislator legem quodammodo *sanctam* facit, ita ut nefas sit contra ejus præscriptum agere.

Sanctio distinguitur in *naturalem* et *positivam*. Prior consistit in præmiis pœnisque, quæ natura sua sequuntur actus juxta vel contra legem positos ; altera consistit in præmiis pœnisque, quæ legislator libere adjecit. Præterea, distinguitur sanctio *sufficiens* et *insufficiens*, prout per se valet movere voluntatem ad legem observandam vel non. Sanctio sufficiens dicitur *absoluta*, si pro omni homine et in omni casu sufficit, secus dicitur *relativa*. Sic, *v.g.*, pœna æterna est sanctio absolute sufficiens, pœna temporalis est sanctio relative sufficiens legi divinæ servandæ.

§ 2. De Lege Æterna.

140. Lex æterna est *ratio divinæ sapientiæ secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et motionum* (**S. Th.**, 1, 2, q. 93, a. 1).

Dicitur 1°. *ratio divinæ sapientiæ*, ut indicetur divinam sapientiam esse exemplar, secundum quod res omnes in proprios fines diriguntur.[1]

[1] As with every artificer there pre-exists the plan of the things that are set up by art, so in every governor there must pre-exist a plan of the order of the things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And as the plan of things to be done by art is called

Dicitur 2°. *secundum quod est* **directiva** etc., quia divina sapientia non habet rationem legis, nisi quatenus imprimit rebus inclinationem vel obligationem ad operandum juxta exemplar mente divina conceptum.

141. Consectaria.—1°. Ergo lex æterna est fons omnium ceterarum legum, nec hæ vim obligatoriam habent nisi in quantum in illa fundantur ; quod sane expresse enuntiatur in illa nota S. Augustini legis æternæ definitione. "*Lex æterna,*" inquit, "*est ratio vel voluntas*[1] *Dei ordinem naturalem conservari jubens et perturbari vetans.*" Nam per *ordinem naturalem* intelligitur ordo a Deo rebus omnibus impositus.

2°. Ergo omnes creaturæ legi æternæ subduntur, non tamen eodem modo. Etenim creaturæ irrationales ei subduntur per *physicam* necessitatem, quatenus per vires a Deo illis inditas necessario feruntur ad operationes suas eliciendas Deique voluntatem adimplendam ; at creaturæ rationales, quatenus sunt liberæ, ei subduntur per *moralem* necessitatem, quia per cognitionem legis æternæ ejusque obligationis eis aufertur libertas moralis, minime vero libertas psychologica legem non adimplendi.

142. *Dices* 1°. Peccatores se legi æternæ subtrahunt. quum contra eam agant ; *ergo* non omnes ei subduntur.

Resp.—" Licet peccando quis agat contra unam legem æternam Dei, in aliam præcipientem incidit, quæ jubet, ut

a pattern or exemplar, so the plan of him who governs subjects has the character of a law. . . Now God by His wisdom is the Creator of all things, and stands to them as the artificer to the products of his art. He is also the governor and controller of all the acts and movements that are found in any creature. And as the plan of the divine wisdom has the character of an exemplar, pattern, or idea, inasmuch as by it all things are created, so the plan of divine wisdom moving all things to their due end has the character of a law. And thus the Eternal Law is nothing else than the plan of Divine wisdom, as director of all acts and movements—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 1, 2, q. 93, a. 1).

[1]" Usitatum est, ut particula *vel* pro copulatione accipiatur, maxime quando illa, inter quæ ponitur, ita sunt connexa inter se, ut non separentur ; sic autem se habent ratio divina et voluntas circa legem æternam "—(**Suarez,** *De leg.*, l. 2, c. 6, n. 13).

quantum in *actione* homo deficit, tantum per *passionem* compensetur, ut dixit S. Thomas cum S. Augustino scribente: Novit Deus ordinare deserentes se animas, et ex earum justa miseria inferiores partes creaturæ suæ convenientissimis et congruentissimis legibus admirandæ dispensationis ordinare. Et huc etiam spectat, quod ait idem Augustinus: Jussisti, Domine, et sic est, ut pœna sua sibi sit omnis inordinatus animus. Si quis autem recte consideret, lex illa præcipiens, quæ in malis impletur per pœnam et in justis per præmium, non spectat ad legem præceptivam moralium actuum respectu creaturæ intellectualis, sed est lex taxativa (ut sic dicam) talis pœnæ vel præmii, quæ lex per efficaciam divinæ providentiæ ad effectum producitur" (**Suarez,** *op. cit.*, l. 2, c. 2, n. 16).

Dices 2°.—Si leges humanæ ex lege æterna vim obligandi accipiunt, non ex jure humano sed divino obligant, quod certo dici nequit.

Resp.—Lex humana obligat *formaliter* ex jure humano, sed quum omne jus creatum in jure increato fundetur, vis obligandi, quæ legi humanæ inest, *fundamentaliter* a lege æterna procedit.

Dices 3°.—Lex humana multa permittit, quæ lex æterna prohibet; *ergo* lex humana ex lege æterna derivari nequit.

Resp.—Permittit et approbat, *neg.*; . . . quia illa impedire nequit, *conc.* "Lex humana dicitur aliqua permittere, non quasi approbans, sed quasi ea dirigere non potens. Multa autem diriguntur lege divina, quæ dirigi non possunt lege humana; plura enim subduntur causæ superiori quam inferiori"—(**S. Th.,** *loc. cit.*, a. 3, ad 3).

143. Lex æterna est duplex: *antecedens* et *consequens*. Prior præcipit vel prohibet per se, *i.e.*, exclusa omni ignorantia ex parte hominis; altera præcipit vel prohibet per accidens, *i.e.*, supposita ignorantia invincibili. *V.g.*, lex æterna (antecedens) prohibet mendacium; datis vero circumstantiis, in quibus aliquis ex ignorantia invincibili putat se mentiri debere, tunc lex æterna (consequens) eum mentiri præcipit. Quo in casu actus mentientis est *formaliter* honestus, *materialiter* inhonestus (*peccatum materiale*).

144. Obs.—Lex æterna in hoc differt ab aliis legibus quoad promulgationem, quod lex æterna " censetur consummata et perfecta eo ipso, quod in mente legislatoris stabilita est ; aliæ vero leges non sunt consummatæ, donec actu promulgentur. Ratio autem reddi potest, quia *decretum Dei æternum immutabile est*, et sine ulla sui mutatione pro suo tempore obligat ; *decretum autem hominis mutabile est*, unde quamdiu non promulgatur per modum legis, semper se habet potius per modum propositi ferendi legem, quam per modum legis firmiter stabilitæ et latæ. Unde, *in hac lege æterna per se loquendo, nulla publica promulgatio requiritur ut actu obliget*, sed solum quod veniat in notitiam subditi. Unde, si per internam revelationem nobis innotesceret divinæ voluntatis decretum, sufficeret ad obligandum, quod non ita est in lege hominis ; nam licet subditus sciat legem jam esse scriptam apud regem, non obligatur illa, donec promulgetur. Ordinarie autem Deus non obligat homines per legem æternam, nisi mediante aliqua exteriori lege, quæ sit illius participatio et significatio, et ita quando aliæ leges promulgantur hominibus, promulgatur ad extra ipsa lex æterna ; ideoque in illa, ut æterna est, non habet locum propria promulgatio "—(**Suarez,** *loc. cit.*, c. 1, n. 11).

§ 3. De Lege Naturali.

145. " Quum omnia, quæ divinæ providentiæ subduntur, a lege æterna regulentur et mensurentur, manifestum est quod omnia participent aliqualiter legem æternam, *in quantum scilicet ex impressione ejus habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.* Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinæ providentiæ subjacet, in quantum et ipsa fit providentiæ particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio æterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem ; et *talis participatio legis æternæ in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur* " (**S. Th.,** 1, 2, q. 91, a. 2).

Quare, **lex naturalis** definitur: *participatio* seu *transcriptio legis æternæ in creatura rationali.* Quæ transcriptio eo fit, quod homo, simul atque evigilat ad plenum rationis usum et speciebus intellectivis informatur, concipit necessitatem positionis aut omissionis quarumdam actionum pro sua morali perfectione et consecutione

sui finis ultimi, seu, apprehendit quid Deus, ut agat aut omittat, absolute velit.

146. Lex naturalis a lege æterna differt, licet utraque sit divina. Nam 1°. Lex æterna extenditur ad omnes creaturas ; lex naturalis coarctatur ad creaturas rationales.

2°. Lex æterna existit in Deo legislatore, nec est aliud ab ipso ; lex naturalis existit in homine per modum judicii practici proclamantis quid faciendum, quid omittendum.

3°. Lex æterna ab æterno fertur, et proinde est prima et imparticipata ; lex naturalis in tempore orta est in mente humana, derivata, tamquam effectus a sua causa, a lege æterna (cf. *Cronin*, pp. 611-12).

147. Existentia legis naturalis nullo negotio ostenditur. Dei enim infinita sapientia exigit, ut creaturæ rationales, sicut ceteræ creaturæ, in finem eorum ultimum apte ordinentur ; *atqui* hujus ordinationis congruum medium " sola est *lex* et primario quidem ***naturalis***. Dico *sola lex ;* nam aliud vinculum ordinis nisi obligatio moralis congruere homini libertate prædito non potest ; sed ea debet esse primario *naturalis*, *i.e.*, per modum naturæ lata et naturali lumine homini innotescens. Id enim exigunt : *a*) *analogia* omnium aliarum rerum creatarum, quæ omnes per ipsam suam *naturam* ad finem ordinantur ; *b*) *finis legis*, qui totus naturalis est, ideoque media, quibus compleatur, requirit ejusdem ordinis ; *c*) ipsa denique *natura rationalis hominis*, utpote quæ ordini perspiciendo tota accommodatur, neque ullam legem positivam efficacem recipere posset, non supposita lege naturaliter cognita. Quis enim lege positiva, etiam divina, sese immediate moraliter obstrictum sentiat, nisi *antecedenter*, *i.e.*, naturali rationis lumine, Deo quodcumque præcipienti absolutam obedientiam deberi perspexerit ? " (**Meyer,** p. 215).

Idem constat testimonio conscientiæ, quum quisque

cognoscat non solum moralitatem multarum actionum, sed etiam obligationem quasdam illarum ponendi, et quasdam omittendi ; qui sensus obligationis explicari nequit nisi per intimam et naturalem persuasionem existentiæ cujusdam entis supremi suam voluntatem nobis, per dictamina nostræ naturæ rationalis, patefacientis. *Atqui* lex naturalis non est aliud quam voluntas divina per dictamina ipsius nostræ naturæ rationalis nobis promulgata.

Idem denique probatur ex *communi hominum persuasione* ubique et semper legem naturalem agnoscentium cultu deorum, officiis in parentes, liberos, benefactores, etc. ; *atqui* talis consensus universalis causam pariter universalem requirit ; quæ causa nequit esse nisi ipsa natura rationalis, quum ipsa sola (et ea, quæ ab ipsa necessario profluunt) in omnibus inveniri possit.

148. Consectaria.—1°. Ergo dari nequit peccatum mere philosophicum, *i.e.*, actus, qui, etsi rectæ rationi contrarius, nullum tamen reatum culpæ erga Deum inducat. Ratio enim eo ipso, quod cognoscit aliquid repugnare naturæ rationali, cognoscit, saltem obscure, quasdam actiones esse vitandas, ne lex et voluntas auctoris naturæ violetur. " Sicubi ergo dicatur philosophus considerare peccatum secundum quod rationi contrariatur, non ideo asseritur præcisio absoluta ab ordine ultimi finis et a lege æterna in ipsum dirigente, sed quum sit duplex regula moralitatis, remota vid. et proxima, jure meritoque explicita regulæ supremæ consideratio theologo attribuitur præ philosopho, cujus speculatio versatur potissimum circa oppositionem, quam peccatum habet ad rationem. Atvero, quum naturalis ratio non sit regula obligatoria, nisi in quantum signatum est super eam lumen legis æternæ, constat quod philosophus considerans peccatum ut rationi contrarium, eo ipso implicite attingit ipsum ut Dei offensivum " (**Billot,** *Disquisitio de natura pecc. personalis,* p. 27).

2°. Ergo lex naturalis, etsi residet in mente humana, procedit a mente divina ; et ideo ratio humana, sicut non est sui ipsius principium efficiens, ita non est principium efficiens legis naturalis, sed solummodo principium istam legem nobis manifestans, et veluti præco jussa Dei voluntatis nobis proclamans. Et revera, quum obligatio necessario præsupponat auctoritatem in obligante et subjectionem in obligato, ideoque realem inter utrumque distinctionem, ex una parte ratio humana seipsam obligare nequit, ex altera vero parte obligatio absoluta agendi vel non agendi, quam quisque sentit, emanare non potest nisi a legislatore absolutum in nos dominium habente.[1]

149. Quare, Rationalistæ, Socialistæ aliique hujusmodi, fautores moralitatis independentis et mere civilis, ipsa lege naturali condemnantur ; lex enim naturalis proclamat moralem hominis ab ejus auctore dependentiam et impossibilitatem moralitatem ab idea et cultu Dei separandi.

Nec extra errorem est doctrina eorum, qui (cum *Vasquez*) confundentes proximam normam moralitatis cum lege naturali putant naturam rationalem, sicut est norma *discriminans* inter bonum et malum morale, esse etiam normam *obligantem*. Et sane, homines non solum distinguunt inter bonum et malum morale, seu, inter id, quod decet, et id, quod non decet naturam suam, sed

[1] All prescriptions of human reason can have force of law only inasmuch as they are the voice and the interpreter of some higher power on which our reason and liberty necessarily depend. For, since the force of law consists in the imposing of obligations and the granting of rights, authority is the one and only foundation of all law—the power, that is, of fixing duties and defining right, as also of assigning the necessary sanctions of reward and chastisement to each and all of its commands. But all this, clearly, cannot be found in man if, as his own supreme legislator, he is to be the ruler of his own actions. It follows, therefore, that the law of nature is the same thing as the eternal law implanted in rational creatures, and inclining them to their right action and end, and can be nothing else but the eternal reason of God, the Creator and Ruler of all the world—(*The Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII.*, p. 140, Encycl. ' *Libertas* ').

insuper judicant sibi incumbere obligationem seu necessitatem moralem absolutam bonum agendi malumque vitandi, et proinde se esse subjectos alicui voluntati a voluntatibus omnium hominum distinctæ eisque superiori ; obligatio enim est necessitas imposita voluntatibus subditorum a voluntate superioris. Unde, absoluta necessitas moralis alias actiones ponendi alias omittendi, *i.e.*, obligatio moralis, non a natura rationali, sed a voluntate divina suum in nobis dominium absolutum exercente, imponitur.[1]

150. Proprietates legis naturalis sunt *universalitas* et *immutabilitas*.

1°. *Lex naturalis est absolute universalis : a) ratione ejus fundamenti*, quod est ipsa natura rationalis omnibus hominibus communis ; *b) ratione ejus promulgationis*, quæ fit per lumen rationis, et proinde ab omnibus ratione utentibus lex naturalis plus minusve cognoscitur. Hic adnota præcepta in lege naturali contenta triplicis esse generis (cf. *Cronin*, p. 509-10).

Præcepta primaria, quæ universalissima morum principia enuntiant, quæque primo intuitu innotescunt et proinde a nemine usu rationis fruente ignorari possunt, *v.g.*, *bonum est faciendum, malum vitandum ; oportet*

[1] The moral order accounts for the rightness or wrongness of an act, but it does not in itself contain the reason why the right might not be neglected or the wrong embraced. It shows me, for instance, why lying is wrong, but it does not show me why I may not lie, even though in that I do wrong. The concept of duty to which conscience testifies, the " ought " which it puts before us is something altogether distinct from moral goodness. It implies a necessity, not a physical necessity of course, its very essence excludes that, but the necessity that arises from law. Now law supposes a superior, and the moral order of itself is not the superior of man. The moral order can thus constitute moral right and wrong, but it can become a law or impose an obligation only when it is prescribed by some one who is superior to man, and who can therefore ordain that man should conform his actions to this order. There is only one Superior who can give this sanction to the moral order, who can impose it as a law on mankind, and that Superior is God, who created man free, but ordained that he should direct his actions according to this order of right and wrong—(**Kelleher,** *Private Ownership*, p. 50).

rationabiliter vivere. Hæc enim in omni lege particulari continentur et elucent.

Præcepta secundaria, quæ facili discursu et quasi sponte ex primariis deducuntur, quæque nonnisi culpabiliter ignorari possunt, ut : *Deus est colendus ; parentes sunt honorandi ; temperate est vivendum.*

Præcepta tertiaria seu conclusiones, quæ nonnisi studio diligenti ex principiis primariis colliguntur, quæque proinde facile et inculpabiliter ignorari possunt, ut : *numquam licet mentiri ; inimici quoque amandi sunt.* Horum præceptorum illud : *bonum est faciendum, malumque vitandum*, est principium absolute primum, universalissimum, evidentissimum in ordine morali (quippe quod innititur ideis primigenis, universalissimis et evidentissimis *boni* et *mali*) quemadmodum principium contradictionis in ordine reali.[1]

Bonum vero, de quo agitur, non est bonum quodcumque, sed bonum *morale*, et quidem *necessarium* ad finem ultimum ; cetera enim bona suaderi quidem possunt, sed non præcipi, seu, consilia sunt, non præcepta.

Exempla contra legis naturalis universalitatem populorum, qui furta in quibusdam adjunctis, occisionem parentum ætate confectorum, etc., licita existimabant, id unum probant hos populos in principiis naturalibus applicandis interdum errasse, haud vero ea nescisse aut rejecisse, sicut ex eo, quod homines interdum principia speculativa male applicant, nemo jure concludit tales hæc principia non scire.

[1] As *being* is the first thing that falls under apprehension absolutely, so *good* is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason. For every agent acts for an end, which end has a character of goodness, and, therefore, the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, good being that which all things seek after. This then is the first precept of law, that *good is to be done and gone after, and evil is to be avoided.* All the other precepts of the natural law are founded upon this ; so that all those things belong to the precepts of the law of nature as things to be done or avoided, which practical reason naturally apprehends and recognises as human goods [or evils]—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 1, 2, q. 94, a. 2).

2°. *Lex naturalis est absolute immutabilis.* Lex enim naturalis pro suo objecto habet actiones, quæ præditæ sunt intrinseca moralitate (n. 54), ob quam exigunt præcipi, si bonæ sunt, et prohiberi, si malæ sunt ; nimirum, actiones, quæ per se habent nexum necessarium cum ultimo fine hominis, et proinde non possunt non esse præceptæ aut prohibitæ omnibus hominibus cujusvis loci ac temporis. Et quum Deus nequeat non velle, ut homines ponant actiones, quæ nexum necessarium habent cum eorum fine ultimo, et omittant actiones, quæ ab hoc fine divertunt, totum objectum legis naturalis semper manet sub divina voluntate præcipiente, et prohibente, et proinde lex naturalis absolute immutabilis dicenda est. Unde, immutabilitas, quæ legi naturali convenit, excludit non solum *abrogationem* et *derogationem*, quibus lex ex toto vel ex parte aufertur ; sed etiam *suspensionem*, qua efficacia legis pro aliquo tempore tollitur ; et *dispensationem*, qua, manente lege, aliquis ab ejus obligatione eximitur.

151. Ad difficultates contra legis naturalis immutabilitatem obviandas, duo præ mente habenda sunt : *a*) Quando lex naturalis dicitur immutabilis, sermo est de lege naturali *objective* sumpta, *i.e.*, de rebus lege naturali præceptis aut prohibitis, non de ea *subjective* accepta, *i.e.*, quoad nostram de his rebus cognitionem ; lex enim naturalis, si excipias ejus principia primaria, a singulis hominibus plus minusve ignorari, et proinde evolvi ac mutari, potest. *b*) Exempla mutationum, quæ objici solent, *apparentes* tantum mutationes sunt, quum non ipsam legem spectent, sed legis objectum *materiale* vel adjuncta. " Ejusmodi sunt nonnulla exempla in sacris litteris relata, quibus obiter rem consideranti Deus videri possit de facto interdum ab ipsis præceptis decalogi dispensasse vel iisdem derogasse. Ita, *e.g.*, ubi Deus præcepit Abrahæ, ut filium suum immolaret. In hoc et similibus factis nihil revera neque legi naturali

neque *formali* ejus objecto derogatum est, sed quidquid hic mutari contingit, circa objectum tantum *materiale* versatur. Omnis nempe prohibitio naturalis pro objecto *formali* habet aliquod *intrinsece malum;* ita per præceptum quintum decalogi prohibetur formaliter *homicidium*, secundum quod intrinsece malum est, *i.e.*, *qua privata hominis voluntate patratum*, et ita quidem immutabiliter prohibeatur necesse est . . . Sic in casu proposito immolatio Isaac eo ipso, quod Deus absolutus dominus vitæ eam præcipit, omnem rationem homicidii naturaliter prohibiti exuit; proinde nihil Deus homini per exceptionem licitum facit, quod non semper iisdem adjunctis licitum fuerit.

"Similiter divina auctoritate solvi *matrimonium* potest, manente interim immutabili jure naturæ, quo illud *indissolubile* esse probatur, *i.e.*, tale, quod *arbitrio humano* solvi nefas sit. Mandatum Dei (Exod. c. 3, v. 21, 22; c. 11, v. 2; c. 12, v. 36), quo spolia Ægyptiorum accipere filii Israel jussi sunt, vel ideo tamquam exemplum dispensationis a lege naturali (septimo præcepto decalogi) objici nequit, quod hic secundum probatam interpretationem textus, præsertim hebraici, nullatenus de furtiva spoliatione sermo est. Deus enim jubet eos *petere* vasa ab Ægyptiis, simul promittens, se daturum ipsis gratiam in oculis illorum, ut libenter dent, non solum commodando, sed etiam donando, quo citius a plagis liberentur. Atque ita hæc 'spolia' furtis adnumeranda non sunt. Quamquam etiamsi Israelitæ Dei mandato ab invitis Ægyptiis vasa abstulissent, nequaquam Dei jussu *furta* commisisse dicendi essent, quippe accipientes rem non alienam, sed *suam* titulo translati dominii per ipsum Dominum universorum" (**Meyer,** *Instit. Juris Nat.*, v. 1, p. 247).

§ 4. De Lege Positiva.

152. Lex positiva definitur : *lex libera Dei vel hominis voluntate lata signoque sensibili promulgata.*

Dicitur 1°. *libera voluntate lata,* quia formalis ratio, qua lex positiva a lege naturali differt in eo est, quod lex positiva libere imponitur, *i.e.*, legislator potuit illam non imponere ; lex autem naturalis, utpote essentialiter connexa cum natura humana, necessario fertur.

Dicitur 2°. **Dei** *vel* **hominis** *voluntate,* quia legis positivæ duplex datur causa efficiens, *a*) *Deus,* non quidem ut est naturæ humanæ institutor (quo modo est causa legis naturalis), sed ut est auctor ordinis supernaturalis) ; *b*) *homo,* quum voluntas unius hominis, vi auctoritatis divinitus traditæ, possit esse respectu aliorum hominum vera regula et mensura operationis, et vera causa obligationis, ita ut transgressio legis positivæ humanæ sit reductive transgressio legis æternæ.

Dicitur 3°. *signo sensibili promulgata,* quia lex positiva, quum, secus ac naturalis, procedat a libera legislatoris voluntate, aliquo signo sensibili indiget, quo legislatoris voluntas subditis manifesta fiat.

153. Consectaria.—1°. Prima et *formalis* differentia inter legem naturalem et legem positivam in eo consistit, quod hæc libere, illa necessario fertur. Est tamen et alia differentia ex parte *materiæ*. Etenim lex naturalis habet ut objectum proprium actiones, quæ ex natura sua sunt bonæ vel malæ ; lex positiva, quamvis sæpe idem præcipit vel prohibet ac lex naturalis (cogita decalogum præcipientem honorem parentum, prohibentem furtum, quo in casu vocatur *positiva* sensu latiori), versatur circa actiones indifferentes seu lege naturali nec præceptas nec prohibitas, quas præcipiendo reddit bonas et obligatorias, quasque prohibendo efficit malas. Unde, inquit **Suarez** (*De leg.*, l. 1, c. 3, n. 10), lex positiva " est illa, quæ versatur circa actiones, quæ, seclusa tali lege,

non essent sub obligatione, per illam autem efficiuntur necessariæ."

2°. "*a*) lex *naturalis* a priori ex principiis rationis cognoscitur ; lex *positiva* per positivam significationem subditis promulgatur. *b*) Lex *naturalis* inseparabiliter cum natura conjungitur et pertinet ut proprietas essentialis ad ipsam naturam intellectualem ; ideo est etiam *universalis, i.e.*, valet pro omnibus hominibus omnium temporum et locorum. Idem de lege *positiva* dici non potest. *c*) Lex *naturalis* est ex sua essentia lex divina ; lex *positiva* potest esse vel divina vel humana" (**Cathrein,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 161).

154. Scopus legis positivæ.—Scopus legis positivæ colligitur ex natura legis naturalis. Hæc enim imprimis ex seipsa non valet ad homines perducendos usque ad eorum finem supernaturalem ; quare, necesse fuit, ut Deus alias eis imponeret leges, quibus ad hunc finem dirigerentur (leges veteris et novi testamenti).[1]

[1] Besides the natural law and human law it was necessary for the guidance of human life to have a divine law. And this for four reasons: first, because it is by law that man is guided to the performance of proper acts in view of his last end. And if, indeed, man were ordained to an end that did not exceed the measure of the natural faculties of man, there would be no need of man's having any guidance on the part of reason beyond that of the natural law, and human law, which is derived from it. But because man is ordained to an end of eternal blessedness, which exceeds the measure of the natural human faculties, therefore it was necessary that over and above natural law and human law, he should be further guided to his end by a law given from God ; secondly, because of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, whence it is that men come to form different judgments on human acts ; whence also different and contrary laws arise. In order then that man might know without a doubt what to do and what to avoid, it was necessary for him to be guided in his acts by a law given from God, which can be relied upon for certain not to err. Thirdly, because man can make a law only upon matters of which he can be a judge. Now the judgment of man cannot pass upon interior acts, which are hidden, but only upon exterior movements which appear ; and yet for the perfection of virtue rectitude in both sorts of acts is necessary. And, therefore, human law could not sufficiently restrain and direct interior acts ; but to this end it was necessary for a divine law to supervene. Fourthly, because human law cannot punish or prevent all evil doings ; for in the wish to take away all evils many good things would be taken

Nec ad omnia in ordine naturali valet lex naturalis. Et requidem vera, 1°. licet omnibus hominibus perspicua sit quoad universalissima sua præcepta, tamen in suis præceptis præsertim remotis majori parti hominum plus minusve semper maneret ignota, nisi adesset auctoritas aliqua, quæ has conclusiones deduceret easque ut normas agendi *declararet*, quod dum lege positiva facit, novam obligationem, circa idem ad quod obligat lex naturalis, subditis imponit.

2°. Plura, quæ ad bonum commune conducentia lex naturalis indeterminata relinquit, lex positiva *determinat*. Sic, *v.g.*, lex naturalis præscribit, ut cultus Deo pendatur ; ut omnes ex suis bonis privatis in bonum commune cooperentur ; ut delicta puniantur ; minime vero determinat quomodo, quando, juxta quam mensuram, hæc fiant, quæ igitur determinari debent per voluntatem superioris positivam legem edicentis. Unde, leges positivæ a lege naturali derivantur sive ut *conclusiones ex principiis*, sive ut *determinationes indeterminatorum a lege naturali*.[1]

away, and the profit of the public would be impeded, which is necessary for the preservation of society. In order, then, that no evil might go unforbidden and unpunished, the supervening of the divine law was necessary, whereby all sins are prohibited. And these four causes are touched upon in the Psalm (xviii. 8) where it is said : " The law of the Lord is unspotted," allowing no sin : " converting souls," because it directs not only exterior but also interior acts : " the testimony of the Lord is faithful," for the certain knowledge of truth and right : " giving wisdom to little ones," in that it directs man to an end supernatural and divine—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 1, 2, q. 91, a. 4).

[1] Of the laws enacted by men, some are concerned with what is good or bad by its very nature ; and they command men to follow after what is right and to shun what is wrong, adding at the same time a suitable sanction. But such laws by no means derive their origin from civil society ; because just as civil society did not create human nature, so neither can it be said to be the author of the good which befits human nature, or of the evil which is contrary to it. Laws come before men live together in society, and have their original in the natural, and consequently in the eternal law. The precepts, therefore, of the natural law, contained bodily in the laws of men, have not merely the force of human law, but they possess that higher and more august sanction which belongs to the law of nature and the eternal law. And within the sphere of this kind of law, the duty of the civil legislator is, mainly, to keep the community in obedience by the

3°. Lex naturalis, quæ in altera vita sanctionem adæquatam habet, hic in terris non munitur ulla sanctione adæquata nisi per auctoritatem humanam ; Deus enim, qui animam delinquentem in æternum punire potest, in hac vita misericordiam potiusquam justitiam exercet. Atvero plures inveniuntur adeo protervi et vitiis dediti, ut nonnisi metu pœnarum temporalium a delictis de terreantur ; ergo necesse est, ut dentur leges positivæ, quibus sanciatur lex naturalis.

155. Conditiones legis positivæ.—*Lex positiva debet esse possibilis, honesta, æqualis.* *a*) *Possibilis, i.e.*, non nimis onerosa, secus enim non in bonum commune sed potius in societatis ruinam vergeret, quum plures eam negligerent ; *b*) *honesta, i.e.*, legi superiori non repugnans ; concipi enim nequit in legislatore inferiori potestas legitima ligandi subditos contra legem altiori auctoritate constitutam. Hinc inhonestæ et proinde invalidæ sunt leges civiles prohibentes evangelii prædicationem, adscribentes clericos militiæ. *c*) *æqualis, i.e.*, subditis degentibus in conditionibus iisdem eodem modo applicari debet, secus enim injusta et inhonesta evaderet. Hinc invalida et injusta est lex, quæ ex ærario publico providet scholis acatholicis, dum scholas catholicas propriis catholicorum expensis relinquit.

adoption of a common discipline and by putting restraint upon refractory and viciously inclined men, so that deterred from evil, they may turn to what is good, or at any rate may avoid causing trouble and disturbance to the State. Now there are other enactments of the civil authority which do not follow directly, but somewhat remotely, from the natural law, and decide many points which the law of nature treats only in a general and indefinite way. For instance, though nature commands all to contribute to the public peace and prosperity, still whatever belongs to the manner and circumstances and conditions under which such service is to be rendered must be determined by the wisdom of men and not by Nature herself. It is in the constitution of these particular rules of life, suggested by reason and prudence, and put forth by competent authority, that human law, properly so called, consists, binding all citizens to work together for the attainment of the common end proposed to the community, and forbidding them to depart from this end ; and in so far as human law is in conformity with the dictates of nature, leading to what is good and deterring from evil—(*The Great Encyclicals*, p. 141).

ART. II.

DE CONSCIENTIA MORALI.

156. Lex homines dirigere et obligare nequit nisi eis innotescat (nemo enim ligatur præcepto nisi mediante scientia præcepti, ut notat *S. Thomas*), et, tamquam regula, actibus particularibus applicetur. Hæc autem applicatio fit per conscientiam moralem, quæ "addit supra scientiam applicationem scientiæ ad actum particularem" (*Q. Disp.* xi., q. 17, a. 2, ad 2). Jamvero, quid sit conscientia moralis, et quomodo per ipsam scientia nostra *moralis* singulis actibus nostris applicari possit, in hoc articulo investigamus.

§1. De Conscientia Morali Generatim.

157. Ejus Notio.—Conscientia moralis duplici sensu accipi solet, nimirum, late pro *synderesi*, quæ est *naturalis habitus principiorum ordinis moralis*; et stricte pro actuali applicatione horum principiorum ad nostras actiones. Quemadmodum enim in ordine speculativo sunt principia immediate per lumen rationis cognita, quæ sunt fontes, unde ope ratiocinii conclusiones deducuntur, ita et in ordine practico conclusiones morales processu ratiocinii sive explicito sive implicito inferuntur ex principiis practicis. Primo enim in mente efformatur aliquod judicium universale exprimens aliquod præceptum legis naturalis (*v.g., mendacium est illicitum*), et hoc munere *majoris* fungitur. Deinde ratio practica considerans aliquem actum particularem esse comprehensum vel non comprehensum sub hoc præcepto generali statuit *minorem* (*v.g., hoc responsum est mendacium*). Deinde, ex cognita conformitate vel difformitate hujus actus cum præcepto generali, infertur *conclusio* de actus moralitate; quæ conclusio proprie constituit conscientiam (*v.g., hoc responsum est illicitum*).

158. Unde, **conscientia,** juxta vim vocis, est *scientia* principiorum legis *cum* aliqua actione nostra collata ; et juxta ipsam rem definitur : *judicium practicum de liceitate vel illiceitate alicujus actionis nostræ concretæ*. Et si hoc judicium est de aliqua actione nostra jam posita, habetur conscientia *consequens* nos accusans, excusans, approbans ; si vero de actione ponenda, habetur conscientia *antecedens* præcipiens vel prohibens, suadens vel dissuadens, vel permittens.

Objectum *materiale* conscientiæ est quælibet actio humana ipsius subjecti judicantis concrete et in individuo sumpta, *i.e.*, secundum complexum omnium ejus notarum. Ejus objectum *formale* est bonitas vel malitia ejusdem actionis individuæ.

159. Consectaria.—Ex dictis colligitur 1°. quomodo lex naturalis et conscientia distinguantur. " Nam lex dicit regulam *generaliter* constitutam circa agenda, conscientia vero dicit dictamen practicum *in particulari ;* unde, potius est veluti *applicatio legis ad particulare opus*. Ex quo etiam fit, ut conscientia latius pateat quam lex naturalis ; quia non tantum applicat legem naturalem, sed etiam quamcumque aliam, sive divinam sive humanam. Immo conscientia non solum applicare solet veram legem, sed etiam existimatam ; quo modo interdum datur conscientia erronea ; lex autem erronea dari non potest ; nam eo ipso non erit lex : quod maxime verum est in lege naturali, quæ Deum habet auctorem. Denique, lex proprie fertur de agendis, conscientia autem etiam versatur circa ea, quæ jam facta sunt ; et ideo illi tribuitur non solum ligare, sed accusare, testificari et defendere " (**Suarez,** *De leg.*, l. 2, c. 5, n. 15).

Colligitur 2°. quo sensu conscientia dicatur ligare voluntatem, et undenam vim ligandi habeat. Conscientia enim dicitur ligare voluntatem, quatenus hæc sine fœditate morali nequit in aliud tendere quam in id, quod ei

a conscientia præcipitur. Nam sicut actio agentis physici non inducit necessitatem in rem aliam nisi per contactum cum ista re, ita nec voluntas obligatur nisi scientia præcepti illam attingit. " Unde, nullus ligatur per præceptum aliquod nisi mediante scientia illius præcepti ; et ideo ille qui non est capax notitiæ, præcepto non ligatur, nec aliquis ignorans præcepta Dei ligatur ad præceptum faciendum, nisi quatenus tenetur scire præceptum. Si autem non teneatur scire, nec sciat, nullo modo ex præcepto ligatur. Sicut autem in corporalibus agens corporale non agit nisi per contactum, ita in spiritualibus præceptum non ligat nisi per scientiam ; et ideo sicut est eadem vis, qua tactus agit, et qua virtus agentis agit, quum tactus non agat nisi ex virtute agentis, et virtus agentis nonnisi mediante tactu ; ita eadem virtus est, qua præceptum ligat et qua conscientia ligat ; quum præceptum non liget nisi per virtutem scientiæ, nec scientia nisi per virtutem præcepti. Unde, quum conscientia nihil aliud sit quam applicatio notitiæ ad actum, constat quod conscientia ligare dicitur vi præcepti divini " (**S. Th.,** *Q. Disp. XI.*, q. 17, a. 3).

Colligitur 3°. conscientiam moralem præsupponere non solum legis cognitionem, sed etiam *libertatem*, qua legi parere vel resistere possimus, necnon *reflectionem* supra actus positos vel ponendos, qua eorum relationem cum regula morum percipiamus ; ideoque *a*) nullo modo brutis animalibus conscientiam moralem inesse ; *b*) eam vero infantibus, amentibus, ebriis, hypnotizatis aliisque hujusmodi non actu sed potentia convenire ; *c*) aliis denique expeditum usum rationis habentibus plus minusve perfecte inesse pro majore vel minore eorum ætate, educatione, experientia, et præcipue pro eorum majore vel minore fidelitate in ejus dictamini obsequendo.[1]

[1] Perhaps there is no more essential condition to our growth in clearness of moral discernment, than that of practical fidelity to the

§ 2. Regulæ Communes Conscientiæ Certæ.

160. 1ª. *Sola conscientia certa est per se legitima regula agendi.* Etenim voluntas debet operari juxta legem, quæ est objectiva et primaria regula honestatis; *atqui* sola conscientia certa revera proponit ipsam legem, seu, nonnisi judicium formidinem errandi excludens voluntati indubie dictat normam honeste agendi. Porro, obligamur non modo non violare legem scienter, sed etiam evitare periculum eam violandi per negligentiam in inquirendo; et ideo peccat qui agit de actionis suæ honestate *vere dubitans.*

161. Obs.—Ad certam conscientiam habendam sufficit *certitudo moralis,* et quidem lata seu imperfecta, licet haberi potest metaphysica vel physica, quando agitur de principiis vel factis sensibus

light that is in us. Nor is the reason far to seek. It is repugnant to our natural and almost laudable pride, to sin in the full face of our better knowledge; whence comes the inevitable tendency to justify our faults both before and after we commit them—a process which involves a certain violent twisting or at least an obscuring of our moral judgments about right and wrong. Let these perversions be sufficiently frequent and grievous and we soon fall under the natural penalty of "judicial blindness," a state in which we are culpably but really incapable of seeing the truth, and rush blindfold to our own spiritual ruin. Nay, even in smaller matters of counsel and higher perfection, we are continually tarnishing the clear surface of that mirror wherein the pure of heart see God and the will of God, as the sky is seen in smooth water. The edge of our spiritual discernment is ever being blunted by rough usage, and needing to be refined by self-examination and correction.

Moreover, if mere intellectualism sometimes makes us skilful casuists and gives us a sort of delicacy of touch in dealing with the niceties of conscience, yet practical fidelity to the right, and an earnest desire to live up to our ideals, will give us a far surer guide in that instinct wherewith love feels and apprehends what is most pleasing to the Beloved. Not that the act is purely blind and instinctive, but so swift is the inference, so minute and complex the data from which it is drawn, so prompt the following up of the will, that memory has not time to record the progress, and leaves us with the impression that we have been inspired or impelled from without. This "taste" or "tact," which love begets in us, is certainly a far safer and more useful guide than any power of reflex reasoning, however highly cultivated. . . . .

It is then by fidelity to the light which is in us, and by availing ourselves of the means of instruction provided for us, that we may hope ever to progress towards a greater refinement in our power of moral judgment—(**Tyrrell,** *Hard Sayings,* p. 56).

obviis. Sufficit 1°. certitudo *moralis*, quia " certitudo non est similiiter quærenda in omni materia " (**S. Th.**, 2, 2, q. 70, a. 2), sed sicut in re physica sufficit certitudo physica, quæ innititur in constanti modo operandi rerum physicarum, ita in re morali sufficit certitudo moralis, quæ innititur in constanti modo operandi entium moralium. 2°. Et quidem *lata*, quia ob varias causas certitudo stricta et perfecta omne dubium excludens raro haberi potest, et proinde contenti esse debemus certitudine morali lata seu imperfecta, quæ omne dubium *prudens* et *practicum* excludit. Secus enim fere semper assensum et operationem suspendere necesse esset, quod procul dubio absurdum esset.

2ª. *Conscientia invincibiliter erronea est per accidens regula honestatis*, quia quisque lege naturali obligatur ad faciendum bonum malumque vitandum, prout hæc sunt a ratione cognita. Quare, qui ex errore invincibili judicat aliquid esse prohibitum, quod vere est licitum, aut vice versa, is tenetur juxta illud judicium operari, non sane quia falsum est, sed quia verum reputatur.

162. Consectaria.—1°. Ergo contra conscientiam invincibiliter erroneam non licet agere ; si enim liceret contra eam agere, sequerentur absurda, quod *a*) lex non prout cognita, sed prout ignota ligaret ; *b*) et obligaret, dum nulla obligatio actu adesset eam cognoscendi.

2°. Ergo nihil prohibet, quominus, qui juxta conscientiam invincibiliter erroneam operatur, non solum a culpa excusetur, verum etiam valde meritorie operetur, etiamsi forte opus ipsum sit materialiter malum ; objectum enim, non ut est in se, sed prout hic et nunc concipitur et voluntati proponitur, speciem tribuit actui morali (cf. n. 143).[1]

[1] Conscience is always to be obeyed in doing the act which it prescribes, and that not only when the conscience is right, but also and equally when the conscience is invincibly, and therefore blamelessly, erroneous. This obligation endures as long as the erroneous conscience continues to exist. If conscience is in either case disobeyed, sin is committed. He who acts contrary to conscience—whether the conscience is erroneous or right, it matters not—has a will to violate the law of God. In this will the sin consists, even if in reality there is no such law of God to be violated. If the minister of a king lies in representing his own command which, as a matter of fact, is contrary to the will of his master, to be the precept of his master, that king's subjects

3°. Ergo conscientiam *probabilem* vel *dubiam*, quamdiu talis manet, minime sequi licet. Qui enim operatur sine morali certitudine de honestate suæ actionis, non solum se exponit periculo legem materialiter violandi de qua dubitat (id, quod nonnumquam licet), sed formaliter violat legem eum obligantem ad inquirendam veritatem, priusquam operetur. Atvero, dubium, quocum non licet agere, debet esse *a*) *positivum*, i.e., aliqua gravi ratione innitens ; dubium enim *negativum*, utpote quod nulla aut fere nulla ratione innititur, jure merito sine ulla nova ratione rejicitur ; *b*) *practicum*, quod nimirum oritur circa honestatem actionis particularis hic et nunc ponendæ aut omittendæ ; dubium enim mere *speculativum*, seu dubium de honestate alicujus actionis in abstracto consideratæ, non impedit, quominus mens judicium certum efformet de honestate actionis particularis ; quod sane judicium efformat deponendo indirecte dubium practicum. Enimvero dubium practicum non solum *directe* deponi potest, nimirum adhibendo principia *directa* (*i.e.*, hausta ex natura rei, circa quam actio versatur), quibus dissolvatur dubium speculativum, et per consequens, dubium practicum ex illo emanans ; sed etiam *indirecte*, invocando aliquod principium *indirectum* (*i.e.*, aliunde quam ex natura rei ortum), cujus ope mens sibi efformat judicium moraliter certum de actionis honestate, manente dubio speculativo. *V.g.*, fac aliquis dubitet, utrum quædam actio sit licita necne (dubium *speculativum*), et, debita diligentia in veritatis

are, nevertheless, bound to obey the edict which has been falsely intimated to them, so long as they erroneously believe it to express their ruler's will. In so doing they are truly exercising their loyal obedience to their sovereign. In like manner, that which an erroneous conscience dictates, although it is not in reality in conformity with the law of God, is nevertheless conceived as if it were a law of God. If this dictate is disobeyed, there is opposition of the will to the will of God, which is supposed to be expressed thereby. The sin of the act is of that species which the mind there and then apprehends as belonging to the act, if it were done in defiance of a right conscience, and so of a true Divine precept—(**Humphrey,** *op. cit.*, p. 59).

inquisitione adhibita, dubium deponi nequeat, sive quia utrimque stant rationes vere probabiles, sive quia utrimque pugnant graves auctores, et tamen necessitas agendi jam urget (dubium *practicum*) ; potest talis recurrendo ad principium indirectum conscientiam moraliter certam et proinde tutam efformare sic ratiocinando : *Lex dubia certo non obligat* (prin. indirectum), .quippe quæ perinde est ac lex non promulgata ; *atqui lex prohibens* (vel *præcipiens*) *hanc actionem est vere dubia ; ergo non obligor hanc actionem omittere* (vel *facere*).[1]

[1] What is one to do when a doubt arises either as to the existence of a law, or as to a present case coming under the law ? Anyone so doubting must examine before drawing a practical conclusion upon which to act. He must endeavour to acquire moral certainty regarding the existence or non-existence of the law, and also regarding the case in question as to whether it is or is not included in the law.

But suppose sufficient examination to have been previously made; what is one to do if the ignorance continues ?

A person in this difficulty may reason as follows : When a general law or the comprehension of a particular case under a general law cannot be discovered after sufficient examination, such law cannot be regarded as sufficiently promulgated as to the general law itself, or at least as to the comprehension of the present case. But a law that is not sufficiently promulgated has not yet its binding force. Therefore there is no binding law in this case.

But, suppose that, after serious examination, we find, for each side, reasons which carry weight and cannot be disproved, and we find ourselves in the impossibility of arriving at a conclusion—what is to be done ?

If these powerful reasons stand, some for the existence, the others for the non-existence of the general law itself, such law (should there be such) is undiscoverable, is not promulgated, has no binding force. If the law itself be certain, but there are grave reasons for and against deciding a given act or omission to be comprehended within the scope of the law, then again may we say that the law has not been sufficiently promulgated with regard to the case in question. . . .

Whenever there is an end which we are absolutely bound to attain, and there is a means by which we can surely attain that end, we may not reject this sure means in order to try one that is only probable, no matter how strong the probability may be. For this would be deliberately to risk the end to which we are absolutely bound and which it is in our power to secure—(**Poland,** *Ethics*, p. 77).

ETHICÆ PARS SECUNDA.

Ethica Specialis.

163. In parte præcedente egimus de generalibus principiis actuum moralium ; nunc vero progredimur ad illa principia generalia applicanda, inquirendo scilicet, ratione habita variarum relationum et conditionum, in quibus homines constituantur, quænam hominibus competant jura, quænam officia eis imponantur (n. 9).

Jamvero, jura et officia, quæ hominem afficiunt, eum afficiunt aut ut est *persona privata*, aut ut est *pars societatis*, et secundum hoc Ethica specialis naturaliter se dispertit in duas sectiones, una de Ethica speciali *individuali*, altera de Ethica speciali *sociali*.[1]

SECTIO PRIMA.

ETHICA SPECIALIS INDIVIDUALIS.

Homo, ut persona privata, multiplices habet relationes morales (ad Deum, ad seipsum, ad ceteros homines), ex quibus diversa jura et officia enascuntur. De his in hac sectione agemus, quibusdam de jure et officio generatim prmæissis.

[1] A science of Ethics fitted to serve any useful purpose cannot be constructed from the mere native convictions of the mind. We do obtain a few most important general principles from this source exclusively, and these underlie the whole science, and bear up every part of it. But in order to serve the ends intended by it, Ethics must settle what are the duties of different classes of persons, according to the relation in which they stand to each other, such as rulers and subjects, parents and children, masters and servants ; and what the path which individuals should follow in certain circumstances, it may be, very difficult and perplexing. In consequence of the affairs of human life being very complicated, demonstration can be carried but a little way in Ethics. In order to be able to enunciate general principles for our guidance, or to promulgate useful precepts, the ethical inquirer must condescend to come down from his *a priori* heights to the level in which mankind live and walk and work. Even in the most practical departments of ethical science the grand fundamental laws of our moral constitution must ever be the guiding principles, but we have to consider their application to an almost infinite variety of earthly positions and human character—(**M'Cosh,** *The Intuitions of the Mind*, p. 407).

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De Jure et officio generatim.

ART. I.

DE JURE GENERATIM.

164. Jus triplici sensu accipi solet : 1°. sensu legali, *pro lege* vel *legum systemate*, ut jus canonicum, jus civile ; 2°. objective, *pro eo, quod est justum, rectum, æquum* seu legi conforme ; quæ est significatio primaria et quidem communis in linguis vulgaribus, *v.g.*, ceart (*Hibern.*), right (*Ang.*), droit (*Gall.*), diritto (*Ital.*), recht (*Germ.*) ; 3°. subjective, *pro potestate morali*. In hac tertia significatione jus hic intelligitur, et definitur : *potestas moralis et inviolabilis alicujus circa aliquam rem tamquam suam.*

Dicitur 1°. *potestas*, ut *jus* distinguatur ab *officio* ; vi enim juris aliquis *potest ;* vi autem officii *debet* seu *adstringitur* ad aliquid agendum vel omittendum.

Dicitur 2°. *potestas* **moralis,** ut potestas, quæ in conceptu juris continetur, distinguatur a potestate physica, quæ vim debiliorem vincit, quomodo latro armatus superat viatorem inermem. Potestas autem juris exercetur directe in voluntatem, non in corpus ; et proinde si potestas physica alicujus jure instructi præpediatur vi et impetu fortioris, non idcirco jus illius corruit vel diminuitur.

Dicitur 3°. *inviolabilis*, ut distinguatur " jus a simplici potestate *licite* præstandi aliquid. Talis siquidem facultas est quidem et ipsa moralis, sed nisi quidpiam aliud adjungatur, nihil continet, quo alienæ voluntates positiva morali obligatione in ejus obsequium obstringi intelligantur " (**Schiffini,** *Disp. Phil. Mor*, v. 1, p. 320). At jus unius importat moralem obligationem ceterorum non obsistendi exercitio hujus juris. Jus enim tuum vanum esset nomen, nisi tibi liceret ita operari aut rem

aliquam tibi asciscere eamve tenere, ut ceteri morali necessitate vetarentur te impedire ab actione illa exercenda vel a re illa tibi vindicanda.

Dicitur 4°. *aliquam rem*, ut indicetur juris *materia*; hæc autem materia potest esse res physica, vel actio (vel actionis omissio) sive propria sive aliena, haud vero aliqua persona.

Dicitur 5°. *tamquam* **suam,** ut indicetur finis juris. "Suum" est id, quod ita cum eo, cujus est, conjungitur, ut in ipsius utilitatem primario ordinetur. "Dicitur esse 'suum' alicujus, quod ad ipsum ordinatur, sicut est servus domini et non e converso" (**S. Th.,** 1, q. 21, a. 1).[1]

165. Consectaria.—Ex tradita juris notione colligitur 1°. quid veniat nomine *subjecti*, *objecti*, *termini* et *tituli* juris.

Subjectum, seu ipse juris possessor, est sola persona sive physica (*i.e.*, individualis) sive moralis (*i.e.*, aliqua societas).

Objectum seu id, circa quod versatur jus, est omne

[1] *A right is a moral power vested in a person, owing to which the holder of the power may claim something as due to him, or as already belonging to him, or demand of others that they should perform some acts or abstain from them.* We say *moral power* to distinguish *right from might*, which is the physical power to enforce obedience. For Determinists this distinction is useless, all acts being alike necessary, there can be no reason to distinguish a moral bond from a physical necessity. But for those who believe that men are free, *sui juris*, and responsible, the distinction is essential. Might must be subservient to right, not conversely.

We add, *vested in a person*, for if it be a moral power, it must reside in a moral agent; but only a person is a moral agent; hence a right, properly so called, must be held by a person.

We say *to claim something as due to him, or already belonging to him*, because the thing claimed may or may not be in the power of him who claims it. As long as the object is not yet possessed, the right is called by jurists *jus ad rem* (*right to claim*, or, simply, *claim*). When the object is already held by the claimant, the right becomes *jus in re* (lawful possession or ownership). Instead of demanding a material object or thing, the holder of a right may claim that others are bound to perform certain acts in his behalf, or at his request; for instance, the executive power, so long as it does not exceed its constitutional limits, has a right to have its mandates carried out and its prohibitions respected by all the citizens—(**Holaind**. *Nat. Law and Legal Practice*, p. 267).

quod honeste prosequi licet, et quod physice sed inhoneste ab aliis auferri vel impediri potest. Unde, ad ejus objectum pertinent *a*) actiones externæ ipsius subjecti juris, *b*) actiones alienæ, quæ a subjecto juris exigi possunt ; *c*) bona externa acquirenda, conservanda, utenda.

Titulus est factum concretum, ratione cujus res in utilitatem subjecti juris ordinatur. Qui titulus est *naturalis* (ut titulus ad famam) vel *acquisitus* (ut titulus ad fundum), prout ex ipsa subjecti existentia vel ex aliqua actione libere posita (*v.g.*, promissione vel pacto) enascitur.

Terminus juris est persona, cui incumbit obligatio jus alterius reverendi. Dum enim uni personæ inest potestas aliquid agendi aut aliquid exigendi tamquam sibi debitum, simul aliis imponitur obligatio istam non impediendi vel etiam præstandi id, quod vi juris exigitur.

Colligitur 2°. nec bruta nec plantas nec alia corpora inferiora posse esse subjecta juris ; jus enim est potestas essentialiter moralis, quæ igitur soli naturæ rationali inesse potest.[1]

[1] If any animals possess rights, all must do so : tigers, puff-adders, sharks, and tape-worms, as much as dogs, cats, rabbits, and canary birds. . . . If we arbitrarily assign rights to some and not to others, is it not we ourselves whom we recognize as the source and origin of those rights ? If this be so, it is hard to understand what the term " animal rights " may signify. . . . When ignoring the gulf between ourselves and them, we argue the case for the brute creation on the ground of " rights " to be set against our own, it is inevitable that we should open the door to abuses of the gravest kind, and dull our sympathies in regard to our own brethren, who, as a rule, claim our service on the score of duty alone, unaccompanied by pleasurable or æsthetic considerations. Instances are not far to seek. Is it not a fact that many who expend their sympathy upon cats and dogs have little left for the poor ; that they are not remarkable for kindness and consideration towards their dependents ; that sometimes even their own children appear to hold a lower place in their hearts than do their pets ? In extreme instances such sentiments are openly professed ; thus, not very long ago on occasion of a muzzling order, it was argued publicly in print that it would be a less evil for a few human beings to die of hydrophobia than for so many dogs to be made unhappy— (**Gerard** apud VAUGHAN, *Thoughts for all Times*, p. 382).

166. Juris Proprietates.—Tres enumerantur juris proprietates : *coactivitas, collisio, limitatio.*

Coactivitas intelligitur potestas moralis adhibendi vim physicam ad jus tuendum et ad obstacula, quæ juris exercitio adversantur, removenda. Jus enim ad aliquem finem obtinendum importat annexum jus ad media requisita ; *atqui* sæpenumero accidit, ut aliquis, jus ad finem habens, finem consequi non possit nisi coactionem adhibendo (cf. *Cronin*, v. 1, p. 626-8).

Est vero notandum coactivitatem non obtinere nisi relate ad res debitas ex justitia *commutativa*, minime vero relate ad res debitas ex justitia *distributiva*, quum ordo socialis prorsus everteretur, si subditi ad vim physicam contra auctoritatem publicam recurrere possent. Nec ordinarie potest ipsum juris subjectum, si in societate civili degit, per seipsum hanc potestatem exercere ; bonum enim commune id vetat, propter perturbationes ordinis publici, quæ orirentur, si cuique liceret jus suum per vim physicam extorquere. Personæ igitur privatæ competit tantum actio, qua apud publicam auctoritatem, quod suum est, reposcat vel defendat. Dixi *ordinarie*, quia in casu, in quo recursus ad auctoritatem publicam haberi non potest, cuique licet, ne jura privata, et consequenter tranquillitas publica, periclitentur, jura sua vi physica defendere, et quidem vi majore vel minore prout majora vel minora jura violentur (cf. *Th.* xii.).[1]

[1] May every individual, under all circumstances, undertake, by *personal* force, the vindication of his right which another has violated ? No. In a constituted civil society the individual may not take the matter into his own hands to settle it by means of his own personal physical force. He must have recourse to the authorities established in the society for the vindication of violated rights. Of course there are certain cases in which the established authorities may be powerless to act by the regular methods, and in these cases the society authorizes the individual to act for himself. Thus, if a man seizes your watch whilst you are walking along a dark and lonely street, you are authorized to seize him, in turn, and recover your watch. But the rule is that when the case comes within the action of the civil power, this must be appealed to as the constituted guardian of the rights of the citizens. The reason of this is sufficiently evident, and is fully appreciated by all who live in civil society. If every man were allowed in all circumstances to undertake the personal vindication of his violated rights, there would be an end to all peace and security in society. Men prejudiced in their own favour might readily attack

167. Collisio jurium est apparens conflictus plurium jurium, quibus simul satisfieri nequit, ut accidit, *v.g.*, quando aliquid præcipitur lege civili, quod lege divina vel ecclesiastica prohibetur. Dicitur *apparens* conflictus, quia quum omnis auctoritas a Deo emanet et nihil ab eo emanet, quod non sit recte ordinatum, auctoritas auctoritati, et hinc jus juri, revera obluctari non potest. Quare, ubi apparet duorum jurium collisio, unum eorum non existit, vel, si existit, hic et nunc quoad exercitium suspenditur, altero prævalente.[1]

168. Limitatio juris est determinatio limitum extra quos jus vim suam exserere nequit. Juris limitatio de-

their neighbours who were really in the right. Many, using the advantage of might or of an obscure case, would do so under a false plea. Numbers, again, through anger and vengeance, would take greater compensation than was due to them. And not a few, through the same motives, would use more violence than necessary, or use it when it might not be necessary at all. Thus society would be delivered up to terrorism and bloodshed. Hence, the law of nature, urging men to live together in society, demands the establishment in that society of an authority to which those who think they are injured may appeal—an authority which shall inquire into the injury and its authors and bring about reparation without respect to persons—(**Poland,** *Ethics*, p. 121).

[1] There is said to be a collision of rights when one person possessing a right cannot exercise it without violating a right possessed by another person. . . . Practically there cannot be a real collision. But the term *collision* is useful to express a condition of things that very often arises—a state of doubt which requires investigation to discover the truth. Whenever, in a given circumstance, one of the colliding rights is found to be real, the other must necessarily be only apparent. . . . Let us take a case where there is a conflict between a right which seems to be conferred by the natural law and a right which seems to be conferred by some positive law. It is clear that, if the natural right be found to be certain, the positive law in question must be only supposed, or apparent, or misunderstood ; or, if none of these, then certainly unjust, and hence null and void. If it be positive divine law, it must certainly be misunderstood in the present application, for the positive divine law cannot come into conflict with the natural law, which is also divine. God is supreme intelligence, and it is not the part of intelligence to demand the simultaneous existence of two incompatible things. If the positive law which seems to conflict with the certain natural law be a human positive law, then either it has been misinterpreted in its application, or, if it be really intended to conflict with the natural law, it is unjust, and is null and void, because no human statute can come in the way of the natural law, which is divine—(*Idem*, ib., p. 106).

terminatur ex *fine*, cujus causa jus conceditur ; finis enim est mensura eorum, quæ in finem ordinantur ; ex *officiis*, ad quæ præstanda subjectum juris adstringitur ; quidquid enim officio opponitur moraliter malum est, ad quod proinde nullum potest existere jus. Unde, ut rem exemplo illustremus, parentes jus habent ad obedientiam filiorum in omnibus, quæ ad debitam eorum educationem spectant, minime vero ad status electionem, quum hæc non pertineat ad eorum educationem.

ART. II.

DE OFFICIO GENERATIM.

169. Officium definitur : *necessitas moralis præstandi vel omittendi actionem in favorem alicujus.*

Dicitur 1°. *necessitas moralis*, quia officium imponit quoddam onus, non quidem physicum sed morale, quod ab eo, cui inest, impleri debet, si vult actionem pravam declinare.

Dicitur 2°. *præstandi vel omittendi actionem*, quia vi officii voluntas dirigitur ad determinatam actionem sive erga Deum sive erga alios sive erga nosipsos, ut honeste vivamus et finem nostrum ultimum assequamur.

Dicitur 3°. *in favorem* **alicujus,** ut officium ab obligatione morali distinguatur. Hæc enim, licet semper conjungantur, non idem important ; obligatio enim exprimit nexum inter subditum et superiorem qua tales (n. 137) ; officium vero hunc nexum non connotat, quum haberi possit erga æquales.

Officii, sicut juris, habetur *subjectum* seu persona, cui obligatio imponitur ; *objectum* seu actio facienda vel omittenda ; *terminus* seu persona, in cujus favorem est actionis positio vel omissio; *titulus* seu factum (*v.g.*, emptio), quo posito, emergit in aliquo necessitas illa moralis, quæ dicitur officium.

170. Officiorum divisio.—Officia dividuntur 1°. *ratione sui* in *naturalia* et *positiva*, prout lege naturali vel positiva imponuntur; 2°. *ratione materiæ* in *affirmativa* et *negativa*, prout aliquid præcipiunt vel prohibent; 3°. *ratione tituli* in *juridica* et *non juridica* (seu pure moralia), prout jus strictum alterius supponunt vel in alio tale jus non supponunt, sed mere obligant ex titulo alicujus virtutis a justitia distinctæ, *v.g.*, officium caritatis. "Hoc discriminis intercedit inter officia juridica et pure moralia, quod is, qui prioris generis officia non implet, inferat injuriam, violet justitiam; non autem is, qui alterius generis officia non servat. Sic dives, qui, quum possit stipem dare egeno, eam denegat, inhumanus dicitur vel avarus, non tamen injustus; pauperem sane *offendit*, non tamen *injuria* afficit. Contra, injustus vocatur, qui tempore debito depositum non restituit; siquidem ita se gerens et offensam domino et injuriam affert" (**Ferretti,** *Instit. Phil. Mor.*, v. 2, p. 44).[1]

Hæc tertia juris divisio respicit officia nostra erga *proximum*, minime vero officia erga *Deum*, quum quoad Deum omnia nostra officia sint *juridica*, quippe qui jus habet exigendi, ut integram legem, quam nobis im-

[1] A man who is starving has a right to *some* food that is in the city where he is starving; for without it he will die, and he has a right to live. The rich man, therefore, who may be appealed to for a loaf from his superabundance, is under the obligation of giving that loaf to the starving man. But if the rich man refuses, the starving man cannot bring him before the authorities of the city to force him to give the bread. The rich man may say that the obligation lies equally upon his next-door neighbour, who has likewise a superabundance. The starving man may, indeed, assert his right by abstracting from superabundance, wherever he may find it; but he has no recourse by city authority against any particular individual. His right is a *purely* moral right. It is a claim upon the rich man's will, a claim upon his charity, generosity, humanity. The rich man's duty is *purely a moral duty*. . . . On the other hand, if a man borrows a sum of money on a "promise to pay" at a certain time, and when that time arrives, refuses to pay, the creditor has the right to proceed against him, individually, to recover that particular sum of money. The duty of the debtor is called a *juridical duty;* and the right of the creditor a juridical right; because the tribunal of justice can be appealed to in the case—(**Poland,** p. 103).

posuit, observemus ; nec erga *nosipsos ; juridica* enim dici nequeunt officia, ubi eorum subjectum et terminus non distinguuntur, quod quum obtineat in nobis erga nosipsos, ibi tantum officia pure moralia locum habent.[1]

Denique 4°. *ratione termini* officia homini incumbunt erga *Deum*, erga *seipsum*, erga *ceteros homines*, de quibus mox fusius sermo erit. Hic nota hæc officia mutuo se includere ; omnia enim officia nostra erga nosipsos et ceteros homines sunt pariter officia erga Deum, qui hæc officia nobis imponit ; et officia nostra erga Deum et ceteros homines sunt officia erga nosipsos, quum quisque hæc officia persolvendo ad suam perfectionem et consecutionem sui ultimi finis pertingat. Demum, officia nostra erga Deum et nosipsos includunt officia erga alios, eo quod homo ordinate se habens erga Deum et seipsum promovet bonum societatis, cujus est membrum, *scil.*, seipsum perficiendo et Deum in homines propitium reddendo. Hic autem venit quærendum

171. Utrum homo obstringatur officiis erga bruta ; cui quæstioni negative respondendum est, Si enim homo erga bruta officia haberet, esset quodammodo brutorum servus ; cui enim aliquis officium debet, huic servire tenetur ; *atqui* homo nullatenus est brutorum servus, sed, e contra, bruta totaliter in hominis utilitatem ordinantur. " Ex ipso naturæ processu (inquit **S. Th.**) imperfectiora cedunt in usum perfectorum ; plantæ enim utuntur terra in sui nutrimentum, animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus Unde, naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus " (1, q , 96, a. 1). Ex quo sequitur *vivisectionem* (*i.e.*, *experimentum dolorosum in brutis animalibus peractum*, sive per sectionem, sive per adustionem, venenum, vim electricam aliudve

[1] As duty is a debt to some one other than ourselves, we cannot, strictly speaking, use the term duties *to* ourselves. They are due to God ; they regard ourselves—(**Fox,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 5, p. 218).

hujusmodi medium) esse per se licitam. Et revera, Creator bruta in utilitatem hominum concessit. Jamvero, testibus eminentissimis ubique terrarum medicinæ cultoribus, huic scientiæ perutilis, immo ejus progressui necessaria, invenitur vivisectio.[1] Neque ulli officio morali sive erga Deum, sive erga ipsum operantem, sive erga alios homines, adversatur. Non erga Deum, quum Deus bruta animalia in usum hominis destinaverit; non erga ipsum operantem, quum supponatur hunc majorem dolorem non infligere, quam experimentum requirat; non erga alios homines, quum supponatur operationem fieri in animalia juste acquisita. Immo usu vivisectionis hominibus consulitur, brutis animalibus posthabitis.[2]

[1] Conventus medicorum Londini habitus (mense Aug. 1881) ubi ex omni parte terræ medici peritissimi convenerunt, hoc modo de utilitate ac necessitate vivisectionis loquitur: "This congress records its conviction that experiments on living animals have proved of the utmost service to medicine in the past, and are indispensable to its future progress. Accordingly, while strongly deprecating the infliction of unnecessary pain, it is of opinion, alike in the interests of man and of animals, that it is not desirable to restrict competent persons in the performance of such experiments."

[2] In vivisection man inflicts a certain amount of pain upon the beasts, not indeed for the sake of causing pain, which *ex hypothesi* he regrets, but solely for the sake of some advantage or some gain to himself or to his fellow-man. Now the question arises—Is it lawful or not? Here, I take it, lies the whole kernel of the matter, so we must put the point as clearly as we can, and as logically. Thus, of two things, one. Either it is lawful for man to inflict pain upon beasts for his own advantage and profit, or it is not. To cause such an amount of pain as is unavoidable for the obtaining of the end he has in view, must be either a sin or not a sin. . . . Take the first alternative. Say it is a sin. Very well. Then it necessarily follows that to drive a horse in a cab; or to imprison a thrush in a cage; or to hurt the fox or the hare; or to put a worm on a fish-hook; or to add a butterfly to a collection and thousands of similar common practices are all actual sins. And if sins, then not to be committed for any consideration whatsoever—no! Not even to save a thousand worlds, could one dig one's spurs into a horse's flanks, or chain up a dog in one's back yard, or spit a worm on a hook. This is the absurdity to which the one alternative drives us. But let us assume the other, and only remaining alternative, and grant that none of the foregoing practices are sins. What then? To concede so much is to evacuate one's position altogether. It is to establish the important and far-reaching principle that beasts may be made suffer, at least in so far as it may be necessary or conducive to

Quamvis autem homo non habet officia *erga* bruta animalia, certo habet officia *circa* bruta, non secus ac circa reliquas res creatas, quæ in ejus servitium traditæ sunt. Et quamvis, dum in bruta crudeliter agit, *injuriam* eis non infert, actionem tamen recto ordini repugnantem ponit, quum rebus ad suum commodum concessis abutatur ; quod sane fieri nequit, quin eorum Creatori et Domino irrogetur injuria.[1]

Præterea, crudelitas in bruta exercita nos disponit ad crudelitatem in homines.

172. Jus et officium comparata.—1°. *Non datur jus sine officio, nec officium sine jure.* PARS 1ª ex eo patet, quod non potest in uno existere jus ad aliquid faciendum vel omittendum, quin simul existat in aliis officium non violandi jus illud. Unde illud : *jus in uno implicat officium in altero.*

PARS 2ª etiam manifesta est, quia lex, quæ officium imponit, jus et facultatem illud præstandi simul concedit. Si vero officium consideratur non in se, sed relate ad terminum seu personam, in cujus bonum ordinatur, potest haberi officium sine jure respondente, *v.g.*, in officiis misericordiæ erga pauperes.

2°. *a*) *Absolute loquendo jus præcedit officium ;* in tantum enim homines officiis obstringuntur, in quantum per prius existit in Deo jus, ut ei serviant.

b) *Relative et universim quoad genus humanum, officium prius est jure ;* quia ex naturali et fundamentali

the well-being of man, for whose use and rational service they have been made—(**Vaughan,** *Thoughts for all Times*, p. 357).

[1] We have no duties towards the brute creation ; there is no relation of justice between them and us. Of course we are bound not to treat them ill, for cruelty is an offence against that holy law which our Maker has written on our hearts, and is displeasing to Him. But they can claim nothing at our hands ; into our hands they are absolutely delivered. We may use them, we may destroy them at our pleasure, not our wanton pleasure ; but still for our own ends, for our own benefit or satisfaction, provided we can give a rational account of what we do—(**Newman,** *Sermons on Various Occasions*, p. 79).

officio, quod incumbit homini tendendi in suum ultimum finem, omnia ejus jura derivantur.

c) Utrum vero in particulari officia specialia sint priora juribus, quæ eis in aliis respondent, non conveniunt auctores. Alii affirmant, quia lex naturalis, quæ est fons jurium et officiorum, per se et immediate *obligat*, seu, non immediate ordinatur ad jura concedenda, sed ad hominem impellendum, ut faciat bonum et vitet malum ; et proinde jus oritur, quia officium a lege imponitur (cf. *Costa-Rossetti*, Phil. Mor., p. 331). Alii negant ; ideoque docent non jus ab officio, sed officium a jure originem sumere. Et revera, " officium omne juridicum respicit vel jus prælationis seu jurisdictionis vel jus proprietatis ; si qua enim sunt alia officia, ea non sunt juridica, adeoque de his minime instituitur præsens controversia. Si primum contingat, manifestum est quod asserimus ; obligatio enim, quæ in tali officio invenitur, gignitur a jure præcipiendi, quod prælato convenit. In altera vero hypothesi, debitum, ne talia jura lædantur, enascitur ex eo quod hoc vel illud consideretur ad alium pertinere, quod solemus exprimere per pronomina possessiva *meum* et *tuum*. Ergo prius unusquisque intelligit et intelligere debet quod hoc sit meum vel tuum (in quo quidem immediate fundatur jus proprietatis), quam intelligatur debitum seu officium nihil efficiendi quod me vel te a re mea vel tua deturbet. Atque hoc verum existimo etiamsi sermo sit de jure omnino positivo, videlicet, sola lege positiva concesso, non obnitente quidem lege naturali. Quando enim legislator talia jura concedit et sancit, primo quidem potestate administrativa, qua fruitur, efficit, ut hæc vel illa res ad hunc potius pertineat quam ad alium, et consequenter, ut hæc sua ordinatio efficaciam habeat, prohibet, ne ceteri illum in tali possessione perturbent, videlicet prius conceditur jus et consequenter imponitur officium tali juri correlatum " (**Schiffini**, v. 1, p. 328).

CAPUT SECUNDUM.

De Officiis hominis erga Deum.

173. Licet sensu latiori omnia hominis officia ad officia erga Deum revocari possint—tum quia a Deo imponuntur, tum quia hominem in suum finem ultimum ordinant—sensu tamen stricto et proprio illa sola dicuntur officia erga Deum, quæ in ipsum directe et immediate diriguntur. Officia, quibus homo erga Deum astringitur, constituunt religionem, qua nimirum homo debitum honorem Deo exhibet ob summam ejus excellentiam. Quare, de religione (naturali) in hoc capite agendum est.

ART. I.

DE RELIGIONIS NOTIONE.

174. Vox religio, sive derivetur a "relegere" (*i.e.*, iterum iterumque in mente revolvere) ut putat *Cicero*, sive a "religare" (*i.e.*, nos ad Deum religare) ut opinatur *S. Augustinus*, "proprie importat ordinem ad Deum. Ipse enim est, cui principaliter alligari debemus tamquam indeficienti principio, ad quem etiam nostra electio assidue dirigi debet, sicut in ultimum finem" (**S. Th.**, 2, 2, q. 81, a. 1). Quare, *quoad rem* et *objective* **religio** est *complexus veritatum, quæ relationes hominis ad Deum enuntiant, et officiorum, quæ exinde derivantur.* Dicitur *veritatum et officiorum*, quia hominis relationes ad Deum sunt duplicis generis: aliæ, quæ respiciunt intellectum, et *theoreticam* partem religionis constituunt; aliæ, quæ voluntatem respiciunt, quæque vocantur pars *practica*.

175. Jamvero, I.—*Quod attinet ad intellectum, a*) tenetur homo eas de Deo notiones acquirere, quibus summa

ejus perfectio, et consequens necessitas ei actibus externis et internis obsequium præstandi, menti humanæ innotescant. Ex obvia enim Dei cognitione derivatur obligatio eum ut Creatorem reverendi, eique ut domino serviendi ; in qua obligatione includitur ulterior obligatio cognoscendi, quæ ad illa officia implenda requiruntur, quum qui tenetur ad finem, teneatur quoque ad media, quibus finem assequi possit. *b*) Tenetur homo illam elementariam Dei cognitionem perficere, quantum status vitæ suæ aliaque adjuncta requirunt et permittunt ; non enim omnibus eadem cognitio veritatum ad religionem pertinentium necessaria est, sed gradus, quem quisque habere tenetur ex adjunctis dijudicandus est. *c*) Tenetur homo, quum primum habet rationem suspicandi Deum religionem supernaturalem ab omnibus accipiendam revelasse eamque ut medium necessarium ad beatitudinem consequendam præscripsisse, hanc religionem inquirere, eamque, quando sufficienter innotuerit, amplecti. Homo enim debet ad Deum tendere per ea media, quæ Deus vult proponere ; in præsenti autem ordine divinæ providentiæ religionem revelatam esse medium cum finis ultimi assecutione necessario connexum, est factum historice certum. Jamvero, quum plures religiones ut veræ et a Deo revelatæ a suis fautoribus statuantur, diligenter investigandum est, quænam inter illas se certis indiciis genuinam et divinitus approbatam commonstret. Hanc enim inventam firmiter tenere debet, ceteris ut falsis rejectis.

176. II.—*Quod spectat ad voluntatem, a*) existit in homine officium naturale *Deum adorandi, i.e.*, eum ut ens summum omniumque rerum Creatorem et supremum dominum agnoscendi, eique se totum subjiciendi. Exinde sequuntur affectus laudis, gratiarum actionis, amoris, reverentiæ, timoris, necnon humilitatis, qua mente et corde creatura profitetur se a seipsa nihil boni habere,

nec etiam esse ad seipsam, sed omnia habere a Deo et se totam esse ad Deum. *b*) Existit officium naturale *sperandi in Deum, i.e.*, tendendi in eum, prout est bonum nostrum, atque ab eo expectandi media, quibus, impedimentis superatis, ad eum pervenire possimus. Lege enim naturali tenetur homo in suum finem ultimum, quæ est beatitudo in Dei possessione consistens, tendere ; *atqui* beatitudo est bonum adeptu difficile, quod ut assequi valeat homo, specialibus Dei auxiliis opus est, quæque proinde, natura dictante, a Deo expectare debet. *c*) Existit in homine officium naturale *Deum super omnia diligendi*, quia, quum Deus sit summum bonum et finis noster absolute ultimus, in eum præ ceteris omnibus tendere debemus ; tendentia autem voluntatis in bonum ut in finem suum est amor. Immo omnia, quæ præter Deum ut bona appetimus et amamus, ad ipsum aliquo modo referre tenemur, a quo omnem suam bonitatem cuncta creata participant.

Atvero non requiritur ut hic Dei amor sit *intensive* summus, *i.e.*, quoad intensitatem affectionis subjectivæ, sed ut sit *appreciative* summus, ita scilicet, ut velimus omnia potius amittere quam a Dei amore recedere.

177. Obs.—Quæri potest utrum oratio, ut est *petitio*, præcipiatur. Ita rem esse ex revelatione certo scimus ; sed ex solo lumine naturali non satis constat. Etenim 1) " nulla est naturalis relatio hominis ad Deum, quæ non jam aliis actibus practice agnoscatur, *v.g.*, relatio viatoris ad providum gubernatorem, per fiduciam ; 2) dabit quidem Deus optimus petenti dona abundantiora, sed nulla apparet naturalis necessitas petendi et obtinendi media necessaria ad finem ultimum ; nam ratio non ostendit statutum a Deo fuisse talia media nonnisi petentibus fore concedenda ; 3) nec præceptum positivum Dei, ut homo oret ac petat aliqua, sola ratio ostendere potest.

Hæc de stricto officio dicta sunt ; nam valde pronum et rationabile apparet, ut quem amamus, cui confidimus, quem nos amantem novimus, hunc in difficilibus oremus, media abundantiora rogemus ; quinimmo si quando per accidens in difficillimis apparebit oratio ut medium necessarium ad superanda obstacula, poterit esse per accidens verum officium " (**Van der Aa,** *Ethica*, p. 86).

ART. II.

DE CULTU DIVINO.

178. Cultus (a verbo *colere*) generatim est *honor alicui exhibitus cum aliqua submissione.* Cultus divinus est *complexus actuum, quibus homo suas erga Deum relationes agnoscit.* Fundamentum hujus cultus est Dei excellentia nostraque ab eo essentialis et omnimoda dependentia tum quoad corpus tum quoad animam omnesque facultates, quibus anima ornatur. Hæc autem recognitio divinæ excellentiæ nostræque dependentiæ duplici modo fieri potest, *scil.*, vel actibus mere *internis*, qui nempe totaliter intra animam (in intellectu et voluntate) absolvuntur, ut quum quis Deum amat ; vel actibus etiam *externis*, quibus actus interni modo sensibili exprimuntur. Ex quo duplici modo duplex intelligitur divisio cultus divini in *internum* et *externum.* Cultus *externus* potest esse *revelatus* vel *naturalis*, *privatus* vel *publicus*. De cultu interno et naturali jam aliqua dicta sunt ; nunc vero quæritur de cultu *externo*, utrum, *scil.*, officium naturale Deum colendi exigat, præter cultum internum, etiam cultum externum.

179. Jamvero, homo duplici ex causa ad cultum externum Deo exhibendum tenetur. Et quidem 1°. *ratione cultus interni*. Homo enim vi legis naturalis uti tenetur mediis efficacibus, ut cultum internum, prout oportet, Deo exhibeat ; *atqui* homo, quum ita natura sua sit constitutus, ut nonnisi per sensibilia ad spiritualia se elevet, cultum externum prætermittere nequit, quin languescat sensimque ex toto deficiat cultus internus.

Præterea, lex naturalis præscribit, ut homo non solum abstineat ab actibus, qui suis cum Deo relationibus adversentur, sed etiam, ut eliciat actus his relationibus connaturales et conformes ; *atqui* tales actus connaturales sunt non solum actus cultus interni sed etiam

externi, quum natura humana sit unum substantiale ex anima et corpore compositum.

2°. *Ratione finis divini cultus;* nam quum homo totaliter a Deo dependeat tum quoad animam tum quoad corpus, ratio recta postulat, ut homo actibus utriusque Deo honorem præstet. " Finis divini cultus est, ut homo Deo det gloriam et ei se subjiciat mente et corpore " (**S. Th.,** 2, 2, q. 73, a. 2).

180. Immo Deo debetur cultus externus *socialis*, nempe ab hominibus societatem efformantibus per modum unius celebratus. Homo enim honorem Deo reddere debet secundum statum, in quo est a Deo constitutus et secundum beneficia, quæ a Deo ratione illius status accipit ; *atqui* Deus hominem ordinavit ad statum socialem eique infudit instinctum seu appetitum societatis tum domesticæ tum civilis, ex qua duplici societate maxima beneficia ei redundare nemo sanus infitiatur. *Ergo* lex naturalis postulat, ut quibusdam actibus communibus et publicis honor Deo deferatur.[1]

181. Consectaria.—1°. Ergo falso et perniciose quidam affirmant scientiam moralem et religiosam nullo inter se vinculo colligari, atque, quod consequens est, de moralitate agi posse, immo debere, quin de religione ulla fiat mentio. Talis præprimis fuit doctrina Kantii, juxta quem leges morales nonnisi a subjecto derivantur, ita nimirum, ut ratio practica non modo sit principium obli-

[1] Nature and reason, which command every individual devoutly to worship God in holiness, because we belong to Him and must return to Him since from Him we came, bind also the civil community by a like law. For men living together in society are under the power of God no less than individuals are, and society, not less than individuals, owe gratitude to God, who gave it being and maintains it, and whose ever bounteous goodness enriches it with countless blessings. Since, then, no one is allowed to be remiss in the service of God, and since the chief duty of men is to cling to religion in both its teaching and practice—not such religion as they may have a preference for, but the religion which God enjoins, and which certain and most clear marks show to be the only one true religion—it is a public crime to act as though there were no God—(*The Great Encyclicals*, p. 110, ' Immortale Dei ').

gationis cognoscendæ, sed etiam unicus fons totius obligationis. Ex quo sequitur moralitatem esse a Deo et religione independentem.[1]

2°. Ergo "sicut vitæ socialis ordo et stabilitas præcipue in publica hominum fide, mutua fidelitate et fiducia fundatur, ita publica fides et fiducia non aliunde fere quam religiosa hominum reverentia erga Deum ejusque

[1] While the first reformers, with their doctrine of faith without works, inculcated a religion of faith apart from morals, and discredited the value of the latter, the later Rationalist school of Kant and Fichte emphasized as exclusively the moral idea, and asserted its absolute independence of all religion or faith, which, they maintained, was a matter of indifference, or, at most, only to be tolerated as the popular expression of the moral idea. The shallowness and fallacy of this teaching, which looks only to results, without regard to first principles, is easily seen. As God is, such our duty to Him will be; as is our creed, such will be our sense of justice and morals. Now, justice is a virtue, which gives to each his due, and is one of the great cardinal virtues which control and direct the whole realm of morals. But our first debt and duty is owing to God, as our Creator and Preserver, and religion is only the discharge of that duty of justice. But if our relations with God be ignored, and our duties flowing therefrom unheeded how is any truly moral life possible? The omission of the primary obligation of justice entails not only the neglect of that one duty, but of that from which all other moral duties derive their highest significance and value. A moral man, then, without religion, that is, who does not confess his dependence on his Creator by adoration, thanksgiving and petition, is in the highest degree immoral, inasmuch as each act of his terminates in himself, the creature, and not in God. Doubtless, the essential glory of the Infinite God is neither diminished nor increased by the homage of any creature, but God claims it, because man can only attain his end thereby. . . . .

Again, how can moral order or law exist without a supreme, personal lawgiver, that is, God? Every ideal is derived from a real personal prototype, and just as ideal eternal truth points necessarily to the essential, existing truth, and ideal good to the supreme living good, so does the moral ideal point to One who is Himself ideal and reality; that is, God. God is the essential, moral order; man bears the moral law stamped upon his soul, because that soul is created in the image of God. There is then no moral order without God, no morals without religion, and the necessary result of the negation of religion has always been, and always will be, the rejection of the moral order. The poetic orgies of "young Germany," the deification of matter and of sensual enjoyment, both in theory and practice, have abundantly proved this fact. "As the empirical thinker," says Ritter, "imagines it possible that creatures may exist without a Creator, so empirical moralists contend that moral actions may be perfect without any relation to the basis and end of the moral law. In both cases such reasoning is both specious and superficial"—(**Hettinger**, *Nat. Religion*, p. 283).

timore externe manifestato fulcitur atque nutritur. Quis vel in subdito fidelitatem et sinceram obedientiam vel in magistratu justitiam et boni publici studium, quis in quotidiano civium commercio integritatem, in servandis contractibus fidelitatem, in jurando veracitatem præsertim ubi nulla humana pœna imminere videatur, ab illo tuto expectare præsumat, de quo nesciat plane, utrum Deum religiose colat, an cum Atheis neget atque contemnat ? Est igitur in cultu Dei externo momentum sociale summe practicum et cum naturali societatis instituto plane individuo nexu conjunctum" (**Meyer,** v. 2, p. 28).

182. 3°. Ergo falsa et Deo maxime injuriosa est *indifferentia religiosa*, sive *absoluta* docens hominem sine ullo actu religionis posse vitam æternam consequi ; sive *relativa*, quæ, dum admittit alicujus religionis necessitatem, perinde esse ad salutem profitetur quanam religione homo Deum colat. Quæ quidem doctrina impie supponit non dari differentiam essentialem inter bonum et malum (n. 54), et Deum summe verum, summe sanctum æquo amore prosequi veritatem et errorem, virtutem et vitium, æquumque præmium fore profitentibus religionem erroribus vitiisque scatentem ac aliis, qui religionem nec errori nec vitio obnoxiam amplectuntur.[1]

Huc pertinet doctrina Modernistarum, qui, "subobscure alii, alii apertissime, religiones omnes contendunt esse veras" (Pius X., *Enc.* 'Pascendi').

[1] Religious Indifferentism, as the term itself suggests, implies the absence of firm religious convictions, at least as far as any definite doctrinal system comes in question. It has been defined as " a popular theory which teaches that all creeds find equal favour in the eyes of God, and that it does not matter to what religious denomination a man belongs, provided he is a good man after his own fashion." It most frequently finds expression in phrases like these : "All religions are good." " One religion is about as good as another." " Religion is a matter of the heart, not of the head." "All religions lead to God." " Do what you think right, and don't worry about creeds."

As appears from these propositions, Indifferentists are agreed that some sort of religion must be practised by every reasonable being, because the fact of creation necessarily points to the obligation of

CAPUT TERTIUM.

De Officiis hominis erga seipsum.

182. Amor suiipsius, sicut appetitus beatitudinis, est naturalis, ideoque physice necessarius. De his autem, quæ ex necessitate physica fiunt, quemadmodum non datur lex, ita non datur obligatio moralis. Unde, non est

worshipping the Creator, and that worship, in whatever manner it be expressed, is an act of religion. Yet, whilst they admit this essential obligation, they contend that all else connected therewith is, more or less, a matter of taste and expediency, pretty much as is the cut of one's coat or the shape of one's hat. According to them, if a man finds one form of religion too exacting, he may try another ; if that doesn't suit, he may try another still ; and, if none of the existing systems are to his taste, he may invent something new, provided he will generously concede that previously existing systems are as good as his own.

The vast majority of those who profess Indifferentists' principles are an easy-going set of people whose aspirations seldom rise above the world of their senses ; yet others there are who treat the matter scientifically, and who, in consequence, are pleased to pose before the world as religious reformers.

These latter, however, do not like to be called Indifferentists, for somehow that name is still in bad repute. They much prefer to style themselves Liberals, thereby intimating that they are men of great minds—men whose keen intellects discern, beyond the multiplicity of doctrinal opposition, the one grand idea of undogmatic unity as the world's true religion. With them religion consists in feeling, as opposed to faith. All clinging to dogma they regard as bigotry, and every effort to defend time-honoured doctrines they put down as fanaticism. In their own estimation they are the only true philosophers, destined by Providence to prepare the world for universal religious toleration, not only civil, but dogmatic as well.

Whether or not these men are really the philosophical prodigies they claim to be will, I think, appear from a brief examination of their fundamental principle—that one religion is as good as another. With the truth or falsehood of this proposition Indifferentism must stand or fall.

Now, the proposition that one religion is as good as another means, in its concrete significance, nothing less than that falsehood is as good as truth, that vice is as good as virtue, and that idolatry is as good as true worship. This, it will perhaps be objected, is a hard saying ; it savours of religious intolerance. Yes, it is a hard saying, but it is a

præceptum homini, ut seipsum diligat, sed ut seipsum diligat rationaliter seu juxta ordinem rectum. Quare, formula *dilige te amore ordinato* complectitur omnia officia hominis ad seipsum. Hæc officia respiciunt animam et corpus.

fact, and " facts are stubborn things to deal with." It does savour of religious intolerance, but truth is necessarily intolerant of error.

First, then, on the supposition that one religion is as good as another, it must needs be admitted that falsehood is as good as truth ; for of the hundreds of existing religions there cannot be found two that agree in principle and practice. What one teaches as true, others reject as false ; what one commends as holy, others condemn as impious. According to Anglicans, for instance, Christ is a divine person ; according to Unitarians and Socinians He is a mere man. By Lutherans infant baptism is considered valid ; by Baptists it is rejected as invalid. Catholics hold that Bishops were divinely instituted to rule the Church ; Presbyterians teach that Bishops were not so instituted. And so all along the line, when one religious body teaches a certain doctrine, others almost invariably deny it, and hold the contrary as true. Yet it is the very first principle in philosophy, and of common sense as well, that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. If it be true, for example, that two and two make four, it cannot at the same time be true that two and two do not make four. And so, also, if it be true that Christ is a divine person, or that infant baptism is valid, or that Bishops are divinely instituted to rule the Church, it cannot at the same time be true that Christ is not a divine person, or that infant baptism is not valid, or that Bishops were not divinely instituted to rule the Church. Hence, as existing religious systems teach *de facto* opposite and contradictory doctrines, some of them must necessarily be false ; consequently, if it be true, as Indifferentists hold, that one religion is as good as another, it must also be true that a false religion is as good as the true one, or that falsehood is as good as truth ; unless, indeed, we are prepared to maintain that no religion is good, which is the very opposite of what Indifferentists have been holding heretofore. Again, if one religion is as good as another, then vice is as good as virtue, and idolatry is as good as true worship—for, in that case, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and the worship of Moloch and Astarte are as good as the purest form of Christianity, though they teach the grossest idolatry and advocate the indulgence of the basest passions. They are so many different forms of religion, and one religion is as good as another. Hence, vice and virtue, idolatry and true worship are equally good. . . . Hence, to whatever number of different religious denominations you may apply the Indifferentists' principle, you are always forced to hold that in religious matters falsehood is as good as truth—you are forced to hold that God Himself is indifferent to truth and falsehood. And, yet, what could be more unreasonable ? What more blasphemous ? Consequently, to hold that one religion is as good as another, is an insult both to God and to man—(**Otten,** S.J., *Does it Matter Much What I Believe ?* pp. 5-21).

ART. I.

DE OFFICIIS HOMINIS QUOAD ANIMAM.

183. Bonum animæ, quippe quod ceteris ipsius bonis antecellit, homo imprimis quærere tenetur. Hoc autem bonum potissime in perfectione intellectus et voluntatis consistit. Jamvero—

184. *Quod attinet ad intellectum.* Singuli homines tenentur eam veri bonique notitiam assequi, quæ ad vitam regendam moresque informandos est necessaria, et proinde ad errores oppositos fugiendos. Principale enim hominis officium est in finem ultimum tendere, ad quam tendentiam requiruntur actus intellectus cognoscentis finem et media, quibus finis attingi possit ; ergo ad cognoscendum finem ultimum et media requisita ad hunc finem assequendum unusquisque tenetur. Quare,

Homines generatim sumpti ad eas dumtaxat notiones adipiscendas tenentur, quæ facile obtineri possunt (cujusmodi sunt principia moralia et officia generalia religionis), et sine quibus homo debitum finem suum nec sciret nec intenderet nec suas actiones in illum dirigeret. Ad scientiam altiorem, licet talis scientia sit valde exoptanda et rationi convenientissima, nemo tenetur *per se*, sed *per accidens* tantum, quatenus nimirum ratione status, in quo forte versatur vel versaturus est, munere suo sine illa exquisitiori scientia fungi nequit ; unusquisque enim ea scire tenetur, quæ ad suum munus rite obeundum sunt necessaria.

185. Quum perfectio intellectus multum pendeat ab aliis facultatibus, quibus in scientia acquirenda juvatur, has etiam, quatenus ad intellectus perfectionem conferunt, excolere necesse est. " Unde, generatim dici potest perfectionem intellectus, pro conditione et circumstantiis, in quibus homo versatur, *per se* et *absolute* quærendam esse ; perfectionem vero ceterarum facultatum, quæ ad sensibilitatem pertinent, quærendam esse

relative, quatenus nimirum rationi deserviunt et ejus evolutioni opitulantur. Sensibilitas enim in homine non est propter se, sed propter intellectum, qui finis munere gaudet ; media autem nonnisi propter finem quæruntur " (**Liberatore,** *Ethica*, p. 152).

186. Consectaria.—1°. Ex supradictis de officio perficiendi intellectum ad cognoscendum finem ultimum et media eum assequendi, excludi intelligitur arbitraria opinandi licentia seu affectata libertas quodlibet cogitandi et verum æstimandi. Nam imprimis, perfectio intellectus non opinione sed scientia seu firmo certoque assensu constat ; deinde, non licet negare nec in dubium vocare, ea, sine quorum inconcussa persuasione nequit impleri officium originarium tendendi in finem ultimum. Ergo licentia opinandi et omnis doctrina, quæ eam proclamat, illicita est et rejicienda.

2°. Res, circa quas quisque debet veritatem inquirere erroremque fugere, sunt maxime illæ, quæ ad vitam practicam et moralem regendam conferunt. Ultro quidem fatendum est aliquam scientiæ copiam perfectioni et felicitati tum hominum singillatim tum totius societatis multum prodesse, ideoque aptis mediis incitamentisque scientiarum ac artium progressum a Statu fovendum esse, non tamen adeo ut vi legis juvenes *cogantur* alicui scientiæ vel arti operam dare. Talis enim coactio bono societatis obesset potius quam prodesset, tum quia pro multis applicatio mentalis esset inutilis virium et temporis jactura, tum quia homines instructi non vellent in inferiori conditione manere, inferiorem laborem exercere. Sapientius sibi consuleret Status, si veram religionem, quæ optimos mores in omnibus fovet, defenderet vel saltem non oppugnaret. Scientias sine religione utilitatis parum, nocumenti multum Statibus ubique terrarum afferre experientia testatur.

187. Recta vero intellectus ordinatio non est nisi præludium ad moralis ordinis custodiam. Quare,

Quod attinet ad voluntatem, qua nimirum hic ordo servatur, homini incumbit officium suam voluntatem in bonum supremum dirigendi, quum ad hoc bonum homo natura sua ordinetur. Quamobrem tenetur omnes actus malos vitare, atque actus bonos sub præcepto injunctos facere ; quoad ceteros actus bonos notandum est eos velle utile et commendabile esse, dummodo fiat juxta dictamen prudentiæ.

188. Usus boni delectabilis per se non adversatur voluntatis perfectioni. Delectabilitas enim juxta divinam ordinationem quibusdam rebus et actionibus competit, ut homo ea allectus agat, et facilius agat, quæ ad bonum individui et totius speciei sunt necessaria. Tamen usus boni delectabilis sæpissime malus evadit ex circumstantiis, ratione quarum nullo modo—ne implicite quidem—ad bonum honestum fortasse refertur. Unde, etiam si voluntas aliquam rem, quæ de se adjuvat ad boni supremi adeptionem, prosequitur propter motivum illi supremo bono repugnans, perverse operatur, utpote pluris faciens bonum finitum quam bonum infinitum.

Quum voluntas in sua perfectione attingenda multum impediri vel omnino frustrari possit motibus appetitus sensitivi inordinate tendentis in bonum delectabile, tenetur homo passiones suas refrænare et dirigere per virtutes fortitudinis et temperantiæ.

ART. II.

DE OFFICIIS HOMINIS ERGA SUUM CORPUS.

189. Ordinatus sui corporis amor homini imponit officia tum affirmativa tum negativa : *negativa* prohibent omnem actum, qui sit mortis directe inductivus, ut sunt suicidium et duellum ; *affirmativa* autem ad hoc reducuntur, ut quisque corporis valetudini et vitæ mediis ordinariis prospiciat ; quocum officio cohæret

jus propriam vitam tuendi contra injústum vitæ aggressorem. Unde, de *suicidio, duello* et *sui defensione* agitur in hoc articulo.

§ 1. De Suicidio.

190. THESIS X.—Suicidium legi naturali repugnat.

Stat. Quæst.—*Suicidium* (sui cædes) definitur : *directa* et *propria auctoritate suscepta suiipsius occisio.*

Dicitur 1°. **directa** *occisio* (i.e., in seipsa intenta), ut suicidium distinguatur ab indirecta sui occisione, quæ contingit, quando quis aliud intendens (*v.g.*, curam ægroti) ponit actionem, ex qua mortem secuturam esse prævidet. Hic enim vitam suam non servat (quod nonnumquam licitum est), suicida autem ex proposito actionem suam dirigit ad vitam suam destruendam.

Dicitur 2°. **propria auctoritate** *suscepta*, quia si quis ex voluntate Dei certo sibi manifestata se interimeret, ille scelus suicidii non committeret ; nec (juxta quosdam, pluribus contradicentibus, cf. *S. Alph.*, l. 3, n. 369) suicida esset, qui juste ad mortem damnatus, in seipsum, ex auctoritate judicis, sententiam exsequeretur.

191. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Ut aliquis rem aliquam licite destruat, necesse est, ut in illam rem plenum habeat dominium ; secus enim jus alterius violaret. *Atqui* plenum dominium in vitam suam nec habet nec habere potest homo, tum quia pro dominio vita est conditio prævia et necessaria, et proinde extra sphæram sui dominii vita uniuscujusque constituitur ; tum quia ad plenum dominium requiritur realis relatio inter rem possessam et dominum, quæ relatio quum in homine respectu sui dari nequeat, homo non potest accipere dominium suiipsius. Nam, " ut ex ipso conceptu et definitione constat, *dominus* est aliquid relativum, sicut pater et magister ; quare, sicut nemo potest esse pater

vel magister suiipsius, ita nec potest esse suiipsius dominus; nam dominus semper dicit superioritatem respectu illius, cujus est dominus. Unde, nec Deus ipse potest esse dominus suiipsius, quamvis possideat perfectissime seipsum. Non potuit ergo homo fieri dominus suiipsius. . . . Solum ergo potest homo disponere de suis operationibus, quarum dominus est, non de seipso, vel (quod idem est) de vita sua, cujus dominus non est nec esse potest" (**De Lugo,** *De Just. et Jure*, Dist. 10, sect. 1, n. 9).

II.—Qui sibiipsi vitam eripit: 1°. *agit contra naturalem inclinationem ad se conservandum*, quam non modo hominibus sed etiam brutis natura tribuit; quæ inclinatio, quum non sit mere sensitiva, sed etiam rationalis, rationisque dictamini subjecta, evidenter sub lege naturali comprehenditur; id quod horror ipse, qui tali scelere excitatur, sufficienter manifestat. 2°. *Injuriam societati irrogat;* homo enim vitam accipit non solum pro seipso, sed etiam in bonum humanæ societatis, cujus membrum ab ipsa sua nativitate constituitur, et proinde eadem lex naturalis, quæ societati imponit obligationem membrorum suorum conservationi ac bono consulendi, singulis membris onus imponit concurrendi ad bonum commune quamdiu et quantum possunt. A quo onere nulla infelicitas conditionis vitæ quemquam eximere potest, quia etsi fortasse societati prodesse nequit directe, saltem indirecte (exemplo fortitudinis et patientiæ res adversas constanter perferendo) prodesse potest; dum, e contra se necando gravissime societati nocet, alios quasi alliciendo, ut propter molestias et infirmitates vitam abjiciant. 3°. *Legem Dei impie contemnit;* Deus enim per dictamen rationis unicuique manifestat, quod malum majus et irreparabile (qualis est vitæ præsentis jactura) assumi nequit ut medium ad malum minus et reparabile evitandum. Hanc igitur legem Dei suicida contemnit, simulque supremum Dei dominium

in vitam humanam arrogans de re aliena temere et pro lubitu disponit.[1]

192. Cor. 1.—Ergo directa proprii corporis mutilatio, si fit absque causa proportionate gravi, licet totam suicidii malitiam non contineat, eam tamen aliquo modo participat ; corporis enim membra eorumque integritas, non secus ac ipsa persona, non nostro sed Dei dominio sunt subjecta. *Neque obstat*, quod membra, utpote partes, toti homini subordinantur et in ejus usum deputantur ; *nam* quum ad integritatem hominis pertineant, ea tantum ratione de ipsis disponere licet, quæ naturali eorum destinationi accommodatur, *scil.*, ut maneant corpori unita et suis organicis functionibus apta.

Dixi *absque causa proportionate gravi*, quia licet homo non sit vere dominus suorum membrorum, est tamen eorum administrator, seu de eis habet dominium utile, et proinde quando alicujus membri abscisio ad vitam servandam requiritur, illud abscidere licitum est, immo nonnumquam præceptum, quum pars subordinetur bono totius.

193. *Dices* 1°. Suicidium est actus fortitudinis, cujus est pericula mortis aggredi.

Resp.—Dist. assertum. . . . fortitudinis *apparentis* et *fictæ conc., veræ., neg.* Nam " ad fortitudinem pertinet, quod quis *ab alio*

[1] To kill oneself is altogether unlawful, for three reasons. First, because naturally everything loves itself, and consequently everything naturally preserves itself in being, and resists destroying agencies as much as it can. And therefore for anyone to kill himself is against a natural inclination and against the charity wherewith he ought to love himself. And therefore the killing of one's self is always a mortal sin, as being against law and against charity. Secondly, because all that any part is, is of the whole. But every man is of the community ; and so what he is, is of the community, hence in killing himself he does an injury to the community. Thirdly, because life is a gift divinely bestowed on man, and subject to His power who " killeth and maketh to live." And therefore he who takes his own life sins against God ; as he who kills another man's slave sins against the master to whom the slave belongs ; and as he sins who usurps the office of judge on a point not referred to him. For to God alone belongs judgment of life and death—(*Aquinas Ethicus*, 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5).

mortem pati non refugiat *propter bonum virtutis et ut vitet peccatum*. Sed quod aliquis sibiipsi inferat mortem, ut vitet mala pœnalia, habet quidem *quamdam speciem* fortitudinis, . . . non tamen est *vera fortitudo*, sed magis quædam mollities animi non valentis mala pœnalia sustinere " (**S. Th.,** 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5, ad 5).

Dices 2°. Inter sanctos veteris et novæ legis sunt, qui se interfecerint.

Resp.—Quod ad tales attinet, eorum actio " explicari debet aliquo ex his tribus modis: 1°. quidem *per modum illum licitum indirectæ mortis*, quem exposuimus. Sic nonnulli exponunt factum Samsonis, quod narratur Judic. c. 16, ut notavit Card. De Lugo. 2°. propterea quia *speciali Dei instinctu* id fecerunt, ut de S. Apollonia legimus in Brev. Rom. Possunt denique 3°. isti excusari *per ignorantiam inculpatam*. Non enim hæc res est adeo clara et perspicua, quin aliquando invincibiliter possit ignorari, puta in casu, in quo id videretur medium quasi necessarium ad patriæ salutem vel pudicitiæ custodiam. Sic forte excusari potest Razias, 2 Machab. c. 14 "—(**Schiffini,** v. 2, p. 60).

194. Cor. 2.—Ergo tenetur homo vitam et corporis valetudinem *mediis ordinariis* conservare; qui enim obligatur ad finem, eo ipso obligatur ad media. Adde, quod hæc obligatio elucet ex naturali instinctu, quo homo, sicut cetera viventia, bona vitæ et sanitatis servare studet.

Dixi mediis *ordinariis*, quia nullum habetur argumentum solidum et convincens, cur homo jure naturæ teneatur media extraordinaria et difficillima adhibere. Unde, "juxta communem doctorum sententiam non est obligatio utendi medicina exquisita et pretiosa ad vitandam mortem; neque enim obligatur sæcularis ad relinquendum proprium domicilium et patriam, ut transferat se ad aliam civitatem et quærat salubriorem aerem suæ valetudini opportunum et necessarium; hæc enim omittere non est se occidere, sed permittere mortem ex se obvenientem, et relinquere se ordinariis et communibus mediis, quibus alii homines communiter vivunt. Neque enim hic se occidit sed moritur propter ægritudinem vel infirmitatem suæ naturæ, cui non tenebatur modis omnibus accurate subvenire" (**De Lugo,** *De Justitia et Jure*, Disp. 10, s. 1, n. 36).

Potest tamen accidere, ut licitum, immo præceptum sit vitam et valetudinem certo periculo exponere, quando nimirum hoc periculum vitari nequit, quin violetur præceptum negativum, aut etiam affirmativum sed ex se vel ex adjunctis prævalens. Sic, militi, *v.g.*, non licet stationem deserere ad vitam salvandam.

§ 2. De Duello.

195. THESIS XI.—Duellum ex privata causa susceptum legi naturali repugnat.

Stat. Quæst.—Duellum (quod veteribus idem fuit ac *bellum*, ponendo *du* pro *b*), prout nunc usus fert, intelligitur *certamen duorum* (vel *paucorum*) *privata de causa ex condicto susceptum cum armis ad occidendum idoneis*.

Dicitur 1°. *certamen duorum*, ut duellum distinguatur a bello, quod est certamen unius populi adversus alium.

Dicitur 2°. *privata de causa*, ut distinguatur duellum a certamine paucorum, quod ad causam publicam et ex publica auctoritate, *v.g.*, ad bellum vitandum, suscipitur. Tale fuit certamen inter David et Goliath. Hoc ad instar belli habendum est.

Dicitur 3°. **ex condicto** *susceptum*, ut duellum distinguatur a defensione legitima, et a rixa, quæ ex repentino animi æstu oritur. Condictio seu conventio, de qua agitur, fit de loco et tempore certaminis.

Dicitur 4°. *cum armis ad occidendum* **idoneis,** quia malitia duelli in eo præcise est, quod aliquis absque justa causa mortis periculo se exponit, et alium in eodem periculo ponit ; quod duplex periculum (et proinde malitia) deest, si arma adhibita non sunt lethalia. Quoad hoc periculum et malitiam nihil refert, utrum duellum suscipiatur cum intentione desistendi, primo vulnere inflicto (duellum ad *primum sanguinem*), sive cum intentione dimicandi donec alteruter vulnus lethale accipiat (duellum *ad mortem*).[1]

[1] The risk to life is of the essence of a duel : it only attains its end—of establishing a man's character for courage—by being dangerous to

196. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Uterque eorum, qui duellum ineunt, expressam facultatem ab altero accipit eum armis lethalibus aggrediendi ; *atqui* talis facultas continet in se malitiam tum suicidii tum homicidii ; uterque enim se proxime exponit periculo amittendæ vitæ propriæ et auferendæ vitæ alienæ, idque absque ulla causa legitima. Et sane, causa propter quam duellum suscipitur aut est *innocentia vel veritas probanda*, aut *lis dirimenda*, aut *injuria vindicanda*, aut *honor reparandus*, Jamvero, ex nulla hujusmodi causa fit duellum honestum. Et quidem, duellum

a) *innocentiam vel veritatem non probat*, quia iniquitati et errori potiusquam innocentiæ et veritati favere potest ; maxime enim a corporis viribus et dexteritate in arte digladiandi pendet, in qua nimirum arte impii sæpenumero sunt probis peritiores ;

b) *litem non dirimit*, quia nihil prohibet, quominus exitus ejus faveat parti injustæ ; nec desunt media pacifica et legalia ad litem dirimendam ;

c) *injuriam non vindicat*, tum quia vindicta et ordinis læsi reparatio spectant ad judices et magistratus, quibus custodia boni communis et reorum punitio sunt commissæ ; tum quia offensor duellum acceptando non modo non retractat vel reparat injuriam inflictam sed potius veritatem sui dicti vel facti armis et periculo mortis defendere se paratum profitetur ;

d) *honorem non reparat*, quum adversarii occisio vel vulneratio nihil prorsus conferat ad honorem deperdi-

life. Fortitude essentially consists in braving death. Deadly weapons, chosen because they are deadly and involve a risk of life in fighting with such arms, are the apt and express means for showing readiness to brave death. If the weapons were not deadly, there would be no point in the duel. As a matter of fact, where our definition of duel is verified, and weapons in themselves deadly are used, the encounter cannot be other than dangerous, especially between foes and where the blood is up. In the French army, where the regimental fencing-master stands by, sword in hand, ready to parry any too dangerous thrust, serious results still have occurred—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 222).

tum reparandum ; ex eo enim quod quis adversarium straverit, minime sequitur victorem esse virum probum, vel exprobrationem, qua affectus fuerit, injustam fuisse.

197. *Dices :* Juxta opinionem apud plures vigentem, is, qui injuria lacessitus non provocat ad duellum vel illud non acceptat, ut ignavus contemnitur, immo non raro ab officiis publicis præsertim militaribus tales arcentur. Unde, duellum ad tantam calamitatem evitandam ut illicitum condemnare valde durum videtur.

Resp.—Quamvis duellum existimetur medium aptum ad notam ignaviæ avertendam, non est tamen medium necessarium nec justum. Quando enim aliquis contumeliose affectus vel ad duellum provocatus aperte declarat se nolle actionem lege naturali prohibitam exercere, interim vero ubique intrepide ac digne se gerit et se paratum ostendit contra quemvis injustum invasorem se defendere, talem procul dubio nemo cordatus (et de ceteris non est curandum) putabit cessisse ignaviæ in duello declinando. Quod attinet ad eos, qui ex officio publico detruduntur, eo nimirum quod nolunt duellum offerre vel acceptare, dicendum est inique agere rectores publici boni, qui talem officii retinendi conditionem approbant, sed inique etiam agere, qui in tali casu duellum ineunt. Valde quidem durum est duellum declinare cum certa officii jactura, sed non magis durum quam lex naturalis, necnon civilis, nonnumquam in aliis casibus postulat.

§ 3. De Cruenta Sui Defensione.

198. Ex officio conservandi vitam sequitur jus repellendi vim, quæ corpori vel etiam animæ detrimentum infert. Quare, hic quæritur, an liceat ad propriæ vitæ conservationem injustum aggressorem occidere. Sit igitur sequens thesis.

199. THESIS XII.—Licita est propriæ vitæ defensio contra injustum aggressorem etiam usque ad hujus necem, servato tamen moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ.

Stat. Quæst.—*Injustus aggressor est ille,* qui sine sufficienti auctoritate alterum aggreditur. Dicitur *sine*

sufficienti auctoritate; nam etsi adsit ratio sufficiens, cur aliquis morte mulctetur, eum tamen morte afficere nemini privato licet.

Ut servetur *moderamen inculpatæ tutelæ*, tres requiruntur conditiones, ad *tempus*, *modum* et *finem* pertinentes. Nimirum *a*) defensio fieri debet *perdurante vel jam instante injusta aggressione*. Unde, non licet eam *prævenire*, nec, ea penitus cessante, quidquam amplius moliri.[1]

b) Ut non major vis vel plus damni aggressori infera tur quam requiritur ad ejus injustam aggressionem frustrandam; jus enim personæ invasæ, utpote causa præsidii acquisitum, limite præsidii continetur. Si igitur minis, fuga, auxilio advocato, etc. invasus se defendere potest, non licet ei occidere vel mutilare aggressorem.

c) Ut non ex animo ulciscendi vel mortem infligendi, sed solum cum intentione propriæ defensionis vis inferatur.[2]

1 The right of self-defence, even to the shedding of blood, involves a mere exercise of indirect killing for a proportionately grave cause. The cause in question is the defence of your own life, of your friend's, or of some other good or possession that can weigh with life, as the honour and inviolability of your person, or a large sum of money. This must be in present danger of being taken away otherwise than in due course of justice. The danger must be present, and even imminent, not prospective. The right of self-defence, even to the grievous harming of the aggressor, endures only while the danger from him is imminent, not when it is passed, or the evil is already done—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 209).

2 The essential idea of self-defence is that of stopping a trespasser, one who, however innocently, is going about to trench on that good which you have a right to maintain and reserve to yourself. . . . You stop a man as you stop a horse, only with more regard to *the moderation of a blameless self-defence*, not using more violence than is necessary here and now to preserve what you have to preserve.

The stopping, unfortunately, has often to be done in a hurry: there is no time to wait: for the next moment, unless you act promptly, it will be all too late, or all to no purpose to act at all. . . . Now, to stop a man in mid-career, all on a sudden, to render him powerless where he was about to strike, motionless in the direction whither he was about to go, and that in an instant, is of common necessity a rude treatment, very dangerous to him who experiences it, and under some conceivable circumstances hopelessly fatal. Still the

200. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—In injusta vitæ aggressione adest collisio inter jus innocentis ad vitam et simile jus nocentis ; *atqui* in tali collisione jus innocentis procul dubio prævalet, tum quia vita innocentis (seu qui sine sua culpa in periculo mortis versatur), præstantior est vita nocentis, qui, cessando aggredi, a periculo se liberare potest ; tum quia qui jus habet aliquid possidendi, jus quoque habet repellendi omne, quod ad hujus possessionem opponitur (n. 166) ; qui sane repulsus in casu injustæ aggressionis sæpe fieri non potest, quin aggressor necetur ; tum denique quia, quum quisque vitæ suæ, duce natura, plus consulat quam vitæ alienæ, si non esset licita violenta sui defensio, injuste aggressus plus alienæ quam suæ vitæ consulere teneretur.

Paulo aliter.—A natura homo possidet jus ad vitam, quod ex hypothesi servari nequit citra necem aggressoris, et proinde jus ad vitam innocentis actu aggressi confligit cum jure aggressoris ad vitam. Jamvero, æquitas naturalis postulat, ut, etiam in casu jurium æqualium, jus innocentis in maximum discrimen vocatum prævaleat juri alterius sponte sua in discrimen se conjicientis ; quod non existeret si injuste invasus a nece invasoris se cohibere teneretur.

II.—Si non liceret vim injusti vitæ aggressoris vi usque ad necem adhibita repellere, lex naturalis postularet, *a*) ut jus injuriæ cederet, seu, ut securior evaderet conditio nocentis ; *b*) ut homines, quo majore virtute emicarent, eo majoribus periculis mortis obnoxii fierent ; quo enim fidelius a defensione abstinerent, eo

fatality—in plain words, the death of the aggressor—is not *directly willed*. It is neither *intended* as an *end*, nor *chosen* as a *means*. It is not welcomed as an end and desirable consummation : on the contrary, it is put up with reluctantly as coming from your act. It is not chosen as a means : for, formally as his death, it is no means to your end, which was the averting of all present danger to your right. For that it was enough to *stop* the trespasser ; and you chose the means, as a *stopping* means, not as a *killing* means. True, in stopping him you killed him, but you did not kill him to stop him : that your blow was a mortal blow, was a circumstance which you did not choose and could not help. All killing then in self-defence is indirect—(*Id.* ib., p. 210).

magis improbi suam in eos converterent audaciam. Ex quo sequeretur, *c*) ut præcepta virtutis supra communem hominum mensuram dura redderentur, quum virtus suis possessoribus cederet in pœnam, et securitati societatis (quæ in repentinis casibus sua membra custodire non valet) plane improvisum esset.

201. Cor. 1.—Ergo sicut licitum est vitam violenter defendere, ita etiam licita est violenta ad ipsam mortem aggressoris defensio bonorum, quæ cum vita quasi æquiparantur. Et quidem licet sic defendere :

a) *integritatem membrorum*, quorum gravis læsio in æstimatione communi malo mortis æquivalet ; nec secus lege naturali incolumitati membrorum satis provisum esset ;

b) *libertatem*, propter ærumnas, subjectionem, aliaque mala, quæ servitutem morte pejorem facere videntur ;

c) *pudicitiam*, tum quia hæc in recta hominum æstimatione vitæ æquivalet, tum quia in discrimen adducitur bonum morale vita longe præstantius ;

d) *bona fortunæ notabilia*, sine quibus nimirum aliquis vitam vel statum vitæ conservare nequit ; quisque enim jure potitur conservandi bona magni momenti et adhibendi media ad hanc conservationem necessaria. *Nec valet dicere* vitam furis esse bonum bono fortunæ superius ; *nam* hic non agitur de collisione jurium, in qua solum jus nobilius prævalet et ignobilius desinit esse jus, sed de protectione juris, ex qua si sequitur furis interitus, hunc sibi imputare debet, non alteri jus suum protegenti ;

e) *alios homines*, quia quod licite fieri potest in sui defensione, non minus licite fieri potest pro defensione aliorum ; immo *ex caritate* ad hanc defensionem præstandam quisque tenetur, si nullum magnum incommodum obstat ; et non solum ex caritate sed etiam *ex justitia*, si quis ex speciali officio periclitanti obstringitur, ut parens liberis suis et vice versa.

Cor. 2.—Ergo licitum est se defendere contra amentem vel ebrium ; hujusmodi enim, licet non sit aggressor formaliter injustus, talis est materialiter.

202. Schol.—Se defendere contra aggressorem non est per se præceptum, et proinde aggressus potest ex motivo bono (*v.g.*, ne aggressor salutem æternam perdat) permittere se occidi ; potest vero esse per accidens præceptum, si nempe per omissionem hujus defensionis jura aliorum (ut familiæ, reipublicæ) violarentur, vel quia alicujus peccati gravis conscius existit ; magis enim tenetur quisque animæ suæ salutem quam proximi diligere.

203. Obj. 1.—Non licet facere malum, ut eveniat bonum ; *atqui* hoc facit, qui se defendendo aggressorem occidit ; *ergo.*

Resp.—*Dist. maj.* Non licet facere malum *morale*, ut eveniat bonum, *conc.* : non licet malum *physicum* alteri inferre, ut eveniat bonum, *subdist.*, si malum sit injuste illatum, *conc.*, juste illatum, iterum, *subdist.*, non licet illud malum *intendere*, *trans.* : illud *permittere*, *neg.*

Obj. 2.—Vita æterna proximi præferenda est vitæ temporali propriæ ; *atqui* contrarium facit, qui injustum aggressorem occidit ; *ergo.*

Resp.—*Dist. maj.* . . . quando proximus aliena cura *eget*, *conc* ; secus, *neg.*, et *neg. min.* " Obligatio caritatis ad procurandam salutem æternam proximi non est universalis, *nisi in casu extremæ necessitatis* : ad necessitatem autem requiritur, quod proximus nostro auxilio indigeat. Quum ergo invasor injustus non indigeat mea ope (ipse enim potest facile sibi consulere, non me invadendo injuste), non censetur esse in necessitate gravi, nedum extrema. Quare, cessat omnino obligatio subveniendi, quia hæc solum est respectu indigentis ; ille vero, qui potest se salvare, non indiget, ut constat. . . . Si invasor injuste quidem materialiter invadat, sed tamen absque libertate, ut si ebrius vel phreneticus te invadat, et aliunde *constat eum esse in statu peccati*, a quo post phrenesim vel ebrietatem poterit resurgere, e contra vero *moraliter credas te esse in statu gratiæ*, non videtur posse licite a te occidi, quia tunc vere non potest proximus sibi consulere et subvenire in illa extrema necessitate et periculo certo æternæ damnationis, nisi tu vitam propriam exponas pro ejus remedio. Hic autem casus *rarissimus* erit, quod constat illum esse in statu peccati, ob quod in æternum damnandus sit " (**De Lugo,** *loc. cit.*, n. 142).

CAPUT QUARTUM.

De Mutuis hominum officiis.

204. Omnes homines in eadem natura specifica subsistunt, eisdem facultatibus tum organicis tum inorganicis ornantur, et ad assecutionem ejusdem finis ultimi ordinantur. Ex hac identitate oritur, ut, etiam extra civilem convictum, mutuis officiis teneantur ; unusquisque enim est sicut alter ego, " et ideo affectus unius tendit in alterum sicut in unum sibi, et vult ei bonum, sicut sibi " (**S. Th.,** 1, 2, q. 27, a. 3). Quare, sicut dilectio suiipsius est mensura dilectionis proximo debitæ, ita dilectio proximi est mensura officiorum hominum ad invicem. Jamvero, omnia hæc officia sunt circa corpus et animam, et continentur in hoc duplici præcepto (subintelligendo, *rationabiliter et honeste*) : " *Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris,*" et : " *Quod tibi fieri velles, fac alteri.*"

ART. I.

DE MUTUIS QUOAD ANIMAM OFFICIIS.

205. Officia mutua, quæ animam respiciunt, circa bona intellectus et voluntatis versantur. Quum vero proprium bonum intellectus sit veritas, et voluntatis sit virtus, mutua hominum officia respectu animæ in eo sunt, ut numquam mendacio se invicem decipiant, neque dictis factisve sese ad malum morale incitent.

§ 1. De Mendacio.

206. THESIS XIII.—Omne mendacium, etiam officiosum et jocosum, est intrinsece malum.

Stat. Quæst.—Mentiri dicitur, qui scienter et libere profert tamquam verum, quod falsum esse existimat ;

est enim mentiri quasi contra *mentem ire*. Unde, *mendacium* definiri solet : *deliberata contra mentem locutio*.

Dicitur 1°. **deliberata** *locutio*, quia ratio, cur falsitas in mendacio contenta dicatur *moralis*, in eo est, quod a libera voluntate procedit.

Dicitur 2°. *contra mentem*, quia " si quis falsum enuntiat credens id esse verum, est quidem falsum *materialiter*, sed non *formaliter*" (**S. Th.**, 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1).

Aliis verbis : qui exterius enuntiat, quod interius cogitat, non mentitur, etiam tunc, quando decipitur et (materialiter) decipit. E contra, is vere et formaliter mentitur, qui exterius enuntiat, quod falsum esse existimat, etiam tunc, quando quod dicit est objective verum. Exinde sequitur in conceptu mendacii non includi intentionem decipiendi, etsi regulariter contingit, ut hæc intentio adsit implicite seu in causa ; deceptio enim est effectus connaturalis mendacii ; qui autem vult causam, implicite vult effectum ejus connaturalem.

207. Mendacium est triplex : *perniciosum*, quod in alterius damnum vergit ; *officiosum*, quod ad utilitatem loquentis vel alterius profertur ; *jocosum*, quod ad animos audientium recreandos dirigitur.

Si quis non verbis sed actione aliqua verborum vices gerente falsa innuit, actio ejus proprio nomine *simulationis* vocatur, quæ a *dissimulatione* distinguitur, sicut locutio a reticentia ; dissimulatio enim est omissio signorum, quibus cogitatio mentis prodatur.[1]

[1] Dissimulation, or at least *dissimulatio*, in Latin . . . can be taken and often is taken, for an innocent, and sometimes merciful, concealment or passing over of something which it would be painful to have noticed and acted upon. We have several instances of this signification in the Latin Vulgate (" nonne *dissimulavi ?* nonne silui ? " *Job.* iii., *Dissimulas* peccata hominum. *Wisdom* xl.). Johnson, in his dictionary, under the word *dissimulation*, gives the following sentence from " South's Sermons " : " *Dissimulation* may be taken for a bare concealment of one's mind, in which sense, we commonly say that it is prudent to dissemble injuries." The Imperial Dictionary has this remark : " Dissimulation may be simple concealment of the opinions, sentiments, or purposes ; but it includes also the assuming of a false or counterfeit appearance which conceals the real opinions

208. Illicitum generatim mendacium esse, vix est qui neget ; sunt tamen (acatholici) qui illud in nonnullis casibus, præsertim quando veracitas cum bono magni momenti confligit, licitum esse affirment.[1] Sunt autem et alii, qui, distinctione inter *mendacium* et *falsiloquium* adhibita, censeant mendacium esse locutionem contra mentem, quæ *juri vel bono alterius repugnat.* Locutionem contra mentem, ex qua nec jus nec bonum alterius ullum patitur detrimentum, *falsiloquium* vocant, eamque non esse per se illicitam existimant.

209. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Mendacium est locutio deliberata contra mentem loquentis ; *atqui* omnis locutio hujusmodi est intrinsece mala. Et quidem,

1°. *Quia contrariatur naturæ rationali loquentis ;* eo enim quod locutio oralis est quoddam naturale complementum externum locutionis mentalis, is, qui contra mentem deliberate loquitur, actum ex se oppositum naturæ rationali deliberate ponit ; *atqui* talis actus non potest non esse intrinsece malus, quum natura rationalis sit proxima norma moralitatis.

or purposes." It is clear that dissimulation may be of friendly and beneficial character, and that where this is the case, unless the concealment be unlawful for some special reason, there is nothing to be ashamed of—(**O'Reilly,** S.J., *The Relations of the Church to Society,* p. 324).

[1] Pronounced Utilitarians do not regard acts of lying as wrong in every case. Mill says : " That this rule [lying is wrong, because inexpedient], sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all (?) moralists ; the chief of which is that when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill), would preserve someone (especially a person other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial."

So also Prof. Sidgwick : " On the whole, then, reflection seems to show that the rule of veracity, as commonly accepted, cannot be elevated into a definite moral axiom ; for there is no real agreement as to how far we are bound to impart true beliefs to others ; and while it is contrary to common sense to exact absolute candour under all circumstances, yet we find no self-evident secondary principle clearly defining when it is not to be exacted." Mr. Leslie Stephen, also, holds it to be right to tell lies in circumstances wherein it is only thus that one can show oneself trustworthy ; and something like this, I take it, may be regarded as the teaching of Utilitarians generally—**McDonald,** *Principles of Mor. Science,* p. 19).

2°. *Quia contrariatur naturæ rationali audientis ;* ad errorem enim in aliis gignendum ut in suum finem proprium tendit. Jamvero, qui alteri falsum sub specie veri amplectendum deliberate proponit, hunc ad errandum inducit ; *atqui* alterum ad errandum inducere est intrinsece malum, quum error intrinsece opponatur rationi humanæ, quæ ad veritatem cognoscendam, ut ad suum finem proprium et essentialem perfectionem, ordinatur.

3°. *Quia contrariatur vitæ sociali hominis ;* homo enim naturaliter ad vitam socialem destinatur, et proinde quidquid ad vinculum hujusmodi vitæ dissolvendum tendit intrinsece malum esse necesse est. Jamvero, sublato officio veracitatis in loquente, eo ipso tollitur officium fidei in audiente, et fundamentum vitæ socialis labefactatur ; non aliter enim alii cum aliis societatem inire possunt, quam mutuam fiduciam in sermone habendo. " Quia homo est animal sociale (inquit **S. Th.**), naturaliter unus homo debet alteri id, sine quo societas humana servari non posset. Non autem possent homines invicem convivere, nisi sibi invicem crederent, tamquam sibi invicem veritatem manifestantibus " (2, 2, q. 109, a. 3).

4°. *Quia contrariatur naturæ divinæ ;* quidquid enim contrariatur naturæ rationali a fortiori divinæ naturæ contrarietur necesse est, quum natura divina sit exemplar secundum quod natura humana formatur.

210. Schol.—Probe a mendacio distinguenda est *restrictio mentalis*, qua quis verba a sensu naturali et obvio ad alium sensum detorquet. Hæc duplex est : *pure* seu *stricte mentalis*, quæ verum sensum loquentis adeo celat, ut minime percipi possit ; *late mentalis*, quæ verum sensum loquentis exprimit sed quadam obscuritate vel ambiguitate involutum, qui tamen ex adjunctis (ex usu recepto, ex modo loquendi, ex circumstantiis, in quibus loquens versatur) colligi potest. Sic, *v.g.*, " nescio " in

ore hominis, qui ad secretum servandum obligatur, idem sonat ac "nescio scientia communicabili." Restrictionem stricte mentalem esse illicitam patet ex hoc, quod verba nullo modo continent sensum, qui in mente loquentis continetur, sed illum excludit.[1]

211. Restrictio late mentalis aliquando licita est, immo præcepta, si adsit gravis causa, *scil.*, si quæstio sit de secreto tegendo, cujus proditio magnum damnum vel ipsi loquenti vel aliis afferret, et silentium esset ipsius secreti proditio, nec alia via suppeditat eludendi importune inquirentem. Et quidem, si non esset licita restrictio mentalis, ratio foret vel quia 1°. a mendacio non differt, vel quia 2°. per eam error audientis intenditur. Jamvero, 1°. per mendacium id, quod verum existimatur, negatur; per restrictionem mentalem verum non negatur, sed subobscure seu modo ambiguo pronuntiatur; et proinde deest locutio contra mentem. 2°. Error audientis potest quidem a loquente intendi, sed non semper necessario intenditur, quum finis per se locutionis ambiguæ non sit alium in errorem inducere, sed veritatem celare; potest igitur veritatis occultatio intendi, error autem audientis permitti. Nam, juxta principium ab omnibus admissum, licet ponere causam, ex qua duplex sequitur effectus, alter bonus, malus alter, dummodo causa non sit mala, effectus malus non sit

[1] Mental reservation is an act of the mind limiting the spoken phrase so that it may not bear the full sense which at first hearing it seems to bear. The reservation or limitation of the spoken sense is said to be *broad* or *pure*, according as it is, or is not, indicated externally. A *pure mental reservation*, where the speaker uses words in a limited meaning, without giving any outward clue to the limitation is in nothing different from a lie, and is wrong as a lie is always wrong. A good instance is Archbishop Cranmer's oath of fealty to the Pope, he having previously protested—of course out of hearing of the Pope or the Pope's representative—that he meant that oath in no way to preclude him from labouring at the reformation of the Church in England, that is doing the evil work which Henry VIII. had marked out for him in the teeth of the Roman Bishop. Even *broad mental reservation* is permissible only as a last resource, when no other means are available for the preservation of some secret which one has a duty to others, or grave reason of one's own, to keep—(**Rickaby,** p. 233).

medium effectus boni, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis. Quas conditiones nemo non videt verificari posse, dum quis restrictionem mentalem adhibet.

212. Quare, " *a*) confessarius ea, quæ ex confessione novit, potest, immo debet, negare sibi esse cognita (*scil.*, scientia communicabili) ; *b*) reus non convictus respondere potest se crimen non fecisse (*i.e.*, quod fateri debeat, antequam sit probatum) ; *c*) item ejusdem rei causidicus ; *d*) viator latroni dicere potest se nihil amplius habere (*i.e.*, quod dare teneatur) ; quivis contra jus, indiscrete, ex improviso interrogatus, contrarium veritatis celandæ respondere potest (*i.e.*, ex adjunctis : alter melius rei cognoscendæ jus non habet). . . . Neque illicita est dicenda hæc tanta restrictio ; nam secus coram astutioribus et audacioribus, omni medio legitimo jus suum defendendi privarentur simpliciores pacificique, et quidem ipsa lege naturali " (**Van der Aa,** *Ethica* p. 100). Quando vero qui interrogat, jus habet veritatem sciendi, illicita est restrictio mentalis ; tunc enim jus interrogantis responso ambiguo læderetur.

213. Obj. 1.—Ex duobus malis minus eligi debet ; *atqui* mendacium leve minus malum est quam homicidium ; *ergo* ad hujusmodi malum avertendum licet mentiri.

Resp.—*Dist. maj.* Minus malum eligi debet, si eligibile est, *conc.* ; secus, *neg.* Pariter *dist. min.* . . . in ordine physico, *conc.*, in ordine morali, *neg.* Mendacium, utpote intrinsece malum, non est eligibile et proinde ad nullum bonum servandum licet illud ut medium adhibere ; mala enim non sunt facienda, ut eveniant bona. Porro, non omne homicidium est jure naturæ vetitum, sed illud solum quod fit auctoritate privata, ideoque occisio alterius auctoritate Dei facta non est mala, et proinde non est æquiparanda mendacio, cujus deformitas non dependet ab hypothesi divinæ voluntatis sed ab intrinseca inordinatione actus.

Obj. 2 —Ideo mendacium reputatur malum, quia per illud alter decipitur ; *atqui* mendacia jocosa solius voluptatis causa efferuntur ; *ergo* hæc non prohibentur.

Resp.—Ideo *etiam* . . . . *conc.* ; ideo *solum* . . . *neg.*, *conc. min. neg. concl.* Mendacium est malum et prohibitum non solum quia jus alterius lædit, sed etiam et quidem primario quia naturæ

rationali repugnat. Hinc etsi nullius jus læderet non desineret esse malum.

Obj. 3.—Ex restrictione mentali eadem mala sequuntur, quæ ex mendacio ; *ergo* illicita est.

Resp.—*Dist. maj.* . . . per se, *neg.* ; per accidens, *subdist.*, si absque causa proportionate gravi adhibeatur, *conc.*, secus, *neg.* Mendacium ex natura sua habet, ut decipiat ; restricto mentalis solum præbet *occasionem* erroris ; occasionem autem erroris ex justa causa ponere lex naturalis minime vetat.

§ 2. De Scandalo.

214. THESIS XIV.—Unusquisque jus strictum habet, ne alii eum dictis vel factis in malum morale inducant.

Stat. Quæst.—*Scandalum* est *dictum vel factum* (*vel omissio*) *alteri præbens occasionem ruinæ spiritualis.*

Scandalum est duplex : *a*) *directum*, quod est dictum vel factum aut natura sua aut agentis intentione alterum ad peccatum inducens ; *b*) *indirectum*, quod est dictum vel factum ex se bonum (vel indifferens), sed quod prævidetur (quin intendatur) fore alteri occasio peccati. Quid in hujusmodi casu licitum sit, dijudicandum est ex regulis pro imputabilitate mali effectus (n. 96, 2°.). Hic agitur de scandalo directo.

215. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Omnis homo jus habet, ne ab aliis avertatur a suo fine ultimo ; eo enim quod mihi incumbit officium in hunc finem tendendi, jus habeo, ne ab aliis patiar impedimentum in eo assequendo. *Atqui* solum malum morale hominem a suo ultimo fine avertit ; *ergo*

216. Cor. 1.—Ergo scandalum non solum officio caritatis (quod nos jubet aliis bonum, præsertim spirituale, sincere velle) opponitur, sed sæpe strictæ justitiæ. Nimirum, is *justitiam* lædit, qui fraude, dolo, metu, vi et similibus ad peccandum inducit ; solam *caritatem* vero, si hoc efficit exemplo vel consilio, nisi agatur de eis, qui ob ætatem immaturam et inexperientiam se tueri vix possunt contra exemplum vel consilium seductoris. Adhuc certius justitia violatur, si pravum exemplum vel

consilium præbens sit parens, præceptor, aliusve, cui specialius auctoritas in innocentes data est (cf. *Meyer*, v. 2, p. 65).

Cor. 2.—Ergo falsa et perniciosa est doctrina asseclarum Liberalismi, juxta quos cuilibet jus competit voce et scriptis proferendi quidquid voluerit in rebus ad religionem et conscientiam pertinentibus ; tale enim jus secum ferret facultatem alios directe inducendi in malum morale. Quo dato, quilibet poterit sine ulla formidine quascumque opiniones etiam absurdissimas et ordinis moralis socialis eversivas prædicare et fallacibus rationibus aliis persuadere.[1]

[1] We must now consider briefly *liberty of speech* and *liberty of the Press*. It is hardly necessary to say that there can be no such right as this, if it be not used in moderation, and if it pass beyond the bounds and end of all true liberty. For right is a moral power which it is absurd to suppose that nature has accorded indifferently to truth and falsehood, to justice and injustice. Men have a right freely and prudently to propagate throughout the State what things soever are true and honourable, so that as many as possible may possess them ; but lying opinions, than which no mental plague is greater, and vices which corrupt the heart and moral life, should be diligently repressed by public authority, lest they insidiously work the ruin of the State. The excesses of an unbridled intellect, which unfailingly end in the oppression of the untutored multitude, are no less rightly controlled by the authority of the law than are injuries inflicted by violence upon the weak. And this all the more surely, because by far the greater part of the community is either absolutely unable, or able only with great difficulty, to escape from illusions and deceitful subtleties, especially such as flatter the passions. If unbridled licence of speech and of writing be granted to all, nothing will remain sacred and inviolate ; even the highest and truest mandates of nature, justly held to be the common and noblest heritage of the human race, will not be spared. Thus truth being gradually obscured by darkness, pernicious and manifold error, as too often happens, will easily prevail. Thus, too, licence will gain what liberty loses ; for liberty will ever be more free and secure in proportion as licence is kept in fuller restraint. In regard, however, to all matters of opinion which God leaves to man's free discussion, full liberty of thought and of speech is naturally within the right of everyone ; for such liberty never leads men to suppress the truth, but often to discover and make it known.

A like judgment must be passed upon what is called *liberty of teaching*. There can be no doubt that truth alone should imbue the minds of men ; for in it are found the well-being, the end and perfection of every intelligent nature : and therefore nothing but truth should be taught both to the ignorant and to the educated, so as to bring it to those who have it not, and to preserve it in those who possess it. For this reason it is plainly the duty of all who teach to banish error from the mind, and by sure safeguards to close the entry to all false convictions—(*The Great Encycl.*, p. 151).

ART. II.

DE MUTUIS OFFICIIS CIRCA CORPORIS INTEGRITATEM.

217. THESIS XV.—Lege naturæ vetatur occisio vel mutilatio alterius auctoritate privata.

Stat. Quæst.—Ablatio vitæ alienæ auctoritate privata dicitur *homicidium*. Dicitur *auctoritate privata*, quia homicidium non committit, qui injustum aggressorem interficit, nec judex (nec carnifex), qui juxta legis præscriptum reum capite damnat, neque milites in bello justo pugnantes.

218. Prob. Thesis. Arg. I.—Quilibet jus naturale habet ad vitam et corporis integritatem conservandam, quod patet instinctu naturali, quo homines mortem et mutilationem refugiunt ac elementis corrumpentibus resistunt ; necnon consensu totius generis humani rigorissime punientis homicidium (et mutilationem) auctoritate privata factum. Jamvero, jus naturale in uno importat officium naturale in aliis jus illud reverendi ; *ergo*.

II.—Qui alium occidit (vel mutilat), injuriam infert illi, qui occiditur (vel mutilatur) ; communitati, cujus est membrum ; Deo, cujus est subditus ; *ergo*.

Prob. antec. a) . . . *illi, qui occiditur* . . . , ut patet ex argumento primo ; unusquisque enim jus habet ad vitam et corporis integritatem.

b) . . . *communitati*, quia communitas tum domestica tum civilis jus habet ad vitam et sanitatem suorum membrorum, quæ plurimis modis ad ejus securitatem et prosperitatem conferre possunt.

c) . . . *Deo*, qui enim servum alienum occidit (vel mutilat), peccat in dominum cujus est servus ; *atqui* omnes homines sunt servi Dei.

219. *Dices :* Quid si alter in sui necem aut mutilationem consentiat, immo illam jubeat ?

Resp.—Quum nemo sit vitæ suæ vel integritatis cor-

poris dominus, nemo potest hoc dominium alii impertire, et proinde nefas manet alium licet consentientem vel imperantem occidere.

Cor.—Ergo homicidii reus est, qui alteri media ad ejus vitam servandam necessaria surripit, vel alium, ne media necessaria adhibeat, impedit, necnon qui alicui efficax dat consilium ad alterum necandum.

ART. III.

DE MUTUIS OFFICIIS CIRCA BONAM FAMAM ET HONOREM.

220. THESIS XVI.—Lex naturalis prohibet, quominus alter alteri injuste noceat in bona fama vel honore.

Stat. Quæst.—*Bona fama* est *testimonium plurium de alicujus excellentia, sive spirituali* (ut de virtute, scientia) *sive corporali* (ut de sanitate, robore, divitiis). Bona fama exterius agnita vocatur *honor*, qui proinde est testimonium bonæ æstimationis, quam de aliquo habemus propter ejus virtutem aliamve perfectionem conspicuam. Honor tamen habetur, quoties æstimatio a paucis vel uno manifestatur ; ad famam requiritur, ut æstimatio apud plures dispergatur.

Læditur bona fama *a*) *detractione*, quæ fit manifestando alterius occultos defectus vel peccata iis, qui nullum habent jus ea cognoscendi ; *b*) *calumnia*, qua crimen falsum alicui imponitur.

Honor læditur *contumelia*, quæ fit quoties alicui vel ordinaria signa æstimationis ei debitæ denegantur, vel verbis factisve spernitur aut deridetur.

221. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Bona fama et honor sunt vera hominis bona, quod sane patet *a*) *communi hominum sensu*, quum homines generatim pluris existiment famam et honorem quam divitias vel ipsam vitam ; *b*) *ratione ;* bona enim fama et honor exinde consequens sunt homini necessaria, ut in societate humana con-

venienter vivere queat, *scil.*, ut alii fidem ei adhibeant, commercia cum eo ineant, operam ejus vel conversationem desiderent, ei officia demandent, etc. Ergo si lædens alterum in bonis fortunæ injuste agit, a fortiori idem dicendum est de injusta famæ vel honoris læsione.

222. Cor. 1.—Ergo qui alterius bonam famam vel honorem injuste lædit, damnum sic illatum tenetur ex justitia reparare, quantum fieri potest ; quidquid enim injuste ablatum est, restitui debet.

Cor. 2.—Ergo qui ut pravus vel delictis occultis affectus cognoscitur ab aliquo individuo, nequit ut talis in publicum traduci, quum nondum apud alios jus ad bonam famam amiserit. *Neque dicas*, æquum non esse quemquam meliorem famam habere quam meretur. " *Nam* sicut jus ad bona fortunæ interdum fundatur non in titulo proprietatis, sed in solo facto possessionis, ita etiam jus ad bonam famam aliquando fundatur in sola possessione, *scil.*, quando defectus est occultus, et hæc possessio confert jus ad illam retinendam seu efficit, ut nemo sine injustitia possit nos illicitis mediis (*v.g.*, revelatione criminis occulti sine justa causa) fama privare. Pax enim et securitas proprietatis tum quoad bona materialia tum quoad famam non parum labefactarentur, si ipsum factum possessionis non conferret jus ad rem retinendam, quamdiu hæc retentio non pugnat cum iure meliore aliorum " (**Cathrein,** *op. cit.*, p. 247). Si vero aliorum interest, ut ipsius pravitatem habeant compertam, ne ab ipso damnum reportent, est licitum, immo sæpe præceptum, pravitatem exponere.[1]

[1] Though it is wrong to lie, it is not always right to blurt out the truth, especially when we are not asked for it. There are unprofitable disclosures, unreasonable, harmful, and wrongful. But it will be said, does not a man forego his right to reputation by doing the evil that belies his fair fame ? No ; his right remains, unless the evil that he does, either of its own proper working, or by the scandal that it gives, be subversive of social order. If he has committed a crime against society, he is to be denounced to the authorities who have charge of society : they will judge him, and, finding him guilty, they will punish him, and brand him with infamy. If,

ART. IV.

DE MUTUIS OFFICIIS CIRCA BONA EXTERNA

SEU

De Jure Proprietatis.

§ 1. Notiones Præviæ.

223. Proprietas definitur : *bonum sensibile et externum, quod ita nobis moraliter conjungitur, ut nostrum dici debeat.* Hæc conjunctio moralis enascitur ex *jure* proprietatis seu **dominio**, quod definitur : *jus alicui conveniens libere disponendi de aliqua re in proprium commodum, ceteris exclusis.*

Dicitur 1°. *jus* **libere** *disponendi* (i.e., consumendi, vendendi, donandi, immutandi), quia dispositione coacta nullum jus amittitur vel in alium transfertur.

Dicitur 2°. *de aliqua* **re** (scil., *irrationali*), quia, homo, quum sit sui juris, nequit esse objectum proprietatis. In consideratione morali *res* differt a *persona* in hoc quod res tota ordinatur in utilitatem alterius, persona vero in bonum suiipsius operatur.

Dicitur 3°. *in* **proprium** *commodum*, ut jus proprietatis

again, he does evil, though not immediately against society, yet in the face of society and before the sun, he shocks the public conscience and rends his own reputation. But the evil, private and proper to himself, that any man works in secret, is not society's care, nor affects his social standing, nor brings any rightful diminution of his good name. If all our secret and personal offences are liable to be made public by any observer, which of us shall abide it ? Our character is our public character ; and that is not forfeit, except for some manner of public sin.

Suppose a veteran, long retired, has made a name for military prowess, by boasting of battles wherein he never came into danger, is the one old comrade, who remembers him for a skulker and a runaway, justified in showing him up ? No ; for that reputation, however mendaciously got together, is still truly a good possession : it is not the fruit of injustice, therefore it is no matter of restitution ; nor is it any instrument of injustice, which the holder is bound to drop ; thus, as he is not bound to forego it, now that he has got it, so his neighbours may not rightfully take it from him—(**Rickaby**, *Mor. Phil.*, p. 252).

a jure jurisdictionis distinguatur ; res enim, quæ possidetur ut propria, est in bonum domini, cujus est propria, quique proinde potest eam in suum commodum ordinare ; jurisdictio autem, quam aliquis supra alios tamquam subditos habet, non in bonum jurisdictionem possidentis, sed in bonum subditorum directe ordinatur.

Dicitur 4°. *ceteris exclusis*, quia si quis careat jure alios a rei usu et dispositione excludendi, jam profecto ista res non est *propria* seu *proprietas*, sed *communis*, ut aer, lux solis.

224. Unde, 1°. duo in conceptu hujus juris continentur, *scil.*, jus habendi et tractandi rem ut suam eamque in suam utilitatem adhibendi ; et jus excludendi ceteros ab iisdem actibus exercendis. Quare, " quod spectat aerem, lucem, aliaque id genus, quæ ob ingentem sui copiam omnibus simul sufficiunt, et nullo usu absumuntur, sub proprietatis humanæ dominio non concluduntur. Foret enim contra manifestam naturæ intentionem, si hæc ita alicui vel aliquibus cederent, ut ceteri ab eorum usu excludantur. His communiter accensetur etiam *vastus oceanus*. Nam et moraliter fieri nequit, ut occupetur et custodiatur, et aliunde communis gentium sive necessitas sive utilitas exigit, ut maneat omnibus liber et apertus " (**Schiffini**, *Phil. Mor.*, v. 2, p. 129).

2°. Juri proprietatis opponitur *communitas bonorum* tum *positiva*, quæ habetur, quando bona ad aliquam societatem sic pertinent, ut singulis membris condominium competat ; tum *negativa*, quæ adest, quando res adhuc est nullius, sed fieri potest alicujus propria.

3°. A proprietate distinguenda est *possessio*, quæ est actualis rei retentio cum animo jus proprietatis in eam exercendi. Hæc legitima vel illegitima est, prout cum vero jure proprietatis conjungitur vel non.

225. Objecta juris proprietatis possunt esse : *a*) bona *immobilia*, quæ nimirum sine sui destructione localiter moveri non possunt (ut domus), et *mobilia*, quæ sine

sui mutatione moveri possunt ; *b*) bona *consumptiva* et *productiva*, i.e., bona, quæ immediate ad usum et consumptionem ordinantur (ut panis), vel ad productionem novorum bonorum adhibentur. Bona productiva sunt *labor humanus, res naturæ* (ut ligna, solum), et *capitale*, i.e., quidquid ipso labore est effectum et ad nova bona producenda inservit. Liquet capitale ex labore et natura oriri.

226. Divisio juris proprietatis.—Ad constituendum jus proprietaris perfectum, quod explicavimus, concurrunt duæ partes integrales : jus directum et jus indirectum. Et quidem, jus rem possidendi sine jure ea utendi vel fructus percipiendi dicitur *jus* seu *dominium directum*. Jus ad usum vel usufructum sine jure ad rei substantiam dicitur *jus* seu *dominium indirectum* seu *utile*. Utrumque vocatur dominium *imperfectum*.

Qui plenum vel saltem directum alicujus rei dominium habet, dicitur *proprietarius* ; qui ideo distingui debet a *usuario* et *usufructuario*.[1] In eo hi differunt, quod prior, secus ac hic alter, re uti quidem potest, haud vero potest rei fructus pro arbitratu vendere, donare, etc.

[1] For practical purposes we may define property with Webster : "The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing." To own the thing itself is to be the *proprietor* ; a right to use, but not to the full and exclusive disposal of the thing itself, is called *usufruct*. A man who is proprietor, but cannot make use of his property as he pleases, because the right of use-value has been transferred to another, and a man who enjoys only the use-value without being the owner of the object itself, have both an *imperfect* dominion. Neither enjoys property in its full sense. Some modern writers, leaning towards socialism or communism, have held that man could never have the full property of anything, but only the usufruct ; or, to use the less barbarous Latin expression, the useful domain, *dominium utile*. The reverse is the case. Man may very well own the thing itself, say a house or a field, which produces a certain amount of food supplies, and yet be bound in certain cases to let others have some share in the benefit which is derived from these possessions. It is only a duty of charity to help the needy when their wants are only pressing, but it becomes a duty of strict justice when those wants are extreme. Man does not live for himself alone, but also for his brother-men—(**Holaind,** *Nat. Law*, etc. p. 205).

§ 2. De Existentia Juris Proprietatis Privatæ.

227. THESIS XVII.—Socialismus falsis fundamentis innititur; nec in societate stabiliri potest, quin ex eo incommoda gravissima necessario consequantur.

Stat. Quæst.—Socialismus est quædam species communismi. *Communismus* vero est systema eorum, qui existentiam juris proprietatis privatæ negantes, omnia bona, vel saltem bona productiva, communia esse debere contendunt. Duplex est :—

a) Communismus *negativus*, qui docet omnia bona *nullius* esse debere usque ad usum, ut usui omnium pateant ; et

b) Communismus *positivus*, qui jus proprietatis individuis denegat, communitati concedit. Hic aut absolutus est aut moderatus : *α*) *absolutus* docet omnia bona esse debere alicujus communitatis, et per ipsam eorum productionem et distributionem temperandas esse ; *β*) *moderatus* sola bona *productiva* in commune redigere cupit. Subdividitur in *Anarchismum*, qui vult bona productiva esse proprietatem inalienabilem *municipiorum* vel *societatum operariorum*, omni potestate politica rejecta ; et *Socialismum* qui, hæc bona in dominium societatis civilis (*scil.*, democraticæ) transferre desiderat. Anarchistæ *vi*, Socialistæ *mediis politicis* (v.g., electionibus), propositum suum attingere conantur.[1]

[1] By *communism* in its wider sense we understand that system of economics which advocates the abolition of private property and the introduction of community of goods, at least as far as capital, or means of production is concerned. *Communism* in this broad sense admits of various forms, the chief of which are the following :—

1. *Negative communism* is restricted to the negation of private property. According to this form of communism all goods should equally be put at the disposal of all. This species of communism found a zealous apostle in the person of *Moses Hess*, who flourished in the forties of the past century. Unrestricted right of enjoyment for every individual, no obligation of working, but active co-operation of all for the sake of the common interest, these were the fundamental dogmas of his gospel. . . . .

2. *Positive communism* demands the total or partial transfer of all property to the community, which is to be owner, administrator,

228. Quare, Socialismi haec sunt fundamenta : *a*) abolitio totius proprietatis privatæ, et proclamatio communitatis bonorum, adeo ut omnia bona sint reipublicæ de novo institutæ proprietas ; *b*) perfecta æqualitas conditionis inter homines cum abolitione omnium privilegiorum classium in actuali societate existentium , *c*) partitio laborum inter omnes cives, ne, in futurum; alii videantur honoribus et deliciis fruentes, quin manum

and distributor of all the products. This communism may be of two or rather three kinds.

(*a*) *Extreme positive communism* advocates the transfer of all goods without exception to one administration. All production and the use of all goods should be common—common meals, common dormitories, common hospitals, etc. This system was advocated by some of the earlier communists and by some religious sects.

(*b*) *Moderate positive communism* advocates only the abolition of private property as far as capital, or the materials of labour, or productive goods, in contradistinction to non-productive goods, is concerned. By productive goods are meant real estate, all kinds of raw material, factories, machines, tools, means of transportation, in fine, everything not intended for immediate consumption. These goods should be handed over to and be administered by some sort of commonwealth. This moderate form of positive communism is at present the only one having adherents. They are divided into two large groups bitterly hostile to each other : *anarchism* and *socialism*.

(*a*) *Anarchism* demands the transfer of productive property to independent *groups of workmen* (communities). In these groups, united to each other by mere federation, each individual is to receive the entire product of his work. Moreover, all governmental functions are to cease. For anarchists desire to realize absolute liberty and equality to their full extent. . . .

Unlike socialists, these anarchists eschew the use of so-called political means for obtaining their purposes ; thus, they disdain to take part in elections, parliamentary discussions, and the like. They appeal principally to violence and explosives, their aim being the quickest possible destruction of existing society. . . .

(*β*) *Socialistic communism*, or simple *socialism*, advocates the transformation of all capital, or means of production, into the common property of society, or of the State, and the administration of the produce and the distribution of the proceeds by the State. Since modern socialists, and chiefly the followers of Karl Marx, intend to realize this scheme entirely upon a democratic basis, they call themselves *social democrats*, and their system, *social democracy*. Social democracy may be defined as that system of political economy which advocates the inalienable ownership on the part of the State of all capital, or materials of labour, as also the public administration of all economic goods and the distribution of all produce by the democratic State—(**Cathrein-Gettelmann,** *Socialism*, p. 13).

labori moveant ; et alii jugiter insudantes sine ulla in deliciis participatione.[1]

229. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (. . . . *falsis innititur fundamentis*).

Arg. I.—1. Injusta est abolitio totius proprietatis privatæ, quia singulis civibus adimit bona, quæ fuerunt suis liberis actionibus acquisita ; quæque proinde jure merito ad eos pertinent ; est enim manifesto injustum, ut qui suo labore et industria prædia aliave bona sibi comparavit ea aliis cederet, quin ullam pro eis compensationem acciperet. Unde, nova bonorum distributio a Socialistis desiderata induci nequit absque manifesta justitiæ violatione et vero furto.[2]

[1] I understand and define Socialism as (1) denying or destroying all individual private property ; and (2) as affirming that Society, organized as the State, should own all wealth, direct all labour, and compel the equal distribution of all produce. I understand a Socialistic State to be (3) that State in which everything would be common as to its use, and in which all labour would be controlled by the State, which from the common stock would maintain the labourer and would take all the produce of the labour—(**Bradlaug** *Socialism* p. 1).

[2] Socialists, working on the poor man's envy of the rich, are striving to do away with private property, and contend that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that by thus transferring property from private individuals to the community the present mischievous state of things will be set to rights, inasmuch as each citizen will then get his fair share of whatever there is to enjoy. But these contentions are so clearly powerless to end the controversy that, were they carried into effect, the working-man himself would be among the first to suffer. They are, moreover, emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring State action into a sphere not within its competence, and create utter confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that when a man engages in remunerative labour the impelling reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and thereafter to hold it as his very own. If one man hires out to another his strength or skill, he does so for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for sustenance and education. He, therefore, expressly intends to acquire a right full and real, not only to remuneration, but also to the disposal of such remuneration, just as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and, for greater security, invests his savings in land, the land in such case is only his wages under another form ; and consequently a working-man's little estate, thus purchased, should be as completely at his disposal as are the wages he receives for his labour. But it is precisely in such power of disposal that ownership obtains,

2. Perfecta conditionis hominum æqualitas est tum naturaliter tum socialiter impossibilis: *a*) *Naturaliter*, quia, licet homines, spectata natura rationali, æquales sint, ideoque juribus æqualibus in abstracto polleant; jura tamen hominum, si hi, prout revera existunt, considerantur, æqualia dici nequeunt, quin naturæ ordinatio subvertatur. Prius igitur quam discrimina classium aboleantur ob socialem inæqualitatem, quam inducunt, videndum est utrum jura hominum in concreto sumpta sint æqualia an inæqualia; si enim inæqualia sunt, tunc inæqualitas conditionis hominum ab ipsa naturæ ordinatione provenit.[1]

whether the property consists of land or chattels. Socialists, therefore, by endeavouring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community at large, strike at the interest of every wage-earner, since they would deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thereby of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.—(*The Great Encycl.*, p. 209, 'Rerum Novarum').

[1] With respect to their natural rights, all men are equal, because all are equal in the rational nature from which such rights are derived. By nature every man is a person, that is, a rational, self-active, independent being. Every man is rational, because endowed with the faculties of reason and will. His will impels him to seek the good, the end, of his being, and his reason enables him to find and adjust means to this end. Every man is self-active, inasmuch as he is master of his own faculties and able in all the essentials of conduct to direct his own actions. Every man is independent, in the sense that he is morally complete in himself, is not a part of any other man, nor inferior to any man, either in the essential qualities of his being or in the end towards which he is morally bound to move. In short, every individual is an "end in himself," and has a personality of his own to develop through the exercise of his own faculties. Because of this equality in the essentials of personality, men are of equal intrinsic worth, have ends to attain that are of equal intrinsic importance, and consequently have equal natural rights to the means without which these ends cannot be achieved.

Only in the abstract, however, are men's natural rights equal. In the concrete they are unequal, just as are the concrete natures from which they spring. This is not to say that equality of rights is an empty abstraction, without any vital meaning or force or consequences in actual life. Men are equal as regards the *number* of their natural rights. The most important of these are the right to life, to liberty, to property, to a livelihood, to marriage, to religious worship, to intellectual and moral education. These inhere in all men without distinction of person, but they have not necessarily the same *extension*, or content, in all. Indeed, proportional justice requires that individuals endowed with different powers should possess rights that vary in degree—(**Ryan,** *A Living Wage*, p. 46).

Jamvero, tantum abest, ut jura hominum, sicut in abstracto, ita in concreto sint æqualia, ut ipsa æqualitas in abstracto inducat inæqualitatem in concreto. Et quidem, jurium æqualitas exigit, ut nemini liceat jus alterius usurpare aut quocumque modo invadere. Quo admisso, habetur jurium inæqualitas. Quia quum homines non sint physice æquales (*v.g.*, in ingenio, robore, agilitate, sanitate, etc.), nec moraliter (evidens enim est alios aliis voluntatis constantia in operando esse præstantiores), sequitur eos, qui potiores dotes physicas et morales a natura sortiuntur, jure merito eisdem melius uti quam ceteros, ideoque majora præ ceteris bona sibi procurare posse. Fac duos, qui æqualem partem fundi excolant, alterum, qui, robustus et solers, pro viribus laborat uberesque fructus colligit ; alterum, qui, utpote minus robustus vel minus labori deditus, vix ullum proventum videt. Jam quæritur, utrum hic possit partem fructuum prioris ut suam postulare necne. Si potest, jam actum est de æqualitate jurium, quæ exigit, ut quisque jus in suum habeat ; si non potest, tunc jus præstantioris in viribus naturalibus ad plura se extendit quam jus debilioris ; et proinde qui tales a natura accepit vires, a natura accepit jus eis utendi ad meliorem vitæ conditionem, et proinde inæqualitas conditionum hominum ex ipsa natura rerum provenit.

b) *Socialiter* quia societas, ad quam homo natura sua ordinatur, constituitur ad instar corporis organici, in quo partes partibus præstant aliæque aliis subserviunt. Unde, et a pari, in societate civili debent esse qui regunt et qui reguntur ; et inter ipsos rectores et primates dari debet quædam gradatio, ita ut detur supremus et deinde alii in ordine succedant. *Atqui* oportet, ut, qui prior est statu et dignitate, plura præ ceteris habeat, per quæ quasi sensibiliter ejus dignitas et auctoritas splendescant.

Porro, inæqualitas conditionum " magnopere confert ad homines inter se mutuis relationibus vinciendos,

atque ad vires humanas multifariam explicandas. Nam nisi divites essent, nemo operosiore cura liberatus se totum intelligentiæ perficiendæ tum in se tum in aliis addiceret ; nec illi, qui viribus corporis pollent sed mente parum valent, adjumenta reperirent aliorum. Certe tanta est necessitas inæqualium conditionum inter homines, ut si (quod possibile numquam erit) auferrentur, omnis civilis cultus, omnis progressus artium et scientiarum, omne virtutum domesticarum et civilium exercitium, omnis denique humana prosperitas plane corrueret. Ceterum, ut optime docet **S. Th.** (2, 2, q. 66, a. 2) sic dives juxta naturæ ordinem possidere debet proprias opes, ut ' de facili eas communicet in necessitate aliorum ' " (**Liberatore,** *Ethica,* p. 185).[1]

[1] Socialists object : Granted that some capitalists can rightly claim a reward as productive causes, for example, a gentleman-farmer, or the managing partner in a factory, or the lessee of a coal-pit, what shall we say of the young nobleman who owns this pit and half-a-dozen others, and who is lounging about Pall Mall or Rotten Row, with less knowledge of coal than a housemaid, and with less brains than four-fifths of the miners ?

Personally, of course, he is not a productive cause, though his money is. But what good comes to society of his having that money and that exemption from all personal labour of production ? Why, this, that such sinecures are the prizes of the intellectual labour that is thrown into the work of production. The managing partner and the coal-pit lessee aforesaid toils and moils in the hope that before the evening of life he shall have reached an opulence which shall enable him to spend the rest of his days exempt from the labour of producing, and, moreover, to hand over his store, undiminished by his period of rest, to his children. His ambition is *to found a family* in wealth. He works that his posterity may not have to work as he does. An ignoble desire, you say, but a potent moral cause of production.

This second and further good comes from the existence of a class of unproductive capitalists, that society has available an array, as it were, of pensioners, who can, and who as a class do, undertake and perform a mass of ministrative duties. Of this class are our Cabinet Ministers and our higher public servants generally, our clergy, authors, scientific investigators, musicians, artists, poets, the men who refine our tastes and brighten our lives. Society exists not for consumption alone, nor for consumption chiefly, and quite as little for production alone. . . .

The class, then, of unproductive capitalists is valuable to society. The drones who are found in this class, as in every other class, should be induced to such labour as they are capable of by public opinion ;

230. PARS 2ª (. . . *societati incommoda gravissima affert*). **Arg.** Socialismus non alium effectum quam continuam societatis perturbationem et duram civium servitutem progigneret. Rem ita se habere manifestum fiet consideranti incommoda, quæ bonorum productionem et distributionem in societate socialistica comitarentur. Et sane, 1°. pro productione bonorum in communi facienda, requireretur, *a*) ut labores inter cives distribuerentur, *b*) ut cives ad laborandum impellerentur. Jamvero,

a) *Quod attinet ad laborum distributionem,* aut singuli pro suo arbitrio laborem suum eligent aut magistratus vel congressus omnium civium laborem proprium singulis assignabunt. *Atqui* in priori casu unusquisque sibi eliget laborem gratum, honorabilem, valetudini innoxium ; aliisque relinquet labores difficiles, abjectos, vitæ et valetudini periculosos ; quæ igitur electiones sine rixis interminabilibus fieri non poterunt. In altero casu, cives contra libertatem naturalem jugo intolerabili gravabuntur, eo quod nulli licet artem vel occupationem, quam amat, exercere. Quæ servitus non diu sustinebitur, quin plures, præsertim ii, qui ad grossiores labores damnantur, conquerantur de spiritu partium in rectoribus, quorum judicio absoluto alii destinantur ad labores leviores, dum juxta principia hujus systematis omnes prædicantur æquales.[1]

. . . but they are not a reason for overturning the whole social beehive, in the hope of building up the comb afresh on unnatural lines of Socialism—(**Rickaby,** *Socialism,* p. 15).

[1] Although it might be said that in a Collectivist organisation all work would be performed for the people, still each worker would not be working for himself, nor would he be in a position to choose his work which would be determined for him by an authority which would be utterly incapable of making effective provision for individual choice. On the other hand although at present the workman must work for some capitalist, it is not correct to say that he is subject to any slavery solely on that account, any more than it would be correct to say that the capitalist is the slave of the workmen simply because he must find men to work for him. The point is that under private ownership there are many capitalists from among whom the workman is free to select the one for whom he will work,

Neque dici potest unicuique pro sua vi et capacitate assignatum iri laborem congruum ; *quia* neminem latet quot motiva fingi possint, ut aliquis a labore fastidioso vel etiam ab omni labore se subtrahat, præsertim quum panis quotidianus non idcirco periclitetur.

b) *Ut cives ad laborandum inducantur*, necesse erit ut adsint stimuli laboris ; nam (quod constat experientia et ex ipsa laboris natura sequitur) homines labori non incumbunt diligenter, nisi certa spe fruuntur se solos vel suos fructum fructusve æquivalentiam e labore provenientem accepturos esse ; *atqui* ex eo, quod nemo posset proprietatem tenere, sequeretur, ut nemo vellet sua industria quidquam acquirere. Quare, sublatis laboris incitamentis et motivis, loco magnæ felicitatis, quam Socialistæ promittunt, brevi tempore magna haberetur miseria, indigentia, inedia.[1]

whereas under Collectivism there would be only one huge capitalist whom all should be compelled to work for. Thus at present, workers are employed for their own interest at labour of their own choice, but under Collectivism they would be compelled to work for the common benefit at whatever employment others selected for them— (**Kelleher,** *Private Ownership*, p. 126).

[1] It is a stern fact that in thickly inhabited and civilized countries the earth is able to nourish its inhabitants only at the price of hard labour and great economy in the use of labour materials. Nor is there any lack of incentive to such economy in the modern social order, as is manifest. The interest of the individual, nay, the very necessity of self-preservation and self-advancement, urges most people to untiring and energetic labour. In the race for gain we need, therefore, a check rather than an incentive ; nor is there any great extravagance to be observed in the use of labour means—raw materials, work-tools, machinery, factories, means of transportation etc. On such economy depends to a great extent the success of all modern enterprises. . . . But how far would diligence and economy in the use of the means of production be practised in the socialistic commonwealth ? Marx assures us that " in a higher phase of communist development, labour " will " be not only a means of sustaining life, but also a most urgent desire." Bebel is anxious to outdo his master in the matter of liberal promises. To him it is self-evident " that such an organization of labour, based on perfect freedom and equality, in which one would stand for all, and all for one, would awaken the highest consciousness of solidarity, would beget a spirit of joyous industry and emulation, such as is nowhere to be found in the industrial system of our day. . . ." However, such promises are but idle talk. For what motive has the member of the socialist state to toil honestly day by day and to use the labour

—2°. Productione supposita, *impossibilis evadit in societate socialistica distributio* rerum, quæ ad vitam sunt necessariæ. Nam "quintuplex tantum norma excogitari potest, secundum quam hæc distributio fieri possit, nimirum, vel *numerus capitum* vel *tempus*, per quod quis laboravit, vel *præstatio*, i.e., qualitas et quantitas laboris præstiti, vel *diligentia* in laborando, vel denique *indigentia* singulorum. Jamvero,

a) Solus *numerus* capitum est mensura omnino injusta. Nam non omnes sunt æque diligentes vel eamdem habent dexteritatem, experientiam, idem corporis robur. Esset plane iniquum omnibus eamdem quantitatem ex rebus communi labore partis distribuere.

b) Si *tempus* est mensura distributionis, ergo, qui per idem tempus laboraverunt, eamdem mercedem accipient, sive fuerint habiles et periti sive non, sive diligentes et assidui sive non, sive operam dederint laboribus molestis et periculosis sive non ; sed hæc summa esset iniquitas.

c) Si *præstatio* statuatur pro norma distributionis, quæro : quomodo accurate determinari potest singulorum dexteritas, peritia, ingenium, diligentia, a quibus quantitas laboris præstiti pendet ? Quænam erit norma hujus determinationis, ne magistratus solo arbitrio suo et partium studio in distribuendo dirigantur ? Quod ut melius intelligatur, distinguendi sunt duplicis

materials economically ? Only the smallest part of the fruit of his industry belongs to himself. If we imagine a million members of a socialistic commonwealth, each one reaps one-millionth of the proceeds of his labour. And if he is idle, what does it matter ? Only one-millionth of the production which he neglects to bring forth is lost to him. It is not without reason that Carring maintains that the disappearance of private interests in socialism would necessitate the introduction of other motives of action. But what are they to be ? Carring replies : " The ideal of socialism, the mutual co-operation of brothers can be realized only by men whose conscience works to perfection." But only an incorrigible optimist will imagine that the socialists of the future, materialists and atheists as they are sure to be, will have a more delicate conscience than the average proletarian of to-day—(**Cathrein,** *Socialism*, p. 301).

generis labores: alii aliquid operatum relinquunt, *v.g.*, labor sutoris, alii vero nihil operatum relinquunt, *v.g.*, labores famulorum, infirmariorum, medicorum, magistrorum. Jam, quoad posteriores labores quomodo poterit præstatio mensurari? Quoad priores vero in multis casibus præstatio mensurari potest, sed in plurimis non potest, *v.g.*, præstatio agricolæ non solum pendet ab ejus labore, sed etiam a fertilitate agrorum, a tempestate, etc. Quid denique dicendum est de illis, qui ob defectum virium, ingenii, etsi diligentes, non æque multum aut fere nihil laboris præstare possunt?

d) Ex quo patet neque *diligentiam* in laborando normam distributionis esse posse. Ad diligentiam determinandam enim necesse esset custodem juxta unumquemque collocare, qui eum perpetuo observaret. Quis autem magistratus securos reddet illos præfectos ab operariis electos cum operariis non consilia communicaturos esse?

e) Neque *indigentia* tamquam mensura distributionis adhiberi potest. Quis enim erit æstimator hujus indigentiæ. Hæc certe æstimatio judicio uniuscujusque permitti nequit, quum nemo sit æquus judex in rebus suis. Ergo committenda erit judicio alicujus concilii, cui incumberet in singulorum indigentiam inquirere eamque definire. Sed hoc qui fieri poterit, quin excitentur plurimæ querelæ, discordiæ, invidiæ, quæ brevi totam rempublicam everterent"? (**Cathrein,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 273; cf. Kelleher, *op. cit.*, pp. 109 sqq.).

231. Schol.—A Socialismo simpliciter dicto (seu democratico) distinguitur Socialismus, qui dicitur *agrarius*, quippe qui non omnia bona productiva, sed tantum bona productiva *immobilia* (i.e., terram, et alia, quæ cum ea sunt immobiliter connexa, ut domos, fodinas, etc.) in commune redigere seu "nationalizare" cupit. Hoc systema *Henry George* primus propugnavit, et pluribus scriptis late, præsertim in America, evulgavit. "This then," sic ille, "is the remedy for the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth apparent in modern civilisation, and for all the evils which flow from it—*we must make land common property*" (*Progress and Poverty*, p. 52).

Hoc Socialismi systema impossibile esse facile apparet. Et quidem, 1°. *ex ineptitudine plurium ad terram colendam.* Ad hoc enim munus fugendum requiritur optimam valetudinis et virium conditio, qua sane non pauci carent. 2°. *Ex influentia hominum ad quasdam nationes.* In pluribus enim regionibus tanta est multitudo hominum, ut pars terræ, quæ singulis individuis vel familis ex divisione contingeret, eorum indigentiis minime sufficeret. Nec casualis, sed rationalis et inevitabilis est hæc ad quædam loca influentia; contingit enim propter naturales harum regionum qualitates vel propter opportunitatem, quam suppeditant, commercia feliciter agendi. Quodsi hæc influentia prohiberetur, et homines compellerentur in eodem loco constanter permanere, naturalis eorum libertas periret, nec esset spes miseriam effugiendi. 3°. *Ex variabilitate familiarum,* quarum membra non semper eadem numero manent; sed crescunt et diminuuntur; ideoque, quum terra dividenda deberet quantitative proportionari familiis, in societate esset continua familiarum peregrinatio de loco ad locum, quod sane sine maximis familiarum et societatis incommodis fieri nequit.

232. *George argumentatur:* 1°. Illud tantum haberi debet ut proprium, quod labore proprio producitur; *atqui* terra labore proprio non producitur; *ergo.*

Resp. 1°.—Argumentum assumit laborem esse unicum titulum proprietatis; quod certo falsum est. Dantur enim alii tituli, ut occupatio, accessio, præscriptio, hæreditas, etc.

Resp. 1°.—Arg. ducit ad Socialismum simpliciter. Nam si ad id tantum proprietas licite extendit, quod labore producitur, sequitur, ut quidquid labore non producitur non sit legitimum proprietatis objectum; *atqui* non modo terra sed plura alia (*v.g.*, pisces, animalia silvestria) sine labore producuntur; immo nulla res est, quæ labore solo producitur, quum labor præsupponat materiam (*v.g.*, marmor, lignum), quam modificat et immutat. Quare, admissa prædicta theoria, nec res labore productæ erunt objectum proprietatis. Nec valet dicere hominem circa lignum, pannum, etc., aliquem laborem exercendo ea ut sua propria obsignare; idem enim de parte terræ, quam sibi vindicat, dici debet.

2°. Jus æquale vivendi quod omnibus competit, infert jus æquale habendi bona, quæ natura omnibus suppeditat, et proinde jus æquale ad terram, ex qua bona ad vitam necessaria producuntur. "*If the new-born infant has an equal right to life, then it has an equal right to land,*" inquit George.

Resp.—Jus æquale vivendi infert jus acquirendi illa media quibus vita sustineatur, necnon jus arripiendi ea, quæ ad vitam in extrema necessitate constitutam conservandam sunt necessaria, etsi ad alium pertineant, *conc.*; jus vivendi infert jus ad ipsam terram in commune redigendam, *neg.* Non terra sed fructus terræ ad vitam sustinendam requiruntur; aliud vero est vitam sustineri non posse sine fructibus

terræ, aliud vero terram excolendam esse ab ipsis, qui his fructibus sustinentur, quum fructus terræ quis possit sibi comparare, quin terram excolat, ut reipsa maximam partem hominum sibi comparare videmus.

3°. *a*) Terra a Deo creata fuit, cetera ab homine producuntur; *b*) terra limitatam quantitatem habet, res aliæ indefinite augeri possunt; *c*) terra semper eadem manet, ceteræ res cito dissolvuntur.

Resp.—*a*) Deus non solum terram sed et alias res creavit, labor hominis non aliud efficere potest quam eas modificare ad actum reducendo id, ad quod erant in potentia. Quare, aut negandum est jus proprietatis circa omnia aut concedendum est circa terram. *b*) Terra limitata est quoad quantitatem, haud vero quod fecunditatem et utilitatem, quam affert; unde, non minus quam aliæ res potest esse objectum proprietatis. *c*) Multa alia non minus durant quam terra; si igitur terra propter ejus permanentiam a dominio hominis subtrahitur, et plura alia subtrahi debent, seu, objecta proprietatis esse nequeunt.[1]

[1] Mr. H. George tells us that "in every essential, land differs from those things, which being the product of human labour, are rightfully property. It is the creation of God: they are produced by man. It is fixed in quantity: they may be increased illimitably."

Let us examine the logical value of these antitheses. Land is the creation of God certainly, and so is everything else. Man creates absolutely nothing. He modifies with his labour what God has created; he sets free forces which before were held in equilibrium; he causes to spring into existence new forms, which matter had not yet evolved; but the power to evolve them lay dormant in nature. What Mr. H. George means is that the share of labour is greater in industrial products than in raising and reaping of harvests. Suppose that it were so, we would have a difference in degree, none in kind. In both cases matter and force are supplied by our great Maker, and labour avails itself of both.

"Earth is fixed in quantity and the products of labour are illimited." They are limited by the material, which cannot be greater than the earth from which it is drawn, unless we suppose that the contents can be greater than the container. They are limited by human energy, which is not infinite. By *fixed in quantity* we must understand actually measured or measurable. In this sense only, is it true that the earth itself is a fixed quantity; for if to the energies which it holds in its bosom we add human labour, the product defies human calculation. In other words, the bulk of the earth is a fixed quantity, but the productiveness of the earth is a variable quantity.

"Earth exists though generations come and go." Yes, but gold and diamonds also are more lasting than man, and yet Mr. George does not oppose ownership either in diamonds or gold. In fact, most of our earthly possessions can outlast us. Nothing sublunary will last for ever.

The differences mentioned by Mr. George are real, but not specific. . . .

When we wish to point out whether a particular object may be

§ 3. De Origine Juris Proprietatis.

233. THESIS XVIII.—Jus proprietatis non ex pacto primævo neque ex lege civili, sed ex lege naturali derivatur.

Stat. Quæst.—Ex dictis in præcedenti thesi probatum manet existere verum jus proprietatis non solum societatis, sed etiam singulorum hominum. Hic vero quæstio de origine hujus juris agitatur. Alii enim negant, alii affirmant, jus proprietatis privatæ esse naturale. Qui hoc negant in duas classes dividuntur. Sunt enim (ut *Grotius*, *Puffendorf*), qui existiment omnia ex ordinatione naturæ esse omnibus hominibus positive communia, sed hanc ordinationem naturæ fuisse ab hominibus commutatam, necessitate generis humani sic exigente. Quando enim genus humanum fuit propagatum et in familias divisum, necesse fuit, ut bona materialia inter eas dividerentur; minime enim fieri potuit, ut singulæ familiæ, quantam optarent utilitatem, extraherent ex rebus in communi positis. Hinc a primitiva illa bonorum communitate cœperunt homines recedere, et proprietatem privatam invehere *vi cujusdam generalis et mutui pacti*.

Hobbes, *Bentham* aliique docent jus prædictum esse ex *lege civili*. Docent enim naturalem esse bonorum communitatem, sed huic communitati homines renuntiasse, ut propter majora bona societatis sub legibus

held as property, we must examine whether it has the test qualifications recognized by moralists; whether it is useful or at least agreeable, capable of receiving the impress of man, or at least of being confined by its owner; whether it is limited, so that the use made of it by another man would abridge the owner's right. Now land possesses these characteristics in an eminent degree. It is not only useful, but indispensable, it can receive the impress of man so as to acquire, and permanently retain, a utility and value which it may take a long time and much labour to impart to it. In point of fact land, as brute material, has ceased to exist in civilised countries, and the soil has acquired an economic value, like any other bounty of nature that man has appropriated. Logically, denial of land ownership leads to a denial of ownership in capital. This, in turn, leads inevitably to communism—(**Holaind,** *Nat. Law and Legal Practice*, p. 223).

civilibus viverent, et vi legum civilium jus proprietatis acquirerent.

Juxta Scholasticos homo ex natura habet jus acquirendi proprietatem. "Possidere res privatim ut suas *jus est homini a natura datum*" (**Leo XIII.**, *Enc.*, 'Rerum Novarum').

234. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (. . . *non ex pacto primævo*). **Arg.**—*a*) Prædictum pactum primævum omnino gratis asseritur, quum nullum ipsius vestigium in monumentis historicis populorum invenitur. Constat enim "ubique terrarum, ubicumque familiæ oriebantur et qua tales separatim existebant, aliqua etiam rerum dominia jam viguisse, nec magis olim quam nunc cuiquam in mentem subiisse aliorum expectare consensum, si quando in terræ fundo, nemini adhuc subjecto, sibi suisque sedem stabiliter figere vel alia nondum occupata sibi ut propria assumere et retinere, immo et defendere contra invidos adversarios vellet" (**Meyer,** *Instit. Juris Nat.*, v. 2, p. 165). *b*) Supposito primos homines pactum hujusmodi inter se inivisse, quæritur, utrum posteri hoc pactum rescindere possent necne. Si prius, nihil obstat, quominus Socialismus ut licitus stabiliatur, dummodo pars major populorum alicujus nationis ad pristinam bonorum communitatem redire vellet; quod enim solo consensu vim habet, æque solo consensu vi privari potest. Si illud pactum rescindere non possunt, ratio est, quia bonum societatis, et hinc lex naturalis, jus proprietatis privatæ requirit; quod sane perinde est ac admittere jus proprietatis privatæ non pacto, sed lege naturali oriri.

235. PARS 2ª (*nec ex lege civili*). **Arg.**—Hæc sententia *a*) *falso fundamento innititur;* supponit enim naturalem esse generi humano statum solivagum et silvestrem, quod falsum esse mox apparebit.[1]

[1] "He who derives the origin of private ownership from the civil laws," says the *Civilta Cattolica*, "supposes that the primitive or

b) *ad absurda ducit,* si enim lex civilis jus proprietatis creat, quidquid illa de jure proprietatis statuat, bonum et justum erit ; *atqui,* duce natura, ipsas leges civiles ad præexistentem justitiæ normam revocamus, easque nonnumquam iniquas habemus, quando de jure proprietatis decernunt. Porro, hæc theoria omne jus naturale diruit. Nam si proprietas haberi nequit absque lege civili, jus acquirendi proprietatem, absque lege civili, inane est ; necnon jus ad liberum et utilem usum facultatum animæ et corporis, jus ad seipsum perficiendum et conservandum, quæ nimirum præsupponunt jus proprietatis privatæ, ut finis præsupponit media. *Ergo* aut omne jus a lege civili derivatur aut rejicienda est theoria jus proprietatis privatæ a lege civili derivans.

c) *sibi contradicit,* quia juxta hanc sententiam ante leges civiles distributionem terræ determinantes nulla erat proprietas individuorum vel societatum, et tamen societas per leges suas proprietatem individuis partiit ; quod sane facere nequivit, nisi prius partem terræ sibi vindicaverat et propriam fecerat ; nemo enim potest disponere de re, quæ ejus dominio subjecta non fuerit.

236. Pars 3ª (*ex lege naturali oritur*). **Arg.**—Homini competit jus utendi rebus externis ad suas necessitates sublevandas ; res enim inferiores sunt propter hominem ut possit se conservare et perficere. *Atqui* medium ad hoc jus efficaciter exercendum non est aliud quam jus proprietatis privatæ ; *ergo.*

natural state of men, as its upholders are pleased to call it, was unsociable and savage, *pecudum more,* and that from such a state they must have passed to civil society. But such opinion naturally supposes the other opinion of the positive community of goods in the savage life. Moreover, against such opinion is found history, which exhibits the Patriarchs as private owners possessed of extensive domains, and as such recognized, though they did not live in any civil commonwealth, but only in a domestic state. Tradition also, handed down to us in the different codes of laws, teaches that private property was among all nations invariably held as a sacred right, and as an institution already existing, protected indeed, as it is to-day, by the laws, but not created by them"—(**De Concilio,** *Amer. Cath. Quarterly,* v. 13, p. 279).

Prob. Min. 1°. Non posset homo satis sibi in tempus futurum prospicere, sed ludibrio fortunæ vitam suam committere deberet, si jure naturæ ea tantum possidere posset, quibus in præsenti indiget, nec posset res sibi adjungere et suas facere, quæ suo fructu et valore reliquam vitam ejus servarent ; res enim hujusmodi non adeo abundant, præsertim ob generis humani incrementum, ut semper (et speciatim, quando aliquis labore nobiliore detinetur, vel senectute, infirmitate, aliisve miseriis opprimitur) sine labore præsto sint.[1]

2°. Homo non solum ad suas proprias necessitates corporales sublevandas pondere naturæ tendit, sed etiam ad suam mentem scientiis et artibus imbuendam ; ad parentibus, filiis, amicisque indigentibus subveniendum ; *atqui* his tendentiis satisfieri nequit, nisi cuique a natura competit jus res stabiliter possidendi, ita ut ab earum usu ceteri excludantur. Quod sane nemo inficiabitur, nisi qui aut hominem improvidum et more pecudum viventem approbet, aut ordini et rationi con-

[1] On this very account—that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason—it must be within his right to possess things, not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living things do, but to have and to hold them, in stable and permanent possession ; he must have not only things that perish in the use of them, but those also which, though they have been reduced into use, remain his own for future use.

This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by his faculty of reason matters without number, and linking the future with the present, becoming, furthermore, by taking enlightened forethought, master of his own acts, guides his ways, under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice not only as to matters that regard his present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he needs to lay by provisions for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur ; although satisfied to-day they demand fresh supplies for to-morrow. Nature accordingly owes to man a store-house that shall never fail, affording the daily supply for his daily wants—(*The Great Encycl.*, 'Rerum Novarum,' p. 211).

sonum esse dicat, ut segnis ac dissolutus fruatur bonis, quæ alter industria comparavit.[1]

237. Cor. 1.—Ergo proprietas privata generatim sumpta non est juris naturalis *concedentis* sed *præcipientis*. Ad jus enim naturale præcipiens pertinent omnia, quæ ratio humana, independenter a quacumque lege positiva, dictat facienda ; *atqui*, ut ex dictis sequitur, proprietas privata est hominibus generatim acceptis prorsus necessaria, et proinde jus ad illam ex dictamine naturæ humanæ dicendum est oriri.

Dixi *generatim*, quia inter homines, qui bonis sensibilibus renuntiare velint, ut virtutem sectentur, communitas bonorum non solum possibilis et licita est, sed maxime conveniens, quum ex una parte ad virtutem assequendam paupertas voluntaria haud parum con-

[1] Man has the duty, and, therefore, the right to accomplish those acts which are necessary to attain the end of his being, and work out his destiny ; but in order to do so, man is bound to appropriate many exterior objects ; hence the right of appropriating such objects unquestionably springs from an essential duty. This appropriation must be *permanent ;* for man cannot incessantly continue the struggle for existence ; he has other duties to perform which prevent him from being constantly engaged in the work of appropriation. Should the effect of appropriation be transient, these duties would become impracticable. Besides, nature has compelled him to cease his labour at times. Now, if during these intervals the effect of appropriation should cease, he might lose the means of renewing his labours, and this would defeat the purpose of appropriation.

Nature directs man to give his faculties the fullest development that is practically attainable ; but without permanent dominion, this development would be unattainable. For, should a man devote his attention to the cultivation of science, he would have either to starve or to rely on the charity of other people. The former is evidently against his duty to himself ; the latter would compel him to rely on the kindness of others, and the supply would be both insecure and enslaving. Besides, the contributor must have hoarded up something over and above his actual wants. Over that something he must have a perfect ownership, since he can give it away. But this very hypothesis proves *permanency*, for the savings have remained his, even after he had ceased to need them ; it proves *exclusiveness*, because he could not hoard up first, and give away afterwards, what anyone might have appropriated, while the holder of the property did not actually use it. We have, then, the three characteristics of ownership, permanency, exclusiveness, free disposal—(**Holaind,** *Nat. Law*, etc., p. 211).

ducat, et ex altera parte moderatæ divitiæ in communi habitæ perfectioni virtutis non noceant.

Cor. 2.—Ergo sine injuria nemo potest invitus spoliari re semel legitime acquisita, sive spoliatio fiat clam (*furto*) sive vi aperta (*rapina*) sive alio quocumque modo.

238.—*Dices* 1°.—Si jus proprietatis a natura procederet, numquam licite violari posset; *atqui* quandoque licite violatur, quando nempe aliquis in extrema necessitate constitutus, sibi ex rebus alienis subvenit; *ergo*.

Resp.—Quum homini incumbat officium vitæ suæ servandæ, pariter ei competit jus ea media adhibendi, quæ ad vitam conservandam sunt necessaria. Quando igitur persona in extrema vel quasi extrema necessitate constituitur, et aliter se salvare nequit, jus et officium habet ex rebus alienis sibi occurrentibus assumendi quantum opus est ad se salvandum; in casu enim jus ad vitam ex una parte præstantius est jure ad proprietatem ex altera parte, quum juxta ordinem divinæ providentiæ res inferiores ordinatæ sint ad hoc, ut ex eis subveniatur hominis necessitati. Qua ex causa *S. Th.* docet rerum *usum*, etiam supposito alterius dominio, aliquo modo *communem esse debere* (*cf.* 2, 2, q. 66, aa. 2 et 7).

Dices 2°.—Plures Scholastici, duce S. Thoma, in ea fuerunt opinione jus proprietatis non oriri a lege naturali, sed a jure gentium, ideoque a lege positiva.

Resp.—Quod attinet ad ipsa verba, dicendum est S. Thomam et Scholasticos communiter usque ad XVII. sæc. hæc docuisse, sed per *jus gentium* non intellexerunt pactum primitivum a variis nationibus initum, nec legem civilem, sed *conclusiones ex principiis primis legis naturalis* (ut ait *S. Th.*, 1, 2, q. 95, a. 4), quæ ideo ab omnibus gentibus admittebantur et legibus positivis sanciebantur, quia in his principiis esse contentæ videbantur. Ad legem naturalem stricte dictam ea tantum præcepta pertinere putabant, quæ fluunt ex essentialibus relationibus hominis ad Deum et hominum ad invicem. Jamvero, jus proprietatis non ex his relationibus profluit, sed ex præsenti conditione naturæ humanæ. Si enim (quod certo Deus efficere potuit) homo rebus materialibus non egeret, aut si eis indigeret, semper ad manum essent absque ullo labore vel difficultate, tunc jus proprietatis privatæ inutile esset, nec proinde existeret. Porro, in sensu veterum jus positivum non restringitur ad ea, quæ *libero* hominum pacto vel lege civili constituuntur, ita ut aliunde vim nullam habeant, sed extenditur ad omnia, quæ, tametsi non immediate et absoluta necessitate, tamen mediante dictamine rectæ rationis ex naturæ humanæ conditione sequuntur, quæque ideo a nemine licite repudiari possunt (cf. *Meyer*, v. 2, p. 712).

§ 4. De Primario Proprietatis Titulo.

239. Ut jus proprietatis determinetur in concreto, requiritur aliquod factum, quo res aliqua ad determinatam personam pertineat, ita ut talis persona de illa re licite disponere valeat, ceteris exclusis Et agitur de facto primario, quo res, quæ nullius erat, fit alicujus. Hoc factum est **occupatio,** quæ definitur : *apprehensio rei actualiter nullius domini cum intentione exterius manifestata eam ut propriam possidendi.*

Dicitur 1°. *actualiter* **nullius,** quia, ut res legitime possideatur, vel talis esse debeat, quæ sub alterius dominio numquam fuerit, vel quæ pro derelicto a domino censeatur.

Dicitur 2°. *cum intentione* **exterius manifestata,** quia interna intentio alicujus non sufficit, ut alii rem ut illius agnoscant, sed requiritur, ut ista intentio aliquo actu manifestetur, seu, requiritur, ut res tum moraliter tum realiter apprehendatur.—Hæc duplex apprehensio est quasi forma proprietatis.

Realis apprehensio diversa esse potest et debet pro diversa rerum natura, *v.g.*, sepes circa agrum, translatio rei mobilis in domum propriam. Jamvero, occupatio est titulus proprietatis alios titulos *tempore* et *natura* præcedens, et proinde est primarius : 1°. *tempore*, quia priusquam homines jam ab initio generis humani aliquid possent in usum proprium adhibere, ad alios venditione vel donatione transmittere, illud habere seu occupare debebant ; 2°. *natura*, quia occupationis titulus includitur in omni alio titulo, *v.g.*, in hæreditate, præscriptione, traditione, etc.

Confirmatur 1°. *historia*, quia primi homines, ut viverent, regionem aliquam sive ad agros colendos sive ad greges pascendos occupare debebant ; *atqui* hanc suam existimabant, eo quod eam occupabant.

2°. *experientia ;* adhuc enim sunt multa nullius

domini (*v.g.*, lapides pretiosi, feræ et aves liberæ, pisces), quæ sane inventione vel captione cum animo retinendi omnes ut propria occupantis judicant. Occupatio igitur est titulus proprietatis primarius.

SECTIO SECUNDA.

ETHICA SPECIALIS SOCIALIS.

Hucusque in hac parte consideravimus jura et officia, quæ conveniunt hominibus ut *individuis*, nunc autem agendum est de eorum juribus et officiis, prout in societate coadunantur. Quum enim homines quodam instinctu naturali ad statum socialem ordinentur, fieri nequit, quin ad invicem jura et officia habeant. Vi prædicti instinctus homines ordinantur ad societatem tum domesticam tum civilem. Quare, de hac duplici societate agemus in hac sectione, præmisso capite de societate in genere.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

De Societate humana in genere.

ART. I.

DE SOCIETATIS NOTIONE.

240. *Societas humana* definitur : *conjunctio moralis et constans plurium hominum in aliquem finem honestum conspirantium.*

Dicitur 1°. *conjunctio* **moralis,** quia vinculis moralibus, (*i.e.*, intelligentiæ et voluntatis), nectitur. Quare, a nomine societatis excluditur multitudo hominum nonnisi loco vel tempore unitorum.

Dicitur 2°. *conjunctio* **constans,** tum quia conjunctio plurium ad finem unico fere conatu obtinendum non

dicitur societas, tum quia conjunctio, de qua agitur, mutuis juribus et officiis membrorum firmatur.

Dicitur 3°. in *aliquem* **finem** *honestum conspirantium*, quia finis est conditio necessaria omnis unionis moralis: omnes namque actus sociales ex exigentia finis determinantur, omnia jura et officia societatis ex ejus fine derivantur, ipsa quoque natura uniuscujusque societatis ex ipsius fine cognoscitur. Hic finis debet esse *honestus*, quia conjunctio moralis entium rationalium nonnisi in bono rationali et honesto fundari potest. "Quare, sceleratorum conjuratio aut latronum consortium, quamvis ceteroquin societatis analogiam præ se ferat, immerito societatis nomen ac dignitatem sibi arrogaret" (**Meyer**, v. 1, p. 311).

241. Consectaria.—1°. Ergo societas duplici elemento constituitur: uno *materiali*, quod est ipsa multitudo personarum, quæ in societate adunantur; altero *formali*, quod in *unione morali et constanti collatione virium propter finem* reponendum est. Quum vero hæc unio propter finem efficax esse nequeat nisi sub directione alicujus gubernatoris, recte dici potest elementum formale societatis intrinsecum esse *unionem moralem*, elementum extrinsecum esse **auctoritatem**, quæ est *jus efficaciter dirigendi operationes membrorum societatis in finem honestum*.[1]

[1] Society implies authority as one of its constituent parts. Society, in general, is any union of rational beings for the purpose of pursuing the same end with common effort. Since of rational beings each one is a complete whole, an entire principle of immanent and free activity, subsistent in itself; they cannot be united intrinsically or as to their entity so as to form by their combination new natures or substances. Between them a union is effected only by joining together tendencies or operations towards the obtaining of the same object. This we call moral union, because by it free wills are combined. So, indeed, men coalesce against a common enemy, or for the sake of a profitable commerce, or the promotion of science, or the establishment of useful institutions. However, the great difficulty is, how permanently to unite rational beings as to their free will. May they not, though they once desired the same object, later relax in its pursuit, or though they agree as to the end in view, disagree as to the means to be employed in behalf of its

Quare, auctoritas natura sua est hominibus benefica, quum tendat ad bonum societatis procurandum ; et proinde non natura sed perversa voluntate aliqui auctoritatem odio habent.

2°. Ergo, quum singulæ societates a fine specificentur, tanto præstantior est aliqua societas, quanto præstantior est finis, quem intendit ; et proinde societas, cujus finis est supernaturalis, præstat omnem societatem naturalem.

3°. Ergo, quum tendentia in finem sit societati intrinseca, nulla societas potest esse sibi finis, sed medium ad finem, seu, non est aliquid propter se constitutum, sed propter finem, cui dirigitur.

4°. Ergo societas est subjectum jurium et officiorum, idque tum intrinsece tum extrinsece. *Intrinsece*, i.e., vi relationis inter partes societatis, quia membra nequeunt ad finem societatis, cui addicuntur, pervenire, nisi ex una parte existit auctoritas membra convenienter in finem dirigens, et ex altera parte submissa adimpletio eorum, quæ auctoritate imponuntur. *Extrinsece*, i.e., vi relationis inter diversas societates vel inter societatem et *individua* alterius societatis, quia singulæ societates jus habent, ne ab aliis impediantur

attainment ? With regard to union the free will is quite different from the physical force. The latter, because it acts and is determined with necessity, is of itself unchangeable in its agreement with the elements with which it is combined ; yet the former, just on account of its freedom, can with those with whom it was once united be again at variance. In such a case it is evident that society is dissolved or becomes loose and inefficient. Therefore, to render the union of free beings permanent, strong, and energetic, still another element must enter it besides the sameness of the end that attracts all. There must be a bond which ties them together inseparably, a power which energises and regulates their common tendency. This principle, as it directs rational beings, referring their actions to an end, must belong to the moral and intellectual order, and as it exercises a rule over others, necessarily implies superiority. We hence call it *authority*. Authority, therefore, is, in any society, the source of unity, the formal constituent, the life-giving principle ; it is for the members of a moral union what the head is for the body —(**Ming,** *Amer. Cath. Quarterly*, v. 7, n. 28.)

in fine suo assequendo ; et proinde officiis ad invicem onerantur. Et quum jura et officia sint personæ propria, societas dicitur persona *moralis*. Hinc etiam fit, ut societas sit meriti et demeriti capax.

ART. II.

DE SOCIETATIS DIVISIONE.

242. Societas vario modo dividitur. Sic—

1°. *Ratione materiæ* dividitur in *simplicem*, cujus membra immediata sunt personæ physicæ (*v.g.*, societas conjugalis) ; et *compositam*, cujus membra immediata sunt personæ morales seu societates minores jam constitutæ (*v.g.*, civitas).

2°. *Ratione originis* dividitur in *naturalem*, quæ secundum speciem considerata naturali necessitate oritur, (*v.g.*, societas domestica) ; et *liberam*, quæ non solum in individuo sed etiam secundum speciem a libera voluntate pendet (*v.g.*, societas industrialis).

3°. *Ratione finis* dividitur in perfectam et imperfectam. Societas *perfecta* est illa, quæ in seipsa habet media necessaria ad suum finem assequendum, quæque proinde non est ordinata ad aliam societatem, in qua suam perfectionem obtineat. Cujusmodi sunt Ecclesia et Status civilis.[1] Societas *imperfecta* est pars alterius societatis, cujus ope indiget, ut suam perfectionem consequatur. Sic, imperfecta est societas domestica, quia, prout tendit in bonum temporale, debet societate civili compleri ; prout habet finem religiosum, debet in societate religiosa consummari.

[1] A perfect community is self-sufficient, *αὐτάρκης*. It is not referred to any other community as a part to the whole. It takes the law from no other : it is a community with sovereignty inherent somewhere within itself. It supplies, or is capable of supplying, all its own needs. Were the rest of mankind to perish, it would still subsist, and flourish in some sort—(**Rickaby**, *Political and Moral Essays*, p. 1).

243. Ut hæ divisiones melius intelligantur, recolere oportet *triplex esse stadium vitæ humanæ*, secundum quod tripartita Ethicæ specialis divisio in *monasticam* seu solitariam, *œconomicam* seu domesticam, *politicam* seu civilem nonnumquam instituitur. Primum stadium est, in quo quisque tamquam persona individua spectari potest, et qua talis vivit vitam non solum physicam sed etiam moralem constantem actibus potissimum internis intellectus et voluntatis.

Secundum est quædam vita humana privata quidem, sed tamen socialis quasi in primo gradu ; quippe quæ consistit in communicatione in actibus quotidianis vitæ necessariis, ut sunt cibum parare et hujusmodi, ad quos actus exercendos singuli sibi non sufficiunt. Hæc vita socialis a vita individuali in eo differt, quod consistit imprimis in actibus externis, quibus actus intellectus et voluntatis mutuo manifestantur.

Tertium stadium constituit perfectam vitæ humanæ sufficientiam. Nam, quum impossibile sit unamquamque familiam omnia sibi necessaria procurare, opus est ad huic necessitati subveniendum, ut plures familiæ conveniant et vicum constituant. Quæ tamen et ipsæ, ut patet, impares sunt ad constanter et abundanter præstandum omnia, quorum hæ familiæ indigent. Quare, opus est collectione vicorum, qua demum civitas seu respublica perficitur ; quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam perfecta societas naturalis continens omne bonum humanum sociale.[1]

[1] Let us trace out how many people have co-operated in the making of the single loaf of bread we eat for breakfast. We would at once admit our indebtedness to the baker who made and baked the loaf ; to the miller who ground the wheat into flour ; and to the farmer who raised the grain. But the baker used an oven and pans. Now ovens and pans are not desired by us for their own sake ; they are secondary wants. The labour expended in making them is labour expended in the production of bread. So the bricklayer, and, further back, the brickmaker and the maker of the pans, are all to be enumerated in the list of those whose labour made that loaf of bread for us.

But the pans themselves were made in a large factory, where

244. Unde colligitur *familiam* et *civitatem*, esse societates naturales, illam imperfectam, hanc perfectam, utramque vero necessariam, utramque religiosam, sed ita, ut institutio moralis et cultus religiosus privatus ad familiam, regimen morum et cultus publicus ad rempublicam pertineant.

Deinde, omnes homines simul in hac vita degentes constituunt quamdam magnam familiam, cujus caput est Deus eam lege naturali moderans, cujus membra ad communem finem ultimum conspirare tenentur et mutuis juribus et officiis devinciuntur.

Ex dictis sequitur societatem esse homini naturalem, et erroneam esse sententiam eorum, qui censent homines quemdam statum originarium a natura nactos esse, in quo soli vagarentur, et nonnisi ad se invicem impugnandos congrederentur.[1]

there was much machinery; and in the making of each pan many men co-operated, beginning with the fireman who shovelled coal into the furnaces, and on up to the manager of the works. Each of these, numbering in all dozens, probably, was, in part, maker of the pan; and as the pan was only made for the purpose of baking the bread, each of these was a factor in the making of that loaf.

Again, the machinery in the pan factory, from engine and boiler, on through the whole list, was only made for the purpose of making the pan in which to bake the loaf of bread. And so the labour of many men in the different factories that made the machinery, that was used in the factory that made the pans, was labour expended in the making of bread.

The pedigree of that loaf of bread is already growing bewildering; but we are only at the beginning. In the mill in which the wheat was ground to flour there were numbers of men, all of whom took part in the flour-making, and who thus added themselves to the list of those whose labour went to the making of our loaf of bread.

Again, there are in the background other groups of men who made the boiler, engines, and machinery in the flouring mill. Then, too, the farmer who raised the wheat used ploughs and harrows and reapers and threshers, and each of these was made in factories using other machinery; and so the series runs on and on, until the list of those who co-operated in the planting, raising, and harvesting of that wheat becomes, in turn, bewildering. And all these have to be added to the already long list of those who co-operated in the making of the loaf of bread—(**Neill**, *Cath. Univ. Bulletin*, v. 6. p. 148).

[1] Everything about man stamps him as a social being. So true is this, that without society man could not be said to be leading

CAPUT SECUNDUM.

De Societate domestica.

245. Societas domestica seu familia est societas composita ex tribus societatibus simplicibus, quæ sunt societas conjugalis seu matrimonium, societas parentalis, societas herilis. Familia (inquit **Suarez,** *De Leg.*, l. 3, c. 1, n. 3) " inchoatur ex societate maris et feminæ (*societas conjugalis*), sine qua non posset genus humanum propagari aut conservari. Ex conjunctione hac proxime sequitur societas filiorum cum parentibus (*societas parentalis*), quia prior conjunctio ad filiorum educationem ordinatur. . . . His autem accedit conjunctio aliqua servitutis seu famulatus et dominii (*societas herilis*), quia moraliter loquendo indigent homines adjutorio et ministerio aliorum hominum."[1]

a truly human life at all. It is not merely that he could not progress, or that the improvements of civilisation could not be achieved by man living as a detached individual Without intercourse with his fellows half a man's natural faculties should remain unused, half his natural aspirations should be without possible realisation. Knowledge could not be acquired nor intelligence developed ; the gift of speech, too, that great prerogative of man, the most manifest evidence of his intelligence, could serve no purpose ; the very feelings that prompt the use of speech would be stifled. The universality of society is really nothing else than the effect of its natural necessity —(**Kelleher,** *Private Ownership*, p. 60).

[1] According to Christian principles, there was to be no distinction between bond and free ; and I remember to have seen that idea beautifully brought out in the letters of Sir Thomas More, in which when away from home, he used to ask about the servants as well as about his own children. According to his enlightened Catholic idea they were all members of his family. In English the word *family* now excludes the servants ; whilst in Spanish and Italian it includes the servants, who are considered to be members of the family, as they were in England in Catholic times. Thus the Catholic doctrine of the equality and brotherhood of man is enshrined in the language of Catholic nations, living at least as a memorial of the consistent conduct of our fathers. That instinct is alive in Catholic Ireland to-day, unless where and in so far as we have become Anglicised—(**O'Riordan,** *Catholicism and Progress*, p. 85).

ART. I.

DE NATURA SOCIETATIS CONJUGALIS.

246. THESIS XIX.—Matrimonium est honestum et humanæ naturæ consentaneum, non ita tamen, ut singulis sit obligatorium.

Stat. Quæst.—*Matrimonium* (*matris munus*, quia munus concipiendi et nutriendi prolem ad matrem potissimum spectat, sicut munus patris, quod potissimum in bonis materialibus familiæ procurandis consistit, dicitur *patrimonium*) definitur : *stabilis et legitima viri et mulieris unio ad prolem procreandam et educandam.*

Dicitur 1°. *unio* **stabilis,** quia talis unio requiritur ad debitam liberorum educationem, quæ longum tempus requirit.

Dicitur 2°. *legitima,* quia prædicta unio debet esse (in ordine naturali) legi naturali conformis, et proinde nequit esse inter personas jure naturæ interdictas.

Dicitur 3°. *ad prolem procreandam et educandam,* quia finis *primarius,* ad quem matrimonium natura sua ordinatur, est prolis generatio et educatio. Finis *secundarius* est mutuum inter conjuges vitæ subsidium tum materiale tum spirituale.

Matrimonium sic expositum sumitur *passive* seu in *facto esse ; active* vero seu *in fieri* consistit in *contractu* libere inito inter virum et mulierem ad finem descriptum.

Status seu modus vivendi eorum, qui a matrimonio abstinent propter quodcumque motivum honestum dicitur *cœlibatus ;* sensu vero strictiori, cœlibatus est status eorum, qui a matrimonio abstinent, *ut Dei servitio se mancipent.*

247. Prob. Thesis. Pars 1ª (. . . *est honestum.* . . .) **Arg.**—Ille status honestus et naturæ humanæ consentaneus dicendus est, qui inclinationi homini naturaliter inditæ et Dei ordinationi respondet. *Atqui* ita se habet

matrimonium, tum quia ad ipsum ineundum Deus, naturæ auctor, propensionem homini indidit, tum quia nonnisi per ipsum satis provisum est propagationi et permansioni generis humani ; liberi enim in principio et per multos annos indigent cura parentali, nec secus vivere vel convenienter educari possunt.

Brevius : Matrimonium ordinatur ad bonum commune, quod est propagatio generis humani ; *atqui* bonum commune, utpote a Deo intentum, est honestum et naturæ humanæ consentaneum ; *ergo.*

248. Pars 2ª (. . . *non singulis obligatorium*). **Arg.**— Matrimonium ideo singulis esset obligatorium, aut quia matrimonium ad singulorum perfectionem pertineret, aut quia secus propagatio generis humani periclitaretur, aut quia vita cælebs esset impossibilis ; *atqui* nulla harum rationum valet. *Non prima,* quia matrimonium non pertinet ad perfectionem individuorum, sed speciei, quum ad speciem propagandam instituatur. " Natura (inquit **S. Th.**) inclinat ad aliquid dupliciter : uno modo sicut ad id, quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius (*v.g.*, ad cibum) et talis inclinatio quemlibet obligat . . . ; alio modo inclinat ad aliquid, quod est necessarium ad perfectionem multitudinis ; et quum multa sint hujusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud, ex tali inclinatione non obligatur *quilibet* homo per modum præcepti ; alias quilibet homo obligaretur ad agriculturam et ædificationem et ad hujusmodi officia, quæ sunt necessaria communitati humanæ " (*Suppl.*, q. 41, a. 2).

Non altera, quia propagatio generis humani non eo periclitatur, quod singuli matrimonium non ineunt ; fieri enim nequit, ut maxima pars hominum naturali propensioni matrimonium ineundi non obsecundet, et proinde ut non semper sufficiens sit procreatio generis humani, licet ad eam procurandam singuli non obligentur.

Non tertia, quia vitam cælibem esse impossibilem non modo non probatur, sed omnis experientia contrarium probat, quidquid dicant osores status cælibatus. Nec desunt media naturalia et supernaturalia ad talem vitam secure servandam.

249. Præterea, vita cælebs, si causa virtutis suscipitur, statu matrimoniali perfectior est et homini ut rationali magis consona. Sic enim homo naturam inferiorem, quam cum brutis animalibus habet communem, subjicit naturæ superiori, ut hæc liberius et perfectius evolvatur, quum a curis temporalibus se abstrahendo expeditiorem se reddat ad veritatis contemplationi vacandum, ad virtutes colendas, ad opera caritatis tum corporalia tum spiritualia exercenda.

ART II.

DE MATRIMONII PROPRIETATIBUS.

250. Matrimonii proprietates sunt *unitas* (seu *monogamia,* cui opponitur *polygamia simultanea*) et *indissolubilitas* (cui adversatur *divortium*). Nullum est dubium, quin matrimonio, ut est Sacramentum, unitas et indissolubilitas conveniant—id enim fides docet,—quæritur vero utrum hæ proprietates ei conveniant, inspecta lege naturali, seu, prout apud infideles existit.

§1. De Unitate Matrimonii.

251. THESIS XX.—Polyandria est absolute contra naturam, polygynia est fini matrimonii minus conformis, ideoque per se illicita.

Stat. Quæst.—Polygamia vi nominis significat pluralitatem quoad vinculum matrimoniale. *Simultanea* dicitur, si, priore vinculo nondum dissoluto, aliæ nuptiæ contrahuntur. Quod contingit, *a*) si una mulier

plures simul habeat viros (*Polyandria*), *b*) si unus vir plures simul habeat uxores (*Polygynia*).

252. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (*polyandria . . .*). **Arg.**— Polyandria, præterquam quod, ut physiologi et medici testantur, persæpe impedit prolis procreationem, in incerto relinqueret quisnam esset pater prolis susceptæ, ex quo sequeretur, ut nulli ex viris imponi posset officium educationem physicam et moralem prolis curandi. *Atqui* educatio prolis pertinet ad finem primarium matrimonii a naturæ auctore intentum ; *ergo*.[1]

Neve dicas : Aliquando accidit, ut liberi nascuntur post obitum patris ; *quia* hoc ab omnibus existimatur et vere est magna calamitas. Quid igitur sentiendum est de statu rerum, in quo liberi certo nascerentur absque patre, qui eos agnosceret ?

253. PARS 2ª (*polygynia non absolute . . ., sed minus conformis . . .*). **Arg.**—*a*) Non est absolute contra naturam, quia per eam nec procreatio nec educatio prolis omnino impeditur, quum proles certos parentes habeat, nec proinde privetur affectu et cura parentali. *b*) Est fini secundario matrimonii minus conformis, quia matrimonium est societas, quæ supponit mutuam conjugum amicitiam eamque natura sua strictissimam et ex utraque parte æqualem ; *atqui* talis amicitia haberi nequit pluralitate uxorum admissa, tum quia vir, secus ac mulieres, suum amorem inter plures dividere deberet, tum quia graves dissensiones non possent non oriri ex tali pluralitate, sive propter zelotypiam mulierum sive propter prolem, quum contingeret, ut vir liberos unius

[1] " Unam uxorem habere plures viros, est contra prima præcepta legis naturæ, eo quod per hoc, quantum ad aliquid totaliter tollitur, et quantum ad aliquid impeditur bonum prolis, quod est principalis finis matrimonii. In bono enim prolis intelligitur non solum procreatio, sed etiam educatio. Ipsa procreatio, etsi non totaliter tollatur, tamen multum impeditur. . . . Sed educatio totaliter tollitur, quia ex hoc quod una mulier plures maritos haberet, sequeretur incertitudo prolis respectu cujus curæ necessaria est in educando " —(**S. Th.**, 4° *Dist.* 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 8).

præ liberis reliquarum affectu et opere diligeret, tum denique quia, æqualitate inter virum et mulierem sublata, mulier desineret esse viri socia et in quamdam servitutem reduceretur, id quod reapse fit ubicumque polygynia viget.[1]

254. Cor.—Ergo polygynia non est simpliciter contra finem primarium matrimonii, quum prolis procreationem et educationem non impediat; sed contra jus æqualitatis mulieris cum viro. Potest autem Deus, ut supremus dominus, auferre illud jus æqualitatis, quod uxori secundum exigentiam contractus matrimonialis convenit (cf. p. 130).

§ 2. De Matrimonii Indissolubilitate.

255. THESIS XXI.—Natura contractus matrimonialis ejus indissolubilitatem postulat, et ideo divortium stricte dictum illicitum est.

Stat. Quæst.—Philosophi non catholici communiter docent licere quasdam ob causas (*v.g.*, ob adulterium) vinculum matrimoniale solvere. Quæritur igitur, utrum matrimonium, non tantum ut est Sacramentum, sed etiam ut est *contractus naturalis*, sit indissolubile. Hoc dicendum esse recta ratio probat, ideoque divortium stricte dictum seu *separationem conjugum legitimorum cum facultate transeundi ad alias nuptias* esse legi naturali contrarium et proinde illicitum.

[1] The reason why a wife is not allowed more than one husband at a time is because otherwise paternity would be uncertain. If, then, while the wife has one husband only, the husband had more than one wife, there will not be a friendship of equality on both sides, friendship consisting in a certain equality. There will not be the friendship of a free man with a free woman, but a sort of friendship of a slave with her master. The husband might well be allowed a plurality of wives, if the understanding were allowable, that the friendship of each with him was not to be that of a free woman with a free man but of a slave with her master. And this is borne out by experience: for among men that keep many wives the wives are counted as menials—(**S. Th.**, *God and His Creatures*, B. 3, c. 124).

256. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Indissolubilitas matrimonii exigitur *a*) fine tum primario tum secundario matrimonii, *b*) naturalibus liberorum ad parentes officiis, *c*) bono communi societatis ; *ergo*.

Prob. antec. a) Indissolubilitas exigitur fine primario et secundario matrimonii, quia physica et moralis educatio prolis est officium individuum et communis utriusque parentis ; quod sane officium longum tempus perdurat, plurimasque solicitudines inducit etiam pro unius filii educatione. Quodsi, ut ordinarie contingit, alii post alios nascuntur filii, quorum educatio, sicut serius inchoatur, serius, et parentibus jam senescentibus, completur, futurum erit, ut, cessante officio educandi liberos, incipiat in ipsis speciale officium mutui auxilii et solatii præbendi, senectute ingruente. *Atqui* talis cooperatio deesset, nisi utrique conjugi persuasum esset suam sortem cum bono liberorum et alterius conjugis fore ad finem vitæ connexam, quam aliter potius suum privatum commodum quam bonum commune familiæ uterque quæreret.

b) *Naturalibus liberorum officiis ;* nam sicut uterque parens concurrit ad liberorum existentiam et educationem (quæ nimirum sunt fundamenta officiorum, quibus liberi erga parentes obstringuntur), ita uterque parens in liberorum amore et obsequio naturaliter unitur ; *atqui,* dissoluto vinculo matrimoniali, affectus et obsequium liberorum in diversas partes traherentur, et vix fieri posset, quin liberi, nedum officia sua naturalia erga parentes implerent, alterutrum parentum et se invicem odio haberent ; et proinde sicut natura officia erga parentes imponit, ita natura dissolutionem vinculi matrimonialis prohibet.

c) *Bono communi societatis,* quia, teste experientia, ubicumque obtinet lex hanc dissolutionem legitimam proclamans, ibi viget magna corruptio morum, quæ procul dubio a lege naturali manare nequit. Nec

solum moralitas privata et publica sic impetitur, sed etiam stabilis ordo societatis, qui a firmitate et non interrupta successione familiarum plurimum dependet ; necnon publica tranquillitas, quum, ut consequens dissolutionis matrimonialis, non solum inter conjuges separatos, sed etiam inter eorum parentes, consanguineos et amicos lites hostilitatesque interminabiles sponte oriantur.[1]

[1] It is hardly possible to describe how great are the evils that flow from divorce. Matrimonial contracts are by it made variable ; mutual kindness is weakened ; deplorable inducements to unfaithfulness are supplied ; harm is done to the education and training of children ; occasion is afforded for the breaking-up of homes ; the seeds of dissension are sown among families ; the dignity of womanhood is lessened and brought low. . . . Since, then, nothing has such power to lay waste families and destroy the mainstay of kingdoms as the corruption of morals, it is easily seen that divorces are in the highest degree hostile to the prosperity of families and States, springing as they do from the depraved morals of the people, and, as experience shows us, opening out a way to every kind of evil-doing in public alike and in private life. Further still, . . . divorce once being tolerated, there will be no restraint powerful enough to keep it within the bounds marked out or presurmised. Great indeed is the force of example, and even greater still the might of passion. With such incitements it must needs follow that the eagerness for divorce, daily spreading by devious ways, will seize on the minds of many, like a virulent contagious disease, or like a flood of water bursting through every barrier. These are truths that doubtlessly are all clear in themselves ; but they will become clearer yet if we call to mind the teaching of experience. So soon as the road to divorce began to be made smooth by law, at once quarrels, jealousies, and judicial separations largely increased ; and such shamelessness of life followed, that men who had been in favour of these divorces repented of what they had done, and feared that, if they did not carefully seek a remedy by repealing the law, the State itself might come to ruin.

The Romans of old are said to have shrunk with horror from the first examples of divorce, but ere long all sense of decency was blunted in the soul ; the meagre restraint of passion died out, and the marriage vow was so often broken that what some writers have affirmed would seem to be true—namely, women used to reckon years not by the changes of consuls, but of their husbands.

In like manner, at the beginning, Protestants allowed legalized divorces in certain although but few cases, and yet from the affinity of circumstance of like kind, the number of divorces increased to such extent in Germany, America, and elsewhere, that all wise thinkers deplored the boundless corruption of morals, and judged the recklessness of the law to be simply intolerable.

Even in Catholic States the like evil existed. For, whenever at any time divorce was introduced . . . many lent their minds to contrive all kinds of fraud and device, and by accusations of cruelty,

257. Schol. 1.—Nihil vetat, quominus matrimonium divina auctoritate dissolvatur, quum supremo Dei dominio omnia jura creaturarum subdantur. Quare, sicut antiquis Patriarchis polygynia fuit, propter bonum religionis, concessa, ita propter bonum religionis vinculum matrimoniale dissolvi potest. Quid possit Ecclesia hac de re vide apud Theologos.

Schol. 2.—Hic quæri potest utrum matrimonium, ut viget inter infideles, subjaceat potestati civili, non solum in suis effectibus civilibus, sed etiam in se, ita ut potestas civilis impedimenta dirimentia et impedientia statuere possit. Alii negant hanc potestatem auctoritati civili competere. Alii vero affirmant, sive quia in societate, in qua non existit potestas religiosa a civili distincta, potestatis civilis est ordinare res sacras (quale est matrimonium naturale),[1] non ut civilis est, sed ut est simul religiosa ; sive quia quum desit in tali societate potestas proprie religiosa, jus ordinandi contractum matrimoniale per accidens et ratione necessitatis devolvitur ad auctoritatem, quæ sola ibi obtinet, *i.e.*, ad civilem.

258. Obj. 1.—Ex indissolubilitate matrimonii sæpe oriuntur mala gravissima ; *ergo* ejus dissolubilitas est aliquid bonum.

Resp.—*Dist. antec.* . . . Sæpe per accidens oriuntur mala pro individuis gravissima, quæ tamen minora sunt malis, quæ societati ex matrimonii solutione venirent, *conc.* hæc mala ex ipsa matrimonii natura oriuntur, *neg.* Ultro fatemur, indissolubilitate matrimonii admissa, plura mala quandoque haberi ; qui vero ob hanc causam dissolubilitatem defenderet, rem sub uno aspectu eoque rectæ rationi

violence, and adultery, to feign grounds for the dissolution of the matrimonial bond. . . .

Thus we see most clearly how foolish and senseless it is to expect any public good from divorce, when, on the contrary, it tends to the certain destruction of society—(*The Great Encycl.* p. 74. 'Arcanum').

[1] Marriage has God for its Author, and was from the beginning a kind of foreshadowing of the Incarnation of His Son ; and, therefore, there abides in it something holy and religious ; not extraneous but innate. . . . Innocent III. affirmed not falsely nor rashly that a certain sacredness of marriage rite existed ever among the faithful and unbelievers—(*The Great Encycl.* p. 68).

minus consono respiceret. Qui enim rem bene consideraret, procul dubio videret mala, quæ ex dissolubilitate matrimonii profluunt intrinseca esse et inevitabilia, ac conjuges, prolem, propinquos, ipsamque societatem simul afficere; mala vero, quæ ex ejus indissolubilitate enascuntur, plerumque sunt ex pravis passionibus vel discordiis transitoriis aliisve hujusmodi causis, quæ constanti animo superari possunt. Quodsi mutuus convictus plane impossibilis evadit, adest remedium in divortio imperfecto, quin dissolvatur vinculum matrimoniale.

Obj. 2.—Matrimonium fit per consensum contrahentium; *atqui* per quascumque causas res nascitur, per easdem solvitur; *ergo.*

Resp.—*Dist. maj.* . . . quoad *contractum, conc.;* quoad *vinculum* seu statum permanentem ex illo contractu provenientem, *neg.* In matrimonio aliud est *actus contrahendi*, qui semel positus cessat; aliud autem est *effectus*, i.e., vinculum seu status permanens ex libero contrahentium consensu promanans. Jamvero, contractus matrimonialis seu matrimonium *in fieri*, sicut omnis alius contractus dependet a consensu contrahentium, nullatenus vero in *facto esse* seu quoad vinculum, quum indissolubilitas sit proprietas necessaria ex ipsa matrimonii natura resultans. Quodsi contrahentes apponerent conditionem se non velle inire matrimonium indissolubile contractus esset nullus.

ART. III.

DE SOCIETATE PATERNA.

259. THESIS XXII.—Inter parentes et liberos existit vera societas ab ipsa natura immediate constituta.

Stat. Quæst.—*Societas paterna* est *illa, quæ existit inter parentes et prolem ad hanc nutriendam et educandam.* Talem societatem esse naturalem Socialistæ negant, qui ideo contendunt liberos esse civili auctoritati immediate subjectos, cujus proinde est eorum curam et educationem suscipere.[1]

[1] The basis upon which the indissolubility of marriage, and consequently the stability of the family, chiefly rests is the education of the children. It is chiefly for this purpose that the life-long union of man and wife is necessary; for such a life-long union is generally required for the suitable education of their offspring. Therefore whoever wrests the education of their children from the hands of parents,

Quum nulla societas existere possit sine auctoritate, qua ad suum finem dirigatur, necesse est, ut detur *auctoritas paterna*, quæ, nimirum, consistit in *complexu jurium et officiorum parentum ad liberos debite instituendos.*

Hæc auctoritas dicitur *paterna*, quia imprimis competit *patri*, capiti naturali totius familiæ, deinde vero matri ; parentibus vero deficientibus, auctoritas transit ad avum, fratrem natu majorem, tutorem, etc.

Auctoritas paterna se extendit ad vitam physicam, intellectualem, moralem ; id quod innuitur in ultimis definitionis verbis.

260. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Existit vera societas paterna ab ipsa natura immediate oriens, si ex una parte liberi, ut nutriantur et educentur, auxilii alieni indigent, et si ex altera parte parentes natura designantur ad liberos nutriendos et educandos ; sic enim existit obligatio naturalis plurium ad eundem finem tendendi, quæ est societatis definitio. *Atqui* ita res se habet, *a*) quia liberi nascuntur ex omni parte alieni auxilii et quidem diuturni indigentes, nec quidquam sibi providere possunt, et proinde sapientissimi naturæ auctoris et provisoris est certas personas ad eos nutriendum et educandum destinare et obligare ; hoc enim officium, utpote molestum et diuturnum, si nullis in individuo personis impositum esset, ab omnibus negligeretur, et quidem cum celeri totius generis humani interitu. *b*) Personas ad hoc officio fungendum a natura destinatas esse parentes probatur tum ex naturali et intenso amore, qui inest parentibus erga prolem, tum ex naturali et

and makes it a function of the State, thereby undermines the lowest foundation of the family. But socialism puts education and instruction altogether in the hands of the commonwealth. The Gotha platform demands : " Universal and equal education of the people by the State," . . . while the American Socialist Party platform advocates " education of all children up to the age of eighteen years, and *state and municipal aid for books, clothing, and food* "—(**Cathrein,** *Socialism,* p. 344).

intima causalitatis relatione, quæ eos cum prole conjungit. Quod sane confirmatur universali populorum usu, et analogia animalium, quæ, ut videmus, suam prolem amant et conservant.

Dices : Parentes agunt ad prolem nutriendam et educandam, proles vero potius patitur quam agit ; *ergo* nulla habetur inter parentes et prolem conspiratio actionum, nec proinde societas.

Resp. . . . patitur secundum actionem parentum, et proinde potentiæ activæ et passivæ exercentur in ordine ad unum finem, et mox ipsa proles *agit* secundum parentum directionem. Adsunt igitur notæ essentiales societatis.

261. Schol. 1.—Officia parentum in liberos, hæc fere sunt : *a*) *eos amare* amore sincero, spirituali, æquali erga omnes ; *b*) *eos alere*, eis nimirum præbendo, quæ victui et vestitui sunt necessaria, et eis diligenter thesaurizando, ut vitæ eorum futuræ satis provideatur ; *c*) *eos educare intellectualiter*, instruendo in aliqua arte, scientia vel industria honesta, qua sibi prospicere et statum suæ conditioni accommodatum occupare possint ; *d*) *eos educare moraliter*, docendo quæ ad virtutis exercitium requirantur, eosque verbo suoque exemplo ad virtutem incitando. Quam educationem moralem jam a teneris annis incipere debent, quia affectus, qui ineunte ætate animo inseruntur et usque ad ætatem virilem cura paterna excoluntur, adeo profunde radicantur, ut postea vix evelli possint.[1]

[1] Education begins even with the birth of the child. All sages, all men of experience, all masters of Ethics, the pagans themselves, have proclaimed it. . . . Be not deceived ; the training of this early age is the foundation, the base of all that his later development in more advanced education, and even his application during the whole course of his life, will receive. In everything, all depends on the principles—this is a trite saying, because so true—but it is especially with respect to education that we must take care to adhere to the best principles, to lay them down forcibly from the beginning, and follow them perseveringly. Behold the terms in which the great Bossuet remarks the decisive importance of so commencing : " If one occupies himself with

262. Quare, 1°. non licet parentibus liberos suos exponere seu eos relinquere, ut pereant, sive id fiat causa paupertatis sive causa alicujus defectus physici vel intellectualis liberorum. Simul enim atque anima corpori unitur, habetur vera persona humana jura personalitatis possidens et officia parentalia exigens.

2°. Possunt et debent parentes liberos desides moderate et opportune corrigere etiam correctione et castigatione corporali, si verba et monitiones non profecerint, ut media efficacia in opere educationis. Dixi *moderate*, quia graviores pœnæ ad bonam familiæ gubernationem non requiruntur, nec cum instinctu naturali benevolentiæ parentum erga liberos congruunt. Potest vero parens filium rebellum et indomitum, qui per leniora media ad meliorem frugem revocari nequeat, domo expellere et hæreditate privare.

3°. Absurde et impie quidam post Rousseau asserunt non prius de Deo et religione sermonem esse debere

his children in good time, paternal influence and good precepts can then accomplish much. On the contrary, if false and fatal maxims are once permitted to enter their minds, the tyranny of habit becomes so invincible in them that there is no remedy which can cure the evil. To prevent it becoming incurable, it must be anticipated." . . . The sages of antiquity spoke in the same manner: "You are not ignorant" said Plato, "that in everything the beginning is the great affair, especially with respect to young and tender beings; it is then they may be moulded, and receive the imprint which you wish to give them." . . . Plutarch, in a treatise on the education of children, expresses himself with still more force than Plato: "It is necessary to use every care in order to make a good choice of the nurses entrusted with their early education. In a word, if it be necessary to mould the limbs of children immediately after their birth, that they may not contract any natural defect *we cannot too soon form also their disposition and their manners.*" The mind of a child is a flexible paste, which receives without resistance every form that we wish to give it—once strengthened by age, it bends with difficulty. Seals impress themselves quickly on wax; in the same manner the precepts we give to these still tender minds easily become imprinted, and leave deep traces there. . . . I have already said the cares given to these early years are the commencement of all that his application or development will receive later on. Everything, then, requires the most serious attention. Physical education, intellectual education, moral education, and religious education—nothing should be abandoned to chance—nothing should be done or tried at random—(**Dupanloup,** *The Child*, p. 61).

apud juvenes, quam ipsi ætatem adultam consecuti de Dei existentia agnoscenda et religione aliqua amplectenda deliberare possint sine præjudiciis. "Igitur pueri, si credamus Rousseau, sine ulla disciplina morali relinquendi sunt, ut bestiales sint, ne fiant præjudicati" (*Zigliara*, p. 208).

4°. Quum potestas paterna non ordinetur nisi in bonum physicum, morale, intellectuale liberorum, non licet parentibus *a*) eos cogere ad falsam religionem amplectendam, vel a vera religione profitenda et exercenda prohibere ; *b*) eos inducere ad eligendum statum vitæ, quem liberi eligere nolunt. Unde, ex una parte non possunt eos compellere ad statum conjugalem ineundum, et multo minus ad matrimonium cum determinata persona contrahendum ; nec ex altera parte possunt objicere, si matrimonium inire volunt, dummodo nuptiæ, quas contrahere proponunt, sint honestæ atque eorum conditioni accommodatæ. Similiter nequeunt prohibere, quominus liberi nomen cuidam familiæ religiosæ dent, nisi in casu, quo ipsi ope illorum graviter indigent. Ordinarie tamen tenentur liberi circa status vitæ electionem consilium parentum quærere.

5°. Potestas paterna, quum eo spectet, ut liberorum inopiæ et impotentiæ suppleatur, maturescentibus liberorum ætate et discretione, gradatim decrescit, donec tandem ad eas restringitur actiones, quæ externum regimen familiæ respiciunt.[1]

[1] The right of the parent over his child is, of course, commensurate with his duties. If he be under an obligation to educate his child in such manner as he supposes will most conduce to the child's happiness and the welfare of society, he has from necessity the right to control the child in everything necessary to the fulfilment of this obligation, and that he exert it with the intention for which it was conferred. While he discharges his parental duties within these limits, he is, by the law of God, exempt from interference both from the individual and from society. . . .

In infancy, the control of the parent over the child is absolute ; that is, it is exercised without any respect whatever to the wishes of

6°. Graviter jus naturale lædit Status civilis, qui impedit parentes, quominus liberos suos, sive per se-ipsos sive per magistros pro suo arbitrio electos, educent ; vel eos compellit, ut liberos ad scholas sive privatas sive publicas mittant ; quia parentes gignunt individuum humanum, cujus vires intellectuales et morales, non minus quam vires physicæ, evolvi debent, et proinde sicut parentum est curæ habere prolis perfectionem physicam, ita quoque ipsorum est curæ habere ejus perfectionem intellectualem et moralem. Unde, a parentibus habemus non solum *esse* et *nutrimentum* sed etiam *disciplinam*.[1]

the child. When the child has arrived at a majority, and has assumed the responsibility of its conduct, both the responsibility and the right of the parent cease altogether. The time of majority is fixed in most civilized nations by statute. In Great Britain and in the United States, an individual becomes of age at his twenty-first year. The law, therefore, settles the rights and obligations of the parties, so far as civil society is concerned, but does not pretend to decide upon the moral relations of the parties.

As the rights and duties of the parent at one period are absolute, and at another cease altogether, it is reasonable to infer that the control of the parent should be exercised on more and more liberal principles, that a wider and wider discretion should be allowed to the child and his feelings and predilections should be more and more consulted, as he grows older ; so that when he comes to act for himself, he may have become prepared for the responsibility which he assumes, by as extensive an experience as the nature of the case admits—(**Wayland,** *Moral Science*, p. 309).

[1] Two systems are at this time in conflict. On one side is the system of secular education. . . : (1) That education primarily and properly belongs to the State. (2) That the schools belong to the State. (3) That the children belong to the State. (4) That the State has no religion. (5) That the formation of the national character belongs to the State. (6) That the formation of the teachers of the people belongs to the State. (7) That no one shall teach the people except by patent of the State. In a word, we are being stealthily drawn into a pass where these principles are foregone conclusions already embodied in the law of the land, and irresistible in their future application.

On the other side is the traditional Christian teaching, which rests upon the following principles :—(1) That the children of a Christian people have a right by Divine law to Christian education. (2) That Christian parents have a two-fold right and duty, both natural and supernatural, to guard this inheritance of their children. (3) That Christian children are in no sense the children of a State that has no religion. (4) That their teaching and training, or formation as Christians, is of higher moment than all secular instruction, and may

263. Schol. 2.—Officia liberorum erga parentes revocari possunt ad *a) amorem* sincerum simul cum timore filiali, *b) obedientiam* in his omnibus, quæ ad educationem tum moralem tum intellectualem pertinent, *c) reverentiam* internam et externam cavendo ab omni actu, quo rationabiliter offendi possint, *d) auxilium*, eis subveniendo tempore infirmitatis, indigentiæ, senectutis. Et ad hæc officia tenentur, quamvis parentes sint pravi, et paternitatis officia nullatenus impleant, quum natura, in qua officium filiale fundatur, eadem sit in parentibus improbis ac in bonis.[1]

Parentes magistris, quibus tradunt filios educandos, suam auctoritatem communicant; discipuli itaque suis magistris amorem, reverentiam, et obedientiam exhibere debent.

not be postponed to it, or risked to obtain it. (5) That in the selection of teachers to whom their children shall be entrusted, Christian parents have a right and a duty which excludes all other human authority. (6) That to deprive the poor of this right and liberty which is claimed by and yielded to the rich is a flagrant injustice.

Let no one be deceived by thinking that these two systems can be reconciled or mingled with each other. They are mutually exclusive. We have to choose between them. The sooner we make up our mind the safer for us. Every year we are losing ground. Every year the antagonist system, fraught with antagonistic principles, is penetrating the legislation and structure of the commonwealth, and tainting the brain and blood of the governing classes. . . . It is throwing off Christianity from the public life of the State, and relegating it to the private life of men—(**Manning,** '*Characteristics*,' p. 82).

[1] A parent may be entitled to our love, because he is a man, or because he is *such a man*, that is, possessing such excellences of character; but, besides all this, and aside from it all, he is entitled to our affection on account of the *relation in which he stands to us*. This imposes upon us the duty not only of hiding his foibles, of covering his defects, of shielding him from misfortune, and of seeking his happiness by what means soever Providence has placed in our power, but also of performing all this, and all the other duties of which we have spoken, *from love to him*, because *he is our parent*,—a love which shall render such service not a burden, but a pleasure, under what circumstances soever it may be our duty to render them. It is the duty of the child, whenever it is by the providence of God rendered necessary, to support his parent in old age. That man would deserve the reputation of a monster, who would not cheerfully deny himself, in order to be able to minister to the comforts of the declining years of his parent—(**Wayland,** p. 314).

ART. IV.

DE SOCIETATE HERILI.

264. *Societas herilis* est *illa, in qua unus (pluresve) propriæ utilitatis gratia suam operam ordinat in commodum alterius.* Persona, in cujus commodum opera ordinatur, dicitur *herus* seu *dominus ;* operam præstans dicitur *servus.* Status servi, qui, sola sustentatione vitæ acceptâ, sine ullâ mercede, ad commoda heri procuranda perpetuo obligatur, dicitur *mancipium.* Quod *absolutum* est, si per modum bruti animalis servus domino suo subjicitur, ita ut hic eum possit occidere, vendere, ab uxore et liberis divellere ; et *moderatum,* si jura essentialia personæ humanæ servantur.[1]

[1] The essence of slavery consists in this,—that the slave is not his own, but another's : he does not exist for himself, but is wholly referable and referred to the will and convenience of his master. In the juridical order, he is a *thing*, a chattel, a piece of property, *heterocentric :* whereas a person, being *sui juris*, existing (under limitations) for himself, and not being the property of any other, is *autocentric*. Greek philosophy and Roman law and, in a certain age, the common consent of mankind held that one man could be another man's slave in the full sense of the word. If the master killed his slave, cut up his body, and threw the flesh to feed the lampreys in his fish-ponds, he was not in excess of his legal rights, although he outraged moral sentiment, which in every age has protested against carrying legality in this matter of slavery to all lengths. The slave had *no rights* against his master, and could suffer no *wrong* at his hands. He was not a fellow of the society, of the πόλις or *respublica*, to which his master belonged. As for *human society*, either there was no such thing, or it consisted only of freemen. Such notions could be in vogue only under very imperfect conditions of humanity and morality. As morality progressed, the slave's condition was improved, first practically, then also legally. In fact, he ceased to be absolutely and thoroughly a slave. Finally, Christianity invented the distinction between the living body of the man and the labour of the man : the master, it was said, was master of all the labour of the slave, he was not master of the body and soul of the man. He could not rightfully kill him, or strike him, otherwise than in just punishment, or outrage him, or prevent or compel his marriage, or control his religion. In all these and other particulars the slave has rights against his master. Only in this modified sense would Christianity ever recognise slavery. Such slavery was slavery, as Aristotle and Cato knew slavery, no longer. The slavery of the Aristotelian φύσει δοῦλος perished in the recognition of a common nature, *one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all*, Eph. iv. 5—(**Rickaby,** *Political and Moral Essays,* p. 268).

A statu mancipii distinguendus est *famulatus* seu *status eorum, qui libera revocabilique conventione ob mercedem pactam operam suam alteri præstant.* Hi dicuntur *famuli* proprie dicti seu *domestici*, si in domo heri vivunt ejusque curæ subsunt ; et *operarii* seu *proletarii*, si domicilium proprium habent, nec subsunt hero, nisi ratione operis præstandi.

265. Officia mutua inter herum et famulos sunt in genere eadem ac officia mutua inter parentes et liberos ; nam tunc solum societas herilis intentioni naturæ respondet, quando famuli tamquam pars familiæ agnoscuntur, iique operam suam ad bonum familiæ conferunt. Quod ut fiat " requiritur 1°. ut famuli (domestici) non ad determinatos tantum quosdam labores se obligent, sed ut generatim ad domesticæ societatis bonum promovendum vires suas ex domini voluntate impendant, et ita quoad vivendi rationem ut plurimum ab hero dependeant ; 2°. ut herus vicissim non tantum obligationem in se suscipiat victum, vestitum, pactam mercedem famulis præbendi, sed generatim *eorum bonum temporale et spirituale paterne curandi et ita illos beneficii domesticæ vitæ participes efficiendi.* Hæc duplex nimirum conditio necessaria est, ut homines extranei vera familiæ membra constituantur ; in hoc ipso autem *essentialis ratio herilis societatis* consistit, qua a simplici *contractu cum operariis* inito distinguitur " (**Meyer,** v. 2, p. 113).

266. Hanc debere esse relationem inter herum et famulos in oblivionem venisse hisce temporibus videtur ; plures enim prædictam relationem concipiunt ut merum contractum, vi cujus herus laborem maximum pro minima mercede extorquere nititur, et famulus vicissim minimum laborem pro maxima mercede peragere intendit. Quare, quum ex utraque parte non bonum commune sed unice bonum proprium quæratur, ne umbra quidem veræ societatis inter herum et famulum relinquitur.

Sed minutatim tractare de relationibus inter heros et famulos, et præsertim inter patronos et operarios est potius Œconomiæ politicæ quam Ethicæ. Hoc solummodo notamus originem omnium difficultatum inter patronos et operarios, sicut inter conjuges, et inter parentes et liberos, a veræ religionis neglectu repetendam esse. Quare, quodcumque remedium ad tollenda hujusmodi gravamina adhibeatur, nisi id cum religione conjungatur atque a religione efficaciam suam derivet, frustra adhibetur.[1]

[1] The great mistake made in regard to the matter now under consideration is to take up with the notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the workingman are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view, that the direct contrary is the truth. . . . Each needs the other: Capital cannot do without Labour, nor Labour without Capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness of life and the beauty of good order; while perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and savage barbarity. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in uprooting it, the efficacy of Christian institutions is marvellous and manifold. . . Thus Religion teaches the labouring man and the artisan to carry out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless regrets. Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer that their work-people are not to be accounted their bond men; that in every man they must respect his dignity and worth as a man and as a Christian; that labour is not a thing to be ashamed of, if we lend ear to right reason and to Christian philosophy, but is an honourable calling, enabling a man to sustain his life in a way upright and creditable; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look on them merely as so much muscle or physical power. Again, the Church teaches that, as Religion and things spiritual and mental are among the workingman's main concerns, the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he is not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, or employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal duty is to give everyone a fair wage. . . . Lastly, the rich man must religiously refrain from cutting down the workingmen's earnings, whether by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealings; and with all the greater reason because the labouring man is, as a rule, weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should in proportion to their scantiness be accounted sacred—(*The Great Encycl.*, p. 218. 'Rerum Novarum').

CAPUT TERTIUM.

De Societate civili.

267. A societate domestica ad societatem civilem, quæ est ejus naturale complementum, considerandam transimus in hoc capite. Et primo quidem agemus de societatis civilis origine, deinde in ordine de ejus fine, materia, forma, et de ejus cum Ecclesia relatione.

Societas civilis definitur : *cœtus naturalis et perfectus plurium familiarum ad bonum commune temporale conspirantium.*

Dicitur 1°. *cœtus* **naturalis,** quia sponte oritur ex evolutione generis humani,[1] et ad ejusdem conservationem requiritur.

Dicitur 2°. *cœtus* **perfectus,** quia in se habet omnia media ad suum finem consequendum requisita, ita ut non sit ordinatus ad alium cœtum (n. 242, 3°).

Dicitur 3°. *plurium* **familiarum,** quia familiæ sunt membra, ex quibus proxime exurgit societas civilis, quæ proinde est societas composita ; tres enim simplices societates (n. 245) sunt materia proxima familiæ ; ipsæ vero familiæ et communitates ex familiis ortæ sunt materia proxima civitatis.

Dicitur 4°. *ad bonum* **commune,** quia societas civilis non ordinatur proxime ad utilitatem alicujus individui vel classis sed totius corporis civium. Additur *temporale,* quia finis proprius et immediatus societatis civilis

[1] When God made man, He made society ; society springs out of the creation of man, because from man comes the family, and from the family comes the people, and from the people comes the State. The whole civil order of the world is nothing but the growth of that society which lay in the first man, as the tree lies in the seed. Therefore, in our very nature is the society of mankind—(**Manning,** *The Fourfold Sovereignty of God,* p. 61).

in eo est, ut promoveatur felicitas hujus vitæ, ita tamen ut felicitas æterna exinde non impediatur.[1]

Brevius definitur: *societas humana naturaliter perfecta*. Dicitur *naturaliter* perfecta, ut distinguatur a societate *supernaturaliter* perfecta, i.e., *Ecclesia*, cujus finis proprius est supernaturalis felicitas hujus vitæ in sanctificatione hominum consistens, ut felicitatem æternam consequantur.[2]

ART. I.

DE ORIGINE SOCIETATIS CIVILIS.

268. Origo societatis civilis abstracte et concrete considerari potest: *abstracte*, si quæritur utrum societas civilis generatim et secundum suam speciem sit homini naturalis; *concrete*, quærendo quodnam sit factum, quo societas civilis constituatur. De origine societatis civilis sub hoc duplici respectu agemus.

[1] The perfect working of the State can do no more than raise the individual to a platform, where he shall be able, unimpeded, to develop for himself the intellectual and spiritual side of his nature, and to aid the like development of his fellow-men. Man is not a political animal all over, nor are politics and economics the sum of human interests. By virtue of the spirit that is in him, man belongs to a higher order, and is referable to a higher society, than the civil and political. The State is not a union of souls. The State belongs to the visible, temporal, and material order. Souls are immortal, States are mortal. . . . The State sets store by justice, fortitude, self-control, and other virtues, but on public grounds rather than for their own intrinsic worth. Intrinsically these virtues are perfections of the soul that is endowed with them: they are good things in themselves. But the State values them as means to the order and prosperity of the commonwealth: consequently the statesman's solicitude is for the outward act of the virtue, not for those inward dispositions which alone make the act truly virtuous. He appraises virtue politically, not ethically —(**Rickaby,** *Essays*, p. 144).

[1] The Catholic Church . . . has for her immediate and natural purpose the saving of souls and securing our happiness in heaven. Yet in regard to things temporal she is the source of benefits as manifold and great as if the chief end of her existence were to ensure the prospering of our earthly life. . . . All nations which have yielded to her sway have become eminent for their culture, their sense of justice, and the glory of their high deeds—(*The Great Encycl*, p. 107).

§ 1. De Origine Societatis Civilis in Abstracto.

269. THESIS XXIII.—Societas civilis abstracte inspecta ex ipsa natura humana originem trahit.

Stat. Quæst.—Sensistæ et Positivistæ post Hobbes et Rousseau arbitrantur societatem civilem non a natura sed ab aliquo contractu sociali repetendam esse.

Juxta *Hobbes*, *a*) status naturalis hominis est bellum omnium contra omnes ; *b*) hic status perpétui belli inde provenit, quod quisque jus naturale habet ad omnia, ideoque in usu et dominio rerum vi, fraude, aliove modo potest quisque alios prævenire ; et sic jus fortioris est unicum jus verum ; *c*) at quum talis status belli opponatur instinctui naturali propriæ conservationis, homines, ut se communi vi et auctoritate tueantur, libera conventione inierunt societatem, fontem omnis juris, cui in omnibus obediendum est.

Juxta Rousseau, *a*) status naturalis hominis est silvestris vix a statu belluino diversus ; *b*) postquam homines in hoc statu aliquam periodum (quot sæcula incertum est) vixerunt, humana perfectibilitate aliquatenus evoluta, usum loquelæ habere inceperunt ; deinde *c*) utilitate mutuæ communicationis detecta, *pacto* vel *contractu sociali* societatem inierunt, in qua unusquisque jura sua omnibus cessit.[1]

[1] Did society originate in a compact or is it the work of nature itself ? In the first supposition it is an artificial and accidental creation ; according to the second it is a necessary growth, whose laws are both natural and imperative. Opposite schools of sociology must spring from contrary answers to this fundamental question. Hobbes and Rousseau tell us that the whole social organism originated in a contract. Both go back to the primitive state, which, in the opinion of both, was barbarism. But according to Hobbes that barbarism was the state of war of everybody with everybody else ; Rousseau is not quite so unkind to his forefathers ; he makes them innocent, benevolent, and upright, but uncivilized. . . Sometime or other, the men of Hobbes found out that they had to fight or be kept from fighting by an absolute ruler ; and those of Rousseau loathed the simple food supplied by the untilled soil. In both cases dissatisfaction led to a contract, the record of which has unfortunately been lost long ago ; but its tenor has been recovered by Hobbes and by Rousseau. The two

Vera doctrina est homines ex naturali necessitate tendere ad societatem civilem constituendam, ut in ea suam perfectionem socialem consequantur. Hæc tamen necessitas non est *physica* sed *moralis*, i.e., non vita humana simpliciter, sed ejus naturalis perfectio exigit societatem civilem.

270. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Homo natura sua ordinatur ad propriam perfectionem physicam, intellectualem, moralem, religiosam : *atqui* hæc multiplex perfectio nonnisi in societate civili attingi potest, prout debet ; quum enim nulla familia sibi sola sufficiat (n. 243), oportet ut diversæ familiæ diversis officiis et artibus incumbentes, sub regimine alicujus supremæ auctoritatis, sibi invicem opem ferant ; et proinde est per se necessarium, ideoque a natura ordinatum, ut homines in societatem civilem adunentur.

Quod argumentum *confirmatur* 1°. considerando, quomodo societas civilis familiarum indigentiis subveniat earumque naturali inclinationi satisfaciat. Nam præter *naturalem sociabilitatem*, duo sunt, sine quibus familiæ vel omnino cohabitare non possunt, vel certe non ita, ut naturales hominum facultates rite explicentur, scil., *jurium tutela* et *prosperitas temporalis*. Jamvero, si unaquæque familia esset sibi relicta nec ullo præsidio contra ceteras familias muniretur, facillime opprimi vel extirpari posset ; nec in familiis sic disjunctis inveniri posset illa copia rerum materialium, quæ requiruntur, ut vita convenienter servetur et cultura artium, ad quas ipsa intentio naturæ homines adducit, progrediatur ; *ergo*.[1]

texts do not agree very well, but the substance of both amounts to this : everybody gave himself up, soul and body, to everybody else, in order to be handed over in due time to the governing power ; then these primitive beings chose the man or men who were to be entrusted with that supreme power, and immediately the absolute ruler, called by Hobbes, *Leviathan*, arose from the deep ; or the universal democracy of Rousseau ruled the world—(**Holaind**, *Nat. Law and Legal Practice*, p. 192).

[1] The need for the existence of the State with its array of soldiers,

Confirmatur 2°. historia, quæ testatur homines semper et ubique in aliqua societate civili vixisse, eoque societatem semper et ubique perfectionem fuisse, quo magis suam propriam perfectionem homines quærerent ; *atqui* tale factum ubique et semper conspicuum inter homines in natura humana fundari et ex ea procedere necessé est ; *ergo*.

271. Cor.—Ergo a veritate aberrant, qui dicunt hominem esse sua natura *antisocialem* (Hobbes) aut *extrasocialem* (Rousseau), quique ideo habent societatem ut rem adventitiam et hominum arbitrio creatam ; societas enim tum civilis tum domestica est ab auctore naturæ instituta et ob hanc institutionem est generi humano necessaria.

272. Obj. 1.—Existunt homines more belluarum viventes absque ullo vinculo sociali, in quibus procul dubio status naturalis hominis se manifestat ; *ergo*.

Resp. *Dist. antec.*—Existunt homines, qui vivunt absque *perfecto* vinculo sociali, *conc.* ; . . . qui præter vinculum societatis domesticæ *nullo* vinculo sociali continentur, *neg. Nego cons.* Perperam ex hujusmodi hominum conditione concluditur ad naturalem hominis conditionem, quemadmodum perperam aliquis concluderet hominem esse naturaliter monstruosum, quia aliqui homines sunt monstra. Sed sicut monstra humana, etsi adsunt causæ consentaneam naturæ humanæ evolutionem præpedientes, retinent lineamenta humana, ita memorati homines degeneres retinent speciem societatis civilis more gregum simul vivendo.[1]

constables, and tax-gatherers, rests on three grounds : first, the natural sociability of men, or their desire and need of living together ; secondly, their endowment by their Creator with various rights ; thirdly, their moral and intellectual imperfections. If any of these grounds were absent the State would not be necessary : not necessary if men were inclined and destined to live in isolated families ; not necessary if man, like the beasts, had no rights, namely, no claims upon others of such a cogency that compulsion may rightly be used in their defence ; not necessary if the mass of men were so wise and so well disposed that every right was both clear and secure. . . . But with the world as it is, the *State* is necessary ; namely, a society comprising a multitude of men, independent of any other society (in the temporal order), and having as its aim, not some particular good (like private societies), but the temporal felicity of all its members, by making peace and order, wisdom and justice prevail—(**Devas,** *Political Economy*, p. 571).

[1] A nomad horde is not an ideal political community, nor a Maor

Obj. 2.—Si homo esset naturaliter ad societatem civilem ordinatus, nemini liceret extra hunc statum degere ; *atqui* historia ecclesiastica commemorat et laudat vitam anachoreticam ; *ergo*.

Resp.—*Dist maj.*—Si *singuli* homines ad societatem civilem ordinarentur, *conc.* ; si solum homines generatim . . ., *neg.* Sicut matrimonium est naturale et necessarium speciei humanæ, sed ita, ut singulis non sit præceptum, et cælibatus (si virtutis gratia suscipiatur) sit matrimonio melior ; ita societas civilis est quidem speciei humanæ naturalis et necessaria, sed non ita, ut singuli teneantur esse membra societatis civilis, immo vita anachoretica, quam olim non pauci virtutis gratia susceperunt, vitæ civili præferenda est. Nam quum finis melior sit medio, et finis remotior societatis civilis sit promovere vitam privatam et personalem, cujus pars præcipua est contemplatio summi veri et amor summi boni ; si quis in se habet, ut sibi sufficiat, non est necesse, ut ejus indigentiis ab aliis subveniatur. " Habet (inquit **S. Th.**) hoc privilegium sapientiæ studium, quod operi suo prosequendo magis ipsa sibi sufficiat. In exterioribus enim operibus indiget homo plurimorum auxilio ; sed in contemplatione sapientiæ tanto aliquis efficacius operatur, quanto magis solitarius secum commoratur " (*In Boethium de Hebdomadibus*).

Obj. 3.—Omnes conqueruntur de malis, quæ societatem civilem deturpant ; *atqui* quod est naturale nequit esse malum ; *ergo*.

Resp.—*Dist. maj.* Societas civilis est horum malorum *occasio trans.* ; . . . est *causa, neg. Contradist. min.* Aliud est existere mala in societate civili sicut in ceteris rebus humanis, aliud vero est hæc mala efflorescere ex ipsa natura societatis civilis. Illud verum est, istud autem plane falsum. Mala, quæ in societate civili reperiuntur non ipsi societati sed societatis abusui adscribenda sunt ; nihil enim adeo bonum est, ut eo abuti nequeant perversi.

§ 2. De Origine Societatis Civilis in Concreto.

273. Quæstio hic agitata omnino cohæret cum alia de origine auctoritatis civilis ; quum enim auctoritas a conceptu societatis demi nequeat, id quod societati civili tribuit originem, tribuit eidem etiam potestatem civilem. Unde, nonnisi causa claritatis has quæstiones separatim tractamus. Jamvero, de præsenti quæstione, nimirum, cuinam facto tamquam causæ efficienti debeant

a model man, nor a sponge the best type of animal. Still, the perfection of the higher type is no reason for refusing the generic name to the imperfect lower form, especially where that lower form holds in deposit the potency of the higher development—(**Rickaby**, *Essays*, p. 20).

singulæ societates civiles seu civitates earum existentiam, duæ existunt sententiæ. Prima namque pro causa unica ponit liberum consensum eorum, qui societatem inire volunt. Non tamen requirit consensum explicitum ; sufficit enim quilibet actus liber, qui aliquo modo consensum de societate formanda contineat et jus consuetudinis fundet. Hic consensus, fatentibus omnibus, essentialiter differt a pacto sociali (n. 269), quum non importet statum silvestrem esse statum naturalem et originarium hominis, sed naturalem hominis inclinationem ad vitam socialem degendam supponat et expleat.

274. Opposita sententia originem societatis civilis ex diversis causis pro diversitate adjunctorum repetit, quales essent subactio hostium, alienigenarum adventus, liber consensus, et præ aliis evolutio familiarum. Sic, *v.g.*, potest victor in bello justo devictos adstringere, ut ipsum tamquam caput politicum agnoscant, quin consensus eorum sit causa obligationis. Possunt advenæ ex ipso facto adventus cum animo habitandi intra limites alicujus territorii obligari ad cooperandum ad bonum commune et ad legibus, quæ ibi vigent, parendum ; quo in casu adest quidem consensus ibi habitandi, non vero constituendi societatem. Possunt quoque familiæ dispersæ convenire in territorio inoccupato et libero consensu societatem civilem inire. Qui modi nihilominus non sunt ordinarii et naturales, sed rari et quodammodo violenti. Ordinarie enim vi naturalis evolutionis familiæ omnia elementa civitatis sponte efflorescunt. Et quidem, primo habetur aliqua societas conjugalis, deinde vero familia ; ex matrimoniis a filiis et filiabus initis nascuntur nepotes, qui ex sua parte sobolem propagant, et sic habetur materia societatis civilis, non solum remota, sed etiam proxime disposita, ut educatur societatis forma. Propagatio enim non est mera multiplicatio mathematica hominum, sed tran-

situs familiæ in collectionem familiarum eamdem regionem habitantium et vinculo amoris et mutuæ opis junctarum. Quibus habitis, auctoritas paterna est titulus sufficiens auctoritatis specifice diversæ et altioris, *scil.*, auctoritatis civilis.

275. Defensores primæ sententiæ in consensu inveniunt *sufficientem* et *unicam* societatis civilis rationem : 1°. *sufficientem*, quia consensus *a*) concrete determinat *materiam* societatis, *i.e.*, quot et quinam homines, causa boni communis, sociari debeant ; *b*) huic multitudini impertit *formam*, quum hoc consensu homines ex obligatione fidelitatis impellantur ad ea præstanda, quæ bono communi sunt necessaria ; *c*) *jus statuit* a singulis exigendi, quæ ad finem communem requiruntur. 2°. Consensum dicunt esse *unicam* rationem, quia præter ipsum non alia facta ad societatem civilem constituendam apta supponi possunt nisi aut coexistentia familiarum et identitas regionis, aut propagatio familiarum ex eadem stipite, aut coactio familiis illata. Jamvero,

1°. *Coexistentia familiarum et identitas regionis* secum ferunt varias relationes benevolentiæ et caritatis necnon jurium personalium, minime vero familias inter se colligant illis vinculis specialibus, quæ ad veram societatis civilis formationem requiruntur, nec jura propria societatis civilis (*v.g.*, jus gladii) important.

2°. *Propagatio familiarum ex eadem stipite* constituit auctoritatem paternam, quæ, eo quod cum completa liberorum educatione cessat, a potestate civili essentialiter differt.

3°. *Coactio familiis illata*, utpote injusta, nullum jus, et proinde nullam societatem civilem, fundare potest. Ergo, inquiunt, causa efficiens societatis civilis in concreto consideratæ est solus hominum consensus (cf. *Costa-Rossetti, Van der Aa, Mendive*).

ART. II.

DE FINE SOCIETATIS CIVILIS.

276. THESIS XXIV.—Finis societatis civilis est bonum naturale commune civium, simul cum honestate morum.

Stat. Quæst.—Thesis agit de fine proximo societatis civilis, seu, de eo, quod natura intendit homines in societate civili adunando ; non de fine ultimo, qui idem est ac finis ultimus hominis, quum societas civilis non modo nihil agere debeat, quod fini ultimo hominis contrarium sit, sed etiam teneatur cives juvare ad illum finem assequendum.

Bonum naturale est duplex : privatum et publicum. Privatum est et ipsum duplex : *personale*, quod consistit in beatitudine imperfecta hujus vitæ ; et *domesticum*, quæ est tranquillitas familiæ constituta per virtutum moralium exercitium simul cum sufficientia bonorum temporalium. Utrique opponitur bonum publicum, qui est complexus bonorum et institutionum, quæ omnibus familiis præsto esse debent, ut quæque suum finem facilius et melius obtineat et pacem cum aliis habeat. Quare, bonum publicum seu commune non est nisi medium ad bonum privatum, qui est reipublicæ finis remotus, et ideo illud ut medium huic ut fini debet esse proportionatum. Societas civilis " etiam in pura natura spectata (inquit *Suarez*), non habet pro fine intrinseco et per se intento felicitatem naturalem vitæ futuræ immo nec propriam felicitatem naturalem vitæ præsentis, quatenus ad singulos homines, ut particulares personæ sunt, pertinere potest ; sed ejus finis est felicitas naturalis communitatis humanæ perfectæ, cujus curam gerit, et singulorum hominum, ut sunt membra talis communitatis, ut in ea scilicet in pace et justitia vivant, et cum sufficientia bonorum, quæ ad vitæ corporalis conservationem et commoditatem spectant, et cum ea probitate morum, quæ ad hanc externam pacem

et felicitatem reipublicæ et convenientem humanæ naturæ conservationem necessaria est" (*De Leg.*, l. 3, c. II., n. 7).

277. Prob. Thesis. PARS 1ª (. . . *bonum naturale commune*). **Arg.**—Bonum, quod tamquam finem consequendum societas civilis natura sua quærit, ei debet esse proportionatum; *atqui* solum bonum naturale commune est fini societatis civilis proportionatum: *a*) bonum *naturale*, quia societas civilis, utpote mere naturalis, non exigit ut finem suum nisi bonum naturale, nec ei debetur bonum supernaturale; *b*) *commune*, quia quum finis, de quo agitur, talis esse debeat, cujus desiderio omnes et singulæ familiæ moveantur ad societatem ineundam, necesse est, ut omnium desiderio satisfacere valeat, seu, ut sit bonum commune.

PARS 2ª (. . . *cum honestate morum*). **Arg.**—Sine honestate morum bonum commune et pax socialis diu conservari nequit, id quod experientia comprobatur; salus enim publica maxime dependet a virtutibus justitiæ tum legalis tum commutativæ tum distributivæ, temperantiæ, amoris proximi et patriæ, etc. Quare, officium præcipuum rectorum civitatis consistit in procuranda et conservanda pro viribus honestate morum, si bonum commune vere et efficaciter obtinere et conservare velint.[1]

[1] The foremost duty of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as of themselves to realise public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper scope of wise statesmanship, and is the work of the heads of the State. Now, a *State chiefly prospers and thrives through moral rule, well-regulated family life, respect for religion and justice*, the moderation and equal allocation of public taxes, the progress of the arts and of trade, the abundant yield of the land—through everything, in fact, which makes the citizens better and happier. . . . It interests the public, as well as the individual, that peace and good order should be maintained; that family life should be carried on in accordance with God's laws and those of nature; that religion should be reverenced and obeyed; that a high standard of morality should prevail, both in public and private life; that the sanctity of justice should be respected, and that no one should injure another with impunity—(*The Great Enc.*, p. 227).

278. Cor. 1.—Ergo societas civilis est propter bonum civium, non cives propter bonum societatis, ut docet Socialismus statuendo Statum ut finem, cui homines subordinari debeant.[1] Quare, jura, quæ ad humanam personalitatem atque familiam spectant, cives libere exercere possunt, dummodo nihil agant, quod bono communi societatis adversetur.[2]

Cor. 2.—Ergo auctoritas civilis jus et officium habet *a*) tuendi jura civium (*i.e.*, efficiendi, ne injuriæ inferantur) et vindicandi injurias illatas; *b*) procurandi, quantum fieri potest, ea omnia, quæ ad civium prosperitatem conferant, quæque privata activitate sufficienter procurari nequeant (*v.g.*, commercia et industrias fovendo, artes et scientias promovendo). Tam late enim patent jura et officia auctoritatis civilis, quam finis societatis. In hac vero prosperitate procuranda debet spectare bonum *commune* civium secundum justitiam distributivam, non bonum alicujus partis civium in detrimentum ceterorum.[3] *c*) Officium habet hones-

[1] All defenders of Socialism give to the State unlimited right of disposal of every individual. This pagan idea of the State denies to man all personal rights and makes him merely a part of a vast engine, the State, a cogwheel in the big machine. We, Christian Catholics, most emphatically protest against such slavery; we believe that the State exists for us, and not that we exist for the State. Christianity has freed us from the idolatry of the State, and we will cling to our individual liberty with every fibre of our being—(**Stang,** *Socialism and Christianity*, p. 19).

[2] " Man is not subservient to the civil community to the extent of his whole self, all that he is and all that he has " (*S. Th.*, 1, 2, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3). This I take to be a very pregnant saying. It cannot be denied that the best work of the artist, of the mathematician, of the philosopher,—not to say of the saint,—is done without any conscious reference to civil society and away from civil control. Even allowing with the first French Revolution, that the two terms, ' man,' and ' citizen ' have the same *extension* or (as Mill says) *denotation*, yet we must add that greater is the *intension* or *connotation* of ' man ' than of ' citizen '—(**Rickaby,** *Pol. and Mor. Essays*, p. 130).

[3] As regards the State, the interests of all, whether high or low, are equal. The poor are members of the national community equally with the rich; they are real components, living members which constitute through the family, the living body; and it need hardly be said that they are in every State very largely in the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and favour another;

tatem publicam promovendi et defendendi, *i.e.*, sua legislatione efficiendi, ut cives ad bonos mores incitentur, et curandi, ne vitia publice grassentur et virtuti laqueos ponant. Hinc, quantum prudenter fieri potest, tenetur personas pravas expellere vel cohibere, ludos obscenos vetare, atque impedire, ne scripta bonis moribus nociva edantur, vel associationes, quæ bono et tranquillitati societatis adversentur, efformentur.

ART. III.

DE MATERIA SOCIETATIS CIVILIS.

279. Societas civilis ad modum corporis organici constituitur : quemadmodum igitur homo corpore et anima constat, ita et societas civilis constat duplici elemento, altero *materiali, formali* altero. Materia societatis partim *personalis*, partim *realis* est, *i.e.*, complectitur tum populum tum territorium, quod populus inhabitat.

§ 1. De Populo.

280. Populus non significat quamlibet multitudinem sive hominum sive familiarum, sed aggregationem familiarum in unione politica conviventium. Dixi *familiarum*, quia materia proxima societatis civilis non sunt homines individui, ut volunt Socialistæ, qui auctoritatem paternam subvertere nitendo, membra familiæ ab auctoritate civili prorsus dependentia facere volunt. Hæc Socialistarum sententia nullo negotio falsa esse ostendi potest. Re quidem vera, familia est civitate prior, quum ab ea societas civilis originem sumat ; fa-

and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and comfort of the working classes ; otherwise that law of justice would be violated which ordains that each man shall have his due. . . . Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice—with that justice which is called by the Schoolmen *distributive*—towards each and every class alike—(*The Great Encycl.*, p. 228).

milia est civitate magis naturalis et necessaria, quum homines in familia nascantur et ope familiæ conserventur. Quare, si familia est societate civili anterior, si ea est homini magis naturalis et necessaria, dubitari nequit, quin homines, non prout personæ separatæ sunt, sed prout familiam constituunt, sint membra civitatis.[1] Quare,

Non omnes personæ, quibus civitas constat, possunt *cives* juris pleni vocari, sed soli patresfámilias (*i.e.*, omnes, qui vel actu patresfamilias sunt, vel proximam aptitudinem habent ad familiam fundandam), qui juridice repræsentant familiam. Cives, juxta Aristotelem, sunt illi, qui aptitudinem habent ad aliqua parte in regimine politico fungendum. Exinde sequitur filios nondum *majores*, utpote auctoritati paternæ subjectos, nonnisi mediante familia, civitati inseri. Idem dicendum esse videtur de feminis, quarum tamen jura *politica* multum hodie agitantur. Unde pauca

De Feminismo.

281. *Feminismus* definitur : *totalis vel partialis æqualitas feminarum cum viris.* Duplex est : *a*) *moderatus*, qui est partialis æqualitas inter feminas et viros juxta principia juris naturalis et religionis revelatæ, et *b*) *absolutus*, qui omnimodam æqualitatem inter eos constituit.

[1] Inasmuch as the domestic household is antecedent, as well in idea as in fact, to the gathering of men into a community, the family must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the community, and founded more immediately in nature. . . . Paternal authority can be neither abolished nor absorbed by the State; for it has the same source as human life itself. "The child belongs to the father," and is, as it were, the continuation of the father's personality. . . . And for the very reason that "the child belongs to the father," it is, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, "before it attains the use of free will, under power and charge of its parents." The Socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and setting up a State supervision, act *against natural justice*, and break in pieces the stability of all family life—(*The Great Encycl.*, p. 215. 'Rerum Novarum').

282. Feminismus *moderatus* est omnino approbandus, siquidem ubi eadem est natura specifica, ibi debent esse eadem jura et officia ex illa natura essentialiter emanantia. Quare, feminæ eadem cum viris habent jura : *a*) quoad conservationem et integritatem corporis et famæ ; *b*) quoad dominium bonorum fortunæ ; *c*) quoad culturam moralem, necnon intellectualem suo sexui convenientem ; *d*) quoad electionem status vitæ ; *e*) quoad media ad finem ultimum consequendum necessaria.

283. At Feminismus *absolutus* non est aliud quam quoddam elementum Socialismi postulantis perfectam æqualitatem jurium socialium in omnibus, etiam feminis et filiisfamilias. Feminis enim confert *a*) perfectam æqualitatem politicam cum viris, ita ut illæ voce activa et passiva ad omnia munia politica gaudeant ; *b*) jus exercendi quodcumque negotium, commercium, etc., quod hactenus a solis viris exercebatur ; *c*) independentiam domesticam a potestate viri. Jamvero, talis doctrina opponitur :—

1°. *communi praxi omnium gentium* sive cultarum sive incultarum, quæ feminas ab officiis politicis excludunt ;

2°. *juri naturæ ;* nam *a*) si femina est nupta, jure naturæ est viro suo, ut familiæ capiti, subjecta, secus enim societas domestica esset acephala ;[1] si vero in-

[1] As, in the Catholic view, the family is the simplest social unit, so the conjugal association is the simplest and germinal form of the family. In that society of two, as in all society, the distinction between head and body, ruler and ruled, is essential, because where a conflict of wills in morally indifferent matters is possible, social life requires a power of determining and ending such controversy ; a right of decision on the one hand and a duty of acquiescence on the other. We say " morally indifferent matters," for where it is a question of right and wrong and of God's law, the decision of a higher court has already been given. This right of social superiority in the conjugal society the Catholic religion has always attributed to the husband. She has regarded it as the postulate of nature, and therefore as the command of God. She finds it confirmed by revelation in the account of the primitive and Divine institution of marriage, and, further, in the restoration of that institution by Christ to

nupta, sed adhuc *minor*, est jure naturæ subjecta auctoritati paternæ ; nec si majoritatem jam attigit, ideo idonea evasit ad officia publica gerenda, quum talibus officiis feminæ generatim omnino impares sint, sive ratione ingenii et virium physicarum sive naturalis verecundiæ muliebris.[1]

3°. *juri divino et ecclesiastico.* " Mulieres (inquit *S. Paulus*) viris suis subditæ sint, sicut Domino, quoniam vir caput est mulieris, sicut Christus est Ecclesiæ " (*Eph.* 5). Et : " Mulier in silentio discat cum omni subjectione " (1 *Timoth.* 2). " Mulieres in ecclesiis taceant, non enim permittitur eis loqui, sed subditas esse " (1 *Cor.* 14). Hinc jure canonico et perpetua Ecclesiæ praxi ab omni munere publico arcentur mulieres.

more than its pristine dignity. . . . It is, however, important to notice the distinction between social or official superiority and personal—a distinction ever insisted on by the Church in the interests of liberty. Just as, in her ministers and priests, she bids us discern between the man and his ecclesiastical office, and assures us that the personal unfitness of the minister in no way affects the validity of his administrations, so, in the question of jurisdiction, ecclesiastical, civil, or domestic, she admonishes those in office not to credit themselves with personal superiority, or to govern, as it were, in right of possessing greater wisdom, or holiness, or ability than their subjects ; nor to imagine that an appointment necessarily carries with it an infallible guarantee of aptitude, present, past, or future. . . . The tyranny of individualism in government is altogether opposed to Catholic theory, and we cannot conclude at once that, because the husband has authority over the wife, therefore the man is superior to the woman ; but at most, that there is in the man, as such, a certain aptitude for that particular office which is not found in the woman—(**Tyrrell,** *Hard Sayings,* p. 241).

[1] We are aware that many socialists advocate the absolute equality between man and woman . . . Married or unmarried, woman is to enjoy perfect equality with the sterner sex (Bebel).

Bebel, however, may permit us to ask him : Must, then, men in turn with their wives rock the cradle, cook, knit, and darn, and attend to all womanly household work ? And, again, must women as well as men descend into the mines, perform the duties of coachmen, draymen, sailors, etc. ? Must they gird on the sword, take up the knapsack and rifle, and march to the field of battle ? In order to effect such equalities we must go back to the most barbarous times, and even then this equality would be frustrated by the weakness of the female sex. For why did nature bestow on woman so totally different an organisa-

§ 2. De Territorio.

284. Ad corpus politicum constituendum simul cum populo territorium aliquo modo concurrit. Territorium autem non videtur ad ipsum *esse* civitatis, sed ad ejus *bene esse*, pertinere, seu, non est civitatis elementum essentiale, sed complementum necessarium.

— *Non est elementum essentiale*, quia "supposita unione plurium familiarum sub aliqua auctoritate suprema, cui competant jura essentialia potestatis politicæ, omnia ad essentiam societatis civilis requisita adsunt; sed hæc omnia adesse possunt sine territorio. Sic, *v.g.*, populus israeliticus in deserto veram efformabat societatem civilem, Moysi competebat jus gladii, jus bellum gerendi, etc. . . ."

— *Complementum necessarium*, quod constat ex historia. "Quam primum enim gentes ad altiorem vitæ cultum perveniunt, certas fixasque sedes sibi eligunt. Agricultura nimirum, varia opificia et præsertim artes liberales et scientiæ excoli nequeunt, nisi gens territorium determinatum stabiliter incolat; immo evolutio physica, moralis, politica adeo a territorio dependet, ut pro diversitate hujus etiam illa diversa esse soleat. Hinc ad recte intelligendam indolem et necessitates individuales alicujus populi etiam ejusdem ad territorium relatio consideranda est. Unde inferes falsam esse eam opinionem, quæ in organismo politico, nihil nisi meram *hominum liberorum societatem* agnoscit, ideoque principi *nullam jurisdictionem localem* competere dicit in territorium. Secundum hanc opinionem constitutionalismi moderni rex non a territorio, sed solum a populo denominandus esset, *v.g.*, non rex Belgii, sed rex Belgarum" (**Cathrein,** *Phil. Mor.*, p. 403).

tion—talents, inclinations, and characteristics so different from those of man? Is not this intellectual, moral, and physical diversity an evident indication that the Creator of both natures has set for them a totally different task in society?—(**Cathrein**, *Socialism*, p. 191).

ART. IV.

DE FORMA SOCIETATIS CIVILIS.

SEU

De auctoritate civili.

285. Ut plures ad communem finem tendant, oportet, ut adsit aliquid, quod cives contineat et ad illum finem dirigat. Licet enim omnibus persuasum sit bonum commune quærendum esse, quum tamen illud bonum non idem sit nec eodem modo producendum pro omni rerum conditione, necesse est, ut civibus bonum commune in concreto indicetur iique ad illud procurandum determinentur. Hæc sane fiunt *auctoritate civili*, quæ igitur definitur : *jus civitatem gubernandi*, vel : *jus obligandi cives ad bonum commune assequendum*.

Dicitur 1°. *jus obligandi*, quia auctoritas, utpote potestas jurisdictionis (*i.e.*, regendi subditos), hoc munus habet, ut liberam voluntatem liget et officia inducat.

Dicitur 2°. *cives*, quia subditi auctoritatis civilis non sunt homines quacumque ratione spectati (*v.g.*, ut christiani), sed præcise ut sunt cives.

Dicitur 3°. *ad bonum commune assequendum*, quia limites auctoritatis civilis definiuntur causa finali civitatis, quæ est, ut bonum commune procuretur.

Auctoritas civilis triplici modo exercetur, *scil.*, leges condendo, earum executionem mandando, delicta civium judicando. Unde est *legislativa, executiva, judiciaria*.[1]

[1] With regard to its appointed functions, the government of the State is divided into the legislative, judiciary and executive powers. It is of primary importance that the State enact general and stable laws governing the activities of its subjects, as far as this is required for the good order and well-being of the whole body. For this purpose it must possess the right to legislate ; it must, moreover, carry out these laws and provide, by means of the administrative, or rather executive, power for what is needful to the general good of the community ; finally, it has to punish infractions of the laws and authoritatively settle legal disputes, and for this purpose it has need of the judiciary power (in civil and criminal courts). This right of the State to impose penalties is founded on the necessity of preserving good order and of providing for the security of the whole body politic— (**Cathrein,** *Cath. Encycl.*, v. 5, p. 565).

§ 1. De Origine Auctoritatis Civilis.

286. THESIS XXV.—Potestas civilis nonnisi a Deo promanare potest.

Stat. Quæst.—Qui pactum sociale a Rousseau confictum suum faciunt, ab hoc pacto repetunt auctoritatem civitati constituendæ necessariam. Juxta hos igitur auctoritas civilis non est nisi summa voluntatum individualium.

Huic voluntati generali auctoritas civilis inalienabiliter inhæret; potest tamen a populo delegari cuidam libere electo, sed non ita, ut non possit reassumi, etiam sine ulla ratione; est enim essentialiter res populi. Quare, reges aliive auctoritate civili fruentes non sunt nisi ministri et delegati precarii multitudinis.[1]

287. Prob. Thesis. Arg.—Homo naturæ auctore (*i.e.*, Deo) destinatur ad societatem civilem (n. 270); *atqui* in præsenti rerum statu societas civilis existere nequit sine auctoritate civili; *ergo* sicut societas civilis est a Deo, ita etiam auctoritas, qua societas civilis gubernatur.

Prob. min. Sine auctoritate civili impossibile est, ut finis societatis seu bonum commune obtineatur vel

[1] The great assertor and worshipper of the inalienable sovereignty of the people is Jean Jacques Rousseau. He starts from postulates which we have already rejected—that all men are equal—that man is born free—that none can be bound to obey another without his own consent—that civil society is formed by an arbitrary convention—which convention is the Social Contract. From these unreasonable postulates Rousseau draws the conclusion, logically enough, that the sovereign will in every State is the will of the majority of the citizens: but the will of the majority, he goes on, cannot be alienated, from the majority; therefore neither can the sovereignty be alienated but must abide permanently with the people ruling by a majority of votes. The argumentation is excellent, but the premisses are all false. . . . Rousseau will allow you to have your senate, king, emperor, if you will: only remember that he is *the prince*, not *the sovereign*. The people collectively are the sovereign, always sovereign. The *prince*, that is he or they to whom the administration is entrusted—since all the citizens cannot administer conjointly—is the mere official and bailiff of the Sovereign People, bound to carry out their mandate in all things and removable at their pleasure—(**Rickaby,** *Moral Phil.*, p. 329).

conservetur, tum quia plures, illo bono contempto, solum ipsorum bonum particulare quærerent, tum quia nisi adesset, qui civibus dictaret et sanciret media ad illud bonum consequendum adhibenda, unusquisque media ad finem societatis apta putaret, quæ aliis inepta vel etiam noxia viderentur, et sic, deficiente harmonia tendentiæ in bonum societatis, ipsam societatem deficere necesse esset.[1]

Præterea, Deus summe sapiens nequit rem aliquam velle, quin velit omnia, quæ ad istius rei essentiam pertinent ; *atqui* auctoritas ad essentiam omnis cujuscumque societatis pertinet (n. 241) ; *ergo* a Deo derivatur.[2]

Denique, in societate civili inveniuntur jura (*v.g.*, jus gladii, jus obligandi in conscientia), quæ sane aliunde ei derivari nequeunt, quam ab eo, qui, uptote auctor vitæ humanæ, supremum dominium in eam habet.

[1] If the Society called the State is to fulfil its end, there must be a supreme authority within it. The authority may be that of one, of a few, or of many persons, may arise and grow in various ways, may be distributed in the most complicated manner among national or provincial bodies, and may even to a certain extent be indefinite ; but these are accidents : the essence of the situation is that when lawfully established this authority has the right to the obedience of all the other members of the State. They are bound to obey, not always in the same manner, but for the same reason that a son obeys his father. In each case the natural law bids obedience : for the family or domestic society, and the State or civil society are both necessary in our present condition on earth ; hence the subordination required for the working of these societies is commanded by God, who is the author of nature, and whose law, so far as made known to us by the light of nature, is called the natural law. It follows that in every State the lawful authority, called the *Government* or *Civil Power*, has, like parental authority, all its rights from God. If it is otherwise, and the natural law non-existent, then as Burke told our forefathers, " on that hypothesis, let any set of men be strong enough to set their duties at defiance, and they cease to be duties any longer—(**Devas**, *Pol. Economy*, p. 571).

[2] As no society can hold together unless someone be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good ; every civilised community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. For God alone is the true and supreme Lord of the world. Everything, without exception, must be subject to Him, and must serve Him, so that whosoever holds the right to govern, holds it from one sole and single source, namely, God, the Sovereign Ruler of all—(*The Great Encycl.*, p. 108. ' Immortale Dei ').

288. Cor. 1.—Ergo auctoritas civilis non est summa jurium seu auctoritatum particularium, quæ privati libere deponunt ceduntque societati, quam ineunt ; sed est jus seu summa jurium, quæ Deus societati confert, quippe quæ requiruntur a natura societatis civilis, cujus esse et bene esse ipsemet vult.

Cor. 2.—Ergo "qui resistit potestati (civili), Dei ordinationi resistit" (*Rom.* 13). Quare, leges civiles debitis conditionibus vestitæ in conscientia obligant, eo quod homines ad bonum commune procurandum obligantur. Quod confirmatur Apostolo addente : "qui resistunt, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt. . . . Ideo subditi estote non solum propter iram (*i.e.*, pœnam), sed etiam propter conscientiam."[1]

289. Schol.—Cave, ne ipsam auctoritatem civilem cum ejusdem adeptione vel exercitio confundas ; auctoritas enim ratione suæ originis majestatem et inviolabilitatem præ se fert, ideoque in reverentia semper habenda est ; non ita auctoritatis adeptio et usus. "Regia potestas (inquit **S. Th.,**) vel cujuscumque alterius dignitatis, potest considerari quan-

[1] I must obey the State, St. Paul says, *for conscience' sake.* Conscience bids me be a man ; that is, not merely to rank as a member of the human genus, and come under the census as an item of population, but to lead the conscious, intelligent, active life of a man. That I cannot do in solitude. I mean the normal man cannot do it ; the anchorite is out of our purview, ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. Cut off from intercourse with his fellows, man is no more man, morally speaking, than the hand of a corpse can be called a human hand. Nor is the society of the domestic circle sufficient to bring man up to what man should be, unless that circle be one of an aggregate of similar circles, intersecting each other, and coalescing in the unity of a State. I may travel little, out of my family circle, but that circle itself is affected, humanised, and civilised by other circles in contact with it, a contact only maintained in virtue of their civil union. The greatest recluse, a Carthusian monk, or a Poor Clare nun, or a retired collegian, would find the little society of convent or collegiate life a moral impossibility, were it not planted in a land of agriculture and commerce, of peace and order and State-administered law. Neither are recluses born of oak or rock : they are scions of families, linked to other families by ties both connubial and civil. I must then be a citizen to be a man ; at least I must be the subject of some State. . . . That is why I must obey the State, because such is the condition of the humanity that is in me, that I cannot develop as a man unless I fall into my place as subject of some State—(**Rickaby,** *Pol. and Mor. Essays,* p. 73).

tum ad tria. Uno quidem modo, *quantum ad ipsam potestatem ;* et sic est a Deo, per quem reges regnant, ut dicitur *Prov.* 8. Alio modo potest considerari *quantum ad modum adipiscendi potestatem ;* et sic quandoque potestas est a Deo, —quando scilicet aliquis ordinate potestatem adipiscitur, secundum illud *Hebr.* v. 4 : 'Nemo sibi honorem assumit, sed qui vocatur a Deo tamquam Aaron' ;—quandoque vero non est a Deo, sed ex perverso hominis appetitu. . . . Tertio modo potest considerari *quantum ad usum ipsius.* Et sic quandoque est a Deo (puta quum aliquis secundum præcepta divinæ justitiæ utitur concessa sibi potestate), secundum illud *Prov. :* 'Per me reges regnant et legum conditores justa decernunt' ; quandoque autem non est a Deo (puta quum aliqui potestate sibi data utuntur contra divinam justitiam), secundum illud *Ps.* 2 : 'Astiterunt reges terræ, et principes convenerunt in unum adversus Dominum et adversus Christum ejus' " (*In Ep. ad Rom.* c. 13, lect. 1).

§ 2. De Subjecto Auctoritatis Civilis.

290. Philosophi Catholici unanimi consensu docent auctoritatem civilem esse a Deo, quum sequatur naturalem hominum sociabilitatem, quæ a Deo ut naturæ auctore procedit. Bifariam autem dividuntur circa *subjectum* seu *personam juridicam,* cui immediate a Deo hæc auctoritas conferatur. Et quæstio est de auctoritatis collatione in prima civitatis constitutione, non de acquisitione auctoritatis in civitate jam constituta.

291. Prima sententia docet supremam auctoritatem civilem immediate ipsi societati, et ea mediante, ipsi rectori ab ea electo conferri. Hanc " sententiam antiquam, receptam, veram ac necessariam esse " censet *Suarez* (De Leg., l. 3, c. 4), eamque quam plurimi Scholastici tuebantur, ut videre licet apud *Costa-Rossetti* (op. cit., 605), qui fuse eam defendit, necnon *Balmes* (European Civilisation, c. 49), *Van der Aa, Mendive, Castelein* (Phil. Mor. et Soc., p. 748).

Præcipua eorum argumenta sunt :—

1°. Finis primarius societatis civilis est complere insufficientiam privatorum civium, ut eorum jura rite determinentur et protegantur, secus enim societas civilis non esset societas perfecta. *Atqui* datur perfecta sufficientia civium privatorum ad eorum jura determinanda et protegenda, si concrete et collective sumantur in adjunctis, ubi solet enasci societas civilis ; unde, non est opus, ut hæc sufficientia aliunde suppleatur, et nominatim speciali Dei interventu, quia ubique in rebus creatis phænomena ordinis mere naturalis cum simplici Dei concursu producuntur.

2°. Si auctoritas civilis non populo sed personæ alicui particulari immediate conferretur, non possent familiæ societatem ineuntes auctoritatem rectoris ab ipsis electi per leges fundamentales (quibus ipse civitatis character statuitur) limitibus circumscribere ; siquidem rectorem eligendo non aliud facerent quam designare hominem, cui potestas a Deo conferretur. *Atqui* hoc non modo communi populorum sensui adversatur, sed ad intolerabilem despotismum duceret, quum sua voluntate absoluta posset rector leges fundamentales pro lubitu modificare vel etiam penitus abolere.[1]

3°. Sententia confirmatur auctoritate fere totius Scholæ. " *Condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem* vel pertinet ad personam publicam," inquit *S. Th.* (1, 2, q. 90, a. 3). Et : " plus est consensus multitudinis ad aliquid observandum, quam auctoritas principis, *qui non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi in quantum*

[1] In modern States generally, although not in England, there are " fundamental laws," or a written " constitution," with which the legislature may not meddle. The consent, however, of some definite persons—at any rate of the whole people—can abolish any fundamental law, and set aside any constitution, as on one dark day of disaster, the Athenian assembly overruled the γραφὴ παρανόμων. But an effort is required to such effect, and a motive strong enough to rouse the whole people. Failing such excitement, civil authority is tied up, held in suspense, impeded, and therefore diminished by fundamental laws—(**Rickaby,** *Pol. and Mor. Essays,* p. 55).

gerit personam multitudinis" (ib. q. 97, a. 3, ad 3). Jam, personam multitudinis gerere perinde est ac auctoritate a multitudine accepta multitudinem repræsentare.

S. Alphonsus, interpres sententiæ antiquæ scribit: "Certum est dari in hominibus potestatem ferendi leges, sed potestas hæc quoad leges civiles a natura nemini competit, nisi *communitati hominum, et ab hac transfertur* in unum vel plures, a quibus communitas regatur" (*De Leg.*, n. 104).

292. Secunda sententia docet auctoritatem civilem a Deo immediate conferri rectori, ita, *scil.*, ut rector designetur a populo, auctoritatem vero nonnisi a Deo habeat. Ita plurimi moderni, inter quos eminent *Taparelli, Liberatore, Zigliara, Schiffini, Meyer, Cathrein.*

Populus, inquiunt, aut est capax per seipsum sese gubernandi aut non; *atqui* eum esse capacem non est admittendum, nec illud fautores primæ sententiæ admittunt sed candide fatentur "moraliter difficillimum esse quod populus regat seipsum, foreque infinitam confusionem et morositatem, si leges essent suffragiis omnium condendæ" (*Suarez*). Quare, inutilis esset populo potestas gubernandi, quam ipse exercere non posset.

Sin autem affirmaretur populum posse absque incommodo seipsum regere, sequeretur unicam formam legitimam regiminis esse democratiam perfectam, quod certo falsum est.

Porro, intelligi nequit, quomodo populus possit esse *subjectum*, in quo resideat potestas suprema, et simul *subdatur* isti potestati.

Huic sententiæ favere videtur Leo XIII. in Encycl. *Diuturnum* his verbis: "Quo sane delectu (populi) designatur princeps, *non conferuntur jura principatus, neque mandatur imperium, sed statuitur, a quo sit gerendum.*"

§ 3. De Modis Acquirendi Auctoritatem Civilem.

293. Quattuor enumerantur modi, secundum quos auctoritas suprema in civitate jam constituta acquiritur. Hi sunt *electio, hæreditas, victoria in bello justo, præscriptio.*

Electio habetur, quando uno rectore remoto, ei alius subrogatur suffragio populi vel alicujus collegii. Si eligitur persona *singularis* et *ad vitam*, electus dicitur *rex, imperator, princeps ;* si *ad tempus*, dicitur *præses.*

Hæreditas habetur, quando una persona ab imperio removetur, eique succedit alia ex eadem familia.

Titulus victoriæ habetur, quando securitas populi postulat, ut gens victa sua independentia privetur.

Præscriptio hic intelligitur jus exercendi supremam potestatem usurpatione acquisitam, positis quibusdam conditionibus. Conditiones sunt : *a*) pacifica possessio, *b*) tempus sufficiens, *c*) nulla spes probabilis legitimum principem restituendi absque magna societatis perturbatione, *d*) rectus usus auctoritatis usurpatæ. Quare, " regimini usurpatoris jam pacifica possessione stabilito, cives in iis omnibus civilem obedientiam præstare tenentur, quæ ad servandum ordinem publicum et ad ordinariam reipublicæ administrationem in bonum corporis socialis pertinent ; actibus autem publicis, qui directe ipsam usurpationem contra jus legitimum obfirmandam respiciunt, positive cooperari nec debent nec per se licite possunt " (**Meyer,** v. 2, p. 503). Potest igitur usurpator in quibusdam adjunctis evadere princeps legitimus, et ratio fundamentalis est, quia jus principis expulsi cedere debet bono societatis.

294. Occurrit hic quæstio difficilis, num populo competat jus resistendi principi legitimo sed tyrannico eumque deponendi. Ut hæc quæstio rite explicetur, oportet distinguere inter resistentiam *passivam*, quæ in eo consistit, quod subditi legibus obedire renuant ; et *activam*

qua vis contra tyrannum adhibetur. Jamvero, licitum est legibus certo injustis *passive* resistere, immo hoc præceptum est, si leges sunt inhonestæ. Præterea, licita est resistentia *activa mere defensiva*; tunc enim agitur de injusta aggressione repellenda (p. 177). Si vero agitur de resistentia activa, quæ est *offensiva*, qua vis infertur ad tyrannum deponendum, duplex existit sententia auctorum. Alii enim talem resistentiam absolute illicitam existimant, tum quia juris abusu jus ipsum per se non tollitur, tum quia princeps non subjicitur privato subditorum judicio. Alii vero "cum Bellarmino, Suaresio, Balmesio, Bianchi, immo cum tota Schola antiqua" (*Castelein, op. cit.*, p. 487) dicunt resistentiam activam licitam esse, si, ex una parte, tyrannus evidenter emoliatur ruinam moralem vel materialem societatis, nec aliud adsit medium tyrannidem avertendi; et si, ex altera parte, insurrectio fiat cum communi sapientum et proborum consensu atque spe rationabili felicis eventus. Et ratio est, quia, datis his conditionibus, non amplius est quæstio de "abusu juris" ceteroquin legitimi sed de ejusdem essentiali commutatione in aliquid prorsus contrarium, et de abnegatione tituli ad auctoritatem civilem (cf. *Meyer*, v. 2, p. 506-33).[1]

[1] The conditions under which the civil authority may be withstood in self-defence are fairly stated in the *Dublin Review* for April, 1865, p. 292. We must premise that such a course of self-defence once publicly entered upon is like a rock rolled over the brow of a steep mountain: down it rolls and rebounds from point to point, gathering momentum in the descent, till in the end the ruler, once defied, has to be dethroned, the polity subverted, the empire rent, or they who made the resistance must perish. "Resistance is lawful: (1) When a government has become substantially and habitually tyrannical, and that is when it has lost sight of the common good, and pursues its own selfish objects to the manifest detriment of its subjects, especially where their religious interests are concerned. (2) When all legal and pacific means have been tried in vain to recall the ruler to a sense of his duty. (3) When there is a reasonable probability that resistance will be successful, and not entail greater evils than it seeks to remove. (4) When the judgment formed as to the badness of the government, and the prudence of resistance thereto, is not the opinion only of

ART. V.

DE SOCIETATE CIVILI ET SOCIETATE ECCLESIASTICA INTER SE COMPARATIS.

295. THESIS XXVI.—Supposita Ecclesiæ existentia, societas civilis ejusque auctoritas, licet in suo ordine suprema, jam non est simpliciter suprema, sed ecclesia est societas superior et simpliciter suprema tum extensione tum intensione (seu dignitate), eique indirecte subordinatur societas et auctoritas civilis.

Prob. Thesis. 1. *Societas civilis est in suo ordine suprema*, quia in suis operationibus et tendentiis in suum finem (qui est prosperitas publica temporalis) est independens et sui juris, nec talis desinit esse, instituta Ecclesia, quum media adhibenda ad suum finem consequendum (*v.g.*, vectigalia, leges militiæ, media vectionis, etc.) quoad suam substantiam indifferentia sint relate ad finem Ecclesiæ.[1]

2. *Non est simpliciter suprema*, quia finis societatis civilis non est simpliciter ultimus, sed secundum quid seu tantum in ordine *temporali*.

3. *Ecclesia est societate civili superior*, quia finis Ecclesiæ est supremus hominis finis in vita futura possidendus, isque, pro præsente ordine providentiæ, supernaturalis, *scil.*, salus animarum in hac vita per gratiam inchoanda, in altera per visionem beatificam consummanda; aliis verbis: *proprius* finis Ecclesiæ coincidit cum *ultimo* hominis fine, nimirum, gloria Dei externa, quæ ratione tantum ab hominum salute distinguitur (*Cosm.*, n. 50, cor. 3).

private persons or of a mere party: but is that of the larger and better portion of the people, so that it may morally be considered as the judgment of the community as a whole "—(**Rickaby,** *Mor. Phil.*, p. 341).

[1] The Almighty has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each, so that there is an orbit traced out within which the action of each is brought into play by its own native right—(*The Great Enc.*, p. 114. 'Immortale Dei').

4. *Ecclesia est simpliciter suprema*, *a*) tum *extensione*, quia est universalis seu catholica, *b*) tum *intensione*, quia uniuscujusque rei natura et excellentia specificatur ab ipsius fine ; finis autem Ecclesiæ est divinus et æternus, ut ex dictis patet.

5. *Ecclesiæ indirecte subordinatur societas civilis*, quia finis societatis civilis, seu felicitas temporalis, non est nisi medium ad finem Ecclesiæ obtinendum ; medium autem natura sua fini subordinatur. Porro, Ecclesia, præterquam quod plura (*v.g.*, sacrificia, sacramenta, veritatum revelatarum propositionem, designationem præsulum ecclesiasticorum, etc.) auctoritati civili omnino retrahit, ipsas res civiles et temporales ita sibi subjicit, ut hæ res, licet qua temporales auctoritati civili unice sint subjectæ, tamen quatenus intrinsece continent relationem ad finem Ecclesiæ, auctoritati ecclesiasticæ necessario subjaceant. Graviter igitur errant Modernistæ docentes " in temporalibus negotiis Ecclesiam subesse Statui " (**Pius X.**, *Enc.*, " Pascendi ").

296. Quare, 1°. subordinatio societatis civilis sub Ecclesia non solum est negativa et ad cavenda impedimenta in negotiis ecclesiasticis ordinata, sed positiva, quæ fundatur in positiva relatione finium utriusque societatis, quæque proinde exigit non solum positivam tutelam jurium, sed et positivam cooperationem ad finem ecclesiæ. Quæ cooperatio etiam ex eo exigitur, quod obligatio cultus religiosi et regiminis morum, incumbens societati civili in statu naturæ puræ, transit in obligationem Ecclesiam positive adjuvandi, quum essentia societatis civilis, ad quam aliqua cura ordinis moralis et religiosi pertinet, mutari nequeat.[1]

[1] The Church has a right to be protected by the State, because the Church is no intruder, but has a right to be there ; and whoever and whatever has a right to be there has a consequent right to be guarded by the State against molestation. This is true even when the right to be there comes from the State, which ought to be consistent ; but it is more obviously true when the right to be there comes from a

297. Quare, 2°. jus directe curandi educationem juventutis baptizatæ ad Ecclesiam pertinet. "Christus enim in sua Ecclesia *perenne magisterium* instituit, cui jus et officium demandavit omnes homines in iis, quæ ad christianam religionem pertinent, edocendi et educandi. Hoc autem officium supernaturale naturale munus parentum educandi filios non tollit, sed ei superstruitur, quemadmodum educatio christiana naturalem non excludit, sed præsupponit et sub se comprehendit" (**Cathrein,** p. 424). Unde, *a*) Ecclesia vi divini sui muneris habet jus visitandi omnes scholas, etiam eas, quæ a gubernio erectæ sunt, si ibi infantes baptizati educentur; et exigendi, ut pericula, quæ fidei et moribus juventutis quacumque ex causa immineant, removeantur; *b*) auctoritas civilis non potest juvenes adstringere, ut adeant scholas, quas Ecclesia nocivas

higher authority, which the State cannot legitimately contravene.

Besides, Religion is necessary for the well-being of civil society. Civil society cannot go on without religion, and never has gone on without religion of some sort. All governments that have lasted any time have understood this, and have acted accordingly. No doubt, many of the religions on which society had to depend at various periods in different countries were miserably defective, full of the grossest errors, comparatively unfit even for the temporal purpose to which I am now alluding, and comparatively ineffectual in attaining it. But they were better than nothing. The various forms of Paganism were better than nothing. There was a certain amount of religious truth mixed up with them, and this was better than nothing. Natural religion would have been far better. Best of all must have been the supernatural, framed by the Almighty for the whole human race, accommodated to the circumstances and destinies of men in their present condition, comprising in itself natural religion, but natural religion exalted and combined with higher elements. Such is the Catholic Religion—the Catholic Religion alone. This, then, is the religion best fitted—alone fully fitted—to do the work which civil society needs to have done for it by religion. This is the religion which the one great Author of civil society and religion, the natural and supernatural order of things, intended should do that work for society. This, then, is the religion which every State, every government, is bound to receive, protect, cherish, even with a view to securing the more immediate end of temporal rule, the temporal tranquillity and happiness of men on earth. With the Catholic religion comes the Catholic Church, inseparably as both are bound up together—(**O'Reilly,** *Relations of the Church to Society*, p. 25).

fidei et bonis moribus declarat. Immo tale agnoscere non debet. *c*) Ecclesia scholas etiam profanas erigere potest ; etsi enim profana instructio per se non spectat ad Ecclesiæ finem, Ecclesia nihilominus potest ea uti tamquam medio ad religiosam et moralem educationem promovendam.

Atque hic tandem finem imponam huic qualicumque **Summulæ Philosophiæ Scholasticæ,** in qua ii, " *quibus parum, quibus nimium est, mihi agnoscánt ; quibus autem satis est, non mihi, sed Deo mecum gratias congratulantes agant* " (S. Aug., De Civitate Dei, Lib. xxii.).

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